Date: Jun 11, 2026

Belated Rosario Disclosure of Prosecution-Held Therapy Notes Requires New Trial When Prejudice Is Not Cured by Preclusion

1. Introduction

In People v Ibrahim (2026 NY Slip Op 03687 [App Div, 2d Dept June 10, 2026]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a Kings County judgment after a jury convicted Jamil Ibrahim— a physician—of sexual abuse in the third degree (Penal Law § 130.55), burglary in the third degree (Penal Law § 140.20), and computer trespass (Penal Law § 156.10).

The prosecution’s theory combined (i) alleged inappropriate touching of a patient during a medical examination and (ii) conduct occurring after Ibrahim’s suspension from his clinic: allegedly entering clinic property without authorization and accessing the complainant’s medical records while suspended.

The appeal raised multiple issues—preservation and sufficiency challenges, evidentiary rulings (including Molineux and Sandoval), severance, and discovery/compliance issues. The decisive ground for reversal was the People’s late disclosure of therapy-session notes (held by social workers employed by the People), which the court treated as Rosario material and found to have caused substantial prejudice not cured by the trial court’s remedy.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Computer-trespass legal-sufficiency argument unpreserved: The defendant did not specify, in his trial motion to dismiss, the ground that he had a right to continued access to patient records (CPL 470.05[2]; People v Finger, 95 NY2d 894, 895).
Evidence legally sufficient; verdict not against the weight: Applying People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, and People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, the court found the People proved burglary and computer trespass beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (also citing People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495; People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633).
Molineux evidence properly admitted: Testimony from two witnesses about prior alleged sexual misconduct during medical examinations was admissible on intent under People v Molineux, 168 NY 264, 293, and its modern balancing framework (including People v Blackwell, 219 AD3d 619, 621; People v Weinstein, 42 NY3d 439, 460; People v Telfair, 41 NY3d 107, 115). Limiting instructions mitigated prejudice (People v Morris, 21 NY3d 588, 598; People v Nicholson, 210 AD3d 1009, 1011). The court also referenced People v Gonzalez, ____ AD3d ____, 2026 NY Slip Op 02047, as analogous authority.
Sandoval ruling upheld: Cross-examination use of certain audio-recording statements was not improper under People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 376; the defendant conceded the recordings contained no allegations of specific criminal, vicious, or immoral acts (citing People v Chappell, 198 AD3d 1018, 1020 n). Statements concerning the complainant were deemed relevant to the very crime on trial (quoting People v Frumusa, 29 NY3d 364, 370).
Late disclosure of recordings: The claim that the recordings were untimely disclosed was unpreserved (CPL 470.05[2]); no sanction was required on this record (People v Emanuel, 239 AD3d 767, 768). The “due diligence” argument was deemed not reviewable on direct appeal due to an insufficient record, and instead potentially cognizable in a CPL 440.10 motion (People v Dixon, 138 AD3d 1016, 1017; People v Boyce, 118 AD3d 1016, 1016; People v Reeves, 180 AD3d 936, 938).
Severance denied: Joinder of the burglary and computer-trespass counts with the sexual-abuse count was proper to complete the narrative and provide background (CPL 200.20[2][b]; People v Manning, 239 AD3d 887, 888; People v Persaud, 235 AD3d 1006, 1008).
Reversal and new trial based on late Rosario disclosure: The People belatedly disclosed notes between the complainant and social workers describing therapy sessions. Because the social workers were employed by the People and the notes were in the People’s possession, they qualified as Rosario material (People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286). The late disclosure substantially prejudiced the defense and the trial court’s preclusion remedy did not cure the harm; therefore, a new trial was required (People v Lebovits, 94 AD3d 1146, 1149; People v Goins, 73 NY2d 989, 991; People v Mitchell, 14 AD3d 579, 580; People v Smith, 190 AD2d 700, 701).

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Preservation, sufficiency, and weight review

People v Finger, 95 NY2d 894, 895: Enforced the rule that a legal-sufficiency argument must be specifically raised in a trial motion to dismiss; otherwise it is unpreserved under CPL 470.05(2). The court used this to reject the defendant’s theory that he had a continuing right to access patient records as a basis to defeat computer trespass.
People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620: Provided the standard for legal-sufficiency review—viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 (and 348): Supplied both (i) the “beyond a reasonable doubt” sufficiency articulation and (ii) the framework for independent weight-of-the-evidence review under CPL 470.15(5).
People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 and People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495: Reinforced that an appellate court conducting weight review accords deference to the jury’s opportunity to see and hear witnesses.
People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633: Confirmed the appellate court’s role and methodology in weight-of-the-evidence determinations.

2) Molineux (prior bad acts) and intent

People v Molineux, 168 NY 264, 293: The foundational rule permitting evidence of uncharged crimes/bad acts for non-propensity purposes (e.g., intent) and subject to careful judicial control.
People v Blackwell, 219 AD3d 619, 621: Cited for the proposition that Molineux evidence is admissible when it has substantial probative value for a relevant, non-propensity issue, and its probative value outweighs prejudice.
People v Weinstein, 42 NY3d 439, 460 (and 458) and People v Telfair, 41 NY3d 107, 115: Emphasized a limiting principle for intent-based Molineux: generally, the probative balance favors admission only when the charged acts are “equivocal,” making intent not readily inferable from the act alone. The Second Department used this framework to uphold admission because the alleged touching occurred in a medical-examination context where the defendant’s claimed “medical purpose” could render the conduct ambiguous as to intent.
People v Gonzalez, ____ AD3d ____, 2026 NY Slip Op 02047, *1–*2: Used as a contemporaneous comparator supporting admission of similar evidence where the charged conduct involved inappropriate touching during a medical examination and intent was therefore contested.
People v Morris, 21 NY3d 588, 598 and People v Nicholson, 210 AD3d 1009, 1011: Supported the trial court’s approach of issuing repeated limiting instructions to reduce undue prejudice from Molineux evidence.

3) Sandoval and impeachment by prior acts/statements

People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 376: Set the balancing standard for allowing impeachment of a testifying defendant by prior bad acts or immoral/vicious/criminal conduct.
People v Chappell, 198 AD3d 1018, 1020 n: Cited in support of the conclusion that the challenged recordings did not contain the kind of allegations that typically trigger Sandoval prejudice concerns.
People v Frumusa, 29 NY3d 364, 370: Supported the principle that evidence concerning the complainant may be admissible when it is “relevant to the very same crime for which the defendant [is] on trial,” undermining the claim that the recordings were improper impeachment.

4) Sanctions, record-based review, and CPL 440.10

People v Emanuel, 239 AD3d 767, 768: Supported the exercise of discretion to decline sanctions for late disclosure on the record presented.
People v Dixon, 138 AD3d 1016, 1017; People v Boyce, 118 AD3d 1016, 1016; People v Reeves, 180 AD3d 936, 938: Reinforced the divide between direct appeal (record-based) and post-judgment motions (CPL 440.10) where factual development is needed— here, as to whether the People exercised due diligence regarding disclosure.

5) Joinder/severance

People v Manning, 239 AD3d 887, 888 and People v Persaud, 235 AD3d 1006, 1008: Supported joinder under CPL 200.20(2)(b) when counts are needed to “complete the narrative” and provide background for the charged events.

6) Rosario—timeliness, prejudice, and remedy

People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286: The core obligation—produce prior statements of a witness relating to the subject matter of that witness’s testimony for cross-examination.
People v Goins, 73 NY2d 989, 991 and People v Mitchell, 14 AD3d 579, 580: Established that Rosario material must be provided at a time when it can be useful; when late disclosure causes substantial prejudice, the remedy may be a new trial.
People v Smith, 190 AD2d 700, 701: Reinforced the “substantial prejudice” trigger for ordering a new trial.
People v Lebovits, 94 AD3d 1146, 1149: Particularly influential here—used to support both the prejudice analysis and the conclusion that the trial court’s remedial action (preclusion) did not cure prejudice when it did not actually help the defendant.

B. Legal Reasoning

Issue triage: what was preserved, what was not. The court first narrowed what it could review as of right. The defendant’s computer-trespass “right of access” theory failed under CPL 470.05(2) because it was not specifically stated in the motion to dismiss (People v Finger). This underscores that appellate sufficiency review is tightly tied to the trial motion’s stated grounds.
Merits review of proof (despite preservation issues). The court nevertheless assessed sufficiency and weight, emphasizing that the People introduced the defendant’s employment contract restricting removal/copying of records without employer consent—evidence supporting unauthorized access and, by extension, the computer-trespass theory. Applying People v Contes and People v Danielson, the court found the proof sufficient and the verdict not against the weight, deferring to the jury’s credibility vantage point (People v Mateo; People v Bleakley; People v Romero).
Contextual sexual-abuse prosecutions and intent-based Molineux. The court accepted that when the alleged touching occurs during a medical exam, the conduct may be argued as medically justified—making intent “equivocal” in the sense discussed in People v Weinstein and People v Telfair. That framing allowed testimony about prior similar incidents to be probative on intent rather than mere propensity (People v Molineux; People v Blackwell; People v Gonzalez). The repeated limiting instructions were key to the prejudice balancing (People v Morris; People v Nicholson).
Sandoval boundaries: recordings as impeachment and relevance. The court viewed the audio-recording statements as outside the core Sandoval danger zone because they did not contain specific criminal, vicious, or immoral-act allegations (People v Sandoval; People v Chappell). And insofar as they concerned the complainant, the court treated them as substantively relevant to the very charges, not merely collateral smear material (People v Frumusa).
Joinder as narrative completion. The court upheld denial of severance, treating the burglary and computer-trespass counts as legitimate background completing the story of the defendant’s relationship to the clinic and the complainant’s records (CPL 200.20[2][b]; People v Manning; People v Persaud).
The dispositive error: late Rosario disclosure causing uncured prejudice. The opinion’s core holding is remedial and fairness-driven:
- The social workers were employed by the People, and their therapy-session notes were in the People’s possession throughout—so the notes were treated as Rosario material (People v Rosario).
- Timeliness matters: Rosario must be disclosed when it can be used effectively (People v Goins; People v Mitchell).
- The defense showed substantial prejudice: the late turn-over prevented adequate review and the ability to retain an expert to evaluate and deploy the material.
- The trial court’s remedy—preclusion of the notes—did not help the defense and therefore did not cure the prejudice (People v Lebovits).
Because the late disclosure impaired meaningful cross-examination and trial preparation in a way not repaired by the court’s action, the Second Department reversed “on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice” and ordered a new trial.

C. Impact

Strengthened practical enforcement of Rosario timeliness. The opinion reinforces that Rosario compliance is not satisfied by eventual disclosure; the material must arrive early enough to be usable—including time for expert consultation where reasonably necessary to interpret therapy or clinical notes.
“Possession” includes People-employed personnel. By emphasizing that the social workers were “employed by the People” and the notes were “at all times” in the People’s possession, the decision highlights that offices cannot avoid Rosario obligations by siloing materials within affiliated units or staff.
Remedies must be defense-meaningful, not merely punitive. The court’s critique—preclusion was “not helpful to the defendant”—signals that trial courts should focus on whether the remedy restores the defense’s lost opportunity (effective cross-examination and preparation), not simply whether the prosecution loses the ability to use the late-disclosed item.
Molineux in medical-exam sexual-abuse cases. The decision fits within a line of cases treating the medical-examination context as potentially making intent a live, “equivocal” issue, thereby increasing the likelihood that intent-based Molineux proof will be admitted (with limiting instructions).
Appellate strategy lessons. The ruling illustrates how preservation can foreclose sufficiency theories on appeal (People v Finger) and how some disclosure disputes may require CPL 440.10 fact development rather than direct appeal (People v Dixon; People v Boyce; People v Reeves).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rosario material: Prior statements of a prosecution witness (written, recorded, or otherwise) that relate to the subject matter of that witness’s testimony. The defense is entitled to them for effective cross-examination (People v Rosario).
“Substantial prejudice” from late Rosario: Not every delay requires reversal. A new trial is warranted when the delay meaningfully harms the defense’s ability to use the material— for example, by preventing adequate review, investigation, or expert assessment before cross-examination or trial strategy decisions (People v Goins; People v Mitchell; People v Smith).
Molineux evidence: Evidence of prior bad acts is generally barred if offered only to show the defendant’s “bad character” or propensity, but may be admitted for specific non-propensity purposes such as intent or motive, subject to a probative-versus-prejudicial balancing and limiting instructions (People v Molineux; People v Weinstein; People v Telfair).
Sandoval ruling: A pretrial determination of how the prosecution may impeach a defendant who testifies—balancing probative value on credibility against the risk of unfair prejudice (People v Sandoval).
Legal sufficiency vs. weight of the evidence: “Legal sufficiency” asks whether, viewing evidence most favorably to the People, a rational juror could convict. “Weight” review is broader: the appellate court independently considers the evidence’s persuasiveness but still gives deference to the jury’s ability to observe witnesses (People v Contes; People v Danielson; People v Bleakley).
Severance/joinder (CPL 200.20): Whether multiple charges may be tried together. Joinder is often allowed when it completes the narrative or provides necessary background for the charged events (People v Manning; People v Persaud).

5. Conclusion

People v Ibrahim confirms that even where proof is legally sufficient, Molineux and Sandoval rulings are upheld, and joinder is proper, a conviction can still be overturned when the prosecution’s late disclosure of Rosario material causes substantial, uncured prejudice. The decision’s central contribution is its insistence on functional timeliness: Rosario material must be disclosed early enough to be meaningfully used, and remedies must restore the defense’s lost opportunity—preclusion alone may be inadequate when it does not help the defendant.