Belated Insanity Notices Require Good Cause for Post-Evaluation Delay

Case: Tillett v. State of Indiana (Supreme Court of Indiana, Apr. 24, 2026)

Holding in focus: A defendant who misses Indiana Code § 35-36-2-1’s deadline to notice an insanity defense must show “good cause” not only for missing the initial deadline, but also for any substantial delay after mental-health information becomes available; absent a satisfactory explanation, denial of a belated notice—filed nearly two years after the omnibus date and days before trial—is not an abuse of discretion.

I. Introduction

Kathryne Tillett was charged in Floyd County with two Level 1 felony counts of child molesting involving her young daughters, E.W. (seven) and I.B. (three). The case began after E.W. made a spontaneous disclosure to her first-grade teacher that her mother was “hurting” her through digital penetration, causing bleeding, and that similar touching occurred to I.B.

The prosecution relied heavily on out-of-court child statements admitted under Indiana’s Protected Person Statute (Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6), including forensic interviews. Separately, the defense faced significant mental-health issues: multiple evaluations suggested psychotic disorders and, at one point, a lack of competency to stand trial; competency restoration services followed.

The central procedural dispute on transfer concerned whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Tillett’s motion—filed twelve days before trial—to permit a belated notice of insanity defense under Ind. Code § 35-36-2-1. The Indiana Court of Appeals majority had found an abuse of discretion and ordered remand; the Supreme Court granted transfer (thereby vacating the Court of Appeals decision under Appellate Rule 58(A)) and affirmed the trial court. Justice Goff concurred as to evidentiary and sentencing issues but dissented on the “good cause” question.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Belated insanity defense (affirmed denial)

The Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a belated insanity-defense notice. While “good cause” existed for missing the original statutory deadline (no evaluation yet), Tillett failed to show good cause for the extensive additional delay after receiving psychological evaluations in February and April 2023. Filing nearly two years after the omnibus date and two weeks before trial—without an “acceptable explanation for the timing”—supported denial.

B. Protected Person Statute hearsay (admission affirmed)

The Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the children’s statements sufficiently reliable under Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(f)(1). The record reflected prompt interviewing, minimal coaching opportunity, age-appropriate terminology, consistent disclosures, and no evident motive to fabricate.

C. Sentence revision (declined)

The Court declined to revise the aggregate eighty-year sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B), emphasizing deference to the trial court and the aggravated nature of repeated abuse against very young children by their mother. The Court also rejected the characterization of the sentence as the “maximum possible.”

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. “Good cause” and discretion for late insanity notices

  • Eveler v. State, 524 N.E.2d 9 (Ind. 1988): The Court relied on Eveler for the foundational proposition that, although Ind. Code § 35-36-2-1 allows late filing “at any time before commencement of the trial,” that discretion is triggered only “upon a showing of good cause” by the defendant. This frames belated insanity notices as an exception requiring justification, not a routine continuance-like accommodation.
  • Zamani v. State, 33 N.E.3d 1130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied: Zamani supplied both the standard of review reference and a practical benchmark: once mental-health information exists, counsel typically has “adequate time” to prepare and file notice. The Supreme Court treated the presence of evaluations (and their age by the time of filing) as evidence that the defense had time to act and therefore needed a compelling explanation for waiting until shortly before trial.
  • Nicolson v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1096 (Ind. 2012): Cited for abuse-of-discretion review—i.e., whether the ruling was “clearly against the logic and effect” of the facts and circumstances—supporting a deferential posture toward the trial court’s case-management and fairness assessment.

2. Protected Person Statute reliability and evidentiary deference

  • Pierce v. State, 677 N.E.2d 39 (Ind. 1997): Pierce is the Court’s core reliability template. It characterizes the reliability finding as “the sole basis” permitting otherwise inadmissible hearsay and provides a non-exhaustive reliability-factor list (coaching opportunity, questioning nature, motive to fabricate, age-appropriate terminology, spontaneity, repetition, and the effects of lengthy/stressful interviews). The Court mapped the facts to these factors: rapid interviewing, minimal adult contact, explicit safety-plan instructions, consistent disclosures, and age-appropriate descriptions.
  • Carpenter v. State, 786 N.E.2d 696 (Ind. 2003): Used to emphasize the breadth of trial-court discretion over evidentiary rulings and the two main appellate triggers for reversal: rulings clearly against the logic/effect of the record or misinterpretations of law. This supported affirmance once the record showed a reasoned reliability assessment.

3. Sentence revision and appellate restraint

  • Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693 (Ind. 2024): Positioned Appellate Rule 7(B) as a structured, but discretionary, review mechanism.
  • McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977 (Ind. 2020): Provided the “culpability/severity/damage and myriad other factors” framing for appropriateness review.
  • Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012): Reinforced that the question is “inappropriateness,” not whether an alternative sentence might be preferable.
  • Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158 (Ind. 2019)): Anchored the “leaven the outliers” principle—revision is for exceptional cases.
  • Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind. 2006): Placed the burden on the defendant to persuade the appellate court of inappropriateness.
  • Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111 (Ind. 2015): Supplied the “compelling evidence” benchmark to overcome deference—through unusually positive offense circumstances or character evidence.
  • McHenry v. State, 152 N.E.3d 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) and Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021): Informed the advisory-sentence “starting point” and deviation analysis—whether the offense is more or less egregious than the typical crime contemplated by the Legislature.
  • Pierce v. State, 949 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 2011) and Monroe v. State, 886 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. 2008): Supported treating crimes against children as “particularly contemptible” and considering betrayal of a position of trust as an aggravating feature of the offense’s nature.

4. The dissent’s authority and conceptual framing

  • Grecco v. State, 240 Ind. 584 (1960): Justice Goff invoked Grecco (and Indiana practice commentary) to underscore the doctrinal separation between mental condition “at the time of trial” (competency) and mental state “at the time of the offense” (insanity). This separation drove his view that competency litigation may reasonably delay a well-founded insanity decision.
  • Zamani v. State, 33 N.E.3d 1130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (Robb, J., dissenting), trans. denied: Cited by Justice Goff to stress limited prejudice to the State where mental health was an early and obvious issue and where children were exempted from live testimony under the Protected Persons Statute.
  • Tillett v. State, 255 N.E.3d 1235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025): The vacated appellate decision framed the split below and illustrated the discretionary “close case” character of the good-cause inquiry—an interpretive backdrop that the Supreme Court resolved by emphasizing delay after evaluations.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Court’s “good cause” framework: initial deadline vs. post-information delay

Ind. Code § 35-36-2-1 sets an early notice deadline keyed to the omnibus date but allows late filing “in the interest of justice and upon a showing of good cause” at any time before trial begins. The Court treated “good cause” as a two-stage inquiry in practice:

  • Stage 1—Why the initial deadline was missed. The Court agreed Tillett had good cause for missing the April 2022 notice deadline because she had not yet been psychologically evaluated.
  • Stage 2—Why the notice was still not filed once evaluations existed. The dispositive failure was the absence of an “acceptable explanation” for waiting from early 2023 (after schizophrenia/psychosis diagnoses and competency-related information) until April 2024—twelve days before trial—to seek an insanity defense.

This reasoning functionally requires defendants to act with reasonable diligence once their case contains information that could support an insanity defense. The Court emphasized elapsed time (over a year after the first diagnoses), case age (over two years pending), and trial proximity (two weeks) as concrete indicators that the delay itself needed justification independent of the initial missed deadline.

2. Evidentiary admissibility: reliability as the “gate” under the Protected Person Statute

Under Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6, out-of-court child statements may be admitted if the trial court finds, after a hearing with cross-examination opportunity, that the child’s statement is reliable considering the “time, content, and circumstances.” Applying Pierce v. State (1997), the Court highlighted:

  • Spontaneity: E.W.’s initial disclosure to her teacher was unsolicited and urgent.
  • Temporal proximity: the forensic interview occurred within 24 hours, limiting coaching opportunity.
  • Minimal intervening contacts: the grandmother was told not to discuss allegations; no lengthy stressful interviews occurred beforehand.
  • Age-appropriate terminology and demonstration: both children communicated in ways consistent with their ages; I.B. could physically demonstrate conduct.
  • Consistency: the interviews aligned with the initial disclosure.
  • No motive to fabricate: the record suggested none.

With this record, Carpenter v. State supported deference: the trial court’s reliability determination was not illogical or legally erroneous.

3. Sentencing: “inappropriateness” is exceptional, and the record supported aggravation

The Court’s Rule 7(B) analysis proceeded in orthodox steps: advisory sentence as baseline (via McHenry v. State), then deviation assessment (via Madden v. State). It corrected a factual claim (the sentence was not the maximum possible aggregate), and it justified the consecutive, above-advisory terms by:

  • Nature of the offense: repeated digital penetration of very young children, described as daily; injury evidence (pain and bleeding) and betrayal of maternal trust (citing Monroe v. State).
  • Character: mental illness existed, but the Court found no demonstrated nexus between illness and the acts, and it emphasized lack of remorse and victim-blaming statements.
  • Appellate restraint: consistent with Russell v. State and Faith v. State, revision is reserved for outliers; this record did not qualify.

C. Impact

1. Criminal procedure: disciplined timing for insanity defenses

The decision’s practical rule is that “good cause” must account for continued delay after counsel obtains mental-health evaluations or other credible indicators supporting an insanity theory. Courts may treat late notices filed near trial—especially after a year or more of available diagnostic information—as presumptively unjustified absent a concrete explanation tied to case-specific obstacles.

This encourages early issue-spotting and motion practice: once evaluations suggest a psychotic disorder, counsel should promptly decide whether to (a) notice insanity, (b) seek an insanity-focused evaluation addressing wrongfulness at the time of the offense, or (c) create a record explaining why neither was possible.

2. Evidence: reinforcing reliability-focused admissibility under Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6

The Court’s application of Pierce v. State (1997) signals that prompt, professionally conducted forensic interviews—especially those close in time to a spontaneous disclosure—will often satisfy reliability. Challenges will likely need to show concrete coaching opportunities, problematic questioning, internal inconsistencies, lengthy stressful pre-interviews, or other record-based defects.

3. Sentencing: mental illness mitigation requires a demonstrated nexus

On Rule 7(B), the Court’s reasoning underscores that mental illness, without a supported causal or explanatory connection to the criminal conduct, may carry limited weight in reducing moral culpability—particularly where the record includes victim-blaming or lack of remorse and where offense facts are aggravated.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Omnibus date

A procedural deadline set early in a criminal case that drives the timing of certain filings. Here, the insanity-notice deadline is tied to the omnibus date (20 days before it in felony cases).

2. “Notice of insanity defense” vs. proving insanity

Filing notice does not prove insanity; it preserves the ability to raise the defense at trial and triggers procedures (including evaluations). Missing the notice deadline usually forfeits the defense unless “good cause” is shown.

3. Competency vs. insanity

Competency asks whether the defendant can understand proceedings and assist counsel now. Insanity asks whether, due to mental disease or defect, the defendant was unable to appreciate wrongfulness at the time of the offense (see I.C. § 35-41-3-6(a), discussed in Justice Goff’s separate opinion).

4. Hearsay and the Protected Person Statute

Hearsay is generally an out-of-court statement offered for its truth and is usually excluded. The Protected Person Statute creates a pathway to admit certain child-victim statements if the court finds them reliable and the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine at a hearing.

5. Appellate Rule 7(B)

This is not a “resentencing.” It lets appellate courts revise a lawful sentence only if it is “inappropriate” in light of the offense’s nature and offender’s character—used sparingly to correct outlier sentences.

V. Conclusion

Tillett v. State of Indiana clarifies that “good cause” for a belated insanity-defense notice is not satisfied merely by the existence of mental illness or the fact that competency litigation occurred; rather, defendants must justify substantial delay after receiving evaluations or other information supporting an insanity theory. The Court also reaffirms a reliability-centered approach to child-hearsay admission under the Protected Person Statute and reiterates the demanding, deferential nature of sentence revision under Appellate Rule 7(B). Justice Goff’s partial dissent highlights a continuing tension in cases where competency proceedings may impede counsel’s ability to assess an insanity defense tied to the time of the offense—an issue likely to recur in future “good cause” disputes.