Attempted Wire Fraud: “Benefit of the Bargain” and No-Actual-Loss Theories Do Not Defeat Liability; Intended Loss Includes Amounts Placed at Risk

Introduction

In United States v. Robert E. Carter (7th Cir. Jan. 23, 2026) (nonprecedential disposition), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence of Robert E. Carter for two counts of attempted wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349. Carter (self-represented at trial and on appeal) pursued truck leases for a new trucking business by supplying altered financial statements and, in one instance, a fake wire-transfer confirmation.

The appeal raised issues typical of fraud prosecutions and fraud sentencings: (i) sufficiency of the indictment; (ii) limits on defense presentation (PowerPoint slides; cross-examination); (iii) admission of the defendant’s financial documents under evidentiary rules; (iv) refusal to give requested “theory of defense” jury instructions (good faith; “benefit of the bargain”; no deprivation of property/no actual loss); (v) cumulative error; and (vi) guideline loss and restitution calculations—especially where a proposed deal never closed.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed across the board. It held that the indictment adequately pleaded attempted wire fraud; Carter waived any complaint about restrictions on his opening slides by agreeing to modifications; the admission of his financial records was permissible as direct proof of the fraud scheme and was properly limited to avoid unfair prejudice; the district court did not improperly restrict cross-examination; and the requested jury instructions were correctly denied because they were not accurate defenses to wire fraud (and a standalone good-faith instruction was not required).

At sentencing, the Seventh Circuit upheld an intended-loss finding for the prospective lessor that declined to lease to Carter, reasoning that intended loss covers amounts the defendant placed at risk even if no actual loss occurred. It also upheld restitution to the lessor that did lease trucks to Carter, finding the district court’s computation within the permissible range.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• United States v. Alhalabi, 443 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2006)
  Used to frame indictment sufficiency. The panel applied the familiar rule that an indictment is adequate if it alleges the elements, describes the scheme, and identifies the communications (“wires”) used to execute or attempt it. Here, the indictment did so by describing the altered statements and wire-related communications.
• United States v. Shehadeh, 127 F.4th 1058, 1063 (7th Cir. 2025)
  Provided the waiver principle: a defendant who agrees to a course of action at trial (here, modifying slides after an objection) cannot later complain on appeal that the court erred in adopting that course.
• United States v. Ferrell, 816 F.3d 433, 445-46 (7th Cir. 2015)
  Supported admission of financial evidence as “direct evidence” of the charged scheme, not merely character evidence. The court treated Carter’s true financial condition as probative of whether his representations were fraudulent and whether he could perform the lease obligations he was inducing others to extend.
• United States v. Dukes, 147 F.4th 711, 718-19 (7th Cir. 2025)
  Reinforced the use of limiting instructions to mitigate unfair prejudice where evidence is admissible for a specific purpose. The district court admitted the financial documents to show misrepresentation and instructed the jury not to use them for any other purpose.
• United States v. Griffin, 76 F.4th 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2023)
  Supplied the standards for reviewing a denied jury instruction request (de novo) and the principle that a defendant is not entitled to an instruction that misstates the law. It also appears later as the baseline standard for guideline interpretation (de novo) and loss findings (clear error), and for restitution review (abuse of discretion).
• United States v. Chanu, 40 F.4th 528, 543 (7th Cir. 2022)
  Central to rejecting Carter’s “good faith” instruction demand: the Seventh Circuit reiterated that, in wire fraud, lack of good faith (i.e., intent to defraud) is embedded in the government’s burden, so a separate “good faith” instruction is not required.
• United States v. Smith, 150 F.4th 832, 850 (7th Cir. 2025)
  Complements Chanu: district judges may give a good-faith instruction, but failing to do so does not, by itself, deny a fair trial.
• Kousisis v. United States, 605 U.S. 114, 123-24 (2025)
  The opinion’s most consequential authority for the defense theories. The panel used Kousisis to reject the notion that “benefit of the bargain” negates fraud and to emphasize that wire fraud focuses on a scheme to obtain property by fraudulent means—not on whether the victim received something in return.
• Kousisis v. United States, 605 U.S. 114, 124-25 (2025)
  Also used for the proposition that the government need not prove actual deprivation or actual loss in order to establish wire fraud (and a fortiori attempted wire fraud). This undercut Carter’s proposed “no deprivation/no loss” instructions.
• United States v. Medrano, 83 F.4th 1073, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 2023)
  Provided the harmless-error framing for Carter’s cumulative-error claim: even assuming mistakes, reversal requires errors with a substantial influence on the verdict.
• United States v. Buncich, 926 F.3d 361, 368-69 (7th Cir. 2019)
  Supported the panel’s conclusion that any alleged trial errors were harmless in light of overwhelming evidence— including Carter’s own admissions that he sent fraudulent financial statements and a fake wire confirmation.
• United States v. Lauer, 148 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 1998)
  Cited for the sentencing proposition that “intended loss” does not require actual loss; it encompasses the amount the defendant put at risk. This mattered because one lessor declined to contract with Carter, yet the court still attributed intended loss based on the exposure that would have existed had the scheme succeeded.
• United States v. Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d 525, 539 (7th Cir. 2017)
  Reinforced the definition of intended loss as the amount placed at risk, supporting the district court’s methodology for calculating intended loss from the aborted leasing deal.
• United States v. Kyereme, 127 F.4th 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Collins, 949 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 2020))
  Provided a demanding appellate standard for restitution challenges: the appellant must show the district court’s loss calculations were not just inaccurate, but outside the realm of permissible computations. The panel held Carter failed that standard because he produced no evidence undermining the lessor’s loss statement.

Legal Reasoning

1. Indictment sufficiency (attempted wire fraud)
   Applying United States v. Alhalabi, the court concluded the charging instrument properly set out the elements, described the fraudulent scheme (altered financial statements; fake wire confirmation), and identified the wire transmissions. That is enough to provide notice and protect against double jeopardy.
2. Defense presentation and waiver
   Carter challenged the handling of his opening-statement slides, but the panel held the issue waived under United States v. Shehadeh because Carter agreed to modify the slides and then presented them. The court also stressed that he was still permitted to argue his core themes to the jury.
3. Financial documents as scheme evidence, not forbidden character proof
   Carter invoked FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1), contending the government used his finances as character evidence. The Seventh Circuit treated the documents as intrinsically probative of the charged deception: if Carter lacked the funds, that fact made it more likely he knowingly misrepresented financial strength to induce leasing decisions. Under United States v. Ferrell, such proof can be direct evidence of the fraud’s mechanics and intent. Any risk of unfair prejudice was addressed through a limiting instruction, consistent with United States v. Dukes.
4. Cross-examination limits
   The panel found no meaningful restriction on cross-examination: the only limit was against repetition, and the judge even recalled the witness to allow further questioning. The court thus rejected the premise that the trial judge curtailed the defense.
5. Jury instructions: why Carter’s “theories of defense” failed legally
   Using United States v. Griffin as the framework, the court held the proposed instructions were properly denied because they misstated wire-fraud law:
   • Good faith: Under United States v. Chanu and United States v. Smith, a distinct good-faith instruction is not required because the government must prove intent to defraud.
   • “Benefit of the bargain”: Under Kousisis v. United States, receiving something of value does not defeat fraud where the defendant used deceit to obtain property.
   • No deprivation / no actual loss: Under Kousisis v. United States, wire fraud does not require proof of actual loss; attempted wire fraud likewise focuses on the attempted scheme and intent rather than consummated harm.
6. Cumulative error and harmlessness
   Even assuming arguendo some error, United States v. Medrano and United States v. Buncich supported affirmance because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming—particularly Carter’s admissions that he sent fraudulent financial statements and a fake wire confirmation.
7. Sentencing: intended loss for an unconsummated transaction
   The guidelines range turned partly on intended loss under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Relying on United States v. Lauer and United States v. Betts-Gaston, the panel approved treating intended loss as the amount “placed at risk,” even though the second lessor did not contract with Carter. The district court grounded the intended-loss figure in a declaration estimating the loss the lessor would have suffered before repossession if the scheme had succeeded, and Carter offered no competing evidence.
8. Restitution: permissible computation range
   Applying United States v. Kyereme (quoting United States v. Collins), the panel held Carter did not show the restitution figure was outside permissible bounds. His claim depended on additional alleged payments, but he produced no proof undermining the lessor’s loss statement.

Impact

Although designated nonprecedential, the decision is a clear application of post-Kousisis v. United States wire-fraud principles to common defense narratives in commercial-deal fraud cases:

• “We paid something” is not a wire-fraud defense: The opinion reinforces that partial performance or some consideration to the victim does not negate a scheme to obtain property through deception.
• Actual loss is not the touchstone—especially for attempt: The court’s treatment of attempted wire fraud and sentencing intended loss underscores the law’s focus on the fraudulent objective and the risk created by the scheme.
• Sentencing exposure can arise even where the deal never closed: Intended loss may be driven by credible estimates of what would have happened had the victim relied on the misrepresentations (e.g., expected months before repossession).
• Trial management and waiver matter for pro se defendants: The waiver holding (slides) and harmless-error analysis illustrate how difficult it is to overturn a verdict absent a preserved, outcome-affecting error—particularly where the defendant’s own statements supply key proof.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Attempted wire fraud

A crime focused on trying to carry out a deceptive scheme using interstate wire communications (emails, electronic transmissions, etc.). The prosecution need not show the scheme fully succeeded or that the victim suffered a completed financial loss.

“Scheme to defraud” vs. “benefit of the bargain”

Fraud law targets deceptive methods used to obtain money or property. Even if a victim receives something (e.g., a deposit or partial payments), deception used to induce the transaction can still be criminal.

Intended loss (U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1)

For guideline calculations, “intended loss” is generally the amount the defendant meant to cause or the amount placed at risk by the scheme, even if the victim avoided the harm (for example, by declining the contract).

Limiting instruction

A direction from the judge telling jurors they may consider evidence only for a specific purpose (here, proving misrepresentation/intent), not as proof of bad character.

Harmless error

Even if the trial judge made a mistake, an appellate court will not reverse unless the mistake likely affected the verdict in a meaningful way.

Conclusion

United States v. Carter reaffirms core wire-fraud principles: defendants cannot avoid liability by arguing the victim received some value or that no final loss occurred; requested jury instructions premised on those theories may be refused as legally incorrect; and guideline intended-loss calculations may rest on the risk the defendant created—even where a victim detected the scheme and refused to contract. The decision also illustrates the appellate consequences of waiver and the difficulty of overturning fraud convictions when the evidentiary record includes the defendant’s own admissions and documentary proof of falsification.