ASTM D6751 § 1.2 Does Not Create Ambiguity: RFS RIN Generation Requires Up-to-Spec Biodiesel, and Brady/Giglio Do Not Extend to Non-Testifying Warrant Affiants

Introduction

In United States v. Race Miner (3d Cir. Aug. 27, 2026) (nonprecedential), the Third Circuit addressed post-trial arguments arising from a claimed intervening change in law and an asserted disclosure failure under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Appellants Race Miner and Ben Wootton, former leaders of Keystone Biofuels, Inc. (“Keystone”), were convicted for false statements tied to two federal incentive regimes: the EPA’s Renewable Fuel Standard (“RFS”) program (generation of Renewable Identification Numbers, “RINs”) and the IRS’s Biodiesel Mixture Credit (“BMC”).

The core merits dispute concerned whether the regulatory requirement that biodiesel “meet ASTM D6751” was ambiguous because ASTM D6751 § 1.2 contemplates that specification requirements may be applied at points other than delivery by agreement. If the requirement were ambiguous, Appellants argued, United States v. Harra, 985 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2021) would require additional jury instructions and could undermine evidentiary sufficiency for certain counts. Separately, Appellants sought a new trial alleging suppressed impeachment material about two EPA agents under Brady and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

Summary of the Opinion

  • No Harra-based instructional error. The Court held the RFS regulatory definition of biodiesel (“meets ASTM D6751”) was unambiguous as to requiring actual compliance with ASTM D6751’s technical “Requirements” (Section 4 and Table 1) at the time of RIN generation; ASTM D6751 § 1.2 did not create ambiguity.
  • BMC requirement also unambiguous. The Internal Revenue Code and the Certificates for Biodiesel expressly require biodiesel that “meet[s] … the requirements of [ASTM] D6751,” reinforcing that up-to-spec compliance is required prior to claiming the credit.
  • No judgment of acquittal. Because the Court rejected the premise of ambiguity, Appellants’ insufficiency theory—resting on post-delivery compliance agreements—failed.
  • No Brady/Giglio violation. Impeachment material regarding a testifying agent was immaterial given the overall evidentiary record and the legal correctness of the relevant testimony. As to a non-testifying search-warrant affiant, the Court agreed Brady does not require impeachment disclosures for a warrant affiant who does not testify at trial.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1. Ambiguity, falsity, and jury instructions

  • United States v. Harra, 985 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2021): The Court treated Harra as the intervening doctrine Appellants invoked. Harra holds that where the Government alleges falsity based on an ambiguous agency requirement, it must prove falsity under each objectively reasonable interpretation, and the jury decides whether an interpretation is reasonable (once the court finds ambiguity as a gatekeeping matter). Here, the panel’s key move was to stop at the gatekeeping step: it found no ambiguity, so no Harra-style “multiple reasonable interpretations” instruction was required.
  • United States v. Piekarsky, 687 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2012): Cited for de novo review of legal correctness of jury instructions. This standard mattered because Appellants framed their claim as legal error arising from a later-decided case (Harra).
  • United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2002): Used to explain the “general verdict” problem for Counts Two and Nine, which were submitted on alternative theories of falsity. If any alternative theory is legally invalid, the conviction cannot stand. The panel avoided that outcome by holding the “off-spec” theory was legally valid (indeed unambiguous).
  • United States v. Hendrickson, 949 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2020): Cited for the de novo standard of review on evidentiary sufficiency challenges.

2. Brady/Giglio materiality and scope

  • Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972): Giglio is treated as a Brady application covering impeachment evidence; suppression violates due process when the evidence is material. The panel focused on materiality (whether the suppressed information undermines confidence in the verdict).
  • United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2011): Quoted for the “undermine confidence in the verdict” formulation of materiality.
  • United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 1993) and United States v. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985): Cited for standards of review and deference principles in Brady determinations (legal conclusions de novo; factual findings clear error; deference to trial court’s materiality assessment).
  • United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015) and Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2009): Cited for two recurring materiality considerations: whether impeachment would be cumulative, and the importance of the witness to the prosecution’s case.
  • Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1998), Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and United States v. Banks, 104 F.4th 496 (4th Cir. 2024): These authorities supported the panel’s conclusion that Brady/Giglio obligations are trial-focused and generally do not require disclosure of impeachment material solely related to a non-testifying warrant affiant at the warrant-application stage—an arena more typically policed by Franks.

Legal Reasoning

1. Why ASTM D6751 § 1.2 did not create ambiguity under Harra

The panel’s interpretive analysis turns on dividing ASTM D6751 into (a) a timing/default dealing concept and (b) technical specifications. The RFS regulation defines biodiesel as “a mono-alkyl ester that meets ASTM D6751.” ASTM D6751’s technical “Requirements” appear in Section 4 and Table 1, while Section 1.2 (in “Scope”) describes that specification requirements apply at “time and place of delivery” by default, but may be applied at other points “by agreement.”

Appellants argued that Section 1.2 makes it reasonable to interpret “meets ASTM D6751” as allowing post-delivery correction by agreement. The Court rejected this as a category error: Section 1.2 is not itself something that fuel can “meet,” and it does not alter whether fuel satisfies the technical requirements of Section 4/Table 1. Rather, Section 1.2 merely recognizes parties may contract around the default timing of when compliance is checked in commerce. That commercial flexibility does not alter the regulatory condition for generating RINs: the fuel must in fact satisfy the technical standards when the RIN is generated.

Consequently, the Court held there was no regulatory ambiguity to submit to the jury under Harra, and the district court did not commit legal instructional error by refusing to instruct on ASTM D6751 § 1.2 or on competing interpretations.

2. The BMC statutory and certification language foreclosed the same ambiguity claim

For the BMC counts, the Court found the argument even weaker because the Internal Revenue Code defines biodiesel as meeting “the requirements of” ASTM D6751, and Keystone’s Certificates for Biodiesel used the same “meets the requirements” language. Since ASTM D6751 Section 4 is titled “Requirements” and references Table 1, the relevant legal texts directly point to technical compliance as a prerequisite to claiming credits. This eliminated the need for Harra-type ambiguity instructions and preserved the “off-spec” theory supporting the general verdict counts.

3. Sufficiency challenge failed because it depended on the rejected ambiguity premise

Appellants’ request for judgment of acquittal on the RFS-related counts was framed as a failure of proof that no post-delivery agreement existed. The Court held that argument only matters if a post-delivery compliance agreement could render the RIN submissions not false. Because the Court found RFS unambiguous in requiring up-to-spec fuel at RIN generation, the asserted evidentiary gap was irrelevant.

4. Brady/Giglio: materiality as to the testifying agent; non-applicability as to the non-testifying affiant

As to Agent Salak (who testified), the Court assumed much of the suppressed information was impeaching, but held it immaterial. The Court emphasized: (i) Salak’s regulatory-interpretation testimony was legally correct (given the panel’s unambiguity holding), (ii) his calendar/exhibit testimony was based on source materials available to Defendants, and (iii) other witnesses—Keystone insiders with firsthand knowledge—provided core proof that fuel was off-spec, reducing Salak’s centrality on that factual point. Under Walker, the suppressed evidence did not sufficiently undermine confidence in the verdict.

As to Agent Ferrante (non-testifying search-warrant affiant), the panel drew a line between impeachment material relevant to trial testimony and material aimed at the warrant stage. Relying on Mays v. City of Dayton and United States v. Banks, and distinguishing the Franks v. Delaware framework, the Court agreed Brady does not entitle defendants to impeachment disclosures regarding an affiant who does not testify at trial.

Impact

  • Constraining Harra-based defenses in technical regulatory prosecutions. The opinion illustrates how courts may avoid Harra’s heightened falsity burden by treating the relevant requirement as unambiguous, particularly where incorporated technical standards separate “scope/timing” language from “requirements/specifications” language.
  • Compliance timing pinned to the regulatory act (RIN generation) and the tax act (credit claim). For regulated entities, the decision underscores that “fix later by agreement” concepts in commercial specifications may not translate into regulatory eligibility when the legal trigger is a discrete governmental submission (RIN generation; tax-credit certification).
  • Reinforcing limits on Brady for non-testifying warrant affiants. By approving the view that Brady/Giglio do not extend to impeachment material about a non-testifying affiant at the warrant stage, the opinion signals that challenges to warrant integrity generally must proceed through Franks-type avenues rather than Brady.
  • Practical trial consequence: cumulative evidence diminishes materiality. The Court’s treatment of Salak highlights a recurring Brady dynamic: where the defense already has underlying documents and the Government has independent, direct witnesses, additional impeachment may be deemed cumulative and thus immaterial.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“ASTM D6751 incorporated by reference”
The regulation “imports” an external technical standard (ASTM D6751) and treats it as part of the legal requirement, even though ASTM is a private standards body.
“Ambiguity” under United States v. Harra
If a regulatory requirement can reasonably be read in more than one way, the Government must prove the statement is false under all reasonable readings, or that its reading is the only reasonable one. If the court finds no ambiguity, the case proceeds under ordinary falsity proof without the Harra overlay.
“General verdict” and alternative theories (from United States v. Syme)
If jurors return a single “guilty” verdict on a count that was argued under multiple theories, the conviction may be vulnerable if any one theory is legally invalid, because it is unknown which theory the jury used.
Brady/Giglio “materiality”
Not every undisclosed helpful item requires a new trial. The question is whether the nondisclosure undermines confidence in the verdict—often assessed by asking how important the witness was, whether other evidence proves the same point, and whether the impeachment would have added anything truly new.
Franks v. Delaware versus Brady
Franks concerns false statements or omissions in warrant affidavits and provides a mechanism to challenge the warrant. Brady concerns trial fairness through disclosure of material exculpatory or impeachment evidence for use at trial.

Conclusion

United States v. Race Miner affirms convictions by (1) holding that “meets ASTM D6751” is unambiguous for both RFS RIN generation and BMC credit claims, and that ASTM D6751 § 1.2’s timing-by-agreement language does not create a competing reasonable interpretation requiring jury resolution under United States v. Harra; and (2) rejecting Brady/Giglio claims where impeachment of a testifying agent was immaterial in light of the record and where a non-testifying warrant affiant falls outside Brady’s impeachment-disclosure focus.

Although designated nonprecedential, the decision is a clear roadmap for how courts may (a) cabin Harra to genuinely ambiguous regulatory texts and (b) evaluate materiality where the Government’s proof does not hinge on the impeached witness and where defenses target the warrant stage rather than trial evidence.