Berry and Summary Denial: No Evidentiary Hearing When Ineffective-Appellate-Counsel Claims Fail as a Matter of Law

Case: Cedric Lamont Berry v. State of Minnesota
Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota
Date: April 8, 2026

1. Introduction

This decision arises from the kidnapping and murder of Monique Baugh and the non-fatal shooting of her boyfriend, J.M-M., on December 31, 2019. Cedric Lamont Berry and an accomplice, Berry Davis, were jointly tried and convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, kidnapping, and felony murder (left unadjudicated as a lesser-included offense). The Supreme Court of Minnesota previously affirmed Berry’s convictions on direct appeal in State v. Berry, 982 N.W.2d 746 (Minn. 2022), alongside its companion decision State v. Davis, 982 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2022).

Berry then sought postconviction relief, contending that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising four categories of arguments on direct appeal: (1) alleged failures at first appearances under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure; (2) insufficiency of evidence regarding aiding-and-abetting mental-state elements; (3) plain error in a transferred-intent jury instruction; and (4) ineffective trial counsel concerning “Forever Monique” bracelets worn by the prosecution and the failure to pursue a Schwartz hearing. The central procedural issue before the court was whether the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying relief without an evidentiary hearing.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying Berry’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing because—even accepting Berry’s allegations as true—the petition alleged no facts that would entitle him to relief under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In short: Berry’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims failed as a matter of law, so no evidentiary hearing was required under Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is chiefly a “standards-and-application” decision. It synthesizes Minnesota postconviction-hearing doctrine with federal and state ineffective-assistance principles, then applies them claim-by-claim. The following cited authorities structure the analysis:

(i) Postconviction hearing entitlement and standard of review
  • Erickson v. State, 842 N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 2014): frames abuse-of-discretion review for denial of postconviction relief.
  • Heard v. State, 22 N.W.3d 154 (Minn. 2025): defines abuse of discretion (arbitrary/capricious, erroneous view of law, clearly erroneous factfinding).
  • Brown v. State, 895 N.W.2d 612 (Minn. 2017): requires accepting alleged facts as true and viewing them favorably to the petitioner when deciding whether a hearing is required.
  • Andersen v. State, 940 N.W.2d 172 (Minn. 2020): pro se petitions are construed “liberally and with an understanding eye.”
  • State v. Turnage, 729 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 2007): conclusory assertions without factual support do not warrant a hearing.
  • Davis v. State, 15 N.W.3d 635 (Minn. 2025): if alleged facts are legally insufficient, summary denial is proper.
(ii) Ineffective assistance—performance and prejudice
  • Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): the controlling two-prong standard (deficient performance and prejudice).
  • State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62 (Minn. 1993) and Fields v. State, 733 N.W.2d 465 (Minn. 2007): define reasonableness of counsel’s skill and diligence and the “objective standard of reasonableness.”
  • Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369 (Minn. 2020) and Leake v. State, 767 N.W.2d 5 (Minn. 2009): define “reasonable probability” of a different result and confirm courts may dispose of claims on a single prong.
  • Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) and Jackson v. State, 817 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2012): appellate counsel need not raise every colorable issue; effective advocacy requires selecting stronger arguments.
  • Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. 2016) and Davis v. State, 15 N.W.3d 635 (Minn. 2025): establish a strong presumption of reasonable professional judgment and the “most meritorious claims” framing.
  • Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1989): cited for the advocacy principle that weaker issues dilute stronger ones.
  • Pearson, 891 N.W.2d at 60 (as cited): supports de novo review of the underlying ineffective-assistance merits within abuse-of-discretion review of summary denial.
(iii) Plain-error doctrine and jury-instruction prejudice
  • State v. Gilleylen, 993 N.W.2d 266 (Minn. 2023): confirms forfeiture when no objection and application of plain-error review to jury instructions.
  • State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1998): the three-prong plain-error test; also articulates the substantial-rights burden as a “reasonable likelihood” of significant effect on the verdict.
  • State v. Crowsbreast, 629 N.W.2d 433 (Minn. 2001) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997)): fourth-prong discretion—error must seriously affect fairness/integrity/public reputation.
  • State v. Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134 (Minn. 2011): presumption that juries follow instructions as given.
  • State v. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356 (Minn. 2016): intent to kill can be inferred from planning activity and the nature of the killing.
  • State v. Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d 347 (Minn. 2022): used both for the “integrity of proceedings” plain-error prong and for Schwartz-hearing principles.
(iv) Counsel presumptions, first-appearance advisories, and jury-exposure claims
  • State v. Lorentz, 276 N.W.2d 37 (Minn. 1979) (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976)): permits presuming counsel advised a defendant of rights even absent an express on-the-record representation.
  • Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 104 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 1960) and State v. Jackson, 977 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 2022): define and contextualize a “Schwartz hearing.”
  • Schneider v. State, 725 N.W.2d 516 (Minn. 2007) and Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 2004): deference to trial strategy; requirement that an ineffective-appellate-counsel claim premised on omitted trial-counsel ineffectiveness must first show trial counsel was ineffective.
  • State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257 (Minn. 2016): trial court discretion on mistrial motions due to superior vantage on prejudice.
  • State v. Mings, 289 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. 1980) and State v. Tapper, 993 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. 2020): abuse-of-discretion review of denial of a Schwartz hearing and the general nature of that standard.
  • Allwine v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 2023): cited for the proposition that counsel may focus on the most meritorious issues; also used to support the point that where principal liability is sufficiently supported, aiding-and-abetting mens rea challenges may be immaterial to the verdict’s validity.
(v) CSLI evidence and evolving admissibility context (background to appellate strategy)
  • State v. Garland, 942 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 2020); State v. Harvey, 932 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. 2019); State v. Smith, 932 N.W.2d 257 (Minn. 2019): Minnesota’s then-recent CSLI cases informing the direct-appeal strategy.
  • Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018): Fourth Amendment privacy baseline for accessing historical CSLI.

Collectively, these precedents supply the decision’s operative framework: (1) summary denial is proper when alleged facts—even if true—do not establish legal entitlement to relief; (2) appellate issue selection is presumed reasonable; (3) forfeited claims require plain-error prospects strong enough to show prejudice under Strickland.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The “no hearing” rule applied to ineffective-appellate-counsel claims

The court’s threshold move is to translate Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 into a practical filter for ineffective-assistance claims. Berry’s petition alleged essentially one “fact”: appellate counsel did not raise certain arguments. Because the State did not dispute that omission, the dispute was legal—whether the omitted claims had enough merit that failing to raise them was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial under Strickland. When the only alleged facts, taken as true, cannot satisfy Strickland, there is nothing for an evidentiary hearing to resolve.

2. Omitted aiding-and-abetting sufficiency challenge (performance prong fails)

Berry argued appellate counsel should have challenged the sufficiency of evidence as to aiding-and-abetting mental states (knowledge of the crime and intent to further it). The court held appellate counsel acted reasonably for two independent reasons:

  • Principal-liability evidence made an aiding-and-abetting mens rea challenge strategically weak. The record contained substantial evidence supporting Berry as the principal actor (e.g., evidence tying Berry personally to the shooter’s mask, duct-tape fingerprints on the adhesive side, presence at the murder scene at the moment of gunfire, and linkage to tools and concealment materials). If a jury could convict on principal liability, an appellate attack focused on aiding-and-abetting intent is often beside the point, because the verdict need not rest on accomplice theory. The court cited Allwine v. State to underscore that counsel may reasonably avoid arguments that do not meaningfully undercut the conviction’s legal basis.
  • Reasonable issue selection in an evolving CSLI landscape. Appellate counsel instead mounted a targeted challenge to CSLI admissibility—an area the court described as comparatively “new” in Minnesota appellate treatment (referencing State v. Garland, State v. Harvey, State v. Smith, and the shadow of Carpenter v. United States). That strategic focus was deemed objectively reasonable even though it ultimately failed on direct appeal in State v. Berry.

The key doctrinal point: under Jones v. Barnes and Zornes v. State, appellate counsel is not deficient for declining weaker or redundant issues, particularly where the trial evidence supports a conviction under an alternative, stronger theory.

3. Omitted plain-error attack on transferred-intent instruction (no substantial-rights prejudice)

Because trial counsel did not object, any direct appeal would have faced Griller plain-error review. The court assumed (without deciding) the instruction might have been error on these facts, then found a reasonable appellate lawyer could conclude the claim would fail at least on the “substantial rights” prong:

  • The transferred-intent instruction was given for premeditated murder (Baugh), not attempted murder (J.M-M.), and juries are presumed to follow instructions as given (State v. Gatson).
  • The chronology defeated the feared inference: intent cannot “transfer” retroactively from a later killing to an earlier attempted killing.
  • Most importantly, the killing of Baugh—three shots including a point-blank shot to the temple—strongly supported intent to kill from the nature of the act itself (consistent with State v. Barshaw). Berry’s own concession that the killing was intentional undercut any claim of a verdict-altering instructional effect.
  • On plain-error’s fourth prong, affirming an intentional-killing conviction on this record would not “seriously affect” judicial fairness/integrity under State v. Pulczinski and State v. Crowsbreast (quoting Johnson v. United States).

4. Omitted claims about Rule 5 / Rule 19 advisories and charging documents (no Strickland prejudice)

Berry alleged the district court failed to advise him of rights under Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.03 at his first appearance and did not ensure he personally received charging documents at later proceedings (with the opinion construing his pro se “Rule 8” references as analogous Rule 19 issues). Even assuming procedural noncompliance, the court held Berry did not plead facts showing any outcome-relevant harm:

  • Berry was represented at all critical times; the court invoked State v. Lorentz (citing Henderson v. Morgan) to presume counsel advised him of rights.
  • Berry did not allege he was actually unaware of any right, that he would have acted differently, or that any right was subsequently denied.
  • Without a concrete prejudice theory, a plain-error appeal would not likely succeed; thus, failing to raise it did not create a “reasonable probability” of a different appellate result as required by Peltier v. State.

5. Omitted ineffective-trial-counsel issues about “Forever Monique” bracelets and a Schwartz hearing

Berry reframed the bracelet episode as trial-counsel ineffectiveness, then faulted appellate counsel for not raising that issue. Under Schneider v. State, this required showing trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland. The court rejected both components:

  • “Failure to object” claim failed because counsel did object. Trial counsel moved for a mistrial, which is a substantial objection; Berry did not plead facts showing the motion was incompetently made.
  • No Schwartz hearing request was reasonably non-prejudicial and likely futile. The district judge stated on the record the bracelet was small, not noticed, and not readable from a distance; if the jury likely did not see it, there is no juror bias to investigate (State v. Pulczinski). Given the district court’s vantage and discretion on prejudice (State v. Griffin), appellate counsel could reasonably conclude these claims would not succeed.

C. Impact

The decision’s practical impact lies less in creating a novel doctrinal test and more in sharpening how existing tests operate in postconviction practice:

  • Reinforced threshold for evidentiary hearings: When a postconviction petition rests on undisputed omissions by appellate counsel but cannot show that the omitted arguments were reasonably likely to succeed (or otherwise satisfy Strickland), summary denial is appropriate under Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1.
  • Appellate strategy deference is substantive, not rhetorical: The court used CSLI’s evolving legal context (via State v. Garland, State v. Harvey, State v. Smith, and Carpenter v. United States) to validate counsel’s choice to litigate admissibility rather than sufficiency—illustrating how “issue selection” doctrine can decisively defeat ineffective-appellate-counsel claims.
  • Plain-error prospects matter to Strickland prejudice: Where underlying claims were forfeited at trial, petitioners must plausibly show not just “error,” but a realistic path through Griller (including substantial-rights prejudice and the fourth prong).
  • Procedural-rule violations at first appearance require a prejudice narrative: Represented defendants alleging missing advisories (Rules 5/19) must connect the omission to an actual deprivation or decision point; otherwise, the claim is likely to fail as non-prejudicial.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Postconviction petition / evidentiary hearing: A postconviction petition is a collateral attack after direct appeal. A court must hold a hearing only if the petition alleges facts that, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. If the legal claim fails even assuming the facts are true, the court may deny the petition on the papers.
  • Strickland (ineffective assistance): The petitioner must show (1) counsel performed unreasonably compared to a competent lawyer, and (2) the error likely mattered—there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
  • Plain error (Griller): If trial counsel did not object, the appellate court generally will only reverse if the error is plain and likely affected the verdict, and if correcting it is necessary to protect the fairness/integrity of the proceedings.
  • Aiding-and-abetting liability: Even if the defendant is not the direct actor, he can be guilty if he intentionally assisted and intended his actions to help the crime. But if the evidence supports that he was the direct actor (a principal), attacking accomplice intent may not undermine the conviction.
  • Transferred intent: A doctrine allowing intent aimed at one person to satisfy the intent element when another person is killed instead. Berry argued it did not fit the facts; the court held any instructional issue was not likely outcome-determinative.
  • CSLI: Cell-site location information approximates a phone’s location based on which cell towers it used. Its collection and admissibility implicate both privacy (Carpenter) and evidence reliability/foundation disputes (often litigated through Rule 702 and, sometimes, Frye-Mack arguments).
  • Schwartz hearing: A procedure to investigate potential juror misconduct or bias after a verdict. If the allegedly prejudicial material likely never reached the jury, courts typically find no basis to hold such a hearing.

5. Conclusion

Berry v. State of Minnesota confirms that Minnesota courts may summarily deny postconviction petitions—without an evidentiary hearing—when the petitioner’s allegations, even if true, do not satisfy Strickland as a matter of law. The court’s claim-by-claim analysis emphasizes (1) meaningful deference to appellate issue selection under Jones v. Barnes and Zornes v. State, (2) the decisive role of plain-error hurdles for forfeited claims under State v. Griller, and (3) the necessity of pleading concrete, outcome-related prejudice rather than procedural irregularities in the abstract. In the broader postconviction landscape, the opinion functions as a pleading-and-prejudice checkpoint: absent a plausible path to reversal on the omitted issues, “ineffective appellate counsel” remains a legal conclusion, not a hearing-worthy factual dispute.