UPEPA Fee Awards in Utah: “Related to” a Special Motion Means Work Reasonably Necessary to Prosecute the Motion

Case: Aston v. Chronicle-Progress LLC, 2026 UT 7 (Utah Supreme Court) (Apr. 2, 2026)
Statute: Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), Utah Code §§ 78B-25-101 to -115, esp. § 78B-25-110
Subject: Anti-SLAPP-style dismissal procedure and attorney-fee shifting; scope of fees “related to” a special motion for expedited relief

1. Introduction

Wayne Aston and Valley Forge Impact Park Fillmore LLC (collectively, “Aston”) sued the Millard County Chronicle-Progress and its writer/editor Matt Ward (collectively, the “Chronicle-Progress”) for defamation arising from reporting that portrayed Aston as a “serial con man” and questioned the viability and bona fides of a large proposed development project near Fillmore, Utah.

The Chronicle-Progress invoked Utah’s UPEPA—Utah’s anti-SLAPP-style statute—through a special motion for expedited relief, and the district court dismissed the case. The dispute on appeal was not about dismissal, but about the size and scope of the fee award: the Chronicle-Progress sought nearly $400,000 in fees, premised on the notion that essentially all early-stage litigation work was “related to” the special motion.

The Utah Supreme Court used the appeal to answer a foundational question under UPEPA’s mandatory fee-shifting provision: what does it mean for fees to be “related to” the special motion?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court reversed the fee award. It held that “related to” in UPEPA’s fee statute does not mean “everything done in the case up to the special-motion ruling.” Instead, fees are recoverable only for work reasonably necessary to prosecute the special motion. The Court emphasized that some tasks will be obviously included (researching, drafting, filing, and arguing the motion), some obviously excluded (e.g., obtaining a refund for an improperly paid jury fee), and many will fall in between (tasks that do “double duty” or are “mixed,” such as complaint review, answers, or limited discovery).

Because the district court did not apply this task-specific standard and did not meaningfully analyze relatedness and reasonableness, the Court remanded for a new determination—while also ordering discrete exclusions: $15,329.50 for certain redacted entries and a 75% reduction of the fees-on-fees request ($35,205.75) based on a prima facie showing of unreasonableness.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shape the Decision)

A. Statutory interpretation framework

• Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 12: The meaning of a statute is reviewed for correctness (no deference). This supplied the posture for interpreting “related to.”
• Ross v. Kracht, 2025 UT 22, ¶ 21: Plain-language primacy (“best evidence” of legislative intent is statutory text). The Court used this to anchor its reading of § 78B-25-110.
• State v. Christensen, 2001 UT 14, ¶ 8: Legislative history can confirm a plain-language analysis. Here, the Court consulted the Uniform Law Commission commentary to validate its interpretation.
• Turner v. Staker & Parson Cos., 2012 UT 30, ¶ 12: Avoid constructions that render statutory words superfluous. This was central to rejecting the Chronicle-Progress’s effort to make “related to the motion” functionally mean “related to the action.”
• Gables at Sterling Vill. Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Castlewood-Sterling Vill. I, LLC, 2018 UT 4, ¶ 42: Policy cannot rewrite “an inconvenient statute.” Used to cabin UPEPA’s broad-construction directive.
• Jex v. Utah Lab. Comm'n, 2013 UT 40, ¶¶ 52, 56; Lane Myers Constr., LLC v. Nat'l City Bank, 2014 UT 58, ¶¶ 25-27; Elks Lodges No. 719 (Ogden) & No. 2021 (Moab) v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1204: Cited for the proposition that broad-construction clauses often operate as tie-breakers when ambiguity remains—supporting the Court’s conclusion that § 78B-25-110 is not ambiguous in context.
• Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Salt Lake Cnty. Comm'n, 2001 UT 55, ¶ 15: Noted as a possible counterexample where a statute was construed broadly without addressing ambiguity; the Court distinguished the present case by finding no ambiguity.

B. Fee reasonableness doctrine (Utah)

• Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990: The linchpin. The Court imported Dixie’s “reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter” factor into UPEPA by identifying the “matter” as the special motion. This move harmonized UPEPA’s “reasonable attorney fees” with its “related to the motion” limitation.
• Strohm v. ClearOne Commc'ns, Inc., 2013 UT 21, ¶ 52: Frames abuse-of-discretion review for fee reasonableness (“beyond the limits of reasonability” or “not based on an evaluation of the evidence”).
• R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ¶ 25: Emphasizes trial-court discretion in applying legal standards to facts; used to justify remand rather than Supreme Court fact-application in the first instance.

C. UPEPA context and anti-SLAPP purpose

• Mackey v. Krause, 2025 UT 37, ¶¶ 34-38: Provided background on UPEPA’s history, purpose, and procedures, situating the fee issue within UPEPA’s anti-SLAPP design.
• Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, ¶ 50: Described defamation law’s “assortment of defenses, privileges, heightened burdens of proof, and particularized standards of review,” supporting the Court’s recognition that defamation litigation can be costly and thus susceptible to “process-as-punishment.”
• New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-75: Grounded the opinion’s First Amendment defamation backdrop and the high constitutional stakes motivating early-dismissal mechanisms.

D. “Related to” meaning and cross-jurisdictional guidance

• Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47: Used as a definitional reference for “relate to” as “has a connection with or reference to,” while acknowledging the degree-of-connection problem.
• Smith v. Zilverberg, 481 P.3d 1222, 1230 (Nev. 2021): Nevada’s contrasting fee provisions illustrated how statutory qualifiers matter: when a statute limits fees to those “incurred in responding to” a motion, courts should not silently expand it. Utah used this logic to enforce UPEPA’s limitation (even though the overall Nevada result was different because its defense provision was broader).
• Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962 N.E.2d 418, 435-36 (Ill. 2012); Midwest REM Enters., Inc. v. Noonan, 42 N.E.3d 46, 68 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); Shoreline Towers Condominium Ass'n v. Gassman, 936 N.E.2d 1198, 1212-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010): These Illinois authorities supported an approach awarding fees “in connection with” the anti-SLAPP motion, including work reasonably necessary to present it, and sometimes including work that overlaps other filings—consistent with Utah’s “double duty” acknowledgment.
• Enriquez v. Smith, 2015 Guam 29, ¶ 34: Guam’s limitation (“incurred in connection with the motion”) was read to exclude counterclaim-preparation costs, reinforcing Utah’s focus on motion-prosecution necessity.
• S.B. Beach Props. v. Berti, 138 P.3d 713, 717 (Cal. 2006); 569 E. Cnty. Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc., 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 304, 310-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016): California cases were persuasive for the principle that anti-SLAPP fees compensate the cost of “extracting” a defendant from a baseless suit, not every expense in the suit. Utah agreed but rejected any rigid rule confining fees solely to drafting/arguing the motion; some preliminary tasks may be necessary to prosecute the motion.
• Doe v. Burke, 133 A.3d 569, 579 (D.C. 2016): Cited to label and validate “fees-on-fees” as a recognized concept; Utah held that reasonable fees-on-fees are awardable under UPEPA.
• Davenport Extreme Pools & Spas, Inc. v. Mulflur, 698 S.W.3d 140, 161 (Ky. Ct. App. 2024): Acknowledged as arguably inconsistent (affirming a broader fee award), but deemed unpersuasive because the issue was not squarely analyzed and the statute was not interpreted.

E. Appellate briefing consequences (prima facie reversal)

• AL-IN Partners, LLC v. LifeVantage Corp., 2021 UT 42, ¶ 19: When an appellee fails to respond to an argument, the appellant’s burden drops to a “prima facie showing of a plausible basis for reversal.” This doctrine drove two concrete exclusions: a portion of redacted entries and a portion of fees-on-fees.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Reconciling “reasonable” with “related to”

The interpretive crux was the phrase: the court “shall award … reasonable attorney fees … related to the motion” to a prevailing movant. The Court refused to treat “related to” as a mere temporal boundary (“everything billed before dismissal”). Instead, it read “reasonable” and “relatedness” as interlocking limitations.

The Court’s key move was doctrinal integration: relying on Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, it treated “reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter” as the core measure of reasonableness, and then identified UPEPA’s specified “matter” as the special motion. That yields a unified test:

• Recoverable UPEPA fees = fees reasonably necessary to prosecute the special motion.

B. A functional, task-based inquiry (not an “entire action” entitlement)

The Court emphasized that “related to” can vary by degree. To prevent the limitation from collapsing into an “everything in the case” rule, courts must evaluate tasks (and, where needed, parts of tasks). The opinion sketches three categories:

• Clearly included: researching, drafting, filing, and arguing the special motion; discovery that aids the motion.
• Clearly excluded: tasks with no meaningful connection to prosecuting the motion (the opinion gives “getting a refund on an improperly paid jury fee” as an example).
• Middle category (“double duty” / mixed tasks): complaint review, answers, and some early work that may serve both motion prosecution and other litigation needs. The controlling question remains whether the task (or part) was reasonably necessary to prosecute the motion.

C. Broad-construction clause does not authorize rewriting the fee limitation

The Chronicle-Progress argued UPEPA’s directive that it be “broadly construe[d] and appl[ied]” to protect speech (Utah Code § 78B-25-111) supported a broad fee award. The Court rejected this as an interpretive overreach: broad-construction rules do not negate an otherwise clear textual limitation. In practical terms, UPEPA can be construed broadly in its protective aims while still enforcing that fee-shifting is limited to motion-prosecution work.

D. Why remand (and why partial exclusions now)

The Court remanded because (i) it was unclear what standard the district court applied, (ii) relatedness affects the overall amount and thus the reasonableness analysis (traditionally discretionary), and (iii) fairness warranted allowing fresh argument and potentially evidence under the newly clarified standard.

Yet the Court carved out two exceptions based on the appellate briefing posture under AL-IN Partners, LLC v. LifeVantage Corp.:

• Redacted entries: Aston made a prima facie showing that 26.4 hours ($15,329.50) could not be assessed for relatedness due to redactions; the Chronicle-Progress did not meaningfully respond, so the Court reversed that portion. The Court expressly took “no position” on the broader question of when redacted entries may be awardable.
• Fees-on-fees: Aston challenged 91 hours / $46,941 as excessive; the Chronicle-Progress did not respond. The Court excluded 75% ($35,205.75), implicitly accepting Aston’s proposed 23-hour benchmark as a reasonable remainder in these circumstances.

3.3 Impact

A. For UPEPA litigation in Utah: a claim-by-claim and entry-by-entry discipline

This decision establishes the first clear Utah standard for UPEPA fee scope. Going forward:

• Defendants who prevail on UPEPA special motions must be prepared to prove necessity, not just chronology.
• District courts must do more than approve a lump sum; they must engage with relatedness and reasonableness objections and explain their determinations.
• Billing practices become outcome-determinative: contemporaneous time entries should describe the connection to the special motion, especially for “mixed” tasks.

B. Likely downstream disputes: allocation, partial recoverability, and documentation sufficiency

The opinion anticipates the difficult middle ground:

• Allocation of mixed work: If an answer or complaint review partly serves the special motion and partly serves ordinary litigation obligations, courts will need to determine what portion was “reasonably necessary” for the motion.
• Discovery costs: Limited discovery tied to the motion may be recoverable; generalized discovery or tasks required regardless of the motion may not be.
• Redactions: Although the Court did not decide the governing rule, the decision signals that redactions can jeopardize fee recovery if they prevent assessment of relatedness and reasonableness.

C. Policy equilibrium: strong anti-SLAPP protection without turning UPEPA into a fee windfall

UPEPA’s deterrence objective is preserved—prevailing defendants still receive mandatory fees—but the award is targeted to the statute’s procedural mechanism: early extraction via the special motion. The decision therefore reduces the risk that UPEPA becomes a vehicle for recovering all early litigation expenditures (including those that would have been incurred even absent a special motion), while still ensuring that defendants can afford to use the expedited remedy.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• SLAPP suit: A “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation”—a claim brought (often defamation-like) less to win on the merits and more to impose litigation cost and burden to chill speech.
• UPEPA / “special motion for expedited relief”: Utah’s anti-SLAPP-style mechanism allowing early dismissal of claims targeting protected speech, on accelerated timelines, with mandatory fee-shifting for prevailing movants.
• Fee-shifting “related to” the motion: After this case, it means fees for work reasonably necessary to win the special motion—not automatically everything done before dismissal.
• “Double duty” or “mixed” tasks: Work that serves two purposes (e.g., reviewing a complaint both to plan an answer and to build the special motion). Courts may award only the portion reasonably necessary to prosecute the motion.
• Fees-on-fees: Attorney time spent seeking attorney fees (drafting/arguing the fee motion). Recoverable only if reasonable.
• Prima facie showing on appeal (when appellee doesn’t respond): If the appellee fails to address an argument, the appellant need only show a plausible basis for reversal, not a fully developed showing.
• Abuse of discretion vs. correctness: Statutory meaning is reviewed without deference; the ultimate fee amount (once the correct legal standard is used) is largely discretionary for the trial judge.

5. Conclusion

Aston v. Chronicle-Progress LLC is Utah’s foundational interpretation of UPEPA’s fee-shifting limitation. The Supreme Court held that “related to” fees under Utah Code § 78B-25-110 are limited to work reasonably necessary to prosecute the special motion for expedited relief, requiring a task-specific analysis and meaningful judicial engagement with objections. The Court reinforced careful documentation norms (especially where entries are redacted), validated fees-on-fees in principle but policed excess in practice, and remanded for a recalculated award under the clarified standard. The result strengthens UPEPA’s protective function while preventing its fee mechanism from becoming an automatic “entire case” reimbursement.