DVPOs Require Evidence to Protect Children and Findings Supporting a Reasonable Duration

Introduction

In B.S. v. Lopez-Rangel, 2026 ND 70, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed a domestic violence protection order (DVPO) entered by the Dunn County district court in favor of B.S. and the parties’ two minor children against Carlos Lopez-Rangel. The petition alleged Lopez-Rangel sexually assaulted B.S. in her home. After a hearing, the district court entered a DVPO protecting B.S. and the children, with an expiration listed as “Unlimited”.

On appeal, Lopez-Rangel did not contest the DVPO as to B.S. He challenged (1) the inclusion of the children as protected parties and (2) the order’s unlimited duration. The Supreme Court affirmed protection for B.S., reversed protection for the children, and reversed and remanded on duration.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Protected parties: The Court held the record supported including B.S., but did not support including the children because there was no showing—by a preponderance of the evidence—that domestic violence was committed against them or that they experienced fear of imminent harm.
  • Duration: While DVPOs may be indefinite under the governing statute, the duration must be reasonable under the facts and supported by findings. The district court abused its discretion by imposing an “unlimited” DVPO without explaining why such a duration was warranted.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Nature of DVPOs and Standards of Review

The Court reiterated that a DVPO is a civil action primarily for injunctive relief, citing Legacie-Lowe v. Lowe, 2023 ND 140 (quoting Ficklin v. Ficklin, 2006 ND 40). It then applied its well-established DVPO review framework from Anderson v. Krueger, 2025 ND 161: findings that domestic violence occurred are reviewed for clear error, while statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo.

The Court also emphasized that Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P. applies to DVPO proceedings, citing Tracey v. Tracey, 2023 ND 219. Under Hanneman v. Nygaard, 2010 ND 113 (quoting Rothberg v. Rothberg, 2006 ND 65), findings must be sufficiently specific to permit meaningful appellate review. This “adequate findings” requirement became decisive on the duration issue.

2) Inclusion of Children: DVPO Proof vs. Custody Presumptions

B.S. relied on O'Hara v. Schneider, 2017 ND 53 to argue that violence directed at a parent can be relevant to children. The Supreme Court distinguished O’Hara as a parenting-time/residential responsibility context, where the Legislature created presumptions and best-interests factors. Specifically, O’Hara discussed statutory presumptions under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) and § 14-09-29(2), and stated the Legislature intended courts to presume domestic violence negatively impacts children in residential responsibility decisions.

The Court explained that those custody-related presumptions do not extend to DVPO proceedings, which require proof of “actual or imminent domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence,” citing Tracy v. Tracy, 2024 ND 195. It further noted that “domestic violence” for DVPO purposes is defined in N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-01 and focuses on harm or fear of imminent harm inflicted on the complaining family or household members.

The Court also referenced Armitage v. Armitage, 2024 ND 97 to reinforce that best-interests analysis governs custody, not DVPO protected-party determinations.

3) Uncontested Findings and Appellate Presumptions

In affirming protection for B.S., the Court cited Wagner v. Wagner, 1998 ND 117 for the proposition that uncontested findings of fact are presumptively correct—underscoring that Lopez-Rangel’s appeal was limited to the children and duration issues.

4) Duration of DVPOs Must Be “Reasonable” and Supported

The Court anchored its duration analysis in Rinas v. Engelhardt, 2012 ND 146, which recognized that although N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02 could permit DVPOs to remain in effect indefinitely, the Legislature intended the length to be reasonable under the facts of each case. Rinas also supplied the abuse-of-discretion lens for challenges to DVPO relief.

Legal Reasoning

A) Children as Protected Parties

The district court expressly stated it “did not hear anything that indicated domestic violence was directed towards the children,” and the Supreme Court treated the record consistently: the children were asleep (one in a separate room, one near the bed); B.S. did not know if they awoke or heard anything; and there was no evidence they observed the alleged assaults or suffered trauma.

Applying the DVPO burden from Tracy v. Tracy, 2024 ND 195 and the statutory definition in N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-01, the Court concluded the evidentiary gap mattered. Without evidence of actual harm to the children or fear of imminent harm inflicted on them, the children could not be included as protected parties merely because domestic violence occurred against their mother.

The Court’s treatment of O'Hara v. Schneider, 2017 ND 53 is central: O’Hara’s custody presumptions do not “bootstrap” a DVPO remedy for children. DVPO inclusion still requires DVPO-level proof as to the children.

B) Unlimited Duration

On duration, the Court acknowledged the governing statute at the time—N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02 (noting it was “Repealed January 1, 2026, but in effect at the time of the August 2025 hearing”)—did not specify fixed maximum durations, and it allowed later amendment, extension, modification, or termination (N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(6); see also § 14-07.1-02(10)).

But under Rinas v. Engelhardt, 2012 ND 146, the duration must be reasonable under the facts. The district court’s explanation—“The term of this will be unlimited… that doesn’t mean that it can’t be rescinded”—did not supply the reasoned, case-specific basis required for appellate review under Rule 52(a) and Hanneman v. Nygaard, 2010 ND 113.

The Court also flagged a practical ambiguity: the DVPO included firearm-surrender language contemplating that “When this order expires” law enforcement may return surrendered weapons—language that sits uneasily beside an “Unlimited” expiration without findings explaining necessity and proportionality.

The remedy was tailored: the Court did not forbid lengthy DVPOs; it required the district court on remand to (1) make sufficient findings and (2) impose a reasonable duration based on the record.

Impact

  • Clear boundary between DVPOs and custody law: The decision prevents litigants from importing custody presumptions (like those discussed in O'Hara v. Schneider, 2017 ND 53) into DVPO protected-party determinations. Courts must apply the DVPO statute and burden, not best-interests presumptions.
  • Children cannot be added “by association”: When domestic violence is proven against a parent, children are not automatically protected parties; the record must support domestic violence toward them (including fear of imminent harm) by a preponderance of the evidence.
  • Findings-driven duration: “Unlimited” DVPOs are not categorically invalid, but they require explicit, reviewable findings explaining why such length is reasonable under the case’s facts, consistent with Rinas v. Engelhardt, 2012 ND 146 and Rule 52(a).
  • Drafting discipline for trial courts: The remand signals that conclusory pronouncements on duration (and related collateral relief like firearm surrender) risk reversal if not tied to specific factual findings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • DVPO (Domestic Violence Protection Order): A civil injunction designed to prevent further domestic violence by restricting contact and imposing related protections.
  • Preponderance of the evidence: The petitioner must show something is more likely than not. In DVPOs, that applies to whether domestic violence occurred (and, here, whether it occurred as to each proposed protected party).
  • Clearly erroneous vs. abuse of discretion: “Clearly erroneous” asks whether the factual finding lacks evidentiary support or is mistaken on the whole record. “Abuse of discretion” asks whether the court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or without a rational basis—used here for the choice of remedies (like duration).
  • Rule 52(a) findings: In a bench proceeding, the judge must make specific findings so an appellate court can understand why the order was entered and on what facts it rests.
  • Custody presumption vs. DVPO proof: A custody presumption (e.g., under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j)) can shift burdens in a best-interests analysis. A DVPO requires affirmative proof of domestic violence for the relief and the persons protected.

Conclusion

B.S. v. Lopez-Rangel, 2026 ND 70 establishes two practical rules for North Dakota DVPO litigation: (1) children may not be included as protected parties without evidence—meeting the DVPO burden—that domestic violence was committed against them (including fear of imminent harm), and (2) a DVPO’s duration, even if potentially indefinite under statute, must be reasonable under the facts and supported by specific findings sufficient for appellate review. The opinion reinforces careful separation between DVPO proceedings and custody presumptions, and it signals that trial courts must explain—on the record—why extraordinary DVPO terms (like “Unlimited” duration) are warranted.