Attempted Armed Bank Robbery Under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) Is Categorically a § 924(c) Crime of Violence

I. Introduction

In United States v. Monte Emmanuel Straite (4th Cir. May 18, 2026), the Fourth Circuit confronted a recurring post-United States v. Taylor question: whether an attempt offense can qualify as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. The appellant, Monte Emmanuel Straite, had been convicted of armed bank robbery and attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), and also of brandishing firearms during and in relation to both offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). After prior proceedings (including an earlier affirmance in United States v. Straite, 576 F. App'x 211), the court granted a certificate of appealability limited to whether Straite’s attempted armed bank robbery conviction could serve as the predicate “crime of violence” for his related § 924(c) conviction.

The key issue was categorical: does attempted armed bank robbery under § 2113(d) necessarily require “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force”?

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) is categorically a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A). Although the panel acknowledged tension between the text of § 2113(a) and the Fourth Circuit’s older attempt analysis in United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, it concluded it did not need to revisit that question because § 2113(d) itself adds elements—assault or putting a life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon—that necessarily satisfy the elements clause.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. The governing § 924(c) framework and the “elements clause”

  • United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022): The court relied on Taylor for the governing proposition that, after invalidation of residual approaches, § 924(c) “crime of violence” analysis turns on § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause—i.e., whether the predicate offense has as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” The panel framed the dispute as whether § 2113 attempt liability could be established by “intent plus a substantial step” alone (as with attempted Hobbs Act robbery in Taylor), or whether the bank-robbery attempt statute itself requires force or threat of force.
  • United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2019): Cited for the standard of review: de novo review of whether an offense categorically qualifies as a crime of violence.

2. The Fourth Circuit’s prior bank-robbery “crime of violence” holdings

  • United States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2016): McNeal held that bank robbery under § 2113(a)—and thus armed bank robbery under § 2113(d)—qualifies as a crime of violence. In Straite, this precedent anchored the court’s discussion of how § 2113(d) relates to § 2113(a) (as an enhanced-penalty subsection), but the panel ultimately rested its holding on § 2113(d)’s additional weapon-and-assault/jeopardy elements. McNeal also mattered to mens rea: the panel invoked McNeal’s adoption of the principle that “use” of force connotes intentional (not reckless) force.

3. The obstacle: attempt under § 2113(a) in United States v. McFadden

  • United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1984): This was the panel’s acknowledged complication. McFadden described attempted § 2113(a) bank robbery as requiring only (1) intent and (2) a substantial step, and reasoned that such elements do not require force. If applied straightforwardly, McFadden would suggest attempted § 2113(a) is not categorically violent—creating tension with a “force travels with attempt” reading of § 2113(a)’s text.
  • Payne v. Taslimi, 998 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 2021) and McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc): Cited for intra-circuit stare decisis: one panel cannot overrule another panel’s decision, explaining why the court did not “fix” McFadden on this appeal.

4. Sister-circuit textual readings of § 2113(a) attempt

Although not dispositive (given McFadden), the panel surveyed other circuits to show that a text-focused approach often treats § 2113(a)’s “by force and violence, or by intimidation” as modifying both “takes” and “attempts to take.”

  • United States v. Vines, 134 F.4th 730 (3d Cir. 2025) (qualifier “travels” down a parallel list unless syntax signals otherwise).
  • United States v. Armstrong, 122 F.4th 1278 (11th Cir. 2024).
  • United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2008).
  • United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2004).
  • United States v. Brown, 412 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1969).

This discussion signaled a live interpretive conflict: whether attempted § 2113(a) inherently requires intimidation/force (textual view) or can be proved without it (the McFadden view). But the panel avoided resolving that conflict by relying on § 2113(d)’s distinct elements.

5. Weapon/jeopardy language and the force requirement under § 2113(d)

  • Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978): Cited (via footnote) for the proposition that § 2113(d)’s “assault” and “puts in jeopardy” components require the “use of a dangerous weapon or device.” That linkage supported the conclusion that § 2113(d) necessarily entails at least the threatened use of violent force.
  • United States v. Bryant, 949 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 2020): Used by analogy: if a statute requires use of a dangerous weapon to put a victim’s life in jeopardy, that requirement “ensures that at least the threat of physical force is present.” The panel treated § 2113(d)’s structure similarly.

6. “Any person” and self-directed conduct

  • United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 2009): Cited for the proposition that federal “assault” statutes incorporate the common-law definition of assault. The court used this to reject the defendant’s attempt to read “any person” to include oneself, reasoning that one cannot “assault” oneself under the classic common-law conception.
  • Healthkeepers, Inc. v. Richmond Ambulance Auth., 642 F.3d 466 (4th Cir. 2011): Cited for the “presumption of consistent usage” and contextual statutory interpretation, reinforcing that “any person” in § 2113(d) is best read in its assault/jeopardy context as referring to someone other than the defendant.

7. Mens rea: recklessness vs purposeful/knowing “use” of force

  • Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021): Defendant invoked Borden to argue crimes of violence require purposeful or knowing conduct (not reckless). The panel accepted the framework but concluded § 2113(d) satisfies it.
  • Garcia v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 465 (4th Cir. 2006): The panel relied on Garcia for the Fourth Circuit’s rule that when “use of force” is the element, the “use” connotes intentional application of force, not merely reckless force. Combined with McNeal, this supported the conclusion that § 2113(d)’s “use of a dangerous weapon” component imports intent sufficient under Borden.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The categorical method and the “attempt problem” after Taylor

The panel’s analysis followed the categorical approach: it asked what the statute’s elements necessarily require in every case, not what Straite did in fact. That lens made the “attempt problem” central: if the attempt statute can be satisfied by intent plus a substantial step that does not involve threatened or attempted force, then it fails § 924(c)(3)(A), as Taylor held for attempted Hobbs Act robbery.

2. The court’s key move: § 2113(d) independently supplies force-based elements

Rather than depend on whether § 2113(a)’s “by force and violence, or by intimidation” modifies “attempts to take,” the panel held that § 2113(d) requires, during the attempt, that the defendant either:

  • assault[] any person, or
  • put[] in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device.

On that reading, an attempt conviction under § 2113(d) cannot rest on a mere substantial step toward a nonviolent taking; it must include assault or life-jeopardy-by-weapon conduct during the attempted offense. Because those elements necessarily entail at least threatened violent force (and often actual or attempted force), they satisfy § 924(c)(3)(A).

3. Disposition of the “any person” overbreadth argument

Straite argued § 2113(d) is broader than § 924(c)(3)(A) because it speaks of force against “any person,” while § 924(c)(3)(A) requires force against “another.” He hypothesized scenarios like threatening self-harm to obtain money. The court rejected the argument by anchoring “any person” to the assault element’s common-law meaning (one cannot assault oneself), and by reading the statute contextually under the presumption of consistent usage (Healthkeepers, Inc. v. Richmond Ambulance Auth.). In effect, the panel treated self-directed “jeopardy” hypotheticals as outside the realistic scope of § 2113(d)’s assault/jeopardy-by-weapon framework.

4. Disposition of the mens rea argument

Straite further argued that § 2113(d) could be satisfied through reckless conduct involving a “weapon” (e.g., reckless driving causing a crash), which would fail Borden’s purposeful/knowing requirement for violent felonies. The court responded that Fourth Circuit law construes “use” of force as intentional, not reckless (Garcia v. Gonzales), and it had applied the same logic in the bank-robbery context (United States v. McNeal). Thus, the “use of a dangerous weapon or device” element in § 2113(d) was understood to carry an intent requirement sufficient to satisfy Borden.

C. Impact

  • Stabilizing § 924(c) predicates in bank-robbery cases involving § 2113(d) attempts. The decision gives prosecutors and courts within the Fourth Circuit a published, categorical holding: § 2113(d) attempted armed bank robbery qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A), even as other attempt predicates (notably attempted Hobbs Act robbery under Taylor) do not.
  • Doctrinal bifurcation between § 2113(a) attempt and § 2113(d) attempt. The opinion leaves United States v. McFadden intact, meaning attempted § 2113(a) remains analytically vulnerable under the elements clause within the circuit, while § 2113(d) attempt is secured by its additional elements. This creates a practical charging and litigation consequence: the presence (and proof) of § 2113(d)’s assault/jeopardy-by-weapon elements becomes decisive for § 924(c).
  • Signals about a future en banc or Supreme Court question on § 2113(a) attempt. By highlighting the text-based reasoning of United States v. Vines and other circuits, the panel implicitly acknowledged a tension that may prompt en banc reconsideration of McFadden or further Supreme Court review to harmonize attempt analysis across robbery statutes.
  • Mens rea clarification for “use” of a weapon in force clauses. The reliance on Garcia v. Gonzales, United States v. McNeal, and Borden v. United States reinforces a Fourth Circuit approach: when a statute’s element is “use” of force (or “use” of a dangerous weapon in a way that puts life in jeopardy), courts will read “use” to exclude purely reckless conduct for categorical purposes.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Categorical approach: A method that looks only to the statutory elements of the offense, not the defendant’s real-world conduct. If the statute can be violated in a way that does not require violent force, the offense is not categorically a “crime of violence.”
  • Elements clause (§ 924(c)(3)(A)): Defines “crime of violence” as an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.
  • Attempt and “substantial step”: Many attempt crimes can be proved by intent plus a substantial step toward completion—even if no force occurs. After United States v. Taylor, such attempt statutes often fail the elements clause unless the attempt statute itself requires force or threatened force.
  • “Assault” (common-law meaning): Generally involves attempting or threatening harmful/offensive contact that puts another person in reasonable apprehension. The court used this to reject the idea that one can “assault” oneself under § 2113(d).
  • Mens rea (purpose/knowledge vs recklessness): Borden v. United States draws a line: reckless force often is not enough for “use of force” clauses. The Fourth Circuit reads “use” as intentional in this setting (Garcia v. Gonzales), which supported treating § 2113(d) as compatible with Borden.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Straite establishes a clear Fourth Circuit rule: attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) is categorically a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A), because § 2113(d) requires, even in attempt form, assault or placing a person’s life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon or device. The opinion is also notable for what it does not decide: despite recognizing strong text-based arguments and sister-circuit authority suggesting § 2113(a) attempt may inherently require intimidation/force, the panel remained bound by United States v. McFadden and avoided revisiting that precedent. Practically, the decision preserves § 924(c) exposure for § 2113(d) attempt prosecutions in the Fourth Circuit and provides a roadmap for distinguishing violent attempt predicates from those that, like attempted Hobbs Act robbery under Taylor, can be committed without any attempted or threatened force.