Bench-Trial “Uncontradicted Evidence” Comments Are Not an Adverse Inference from Silence When Tied to the Evidentiary Record and Accompanied by Explicit Non-Use Assurances

I. Introduction

United States v. Myelicia T. Rodgers (11th Cir. Jan. 30, 2026) addresses a recurring Fifth Amendment problem in bench trials: when (if ever) a trial judge’s reference to the defendant’s decision not to testify crosses the constitutional line into drawing an adverse inference. Myelicia T. Rodgers, a U.S. Postal Service clerk, was tried without a jury and convicted of tampering with and stealing mail under 18 U.S.C. § 1703(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1709.

The key issue on appeal was not the sufficiency of the government’s proof of mail tampering/theft, but whether the district judge—acting as factfinder— impermissibly “held against” Rodgers her exercise of the right not to testify. The contested moment arose when defense counsel attacked the credibility and voluntariness of Rodgers’s inculpatory statements during an Inspector General interview, and the judge remarked that “the only evidence” about the interview’s circumstances came from the agent because Rodgers “did not testify.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court did not draw an adverse inference from Rodgers’s silence. The panel emphasized two contextual anchors: (1) the judge expressly told Rodgers—before she elected not to testify—that her silence would not be considered “in any way” in deciding guilt; and (2) the later reference to her non-testimony was used to explain an evidentiary reality (the defense offered no witness testimony contradicting the agent), not to treat silence as evidence of guilt.

The court also rejected the suggestion that a bench trial precludes harmless-error-type analysis by treating any mention of silence as automatically fatal. Instead, the court applied the ordinary presumption that judges follow the law and their own stated instructions, and “t[ook] the district court at its word.”

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Lightsey, 120 F.4th 851 (11th Cir. 2024)
    Cited for the practical proposition that the court may choose de novo review where the outcome is the same under either de novo or plain-error review. Here, although the parties disputed the standard, the panel proceeded de novo because it would not change the result.
  • United States v. Anderson, 1 F.4th 1244 (11th Cir. 2021)
    Anderson supplies two pillars of the decision: (1) the defendant’s right to decide whether to testify is “fundamental” and “personal,” not waivable by counsel; and (2) a “pruden[t]” practice is an on-the-record, brief, neutral colloquy ensuring the defendant understands and personally chooses whether to testify. The panel used Anderson to validate the trial judge’s pre-rest colloquy with Rodgers as protective—not punitive—of Fifth Amendment rights.
  • Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999)
    Mitchell is the Supreme Court anchor for the no-adverse-inference rule, including in contexts beyond the guilt phase (Mitchell addressed sentencing). The panel drew from Mitchell the broader principle: courts may not draw “an adverse factual inference” from a defendant’s silence. The opinion also invokes Mitchell to support that the no-adverse-inference rule applies when the judge is the factfinder.
  • Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)
    Griffin articulates the classic Fifth Amendment prohibition in jury trials: neither the prosecutor nor the court may invite the jury to treat silence as evidence of guilt. Rodgers relied on this principle; the panel accepted Griffin’s rule but held the district court’s remarks did not violate it.
  • United States v. Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2005)
    Thompson provides an important clarification: the rule is not a ban on any “direct reference” to a defendant’s failure to testify; rather, it forbids negative inferences (i.e., using silence as proof). The panel used Thompson to frame the key distinction between mentioning silence and leveraging silence.
  • Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333 (1978)
    Lakeside is cited to show that courts may even explicitly instruct factfinders not to draw adverse inferences from silence. This supports the panel’s view that the district judge’s express assurances to Rodgers were constitutionally appropriate, not suspect.
  • United States v. Schwarzbaum, 24 F.4th 1355 (11th Cir. 2022)
    Schwarzbaum is cited for the appellate posture toward district judges: the circuit “take[s] the district court at its word.” That presumption matters in bench trials, where the factfinder is also the speaker whose remarks are being scrutinized.
  • Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339 (1981)
    Harris is the Supreme Court’s articulation of the presumption that trial judges, acting as factfinders, follow the law: if judges routinely instruct juries not to draw adverse inferences, “surely we must presume” they follow the same rule themselves. The panel used Harris to rebut the notion that bench-trial references are inherently more constitutionally dangerous.
  • Sowers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 975 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 2020)
    Sowers reiterates the “rock solid law” presumption that factfinders follow instructions—there, in the jury setting. The panel cited Sowers by analogy, reinforcing Harris’s judge-focused presumption.
  • Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)
    Garrity appears in the factual background: the agent advised Rodgers of her right to remain silent in an employment-linked investigatory context. While Garrity is not the legal basis for the appellate holding, it frames why the voluntariness of Rodgers’s interview statements became a focal point at trial, prompting the “only evidence is Agent Beck’s” remark.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning turns on context and function. The panel treated the Fifth Amendment rule as prohibiting a particular use of silence—drawing an inference of guilt—not prohibiting every acknowledgement that the defendant did not testify.

  1. Protective colloquy, not coercive commentary.
    Before the defense rested, the district court told Rodgers she had the right to testify and the right not to testify, and expressly promised that if she did not testify, that fact was “not something I’m going to consider in any way in deciding the ultimate issue.” The Eleventh Circuit characterized this as the prudent Anderson-type inquiry that protects the defendant’s personal choice.
  2. The challenged remark addressed the state of the evidentiary record.
    During closing argument, defense counsel attacked the agent’s account of the interview and emphasized that the interview was not recorded. The judge responded that counsel’s argument was not evidence and that the “only evidence” about the interview circumstances came from the agent because Rodgers “did not testify as a witness.” The panel read this as a record-based observation: without defense witnesses, the court lacked testimonial evidence contradicting the agent—particularly on an issue (voluntariness/coercion) that often depends on competing accounts.
  3. No suggestion that silence equals guilt.
    Critically, the panel found no language implying that Rodgers’s silence was affirmative proof of the elements of § 1703(a) or § 1709. The judge also reassured counsel after the objection that she was not treating Rodgers’s silence as an “admission of guilt,” reinforcing the absence of a Griffin/Mitchell violation.
  4. Bench-trial posture does not erase the no-adverse-inference rule, but it strengthens the presumption of lawful decisionmaking.
    The opinion acknowledged the rule applies equally in bench trials, but it rejected the argument that bench trials categorically prevent reliance on harmlessness or presumptions. Under Schwarzbaum and Harris, appellate courts presume judges follow the law and their stated limitations. The panel “t[ook] the district court at its word” that it did not consider silence in determining guilt.
  5. “Uncontradicted” means uncontradicted by evidence—not “therefore true because defendant stayed silent.”
    The written verdict’s reference to Rodgers’s lack of witnesses and the government’s evidence being “uncontradicted by any evidence” was treated as an evidentiary characterization, not a constitutional infraction. The panel drew a line between (a) noting the defense offered no evidence, and (b) arguing the defendant’s silence supplies missing proof.

C. Impact

The decision clarifies, in a bench-trial setting, how trial judges may discuss the evidentiary record without triggering Griffin/Mitchell concerns:

  • Permissible: explaining that counsel’s assertions are not evidence; noting that the only testimonial account on a disputed point came from one side because the defense presented no witnesses; describing the government’s proof as “uncontradicted” where the “contradiction” would have to come from evidence.
  • Impermissible: using the defendant’s decision not to testify as substantive proof of guilt or as a credibility penalty (“if she were innocent, she would have testified”).

Practically, the case gives district judges a roadmap for avoiding reversible error: make an explicit on-the-record non-inference assurance, keep any later references tied to evidentiary accounting, and avoid language that suggests silence itself is probative.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Adverse inference”: a conclusion that the defendant’s silence implies guilt or supports a disputed fact against the defendant. The Constitution forbids this in criminal cases.
  • “Argument is not evidence”: lawyers’ statements in closing are advocacy; the factfinder may rely only on admitted evidence (testimony, exhibits, stipulations). The judge’s point here was that challenging an interview as “coached” or “coercive” must be supported by evidence, not just rhetoric.
  • Bench trial: the judge decides both law and facts. The no-adverse-inference rule still applies, but appellate courts generally presume judges know and apply it.
  • “Uncontradicted evidence”: evidence not rebutted by other evidence. It does not necessarily mean the defendant is guilty; it means the factfinder has not heard competing evidence on that point.
  • Garrity warnings: protections in certain government-employment investigations where compelled statements cannot be used criminally. In this case, Garrity is part of the interview backdrop, while the appeal focused on Fifth Amendment trial silence.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Myelicia T. Rodgers reinforces a precise Fifth Amendment boundary in bench trials: a judge may acknowledge that the defense offered no witness testimony and may describe the government’s proof as “uncontradicted,” so long as the judge does not treat the defendant’s silence as evidence of guilt. The opinion places substantial weight on explicit, contemporaneous assurances that silence will not be considered, and it relies on the presumption that judges follow their own stated legal constraints when acting as factfinders.