Bank Fraud Under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2) Requires No Intent to Defraud the Bank; the Carmack Amendment Is No Defense to Fabricated Shipping Claims

Introduction

United States v. Zumar DuBose (Third Circuit, Jan. 20, 2026) is a nonprecedential decision affirming the convictions of three brothers—Zumar, Abdush, and Kariem Dubose— for a coordinated fraud scheme targeting USPS, UPS, and Citizens Bank. The Government’s proof centered on more than 1,200 allegedly fraudulent “lost/damaged package” claims submitted under fake names and supported by reused shipping documentation, with proceeds deposited into bank accounts held by shell entities.

The appeals raised overlapping issues: (1) sufficiency of the evidence; (2) whether the District Court violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by preventing a defense grounded in the Carmack Amendment (49 U.S.C. § 14706); (3) whether the Government improperly shifted the burden of proof in closing; and (as to Zumar) whether the court wrongly revoked his pro se status and whether indictment/variance issues warranted relief.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the mail fraud, wire fraud/attempt, bank fraud, and money laundering conspiracy counts based on extensive circumstantial evidence (including shipping label purchases, patterns of repeated/reused receipts, facially fabricated claimant names, text communications, and bank activity tied to shell entities).

The court also rejected: (i) Kariem’s argument that bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2) requires intent to defraud the bank (foreclosed by Loughrin v. United States); (ii) the proposed Carmack Amendment defense as irrelevant; (iii) burden-shifting allegations under plain-error review; (iv) Zumar’s self-representation challenge; and (v) Zumar’s indictment, constructive-amendment, and variance arguments. Remaining unsupported issues were deemed forfeited.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Erickson v. Pardus — Cited for the principle that pro se filings are liberally construed, framing how the panel evaluated Zumar’s submissions while still enforcing procedural requirements.
  • United States v. John-Baptiste and United States v. Brodie — Established the Third Circuit’s approach to Rule 29 sufficiency review: view the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution and ask whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • United States v. Syme — Supplied the elements of mail and wire fraud, anchoring the sufficiency analysis: scheme to defraud, use of mails/wires, and specific intent to defraud.
  • Loughrin v. United States — Controlled the bank fraud question. The opinion relied on Loughrin’s holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2) does not require intent to defraud the bank; it is enough that the defendant intends to obtain bank-controlled property “by means of” false statements that naturally induce the bank to part with money in its custody.
  • Crane v. Kentucky and California v. Trombetta — Provided the constitutional framework for the “complete defense” claim, but the panel emphasized that excluded evidence must be relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401.
  • United States v. Balter — Guided the burden-shifting inquiry: prosecutors may point out gaps in a defense theory, but may not suggest defendants bear the burden of proof. The panel analogized the Government’s closing to permissible argument under Balter.
  • United States v. Guyton and United States v. Olano — Supplied the four-part plain-error standard applied to the unpreserved closing-argument challenge.
  • United States v. Noble, Faretta v. California, and McKaskle v. Wiggins — Set the governing law on self-representation: the Faretta right exists but is not absolute; courts may terminate self-representation for serious and obstructionist misconduct.
  • United States v. Taylor — Reinforced that trial courts should exercise patience with difficult defendants before ending pro se status; the panel used Taylor to validate the District Court’s incremental approach.
  • United States v. Welty, United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, and United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez — Addressed counsel-of-choice/substitution: no absolute right to a particular lawyer and substitution during trial generally requires “good cause.”
  • United States v. Whited, United States v. Huet (rev’d on other grounds by United States v. Hill), and United States v. Stock — Provided the standards for indictment sufficiency and Rule 12 challenges alleging failure to charge an essential element.
  • United States v. Daraio — Defined constructive amendment and recognized the presumption that juries follow clear instructions.
  • United States v. Castro — Supplied the definition of “prejudicial variance” (unchanged charging terms, but trial proof materially different).
  • Vogt v. Wetzel — Supported the court’s conclusion that even pro se litigants must comply with procedural rules and support arguments.
  • Rivera and Garden — Cited for sufficiency framing and forfeiture principles, respectively, though not elaborated in detail in the opinion text.

Legal Reasoning

1) Sufficiency of the Evidence: Pattern Proof and Circumstantial Links

The defendants’ core sufficiency attack argued the Government did not prove, claim-by-claim, that payees were fictitious or that specific packages were not actually lost/damaged. The panel rejected a “count-by-count direct proof” requirement. Applying United States v. Brodie, it accepted the jury’s ability to infer fraud from a consistent pattern: repeated reuse of receipts, facially fabricated identities, coordinated communications, shipping label purchase volumes, and the flow of money into shell-business accounts.

For Kariem, the panel emphasized evidence from which a jury could infer knowledge and intent: opening and using a replacement account after fraud-related bank action, depositing claim proceeds, and discussing the bank’s investigation. The court treated these facts as sufficient to establish participation and mens rea even absent proof that he personally mailed every parcel.

2) Bank Fraud Under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2): No “Intent to Defraud the Bank” Element

Kariem argued Citizens Bank was not the “intended victim,” so § 1344(2) could not apply. The panel held the argument was foreclosed by Loughrin v. United States. The operative question was whether Kariem intended to obtain money in the bank’s custody “by means of” false statements that naturally would induce the bank (or its processes) to part with the funds.

The court found that standard satisfied by evidence that Kariem and Zumar made false representations to the bank about payees being “doing business as” the shell entity and, when that failed, pursued fraudulent state-court litigation aimed at unlocking the held funds. The panel’s reasoning illustrates an important doctrinal point: under § 1344(2), the bank need not be the ultimate “mark”; it is enough that the falsehood is the mechanism used to obtain bank-controlled property.

3) Carmack Amendment: Not a Shield for Fabricated Loss Claims

Abdush and Kariem framed the Carmack Amendment as a reliance-based defense to carrier claims. The panel treated the issue as turning on relevance: a constitutional right to present a defense does not require admission of irrelevant evidence (Crane v. Kentucky; California v. Trombetta; Fed. R. Evid. 401).

The court’s key move was straightforward: even if the Carmack Amendment governed a legitimate loss claim (the panel said it did not), it does not authorize submitting fabricated claims. Because the charged conduct was fraud—false submissions and misrepresentations—the Carmack framework could not negate an element of the offenses or provide a lawful justification.

4) Closing Argument: Permissible Comment on Evidentiary Gaps, Not Burden Shifting

Reviewing for plain error under United States v. Guyton and United States v. Olano, the panel held the Government’s closing argument fell within the permissible range recognized in United States v. Balter: highlighting that no evidence supported a purported innocent explanation for purchasing large quantities of insured labels. The court emphasized the prosecutor did not claim defendants had a burden to prove innocence and did not comment on a failure to testify.

5) Revocation of Pro Se Status: Faretta Is Conditional on Non-Obstruction

Applying Faretta v. California and McKaskle v. Wiggins, the panel upheld termination of Zumar’s self-representation because the District Court found he deliberately disrupted proceedings—particularly by refusing to answer clear questions on the eve of trial while claiming not to understand them despite prior coherent participation. Citing United States v. Taylor, the panel approved the trial court’s patience and escalation only after the proceeding became nearly impossible to conduct.

The court also rejected a counsel-of-choice claim where Zumar purported to “fire” appointed counsel but identified no retained replacement and showed no “good cause” under United States v. Welty, consistent with United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle and United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez.

6) Indictment, Constructive Amendment, and Variance: Instruction-Centered Analysis

On indictment sufficiency, the panel applied United States v. Whited, United States v. Huet (rev’d on other grounds by United States v. Hill), and United States v. Stock to conclude the indictment adequately identified statutes, elements, time period, and scheme allegations.

On constructive amendment, the court invoked United States v. Daraio, stressing that even if evidence could support some other charge (the opinion notes testimony referencing 18 U.S.C. § 288), there is no constructive amendment where the jury is instructed on—and convicts under—the charged offenses.

On variance, applying United States v. Castro, the court found Zumar failed to identify trial proof that materially differed from the charged scheme; the argument collapsed into a sufficiency challenge the court had already rejected.

Impact

Although labeled “NONPRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion is a practical synthesis of recurring federal fraud and trial-management doctrines:

  • § 1344(2) litigation posture: The decision reinforces that defendants cannot repackage “the bank wasn’t the target” as a defense after Loughrin v. United States; the focus is on obtaining bank-controlled property “by means of” falsehoods.
  • Fraud proof through patterns: The court’s acceptance of circumstantial, pattern-based evidence (reused receipts, fabricated names, and coordinated deposits) underscores how high-volume claim schemes are commonly proved without claim-by-claim direct refutation.
  • Limits on “complete defense” framing: The opinion illustrates that constitutional rhetoric cannot force admission of statutory material that does not negate an element or justify the conduct (here, the Carmack Amendment could not legalize fabricated claims).
  • Pro se boundaries: Trial courts retain authority to terminate self-representation when defendants weaponize obstruction, so long as the record supports serious disruption and the court has exercised measured control.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 29 sufficiency: After the Government rests (or after the verdict), the defendant can argue the evidence is legally too weak to convict. On appeal, courts ask whether any rational juror could convict when viewing evidence favorably to the prosecution.
  • “By means of” in § 1344(2): The lie must be the mechanism that naturally induces the bank to release money it controls; the bank need not be the ultimate victim.
  • Carmack Amendment: A shipping-liability framework for real loss/damage disputes; it does not authorize making up losses or falsifying documentation.
  • Plain error: If an issue wasn’t raised below, an appellate court reverses only for clear, obvious mistakes that affected substantial rights and the fairness of proceedings.
  • Constructive amendment vs. variance: A constructive amendment occurs when trial proof/instructions effectively change the charged offense; a variance is when the charge stays the same but the proof materially diverges. Both protect notice and grand jury charging functions.
  • Forfeiture: Arguments not developed with reasons, authority, and record citations can be treated as abandoned—even for pro se litigants.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit affirmed the Dubose brothers’ fraud and related convictions by applying settled standards on sufficiency, relevance, and trial fairness. Its most legally salient points are (1) the reaffirmation—through Loughrin v. United States—that § 1344(2) does not require intent to defraud a bank, and (2) the rejection of the Carmack Amendment as a defense where the alleged conduct is fabrication rather than legitimate carrier-loss recovery. The opinion also reflects appellate deference to clear jury instructions (rejecting constructive-amendment/variance claims) and to trial courts’ authority to terminate self-representation when defendants engage in obstruction.