Attempted Disarming of a Peace Officer as a Robbery-Analogue Felony Supports § 922(g)(1) Disarmament Under Bruen

Case: United States v. Mitchell (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 2026)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Key Holding (new application): A Louisiana felony conviction for attempting to disarm a peace officer is “functionally identical to robbery,” and therefore is a historically supported predicate for permanently disarming the offender under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

I. Introduction

United States v. Mitchell presented the Fifth Circuit with an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to a felon-in-possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Maurice Mitchell argued that his prior Louisiana felony for attempting to disarm a peace officer lacked adequate Founding-era historical analogues under New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, and thus could not constitutionally serve as the predicate felony justifying his disarmament.

The appeal also raised two trial issues: whether a flight instruction was improperly given to the jury, and whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction, particularly in light of investigative gaps and DNA evidence not matching Mitchell.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed across the board, but the opinion’s most important contribution lies in how it classifies the predicate offense: it treats attempted disarming of an officer as a robbery-analogue and brings it within the circuit’s established line of decisions allowing § 922(g)(1) disarmament for robbery/theft/burglary-type felonies.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Second Amendment: Mitchell’s Louisiana felony for attempting to disarm a peace officer (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:34.6, via attempt) is “virtually identical to robbery” because it involves taking law-enforcement equipment from an officer’s person or immediate control by force or threat of force. Because Fifth Circuit precedent permits § 922(g)(1) disarmament for robbery and similar crimes, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Mitchell.
  • Drug-possession predicates: The government conceded that, under circuit precedent, Mitchell’s simple drug-possession priors could not constitutionally support § 922(g)(1) as applied to him, citing United States v. Hembree. The court accepted the posture but relied on the disarming-of-an-officer conviction instead.
  • Flight instruction: The court held the evidence reasonably supported the inferences required for a flight instruction and found no abuse of discretion.
  • Sufficiency of the evidence: Because Mitchell failed to renew his Rule 29 motion, the court applied the “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard and held the record was not devoid of evidence of guilt.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

The opinion is built on three layers of authority: (1) the Supreme Court’s post-Bruen methodological framework, (2) the Fifth Circuit’s developing § 922(g)(1) as-applied caselaw differentiating between types of predicate felonies, and (3) longstanding evidentiary and appellate standards governing flight instructions and sufficiency review.

  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022):

    The foundational methodological pivot. The opinion uses Bruen’s “historical tradition” test, emphasizing analogical reasoning and the “why” and “how” similarity analysis later repeated in subsequent Supreme Court cases.

  • United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. __, 146 S. Ct. 1677 (2026):

    The court quotes Hemani for the two-step structure: coverage by the Second Amendment’s text and then the government’s burden to prove consistency with historical tradition. It also highlights Hemani’s framing that the “why” (purpose) and “how” (operation) of regulations are the key comparison points.

  • United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024):

    The opinion relies on Rahimi to underscore that the government need not identify a “historical twin,” and to support the general historical principle that Founding-era laws disarmed persons who threatened the physical safety of others. This principle supplies the normative bridge from “robbery-like violence” to “constitutional disarmament.”

  • District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008):

    Cited for the proposition that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, anchoring the analysis before shifting to the historical-tradition test.

  • United States v. Hembree, 165 F.4th 909 (5th Cir. 2026):

    Critical in narrowing the dispute. The government conceded, consistent with Hembree, that § 922(g)(1) could not be constitutionally applied to a predicate of simple methamphetamine possession (and by extension, Mitchell’s simple drug-possession priors). That concession forced the case to turn on whether attempted disarming of an officer is within the historically supported category of violent, coercive, theft-like offenses.

  • United States v. Schnur, 132 F.4th 863 (2025):

    The principal Fifth Circuit comparator on predicates. Schnur rejected an as-applied challenge where the predicate felonies were robbery and burglary—crimes the Fifth Circuit views as sufficiently tied to historical disarmament traditions. Mitchell extends that rationale by classification: if a predicate is “functionally identical to robbery,” it falls within the same permissible bucket.

  • Additional Fifth Circuit predicate cases:
    • United States v. Quiroz, 125 F.4th 713 (5th Cir. 2025) (burglary predicate)
    • United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024) (car theft predicate)
    • United States v. Charles, No. 23-50131, 2025 WL 416092 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished) (theft and burglary)
    • United States v. Arredondo, No. 24-50386, 2025 WL 1249901 (Apr. 30, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished) (robbery)
    • United States v. Collette, No. 22-51062, 2024 WL 4457462 (5th Cir. Oct. 10, 2024) (per curiam) (unpublished) (theft)

    These cases collectively form a circuit pattern: § 922(g)(1) is treated as constitutionally applicable when the predicate is a crime involving coercive taking, invasion, or violence risk (robbery/theft/burglary categories). Mitchell explicitly plugs attempted disarming of an officer into that lineage.

  • United States v. Cordova, 176 F.4th 381 (5th Cir. 2026) and United States v. Reyes, 141 F.4th 682 (5th Cir. 2025) (per curiam):

    Used to reinforce that disarmament is permissible for offenders who pose a “credible threat to the physical safety of others.” The court leverages this phrasing to frame attempted disarming of an officer as inherently implicating immediate violence risk.

  • Stokeling v. United States, 586 U.S. 73 (2019):

    Though not a Second Amendment case, Stokeling is cited for common-law robbery’s force element and for state-law robbery definitions focusing on force overcoming resistance—supporting the “robbery-like” characterization of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:34.6.

  • Commerce Clause foreclosure: United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308 (5th Cir. 2025)

    The court summarily rejected the Commerce Clause attack as foreclosed, reflecting the Fifth Circuit’s continued adherence to existing precedent validating § 922(g)(1) under Congress’s commerce power.

  • Facial challenge foreclosure: United States v. Cisneros, 130 F.4th 472 (5th Cir. 2025)

    The court reiterated that a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed in-circuit, narrowing the inquiry to an as-applied challenge and thereby increasing the importance of how Mitchell’s specific predicate felony is categorized.

  • Flight instruction standards:
    • United States v. Martinez, 190 F.3d 673 (5th Cir. 1999)
    • United States v. Murphy, 996 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1993)
    • United States v. Kalish, 690 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1982)
    • United States v. Templeton, 624 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2010)
    • United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977)
    • United States v. Theagene, 565 F.3d 911 (5th Cir. 2009)

    These cases supply the four-inference framework for when a flight instruction is proper, the “reasonable support” threshold, and the principle that competing innocent explanations do not preclude the instruction. Myers is distinguished as involving uncertainty whether flight occurred and uncertainty as to which crime motivated it.

  • Sufficiency and standards of review:
    • Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (ordinary sufficiency standard)
    • United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004) (“manifest miscarriage of justice” when Rule 29 not renewed)
    • United States v. Martinez, 921 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2019) (inferences from totality of evidence)
  • Second Amendment review posture: United States v. Howard, 766 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2014) (de novo review of constitutionality challenges)
  • Plain error backdrop (not resolved): United States v. Fairley, 880 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2018) (plain error where not objected)

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s Second Amendment reasoning follows the now-standard post-Bruen sequence, but the decisive move is how it characterizes the predicate felony to match the circuit’s already-approved historical category.

  1. Methodology adopted (text → history):

    Invoking United States v. Hemani and Bruen, the court described: (i) whether the Amendment’s terms cover the conduct (possession of a firearm), triggering presumptive protection; and (ii) whether the government can overcome that presumption by showing the regulation is consistent with historical tradition through analogical reasoning focused on “why” and “how.” The court did not dwell on step (i), consistent with many § 922(g)(1) opinions, and turned to step (ii).

  2. Narrowing the predicate set:

    The government conceded that drug-possession predicates were constitutionally problematic under United States v. Hembree, shifting the case to Mitchell’s 2017 conviction for attempting to disarm a peace officer. This is doctrinally significant: rather than expanding historical analogues for nonviolent drug possession, the panel reaffirmed a narrower approach—upholding § 922(g)(1) here because a different, more violence-adjacent predicate exists.

  3. Functional equivalence: disarming an officer = robbery-like taking by force:

    The court treated La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:34.6(A) as a “situation-specific robbery offense” because it criminalizes taking law-enforcement equipment from an officer’s person or immediate control “through the use of force or threat of force.” It then compared the elements to Louisiana simple robbery (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:65(A)) and to common-law understandings of robbery (citing Stokeling v. United States).

    The doctrinal payoff is categorical: if the predicate is robbery-like, then it fits within the Fifth Circuit’s already accepted historical justification for disarming those who commit coercive, violent, or violent-risk property crimes.
  4. Historical tradition invoked at the level of principle, not a statute-by-statute match:

    Drawing on United States v. Rahimi (and its “no historical twin required” phrasing, as repeated in Hemani), the panel emphasized that Founding-era traditions included disarming people who “threat[ened] . . . the physical safety of others.” On that view, § 922(g)(1) “tracks” the historical purpose and operation: keeping guns away from dangerous individuals.

  5. Attempt liability does not reduce disarmability:

    Mitchell’s key factual distinction—he was convicted of attempted disarmament, not completed disarmament—was rejected as irrelevant because attempt requires specific intent to commit the crime even if not consummated. The court treated the “failed robber” argument as unsupported and inconsistent with its dangerousness framing.

  6. Offense seriousness framed by risk to officers and the public:

    The panel leaned on the statute’s definition of “law enforcement equipment,” which includes firearms and other weapons as well as non-lethal tools (sprays, chemical weapons, electro-shock weapons). It cited state cases (State v. Williams; State v. Merritt) to illustrate the obvious escalation risks when suspects attempt to seize officers’ tools. This supported the conclusion that the offense is inherently tied to immediate violence risk.

  7. Flight instruction and sufficiency rulings:

    For the flight instruction, the panel applied United States v. Murphy’s four-inference test and held evidence of immediate flight, abandonment/hiding of the bicycle/bag, and linkage of the bicycle to Mitchell provided “reasonable support” under United States v. Kalish and United States v. Templeton. For sufficiency, because Mitchell failed to renew his acquittal motion, United States v. Avants controlled, requiring a showing of a “manifest miscarriage of justice,” which the panel found absent given the circumstantial evidence and permissible inferences (citing United States v. Martinez (2019)).

C. Impact

1) Clarifies predicate categorization under Fifth Circuit § 922(g)(1) doctrine.
The opinion reinforces that, in this circuit, § 922(g)(1) as-applied validity often turns less on an offender’s generalized status and more on whether the predicate felony belongs to a historically supported class. After United States v. Hembree narrowed drug-possession predicates, Mitchell demonstrates the government’s path forward: identify a predicate that can be analogized to robbery/theft/ burglary or otherwise framed as posing a “credible threat to the physical safety of others.”

2) Extends “robbery/theft/burglary predicates” to officer-disarming crimes via functional equivalence.
The key doctrinal move is the “functionally identical” analysis. Future cases involving predicate felonies not named “robbery” may be litigated through element-by-element comparison to robbery-like takings by force (e.g., carjacking variants, weapon-snatching statutes, or certain coercive seizure offenses), potentially expanding the range of predicates treated as historically disarmable without requiring new historical research for each statute.

3) Limits the practical significance of DNA mismatch evidence in sufficiency review when circumstantial inferences remain strong.
On the trial side, the opinion underscores that investigative imperfections and exculpatory-forensic snippets (like a DNA profile inconsistent with a reference sample) may not defeat conviction—especially on the heightened “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard—if the circumstantial narrative (possession indicators, placement, flight, abandonment) supports guilt.

4) Reinforces permissive use of flight instructions.
The court’s treatment of alternative innocent explanations follows established circuit practice: if the evidence can reasonably support the required inferences, the instruction is permissible even if other explanations exist.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “As-applied” vs. “facial” challenge:

    A facial challenge argues the law is unconstitutional in all its applications; an as-applied challenge argues it is unconstitutional as used against this defendant given his circumstances. Here, a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) was foreclosed by United States v. Cisneros, so Mitchell could only argue that disarming him violated the Second Amendment.

  • Bruen “historical tradition” and analogical reasoning (“why” and “how”):

    Courts do not need an identical old law. They look for historically established regulations that are relevantly similar in (i) the purpose (“why”) and (ii) the mechanism/effect (“how”). The panel found the relevant purpose to be preventing violence by keeping arms from dangerous individuals, and found robbery-like offenses historically fit within that tradition.

  • “Predicate felony” in § 922(g)(1):

    § 922(g)(1) applies if a defendant has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year. Post-Bruen litigation asks whether using a particular predicate to disarm a particular person is historically justified.

  • Flight instruction:

    A jury may be told it can consider running away as evidence of guilt if the evidence reasonably supports that the defendant fled because he felt guilty of the charged crime (per United States v. Murphy). It does not require flight to be the only plausible explanation.

  • “Manifest miscarriage of justice” sufficiency review:

    If a defendant does not properly preserve a sufficiency challenge (e.g., by failing to renew a motion for acquittal), the appellate court applies a much tougher standard than the ordinary Jackson v. Virginia test. Under United States v. Avants, reversal is reserved for cases essentially lacking evidence of guilt.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Mitchell affirms a felon-in-possession conviction by articulating a clear rule of classification: a felony conviction for attempting to disarm a peace officer under Louisiana law is sufficiently analogous to robbery—taking property by force or threat of force—that it falls within the Fifth Circuit’s historically grounded category of predicates supporting disarmament under § 922(g)(1). The decision also exemplifies the circuit’s broader post-Bruen approach: when nonviolent predicates (such as simple drug possession) are constitutionally doubtful under cases like United States v. Hembree, the government may sustain § 922(g)(1) as applied by anchoring the defendant’s disarmament to a predicate offense that inherently signals violence risk and aligns with robbery/theft/burglary precedent.