Bad-Faith Requirement for § 1983 Evidence-Fabrication Claims Arising from State Ethics Investigations

1. Introduction

In Ernest N. Finley, Jr. v. Thomas Albritton (11th Cir. Aug. 17, 2026), Chief Ernest Finley and Deputy Chief Jennifer Reaves sued Alabama Ethics Commission officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officials fabricated evidence during an ethics investigation that culminated in a public probable-cause finding and referral to the Alabama Attorney General. Although the Attorney General later concluded Finley and Reaves were “innocent” and criticized the Commission’s presentation as relying on “false evidence” and “material misrepresentations,” the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the ethics officials on qualified-immunity grounds.

The core issue on appeal was evidentiary: whether Finley and Reaves produced enough proof for a reasonable jury to infer that the ethics investigators (Special Agent Byron Butler and General Counsel Cynthia Raulston) fabricated evidence in bad faith—particularly about which Montgomery Police Department firearms-qualification policy governed in October 2020 and whether disciplinary paperwork showed penalties under the older policy.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held that even assuming (without deciding) that fabrication before an investigatory body could violate due process, Finley and Reaves failed to present “substantial evidence” of fabrication. The court emphasized that fabrication requires bad faith—not mere mistake, confusion, or negligence—so the ethics officials were entitled to qualified immunity.

  • As to Executive Director Thomas Albritton: the plaintiffs’ theory reduced to his “presence” and alleged inaction; under circuit precedent, an investigative official does not violate clearly established law merely by failing to act upon knowledge that another official fabricated evidence.
  • As to Butler and Raulston: the challenged statements (about policy applicability, an alleged attachment to a memorandum, and a redacted disciplinary form) were supported by a record of plausible, good-faith reliance on information from the City Attorney, departmental practice, system records, and at least one similar active disciplinary form.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Qualified immunity framework

  • Marbut v. Phillips, 176 F.4th 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2026): supplied the standard of review—de novo review of summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
  • Stryker v. City of Homewood, 978 F.3d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 2020): reiterated the two-step qualified-immunity structure: discretionary authority plus no liability absent violation of clearly established law.

The opinion used these cases to set the posture: because discretionary authority was undisputed, the plaintiffs had to produce evidence of a constitutional violation (here, fabrication in bad faith) sufficient to survive summary judgment.

Liability for “failure to act” in the face of another’s fabrication

  • Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2002): held that officials in an investigative role do not violate clearly established law by failing to act despite knowledge that another official fabricated evidence.
  • Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999): cited via Rowe to reinforce that “failure to intervene” theory is not clearly established in this investigative context.

These precedents disposed of claims against Albritton: presence plus alleged awareness did not overcome qualified immunity.

Bad faith as an essential element of “fabrication”

  • United States v. Horner, 853 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2017): in the perjured-testimony context, requires proof that the prosecutor knowingly used false testimony or failed to correct known falsity—used here to illustrate that actionable falsity turns on knowledge/intent.
  • United States v. Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th 1310, 1327 (11th Cir. 2024): “honest mistakes” are insufficient—directly supporting the panel’s bad-faith requirement.
  • United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1208 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103, 1110 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Brown, 634 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1981): additional authority for the same principle that mistakes do not equate to deliberate falsification.

Although these are criminal-procedure decisions, the court used them as an analogy to define “fabrication” in the due-process setting: the concept is anchored in knowing falsity or reckless/intentional misconduct, not mere error.

What “fabrication” looks like (affirmative creation of false evidence)

  • Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 841 (11th Cir. 2010): described fabrication as “evidence that was falsely created” with intent “to link the accused to a crime.” The panel treated this as the benchmark description.
  • Riley v. City of Montgomery, 104 F.3d 1247, 1253 (11th Cir. 1997): example of planting drugs.
  • Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d at 1289–90: example of manufacturing a boot print.

By contrasting classic “manufactured evidence” fact patterns with the record here (conflicting policies, ambiguous practices, reliance on counsel and system records), the court underscored that the plaintiffs’ proof did not fit the paradigmatic “falsely created” evidence scenario.

Policy “effectiveness” through custom or practice

  • Huggins v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cnty., 151 F.4th 1268, 1285 (11th Cir. 2025): explained that some policies are “official” while others stem from “custom or practice.” The panel used this to support the reasonableness of treating policy 2.311 as operational despite a purported rescission by policy 3.2.4.

Summary judgment record control

  • Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006): parties cannot avoid summary judgment by ignoring record evidence available to the district court.

This principle mattered because the plaintiffs relied heavily on the Attorney General’s conclusions, but the record developed later contained deposition testimony and admissions supporting the ethics officials’ good faith.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The court assumed (without deciding) a due-process theory—then resolved the case on proof

The panel expressly “assume[d] without deciding” that “fabrications before an investigatory body” can deprive a person of “life, liberty, or property” under the Due Process Clause. This move avoided a major doctrinal holding about the precise constitutional hook for a state-ethics probable-cause proceeding, and instead turned the appeal on whether the plaintiffs could produce evidence of intentional falsification.

(b) Fabrication requires bad faith; mistakes are not enough

Applying the bad-faith requirement, the court rejected three asserted “fabrications”:

  1. Obscuring that policy 3.2.4 rescinded policy 2.311: the record gave Butler and Raulston good-faith grounds to view policy 2.311 as “operational” in practice: internal system search results, screenshots, supervisor beliefs, an email invoking policy 2.311 consequences, City Attorney communications, and the Department’s later “amend[ment]” of policy 2.311 without clarifying it had been superseded.
  2. Stating that policy 2.311 was attached to Hoffman’s memo: that claim traced to how the investigative unit compiled documents and to City Attorney Bellinger’s mistaken (but unretracted) assertion that the memo “attach[ed]” the policy. Given timing and corroborating recollections/custom testimony, the panel treated the statement as an honest mistake, not a deliberate falsehood.
  3. Using a redacted Richardson disciplinary form not found in his file: even accepting that the Richardson form was misfiled or inaccurate, the court found no jury question of bad-faith fabrication because a comparable Williams form citing policy 2.311 existed and supported the investigators’ general point that at least one October 2020 failure generated discipline under policy 2.311.

(c) Qualified immunity for Albritton: presence is not actionable “failure to act”

The plaintiffs’ limited argument that Albritton “was present” could not overcome Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale and Jones v. Cannon. The panel treated the asserted duty to intervene in an investigation’s evidentiary presentation as not clearly established, entitling Albritton to qualified immunity even if Butler and Raulston had engaged in fabrication (which the court found they did not).

(d) Attorney General criticism did not create a triable issue

The court treated the Attorney General’s conclusions as insufficient to defeat summary judgment where later-developed deposition testimony and other record evidence supported good faith. The key point was methodological: summary judgment turns on the evidentiary record before the district court, not an external official’s characterization untested against later-discovered facts.

3.3 Impact

  • Elevated proof burden for plaintiffs alleging “fabrication” in non-criminal investigatory contexts: the decision signals that plaintiffs must show evidence of intentional falsification (or knowing use of falsity), not merely inconsistency, confusion, or sloppy document handling—especially where policy “effectiveness” is muddied by custom and practice.
  • Practical protection for investigators relying on counsel or institutional records: reliance on a city attorney’s representations, internal system screenshots, and existing disciplinary forms strongly supports “good faith,” narrowing pathways to liability when underlying organizational compliance is inconsistent.
  • Limits on supervisory/administrator liability in investigations: mere attendance or passive awareness is unlikely to overcome qualified immunity absent clearly established duties to intervene in evidentiary misstatements during investigatory proceedings.
  • Strategic consequences for targets of administrative investigations: the court noted that Finley’s and Reaves’s attorneys elected not to contest whether policy 2.311 governed during the ethics hearing. Future subjects may treat the decision as a cautionary tale: failure to raise key legal/factual disputes at the administrative stage may later undercut claims that investigators “fabricated” the governing framework.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualified immunity: a doctrine shielding government officials from damages unless they violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights. Even if conduct seems wrongful in hindsight, immunity often applies if the law was not clearly established or if the evidence cannot show the alleged constitutional violation.
  • Summary judgment: a pretrial ruling for the defendant when the plaintiff lacks evidence that could allow a reasonable jury to find in the plaintiff’s favor.
  • Fabrication of evidence (as used here): not just “being wrong.” The court treated it as requiring bad faith—knowingly making false statements, creating false documents, or intentionally presenting false information to link someone to wrongdoing.
  • Probable cause finding (administrative): a preliminary determination that there is a sufficient basis to proceed (here, a public announcement and referral). It is not a final adjudication of guilt.
  • Policy rescission vs. policy in practice: a written policy can be “rescinded” formally but still treated as operational if the organization’s systems, supervisors, and disciplinary actions continue to use it—creating ambiguity relevant to intent and good faith.

5. Conclusion

Ernest N. Finley, Jr. v. Thomas Albritton reinforces a stringent threshold for § 1983 “evidence fabrication” claims arising from investigative or administrative proceedings: fabrication requires bad faith, and plaintiffs must point to record evidence that officials knowingly created or used false material—not merely that they advanced a mistaken interpretation amid institutional confusion. The decision also strengthens qualified-immunity protections for administrators alleged to have merely observed or failed to stop others’ purported fabrication, and it illustrates how good-faith reliance on counsel, internal records, and contemporaneous disciplinary artifacts can defeat a fabrication theory at summary judgment.