Bank Compliance with West Virginia “Suggestion” Turnovers Is Ministerial and Not Conversion (W. Va. Code § 38-5-14)

I. Introduction

This appeal arose from a common post-judgment collection scenario: a creditor obtained a money judgment (here, a Texas default judgment against Hugh D. Dale, Jr. and related entities), domesticated it in West Virginia, and then used West Virginia’s enforcement tools to reach funds held at a West Virginia bank. The bank, Peoples Bank, upon receiving enforcement paperwork (including “suggestions” and writs of execution), debited several accounts that bore the judgment debtors’ names and remitted the funds to the creditor, Signal Ventures, LLC.

The plaintiffs—five partnerships managed by Dale (Cin Dale 3; John Wright 1&2; Miller; BAK; Ball 1&2)—did not sue the judgment creditor or challenge the bank’s actions through the enforcement proceeding itself. Instead, they sued the bank and employees in federal court, alleging (among other claims) conversion, contending the accounts were really partnership property and should not have been turned over.

The central issues on appeal were narrow and practical: whether the bank’s turnover of funds pursuant to West Virginia’s “suggestion” process could be “wrongful” (a required element of conversion), and whether the bank had to wait to allow the judgment debtors an opportunity to respond before paying out.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true, the court held the conversion claim was implausible because the bank’s conduct was authorized by West Virginia law—specifically, W. Va. Code § 38-5-14, which permits a person (including a bank) served with a “suggestion” to pay over the debtor’s property before the summons-answer deadline and grants broad statutory discharge from liability to the judgment debtor for the property delivered.

Two plaintiff theories failed:

• “The bank should have known the funds were not the debtors’.” The court found the bank had no reason, in 2023, to disregard account ownership as reflected in the deposit documents (signed by Dale) showing co-ownership with judgment debtors.
• “The bank paid too quickly and denied a chance to contest.” The statute and precedent expressly allow early payment; West Virginia law does not require notice to judgment debtors in suggestion proceedings, and the plaintiffs did not present a due process challenge.

The court further characterized the suit as, “in truth,” a collateral attack on the Texas judgment and its enforcement. It emphasized that banks serve a “ministerial” role in enforcement and should not be exposed to tort liability for complying with facially valid judicial-enforcement mechanisms.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The ministerial nature of enforcement actors

• Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 24 (1825)
  The opinion opens with Wayman to frame enforcement steps as ancillary, “ministerial” mechanisms “necessary for the perfection of that which was previously done”—the issuance of a judgment. The Fourth Circuit uses this concept to justify why banks should not be treated as independent tortfeasors when they execute routine enforcement steps.
• Turner v. Fendall, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 117, 118 (1801)
  Cited to illustrate the compulsory nature of execution: a sheriff is “bound to bring the money into court.” The court analogizes the bank’s role under suggestion turnover to that compelled function once the court issues an enforceable order (and notes West Virginia even allows earlier voluntary compliance).

2. West Virginia enforcement mechanisms and their contours

• Barber v. Barber, 464 S.E.2d 358, 359 (W. Va. 1995)
  Used to identify and describe the writ of fieri facias (writ of execution) as a recognized West Virginia mechanism creating a lien and empowering seizure of personal property.
• Vanscoy v. Neal, 322 S.E.2d 37, 40 (W. Va. 1984)
  Central to the holding. The Fourth Circuit relies on Vanscoy for the proposition that, after a suggestion, the garnishee/holder of property may choose either to answer and await a court order or to “deliver the property before the return date of the summons.” This directly defeats the plaintiffs’ “too fast” theory.
• Sauls v. Howell, 309 S.E.2d 26, 31 (W. Va. 1983)
  Cited for a crucial procedural point: “none of the provisions in [§ 38-5] expressly require that a judgment debtor be notified of suggestion proceedings.” The Fourth Circuit uses Sauls to undercut any statutory claim that judgment debtors are guaranteed an opportunity to respond before a bank can act.
• Vincent v. Gustke, 336 S.E.2d 33, 35 (W. Va. 1985)
  Referenced in the factual background to support the idea that accounts in a debtor’s name (including joint forms) can be vulnerable to execution by creditors—reinforcing why the bank’s reliance on account titling is predictable in enforcement.

3. Pleading standard and appellate review posture

• Sysco Machinery Corp. v. DCS USA Corp., 143 F.4th 222, 228 (4th Cir. 2025)
  Establishes de novo review for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) in this circuit.
• Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
  Provides the “plausible on its face” requirement. The Fourth Circuit applies plausibility not to whether the plaintiffs lost money, but to whether the pleaded facts make it plausible that the bank’s authorized statutory compliance was “wrongful.”

4. The elements of conversion and what makes dominion “wrongful”

• Rodgers v. Rodgers, 399 S.E.2d 664, 677 (W. Va. 1990)
  Supplies the controlling definition: conversion is dominion over another’s property with “no legal right,” equated to “a wrongful exercise of dominion.” The case is the doctrinal backbone for the court’s focus on wrongfulness as the dispositive element.
• Miami Coal Co. v. Hudson, 332 S.E.2d 114, 121 (W. Va. 1985) (quoting Pine & Cypress Mfg. Co. v. Am. Eng'g & Constr. Co., 125 S.E. 375, 375 (W. Va. 1924))
  Used to emphasize that conversion turns on a “distinct act of dominion” that is “wrongful[].” The Fourth Circuit treats the relevant act as the 2023 debit/turnover—not earlier account-opening events.
• Wholesale Coal Co. v. Price Hill Colliery Co., 128 S.E. 313, 315 (W. Va. 1925)
  Plaintiffs invoked the statement that, once conversion is proved, recovery follows “irrespective of good or bad faith.” The court distinguishes this maxim as irrelevant where the threshold “wrongful” element is not met; good faith cannot substitute for wrongfulness, but neither can lack of good faith create wrongfulness when the act is legally authorized.
• Copier Word Processing Supply, Inc. v. WesBanco Bank, Inc., 640 S.E.2d 102, 111 (W. Va. 2006)
  Cited for the principle that different torts must be evaluated separately—supporting the court’s acknowledgement that an untimely negligence claim does not automatically bar a distinct conversion claim, even though conversion still fails on its own elements.

5. Collateral proceedings context

• Drilco Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Signal Ventures, LLC, No. 23- ICA-492, 2024 WL 5201656 (W. Va. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2024)
  The Fourth Circuit cites this to note Dale and his companies did, in fact, contest enforceability of the Texas judgment in West Virginia and “lost.” This supports the opinion’s framing: the tort suit against the bank functioned as an attempted end-run around adverse outcomes in the proper enforcement forum.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court isolates the decisive conversion element: “wrongfulness”

The opinion’s structure is methodical: it accepts that (i) the funds belonged to the partnerships (for pleading purposes) and (ii) the bank exercised dominion when it debited accounts and issued cashier’s checks. That leaves (iii) whether the dominion was “wrongful” under Rodgers v. Rodgers.

2. Statutory authorization negates “no legal right”

The court treats W. Va. Code § 38-5-14 as dispositive. Under that provision, once served with a suggestion, a holder of property may turn over the debtor’s property “at any time” before its answer is due and, if it does, it is:

• “discharged from any further liability under the execution,” and
• “from all liability whatsoever to the judgment debtor” for the property delivered.

That statutory discharge is not merely a defense; it defines the bank’s legal entitlement to comply. In the court’s conversion vocabulary: conduct authorized by statute and reinforced by Vanscoy v. Neal cannot plausibly be “wrongful,” because the bank has a “legal right” to do exactly what it did.

3. The “should have known” theory fails on the pleadings themselves

The partnerships attempted to convert alleged decades-old account-opening negligence into present conversion wrongfulness. The court rejects the relevance of that theory at the conversion stage because the pleadings also show:

• Dale signed deposit agreements reflecting co-ownership with judgment debtors, and
• the accounts were used for years without objection.

Thus, in 2023, the bank had “absolutely no reason” to treat accounts bearing Dale/Drilco’s names as anything other than accounts owned by Dale/Drilco (at least in part). The bank’s reliance on the account titling and its compliance with the enforcement paperwork are framed as ordinary, predictable, and legally sanctioned.

4. The “too fast” theory misreads who must respond to a suggestion

The plaintiffs’ backup argument depended on the premise that the suggestion procedure guarantees the judgment debtor a procedural window before the bank pays. The court responds in two steps:

• Text: W. Va. Code § 38-5-10 requires the “person” with the property (the bank) to answer the suggestion; it does not confer a debtor response right.
• Authority: Sauls v. Howell confirms that notice to the judgment debtor is not expressly required by the statute, making it untenable to infer a guaranteed debtor opportunity to respond before the bank can act.

The court notes, but does not decide, that West Virginia cases have recognized some due process rights in suggestion proceedings (Vanscoy), because the plaintiffs did not raise a due process claim against the state mechanism; they sued the bank in tort.

5. The opinion’s institutional rationale: preventing back-door judgment challenges

Beyond elements and statutes, the court offers an explicit systemic justification: banks are “ministerial middlemen” essential to enforceability of judgments; exposing them to routine tort litigation would incentivize judgment debtors to relitigate judgments indirectly, undermining credit and the rule of law. The legislature’s choice to immunize compliance (W. Va. Code § 38-5-14) is treated as consistent with that institutional concern.

C. Impact

1. A clear rule for banks and other “holders” served with suggestions

The decision strengthens predictability for banks in West Virginia (and for federal courts applying West Virginia tort law): when a bank debits accounts titled in a judgment debtor’s name and remits funds in response to the suggestion process, such compliance is not “wrongful” and therefore will not support conversion liability—especially where W. Va. Code § 38-5-14’s discharge applies.

2. Litigation-channeling: disputes must be aimed at the judgment or enforcement proceeding, not the bank

Practically, the opinion channels affected parties toward traditional remedies:

• timely correction of account titling/documentation;
• motions or objections in the enforcement forum; and
• direct challenges to the underlying judgment (where available and appropriate).

By framing the tort action as a collateral attack, the court signals skepticism toward strategies that target intermediaries rather than the judgment creditor or the enforcement court.

3. Pleading implications: “wrongfulness” must be plausibly alleged in the face of statutory authorization

Post-Twombly, a plaintiff must plead facts making it plausible that a bank lacked a legal right to act. Where a statute affirmatively authorizes early payment and immunizes the payer, conclusory assertions of “wrongfulness” or “procedural denial” will predictably fail at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage absent a viable constitutional or statutory-violation theory directed at the right actor.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Conversion: A civil wrong similar to “civil theft” of personal property. In West Virginia it requires (a) dominion over another’s property and (b) that the dominion be wrongful—i.e., done with “no legal right.”
• Writ of fieri facias / writ of execution: A court-issued command authorizing seizure of a debtor’s personal property to satisfy a judgment.
• Suggestion proceeding (West Virginia): A creditor’s filing asserting a third party (like a bank) holds the debtor’s property. The court can require the third party to answer under oath what it holds; the court can then order payment. Importantly here, the third party can pay earlier and receive statutory discharge under W. Va. Code § 38-5-14.
• Ministerial function: A task performed by following prescribed legal instructions rather than exercising discretion about who should win. The court views banks as performing this kind of administrative role in enforcement.
• Collateral attack: An attempt to undermine a judgment indirectly—by suing someone involved in enforcement—rather than challenging the judgment or enforcement order directly in the proper proceeding.
• Plausibility pleading (Twombly): A complaint must include enough factual matter to make liability plausible, not merely possible. If the alleged conduct is authorized by statute, the plaintiff must plead a coherent legal basis for why that authorization does not apply.

V. Conclusion

Cin Dale 3 v. Peoples Bank Corp. establishes a practical, enforcement-protective rule: a bank that turns over funds from accounts titled in a judgment debtor’s name in response to West Virginia suggestion proceedings—especially where it acts pursuant to W. Va. Code § 38-5-14 and the option described in Vanscoy v. Neal—does not act “wrongfully” and therefore does not commit conversion.

The opinion is as much about institutional design as tort doctrine. By insulating ministerial compliance from conversion liability, the Fourth Circuit reinforces the reliability of judgment enforcement, discourages indirect re-litigation through suits against intermediaries, and confirms that disputes about ownership, process, or judgment validity belong in the enforcement forum (or through direct attacks on the judgment), not in conversion claims against the bank that followed the statutory script.