Attempted Hijacking Sentenced Under the Hijacking Statute (Not General Attempt): Waiver, Plain-Error Limits, and Non-Structural Voir Dire Oath Deviations

1. Introduction

In COLLINS v. THE STATE (Two Cases) (Nos. S26A0426 & S26A0427), decided June 30, 2026, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions of Miles Chatezal Collins and Josiah Hughley, Jr. for felony murder and related offenses arising from the July 10, 2022 shooting death of Bradley Coleman at a Gwinnett County gas station.

The appeals raised a cluster of recurring criminal-procedure and sentencing issues: (i) constitutional sufficiency of the evidence for hijacking a motor vehicle (including “attempt” hijacking) and related Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act counts; (ii) whether the defense could obtain plain-error relief for omitted or allegedly flawed jury instructions; (iii) whether admission of a co-defendant’s statement violated Bruton v. United States, 391 US 123 (1968); (iv) whether the rule of lenity capped punishment for “attempted” hijacking at the general attempt maximum; (v) whether counsel was ineffective for not seeking suppression under OCGA § 24-8-824 (hope of benefit); and (vi) whether a deviation from the statutory voir dire oath in OCGA § 15-12-132 was structural/non-waivable error.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed across the board. It held:

  • Sufficiency: The evidence supported Collins’s hijacking conviction as a party to the crime and supported Hughley’s hijacking conviction as a principal.
  • Accomplice-corroboration instruction: Collins affirmatively waived any complaint about the omission of an OCGA § 24-14-8 charge, foreclosing plain-error review.
  • Bruton: Collins failed to identify any inculpatory “others/they intended to steal” statement in the redacted interview played to the jury, and thus failed to show error by the record.
  • Aggravated-assault instruction: Even assuming the court charged a method not alleged in the indictment, Collins failed to show the instruction likely affected the outcome under plain-error standards.
  • Lenity/sentencing: The hijacking statute’s explicit inclusion of “attempts” makes it the specific governing statute; the rule of lenity does not require sentencing under the general attempt statute.
  • IAC/suppression: Counsel was not deficient because a suppression motion under OCGA § 24-8-824 would not “clearly have succeeded”; officers’ comments were noncommittal and not an unlawful hope of benefit.
  • Voir dire oath deviation: The omission of “true” from the OCGA § 15-12-132 oath was waivable absent objection and required a showing of prejudice under existing precedent; the Court declined to extend the “unsworn jury” jurisdictional-nullity rule to voir dire-oath deviations.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence & Party-to-a-Crime Liability

  • Jones v. State, 304 Ga. 594, 598 (2018) and Davis v. State, 316 Ga. 418, 420 (2023): The Court applied the familiar constitutional sufficiency framework—viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferring to the jury on credibility/weight.
  • Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743, 744 (2012): Reinforced that proof of commission plus proof the defendant was a party suffices.
  • Badie v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2026), S26A0051, slip op. at 4 (Ga. Mar. 17, 2026): Supplied the articulation that “common criminal intent” may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct before/during/after the crime—central to affirming Collins’s hijacking conviction as a party.
  • Ward v. State, 376 Ga. App. 659, 660, (2025): Provided the three elements of first-degree hijacking used by the Court to structure its sufficiency analysis.
  • Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 594, 597-98 (2019) and Richardson v. State, 373 Ga. App. 252, 254 (2024): Supported the proposition that hijacking/attempt hijacking can be proved even where the car is not ultimately taken, so long as the evidence shows taking/attempted taking by force/violence/intimidation with a weapon.

B. Plain Error, Jury Instructions, and Waiver

  • Stitts v. State, 323 Ga. 109, 114 (2025): Supplied the four-prong plain-error framework and emphasized that an appellant must show no affirmative waiver. This was decisive for Collins’s accomplice-corroboration claim.
  • Szorcsik v. State, 303 Ga. 737, 742 (2018) and Holmes v. State, 318 Ga. 213, 224 (2024): Underpinned the holding that when counsel asks that a charge be omitted (or agrees to its removal), the issue is affirmatively waived.
  • Gude v. State, 320 Ga. 308, 311-312 (2024), Cato v. State, 304 Ga. 496, 498-99 (2018), and Simpson v. State, 302 Ga. 875, 877 (2017): These cases supplied the Court’s “no likely effect on outcome” reasoning where (i) the jury is told the State must prove the indictment, (ii) the jury has the indictment during deliberations, and (iii) the evidence overwhelmingly corresponds to the indicted method.

C. Bruton and Appellate Burdens

  • Bruton v. United States, 391 US 123 (1968): The doctrinal foundation for Collins’s claim—though the Court rejected the claim on a threshold record basis.
  • Soto v. State, 303 Ga. 517, 523 (2018) and Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 650 (2023): Anchored the requirement that an appellant must show error affirmatively by record citation; the Court will not scour the record to build the argument.

D. Rule of Lenity, Specific vs. General Statutes

  • Smallwood v. State, 310 Ga. 445, 451-53 (2020), Sosebee v. State, 317 Ga. 424, 427 (2023), and State v. Nankervis, 295 Ga. 406, 409 (2014): These cases supplied the controlling interpretive hierarchy: lenity applies only after statutory-construction tools fail, and the specific statute controls over the general absent contrary legislative intent. The Court used them to hold that OCGA § 16-5-44.1(b)(1) (hijacking including attempt) governs over OCGA § 16-4-1 (general criminal attempt).

E. Ineffective Assistance & Suppression Based on “Hope of Benefit”

  • Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984), Butler v. State, 313 Ga. 675, 683 (2022), Burke v. State, 320 Ga. 706, 708 (2025), and Starks v. State, 320 Ga. 300, 304 (2024): Provided the deficiency/prejudice framework and the principle that failure on one prong ends the claim.
  • Moss v. State, 322 Ga. 757, 767 (2025): Supplied the crucial filter for suppression-based IAC: the defendant must show the proposed motion “would clearly have succeeded.”
  • Lewis v. State, 311 Ga. 650, 658 (2021) and State v. Leverette, 320 Ga. 806, 809 (2025): Defined “slightest hope of benefit” as promises relating to reduced criminal punishment (not colloquial encouragement).
  • Short v. State, 321 Ga. 613, 620-21 (2025), Mitchell v. State, 314 Ga. 566, 573-74 (2022), and Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 212 (2007): These cases supported the conclusion that noncommittal statements about possible outcomes (especially where officers disclaim authority) do not create an inadmissible hope of benefit.
  • Esprit v. State, 305 Ga. 429, 438 (2019): Used to reject any notion counsel was deficient for failing to argue for overruling existing “promise” precedent under OCGA § 24-8-824.

F. Juror Oaths: Waiver, Prejudice, and Jurisdictional Nullity

  • Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652, 654-55 (1981) and Hargett v. State, 285 Ga. 82, 86-87 (2009): Controlled the voir dire oath issue—errors in administering the OCGA § 15-12-132 oath are waivable absent objection and require a showing of prejudice; harm is not presumed. (The Court noted Hargett was overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 23 (2020).)
  • Phillips v. State, 275 Ga. 595, 596 (2002), Stockford v. State, 276 Ga. 241, 243 (2003), and Smith v. State, 63 Ga. 168, 168-69 (1879): Provided analogous waiver principles for deviations from the OCGA § 15-12-139 trial-jury oath (when an oath is administered but imperfect).
  • Slaughter v. State, 100 Ga. 323, 324-30 (1897), Spencer v. State, 281 Ga. 533, 534 (2007), and Bowman v. State, 315 Ga. 707, 710-11 (2023): Distinguished as addressing the complete failure to administer the trial-jury oath—treated as a non-waivable jurisdictional defect rendering the trial a nullity. Hughley urged extension of this doctrine to voir dire oath deviations; the Court declined.
  • Profet v. State, 322 Ga. 731, 738 n.3 (2025) and Owens v. State, 317 Ga. 125, 126-27 (2023): Cited for the Court’s refusal to undertake stare decisis overruling analysis when the appellant does not do the necessary work.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Hijacking (Attempt) and “Force”

The hijacking statute, OCGA § 16-5-44.1(b)(1), explicitly criminalizes not only obtaining a motor vehicle by force/violence/intimidation while armed, but also attempting or conspiring to do so. For Collins, the Court relied on party-to-a-crime principles: rental of the Mercedes by Collins and Booker, CSLI placing all three in the area at key times, video showing an armed entry into the victim’s driver seat and rapid vehicle movement consistent with flight, and post-crime behavior (including texts about wiping down the car and the urgent return of the rental).

For Hughley, the claimed “abandonment” theory (that force occurred only after the attempt ended) failed because evidence supported force during the attempt itself: the armed entry into the vehicle, struggle inside the car, and pulling the victim out.

B. Plain Error and Instructional Claims: The Court’s Gatekeeping

The opinion illustrates two practical barriers to plain-error relief:

  • Affirmative waiver defeats plain error. Collins’s counsel not only failed to request the accomplice-corroboration instruction but agreed it should be struck—classic waiver under Stitts v. State, 323 Ga. 109 (2025) and Szorcsik v. State, 303 Ga. 737 (2018).
  • No “likely effect on outcome,” no relief. Even if the aggravated-assault instruction referenced a method not charged, the Court relied on Gude v. State, 320 Ga. 308 (2024) and Cato v. State, 304 Ga. 496 (2018): the jury was instructed to prove the indictment and had the indictment; and, given undisputed evidence of a fatal gunshot, it was highly unlikely the jury premised felony murder on mere apprehension.

C. Bruton as a Record-Based Claim

Rather than reaching nuanced Bruton redaction doctrine, the Court disposed of the issue on a foundational appellate principle: Collins did not identify (and the Court did not find) the claimed “they/others intended to steal” statement in the redacted interview played to the jury. Under Soto v. State, 303 Ga. 517 (2018), the appellant bears the burden to show error by the record.

D. Lenity and the “Specific Controls the General” Rule

The Court’s lenity discussion is a straightforward statutory-construction holding with real sentencing consequences. Because OCGA § 16-5-44.1(b)(1) specifically includes “attempts,” it is not ambiguous whether the legislature authorized the hijacking-range punishment for attempted hijacking. Under Smallwood v. State, 310 Ga. 445 (2020) and State v. Nankervis, 295 Ga. 406 (2014), the specific statute prevails over OCGA § 16-4-1 (general attempt), so the rule of lenity does not reduce sentencing exposure to the general-attempt maximum.

E. Hope of Benefit and Suppression/IAC

The Court evaluated the challenged interview comments through the lens of whether they were a promise of reduced punishment or merely noncommittal commentary about potential consequences. Officers said cooperation “could” matter, but expressly disclaimed certainty or authority (“We don’t know that, we can’t say anything about that”). Under Short v. State, 321 Ga. 613 (2025) and Lewis v. State, 311 Ga. 650 (2021), that did not amount to the “slightest hope of benefit” as Georgia law uses that term.

Importantly, the IAC claim failed not because the confession was necessarily voluntary in an abstract sense, but because under Moss v. State, 322 Ga. 757 (2025), Hughley had to show the suppression motion “would clearly have succeeded.”

F. Voir Dire Oath Deviations: Not Structural, and Not Automatically Reversible

Hughley’s most ambitious argument sought to reclassify voir dire oath deviations as non-waivable “structural/jurisdictional” error akin to an unsworn trial jury under Slaughter v. State, 100 Ga. 323 (1897) and Bowman v. State, 315 Ga. 707 (2023). The Court declined, emphasizing that existing precedent—Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652 (1981)—requires an objection and a showing of prejudice for OCGA § 15-12-132 errors, and the appellant did not do the stare decisis work necessary to justify overruling those cases.

3.3 Impact

  • Sentencing exposure for “attempted hijacking” remains high. Prosecutors may charge (and courts may sentence) “attempt” hijacking under OCGA § 16-5-44.1(b)(1), avoiding the lower general-attempt cap; lenity arguments will face the “specific over general” barrier.
  • Defense counsel must preserve instructional issues deliberately. The opinion is a cautionary tale: agreement to omit a charge can be treated as affirmative waiver, not mere forfeiture, eliminating plain-error relief.
  • Bruton claims are record-intensive. Appellants must cite the exact admitted statement; courts will not reconstruct the claim from broader interview context.
  • Voir dire oath deviations remain waivable and prejudice-based. Absent a properly presented stare decisis challenge, deviations from the OCGA § 15-12-132 oath are not treated as structural error requiring automatic reversal.
  • Hope-of-benefit suppression remains narrowly defined. Investigators’ noncommittal statements about possible outcomes—especially with disclaimers—are unlikely to qualify as unlawful inducements under OCGA § 24-8-824; IAC claims will often fail the “would clearly have succeeded” requirement.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Felony murder: A killing that occurs during the commission (or attempted commission) of another felony; the State need not prove intent to kill, only intent to commit the underlying felony.
  • Party to a crime (OCGA 16-2-20): You can be guilty even if you are not the shooter/primary actor, if you intentionally aid or share the criminal intent shown by conduct before, during, and after.
  • Hijacking a motor vehicle (OCGA § 16-5-44.1(b)(1)): Armed obtaining—or attempting to obtain—a vehicle from a person/presence by force/violence/intimidation.
  • Plain error (OCGA § 17-8-58(b)): A demanding standard for unpreserved errors; affirmative waiver defeats it, and the appellant must show likely impact on the verdict.
  • Bruton: Limits use of a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession in a joint trial when it directly incriminates another defendant and cannot be adequately cured.
  • Rule of lenity: A tie-breaker for genuinely ambiguous criminal punishment statutes; it does not apply when standard construction shows the legislature clearly chose a specific punishment scheme.
  • “Hope of benefit” (OCGA § 24-8-824): A confession is inadmissible if induced by a promise relating to reduced punishment; generalized moral appeals or speculative/noncommittal comments usually do not qualify.
  • Structural/jurisdictional error vs. waivable irregularity: Some defects (e.g., a completely unsworn trial jury) can make a trial a “nullity,” but many procedural missteps are waived without objection and require proof of prejudice.

5. Conclusion

The Court’s decision is an enforcement of doctrinal “guardrails” more than a reworking of substantive criminal law: it confirms robust sufficiency review deference to juries; underscores that waiver (not just forfeiture) can foreclose plain-error relief; rejects record-unsupported Bruton claims; treats certain instructional mismatches as non-prejudicial under settled plain-error precedent; and, most significantly for sentencing, holds that attempted hijacking is punishable under the hijacking statute itself because that statute specifically criminalizes attempts, defeating lenity arguments grounded in the general attempt statute. Finally, it preserves the existing Georgia framework that deviations from the OCGA § 15-12-132 voir dire oath are waivable and not structural absent a properly developed stare decisis challenge.