Attendance Is Not Enough: Failure to Benefit from Services and Persistent Domestic Violence Justify Permanent Neglect Findings and Denial of a Suspended Judgment

1. Introduction

Matter of Macayla N. (Sheena N.) (3d Dept July 3, 2025) arises from a Broome County Department of Social Services petition under Social Services Law § 384-b seeking to (1) adjudicate two children (born 2012 and 2016) as permanently neglected and (2) terminate their mother’s parental rights.

The family’s child welfare involvement began after the children were adjudicated neglected in 2019, with the mother placed under supervision and directed to engage in services including anger management, domestic violence programming, and parenting classes. After years of agency involvement and litigation—including a conditional judicial surrender that was later vacated when the contemplated adoptive placement failed—the case proceeded to a final dispositional hearing, culminating in termination of parental rights.

The central issues on appeal were whether DSS proved (a) diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship and (b) the mother’s failure to substantially plan for the children’s future, and whether Family Court should have ordered a suspended judgment rather than termination.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed. It held that DSS proved by clear and convincing evidence that it made diligent efforts, and that the mother—despite attending services—failed to benefit meaningfully from parenting and related interventions, continued domestic-violence-related instability, refused additional programming when requested, and remained resistant and unreceptive to guidance. On disposition, the Court held that a suspended judgment was not in the children’s best interests because the mother had not made the significant progress needed to justify a brief “grace period,” while the children had already spent more than four years in care and were moving toward stability and adoption.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The decision is built on a well-developed Third Department framework for permanent neglect and disposition. The Court’s citations function in three main ways: (1) defining the agency’s diligent efforts burden, (2) defining what counts as substantial planning, and (3) explaining when a suspended judgment is (and is not) appropriate.

  • Matter of Issac Q. [Kimberly R.]: Used repeatedly for core standards: DSS must prove diligent efforts by clear and convincing evidence, and once shown, must prove the parent failed to substantially plan. Also cited on the dispositional standard for suspended judgments.
  • Matter of Konner N. [Justin O.]: Reinforces that reasonable facilitation of visitation, communication, and services can satisfy diligent efforts, and is used to confirm the record here met that threshold.
  • Matter of Nikole V. [Norman V.]: Cited with Issac Q. and Konner N. to support the diligent-efforts framework and appellate review posture.
  • Matter of Carter A. [Courtney QQ.]: Provides a concrete description of “practical and reasonable efforts” (visitation assistance, updates, counseling and programs) and anchors the Court’s view of what DSS must do.
  • Matter of Jessica U. [Stephanie U.]: Cited both for diligent-efforts concepts and later to uphold termination as a proper discretionary disposition. It underscores that the analysis is functional (what the agency did) and child-centered at disposition.
  • Matter of Carmela D. [Shameeka G.]: A key authority in two respects: (1) diligent efforts are satisfied when appropriate services are offered but the parent refuses or fails to progress, and (2) suspended judgment is only appropriate when significant progress makes a short grace period realistic and consistent with the child’s best interests. It also supports the proposition that failure to acknowledge/correct removal conditions demonstrates failure to plan.
  • Matter of Daimeon MM. [Laurie MM.]: Supports deference to Family Court fact-finding/credibility determinations and is later used to affirm denial of a suspended judgment where no meaningful change is likely.
  • Matter of Ryan J. [Taylor J.]: Cited to corroborate that DSS’s efforts (transportation resources, facilitated contact, updates) resemble efforts previously found diligent.
  • Matter of Drey L. [Katrina M.]: Reinforces the burden-shifting sequence: after diligent efforts, the agency must show failure to plan by clear and convincing evidence.
  • Matter of Harmony F. [William F.]: Defines “substantial planning” as meaningful corrective steps; emphasizes that good faith or attendance alone is insufficient and the plan must be realistic and feasible. This case conceptually underpins the Court’s “attendance without benefit” reasoning.
  • Matter of Gabriel J. [Christina I.]: Cited both for the “good faith effort alone is not enough” planning principle and for the standard governing suspended judgments after permanent neglect.
  • Matter of Caylin T. [Christine T.]: Supports appellate deference and the “sound and substantial basis” standard for reviewing Family Court’s neglect findings.
  • Matter of Colby R. [David Q.] and Matter of Corey MM. [Cassandra LL.]: Used to justify deferring to Family Court on conflicts in testimony about the quality of visitation and parenting conduct.
  • Matter of Jase M. [Holly N.], Matter of Chloe B. [Sareena B.], and Matter of Brielle UU. [Brandon UU.]: Cited for the proposition that even when a parent “participates,” termination can be upheld where the parent fails to benefit—especially regarding parenting skills and stability.
  • compare Matter of Victor WW. [Salma XX.]: Invoked as a contrast case, signaling that different records can warrant different outcomes on the “benefit from services” question. Here, the record supported non-benefit.
  • Matter of Dustin D. [Paul D.], Matter of Cordell M. [Cheryl O.], Matter of Arianna BB. [Tracy DD.], and Matter of Destiny CC.: Support the principle that failure to acknowledge and correct the conditions leading to removal (here, domestic violence and anger dysregulation) demonstrates inability to plan for the child’s future.
  • Matter of Arianna I. [Roger I.]: Reinforces affirmance where the Family Court’s determination has a sound and substantial basis, again emphasizing deference to trial-level credibility assessments.
  • Matter of Jahvani Z. [Thomas V.—Mariah Z.]: Supports denial of a suspended judgment when the parent has not made the level of progress needed to make a grace period consistent with the child’s interests.
  • Matter of Leon YY. [Christopher ZZ.]: Used to uphold Family Court’s discretionary choice of termination and freeing the child for adoption when supported by best-interests proof.
  • Matter of Samuel DD. [Margaret DD.] and Matter of Timothy GG. [Meriah GG.]: Address the mother’s argument that earlier permanency-goal determinations tainted the outcome; the Court relied on these cases to reject that theory, noting the relevant order was not appealed and, in any event, the circumstances did not warrant disturbing the neglect adjudication or disposition.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The statutory structure: “15 of the most recent 22 months,” diligent efforts, and planning

The Court applied Social Services Law § 384-b (7)(a), defining permanent neglect as a child in agency care where the parent, though physically and financially able, fails for the statutory period to substantially and continuously or repeatedly plan for the child’s future, notwithstanding the agency’s diligent efforts. The opinion follows the standard two-step approach:

  1. DSS must prove diligent efforts by clear and convincing evidence.
  2. Then DSS must prove failure to substantially plan by clear and convincing evidence.

B. Diligent efforts were satisfied by hands-on support, structured contact, and service referrals

The record—credited by Family Court and accepted on appeal—showed DSS arranged regular visitation, provided transportation resources, coordinated calls, kept the mother updated about placements and medical care, and referred and monitored participation in the relevant programming. The Third Department treated the mother’s hostility and lack of cooperation not as a failure of agency efforts, but as evidence that the agency’s reasonable attempts were met with resistance—an important doctrinal point because diligent efforts do not require the agency to guarantee success.

C. “Participation” without “benefit” can prove failure to plan

The mother’s attendance in programs did not resolve the core question: whether she took meaningful steps to correct the conditions that led to removal. The Court upheld Family Court’s finding that she failed to benefit from services where evidence showed:

  • Visits frequently became chaotic due to the children’s behaviors and the mother’s inability/unwillingness to implement coached strategies.
  • She was often unreceptive, disregarding or ignoring service-provider guidance.
  • She sometimes interacted minimally during visits.
  • Domestic-violence-related incidents continued after removal, including incarcerations and persistent cohabitation with the partner identified as a barrier.
  • When asked to reengage or expand programming (including anger management), she refused, became angry, and terminated calls.

The legal significance is that planning is outcome-oriented: it requires demonstrated behavioral change and realistic protective capacity, not simply showing up to classes. The Court linked the mother’s continued domestic violence and anger dysregulation to a continuing inability to plan safely.

D. Credibility and appellate restraint were decisive

The mother attempted to counter the record with testimony from some providers and allegations of caseworker “abuse.” The Third Department emphasized that conflicts in the evidence were for Family Court to resolve; absent a lack of “sound and substantial basis,” the appellate court would not reweigh credibility. This deference mattered because the dispositive facts—unreceptive behavior, refusal to reengage services, and continuing domestic violence—were supported by multiple witnesses and agency documentation.

E. Disposition: suspended judgment requires significant progress, and best interests control

After permanent neglect is established, the opinion reiterates that the sole concern at disposition is the best interests of the child and there is no presumption favoring return to the parent. A suspended judgment is reserved for cases where:

  • the parent has made significant progress,
  • a brief grace period could realistically demonstrate fitness, and
  • the delay is consistent with the child’s best interests.

Applying those principles, the Court focused on (1) the children’s prolonged time in care (over four years), (2) improvements in the older child’s functioning in foster care, (3) the younger child’s progress in a residential facility while maintaining contact with the foster family, (4) the foster home’s potential as an adoptive resource for both children, and (5) the mother’s continuing resistance and ongoing domestic-violence-related instability (including an October 2023 police report). The Court concluded a suspended judgment would likely not change outcomes and would impose delay inconsistent with permanency.

3.3 Impact

Although framed as an application of existing doctrine, the opinion sharpens several practical points likely to influence future permanent neglect litigation:

  • “Benefit” is the measure, not “attendance.” Agencies and courts may rely on detailed visitation observations, receptiveness to coaching, and real-world behavioral change to prove failure to plan even when program attendance is adequate.
  • Domestic violence is treated as a continuing planning barrier. Repeated incidents, continued cohabitation with an abusive partner, and refusal to engage in further interventions support findings that the parent has not corrected removal conditions.
  • Refusal to reengage services after identified non-benefit is highly probative. The decision signals that when providers request renewed programming to address persistent deficits, a parent’s refusal can weigh heavily against both planning and suspended-judgment arguments.
  • Suspended judgments remain exceptional. Extended time in care, adoptive possibility, and ongoing parental instability will often defeat requests for a grace period.
  • Collateral challenges to permanency-goal changes face procedural and substantive hurdles. The Court’s reliance on unappealed orders and lack of demonstrated prejudice limits the ability to re-litigate earlier permanency determinations within a termination appeal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Permanent neglect: Not a one-time mistake; it is a statutory finding that, over a defined period, a parent did not make adequate, meaningful plans to safely care for the child, even though the agency tried to help.
  • 15 of the most recent 22 months: A time benchmark used to assess whether the failure to plan is sustained, not temporary.
  • Diligent efforts: The agency must make reasonable, practical efforts (visits, referrals, updates, transportation help), but it does not have to achieve reunification if the parent will not engage or change.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A higher standard than “more likely than not”; it requires a high degree of certainty based on the evidence.
  • Substantially plan: Taking real, effective steps to fix the problems that led to removal; “trying” or “attending” without meaningful improvement may be insufficient.
  • Suspended judgment: A conditional pause after permanent neglect is found, giving the parent a short period to demonstrate fitness; granted only when substantial progress makes success realistic and delay benefits (or at least does not harm) the child.
  • Conditional judicial surrender (vacated): A parent’s agreement to surrender rights contingent on a condition (here, adoption by a particular foster parent). If a material condition fails, the surrender can be undone and the case proceeds.
  • Sound and substantial basis / credibility deference: Appellate courts generally do not retry the facts; they affirm if the trial judge’s findings are well-supported and credibility choices are reasonable.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Macayla N. (Sheena N.) reinforces a central theme in New York permanent neglect law: the system evaluates whether a parent benefits from services and achieves real protective change, not whether the parent merely participates. The Third Department’s affirmance underscores that persistent domestic violence, anger dysregulation, resistance to provider guidance, and refusal to reengage programming can collectively establish a failure to substantially plan. On disposition, the decision reiterates that a suspended judgment is exceptional and must yield to children’s needs for stability and timely permanency, particularly after years in care and where adoption is a viable, stabilizing outcome.