Bergin v. N.Y. State Unified Court System: The Second Circuit Aligns Title VII Religious-Accommodation Prima Facie Proof with Abercrombie’s Motivating-Factor Standard

1. Introduction

In Bergin v. N.Y. State Unified Court System (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2026) (amended), the Second Circuit vacated a partial summary judgment entered for an employee terminated for noncompliance with a COVID-19 vaccination requirement after her employer denied her request for a religious exemption.

Parties. Plaintiff-Appellee Jessica Bergin (a court officer) sued Defendant-Appellant New York State Unified Court System (“UCS”) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting a single claim: failure to accommodate religion.

Core issues. The appeal presented two central questions:

  • Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015), abrogated the Second Circuit’s longstanding prima facie test for Title VII religious-accommodation claims stated in Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1985), and reiterated in Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001), and Baker v. Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2006).
  • Whether certain statements UCS made during discovery were properly treated as judicial admissions establishing elements of Bergin’s claim at summary judgment.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit held that Abercrombie abrogated the Circuit’s prior prima facie formulation for failure-to-accommodate-religion claims under Title VII. The Court announced a revised prima facie standard:

  • (1) the plaintiff actually required an accommodation of her religious practice; and
  • (2) the employer’s desire to avoid the actually required prospective accommodation was a motivating factor in
  • (3) an adverse employment decision.

Because the district court expressly declined to apply Abercrombie’s standard, and because it improperly treated discovery statements as judicial admissions, the Second Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

Title VII religious accommodation framework and “undue hardship” backdrop

  • Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977): The Opinion reiterated that Title VII’s definition of “religion” (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)) makes it unlawful to withhold reasonable accommodations absent undue hardship. Although Hardison is not the focus of the holding here, it grounds the statutory structure: accommodation is mandatory unless the employer meets the statutory defense.
  • Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023): Cited for the principle that Title VII does not demand mere neutrality and provides “favored treatment” to enable religious participation in the workforce. In Bergin, this supports the Court’s framing that accommodation cases are not peripheral; they are central to Title VII’s religious-protection design.

The Second Circuit’s pre-Abercrombie prima facie test (now abrogated)

  • Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1985): Provided the prior three-part prima facie test (bona fide conflicting belief; employee informed employer; discipline for noncompliance).
  • Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001) and Baker v. Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2006): Reiterated Philbrook’s approach. The Opinion holds these formulations are “no longer good law” to the extent they conflict with Abercrombie.

Abercrombie as the pivot: motive over notice

  • EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015): The centerpiece. The Supreme Court rejected the idea that the employee must request accommodation or that the employer must have actual knowledge. Liability turns on whether the employer’s decision was motivated by a desire to avoid accommodating a religious practice.
  • Lowman v. NVI LLC, 821 F. App'x 29 (2d Cir. 2020): Cited as consistent with Abercrombie’s focus on motive (even if earlier Second Circuit doctrine had not yet been formally revised).
  • Bailey v. Metro Ambulance Servs., Inc., 992 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2021): Used to rebut Bergin’s attempt to confine Abercrombie to hiring. The Second Circuit pointed to Bailey as an example of applying Abercrombie to termination.

Statutory text and “no special hiring rule”

  • Ames v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303 (2025): Cited by analogy for the proposition that Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision draws no textual distinctions of the sort urged (there, majority/minority; here, hiring/firing). The Opinion uses Ames to support a textualist refusal to carve out a hiring-only limitation for Abercrombie.

Recent adverse-action guidance (issue reserved)

  • Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024): Referenced in a footnote to note the Court did not decide whether “failure to accommodate itself” constitutes an adverse employment action; termination plainly does. The citation signals that adverse-action doctrine is evolving, but the case is resolved on narrower grounds.

Standards of review and summary judgment framing

  • Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986): Quoted for what makes a factual dispute “genuine.”
  • Morales v. Quintel Ent., Inc., 249 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2001): Cited for cross-motions summary judgment methodology—each motion considered separately with inferences against the movant.
  • Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, 158 F.4th 349 (2d Cir. 2025) and McGucken v. Shutterstock, Inc., 166 F.4th 361 (2d Cir. 2026): Cited for de novo review and viewing evidence in the non-movant’s favor.

Abrogation doctrine within the Circuit

  • United States v. Sterkaj, 138 F.4th 95 (2d Cir. 2025): Supplies the rule that Circuit precedent binds unless overruled en banc or abrogated by the Supreme Court, and that abrogation should be applied cautiously to prevent destabilizing the law.
  • Garcia Pinach v. Bondi, 147 F.4th 117 (2d Cir. 2025): Cited for the concept that Supreme Court decisions can “break the link” or undermine an assumption underpinning Circuit precedent, requiring conformity to Supreme Court law.

Dicta vs. holding; why intervening silence did not preserve the old test

  • Russo v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist., 129 F.4th 182 (2d Cir. 2025): The Opinion explains that Russo referenced the old prima facie formulation only as context and assumed arguendo the prima facie case, focusing on undue hardship—thus not binding on the prima facie issue.
  • Baraket v. Holder, 632 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2011): Cited for the proposition that a “passing observation” is dictum, not precedent.

Judicial admissions: formality, clarity, and ambiguity

  • In re Motors Liquidation Co., 957 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2020): Supplies the core standard—judicial admissions must be “intentional, clear, and unambiguous,” and doubts preclude treating statements as binding admissions.
  • Berner v. Brit. Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965): Emphasizes that counsel statements must have sufficient formality or conclusiveness to count as judicial admissions.
  • Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880): Quoted (via Motors Liquidation) for the principle that doubt about a statement defeats a judicial-admission finding.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Recasting the prima facie case: from “notice” to “motive”

The district court applied (and found satisfied) the older Second Circuit test requiring the employee to have informed the employer of a conflicting religious belief. The Second Circuit held that Abercrombie forecloses that approach because Title VII disparate treatment “prohibits certain motives, regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge.” Thus:

  • Employer knowledge may be evidence of motive, but it is not an element that must be proven as a prerequisite to liability.
  • Conversely, even without certainty or a formal request, an employer violates Title VII if it takes an adverse action because it wants to avoid accommodating a religious practice.

The Opinion is careful to clarify what “motive” means in this setting: it is not a requirement to prove anti-religious animus. Rather, consistent with Abercrombie, the question is whether the employer acted “because of” religion in the specific sense that it was motivated to avoid the accommodation that the employee’s religion would require.

(b) Abrogation and the Court’s obligation to update Circuit doctrine

Applying United States v. Sterkaj and Garcia Pinach v. Bondi, the Court held that Abercrombie “broke the link” underlying Philbrook’s knowledge/notice requirement. Even though the Second Circuit had not squarely confronted the conflict in the decade since 2015, the Supreme Court’s rule controlled—and required the Circuit to declare Philbrook, Knight, and Baker no longer good law on that point.

(c) Rejecting a hiring-only limitation on Abercrombie

Bergin argued that Abercrombie was limited to failure-to-hire. The Court rejected this based on Title VII’s text (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)), which treats refusal to hire and discharge as parallel forms of prohibited disparate treatment, and based on Abercrombie’s own broad phrasing (“employment decisions” generally). The Court also relied on Bailey v. Metro Ambulance Servs., Inc. as confirming that other circuits apply Abercrombie to termination claims.

(d) Judicial admissions: why UCS’s discovery statements were not dispositive

The district court treated UCS’s discovery statements—describing Bergin’s initial submission as “perfectly adequate” and as explaining “a religious belief,” and stating it did not contend she lacked a bona fide religious objection—as concessions that Bergin had established sincerity and adequate communication of a religious conflict.

The Second Circuit held this was improper under In re Motors Liquidation Co. because the record, viewed favorably to UCS on summary judgment, showed contextual qualification and ongoing insistence that Bergin had not provided sufficient information to assess sincerity (including UCS’s explanation that the supplemental form was used “very frequently” for the objections Bergin raised). Those qualifications created ambiguity, which defeats judicial-admission treatment.

Importantly, the Court connected this evidentiary error to the revised prima facie standard: if the employer’s motive to avoid accommodating is central, then the employer’s asserted uncertainty about sincerity and the need for additional information may bear on motive; the district court could not short-circuit that inquiry by converting qualified discovery statements into binding admissions.

3.3 Impact

(a) Doctrinal impact in the Second Circuit

  • Formal doctrinal update. This Opinion squarely holds that the Second Circuit’s classic prima facie framework from Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. (and Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health and Baker v. Home Depot) is abrogated to the extent it demands employee notice/request as a component of the prima facie case.
  • Prima facie focus shifts to causation/motive. Litigants should expect the first-stage inquiry to concentrate on whether avoidance of the required accommodation was a motivating factor in the adverse action—an inherently fact-sensitive inquiry often unsuited to resolution by admissions-based shortcuts.

(b) Litigation and case-management impact (especially in vaccine-policy cases)

  • Discovery strategy changes. Because motive is now an explicit component of prima facie proof, parties will likely pursue more discovery into decisionmakers’ reasons, exemption-process design, comparator treatment, and how requests were escalated or denied—rather than focusing narrowly on whether the employee adequately “informed” the employer.
  • Judicial-admission caution. The decision signals that courts should be hesitant to treat interrogatory answers and deposition testimony as dispositive concessions unless they are unmistakably formal and unqualified. Ambiguity will tend to preserve disputes for trial.
  • Procedural adequacy vs. discrimination. Although the Court did not resolve it, it flagged that an employee’s decision not to challenge an employer’s exemption procedures “generally” may matter to proving motive. That suggests future litigation will explore when a denial reflects neutral process enforcement (e.g., deadlines, required forms) versus a desire to avoid a religious accommodation.

(c) Relationship to “undue hardship” and the second step

The Opinion did not decide undue hardship (the second step), but by resetting the prima facie threshold, it may indirectly affect when employers even need to litigate undue hardship. If plaintiffs fail to show that avoidance of accommodation motivated the adverse decision, cases may end before undue hardship is reached; conversely, where motive evidence is strong, undue hardship will remain a central defense.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Prima facie case.” The initial showing a plaintiff must make to move a Title VII accommodation claim forward. After Bergin, in the Second Circuit this means: (i) you truly needed an accommodation for a religious practice; (ii) the employer acted at least in part to avoid that accommodation; (iii) you suffered an adverse employment action (like termination).
  • “Motivating factor.” A reason that played some role in the decision—one of potentially several reasons. The Opinion distinguishes this from proving hostility or animus toward religion.
  • “Judicial admission.” A binding concession in litigation that removes an issue from dispute. Under In re Motors Liquidation Co., it must be intentional, clear, and unambiguous; qualified or context-dependent discovery statements generally are not enough.
  • “Undue hardship.” A statutory defense under Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)): even if an accommodation is religiously required, an employer is not liable for refusing it if the employer proves that granting it would impose an undue hardship. (The Opinion did not reach the merits of that defense here.)

5. Conclusion

Bergin v. N.Y. State Unified Court System is a significant Second Circuit course correction in Title VII religious-accommodation litigation. The Court held that EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. abrogates the Circuit’s older notice-based prima facie test and replaces it with a motive-centered framework requiring proof that the employer acted with a desire to avoid the actually required accommodation as a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision. The Court also reinforced a rigorous standard for judicial admissions, warning against converting qualified discovery statements into dispositive concessions at summary judgment.

On remand, the district court must evaluate the record through Abercrombie’s lens—placing motive, not formal notice, at the center of the prima facie inquiry—without treating UCS’s discovery statements as binding admissions absent the clarity and conclusiveness that Second Circuit law demands.