Assignees Cannot Use CPLR 205-a Savings Unless Acting for Original Foreclosure Plaintiff; CPLR 3215 Neglect Dismissals Bar Savings Under FAPA (RPAPL 1501[4])

1. Introduction

Benjamin v LaSalle Bank, N.A. (2026 NY Slip Op 02094) is a Second Department decision addressing a familiar post-foreclosure-dismissal posture: homeowners (or their estates) suing under RPAPL 1501(4) to cancel and discharge a mortgage as time-barred, while the mortgage holder (or its assignee) argues it can still foreclose by invoking a “savings statute.”

The mortgage originated in 2007. In 2009, LaSalle Bank, N.A. commenced a foreclosure action and accelerated the debt by demanding the full balance in the complaint. The 2009 foreclosure was ultimately dismissed after the court concluded that Chittra Benjamin (a mortgagor) was a necessary party and that the claim against her had been dismissed as abandoned under CPLR 3215. LaSalle’s interest was later assigned to U.S. Bank, National Association, which commenced a new foreclosure action within six months after the termination of the 2009 action.

The principal issues were (i) whether the mortgage was time-barred due to acceleration and the passage of six years, (ii) whether U.S. Bank could rely on the savings period after dismissal—particularly after the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) replaced CPLR 205(a) with CPLR 205-a for mortgage-foreclosure-type claims, (iii) whether FAPA applies retroactively and constitutionally, (iv) whether LaSalle was a proper party, and (v) whether plaintiffs were entitled to a default judgment against LaSalle.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court insofar as it (a) dismissed Chittra Benjamin’s RPAPL 1501(4) claim against U.S. Bank, (b) denied leave to enter a default judgment against LaSalle, and (c) dismissed the claim against LaSalle. It affirmed insofar as it denied U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss the claim asserted on behalf of the decedent’s estate (i.e., it held the RPAPL 1501(4) claim was viable against U.S. Bank).

The court held that U.S. Bank could not invoke the six-month savings period because: (1) FAPA’s CPLR 205-a governs and applies retroactively; (2) the prior foreclosure was dismissed for a form of neglect under CPLR 3215, which CPLR 205-a excludes from savings relief; and (3) U.S. Bank, as an assignee/successor, neither pleaded nor proved it was acting on behalf of the original plaintiff as required by CPLR 205-a(a)(1).

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

i. RPAPL 1501(4) “quiet title by limitations” framework

  • 97 Lyman Ave., LLC v MTGLQ Invs., L.P. (233 AD3d 1038): Cited for the core rule that a person with an interest in mortgaged property may sue under RPAPL 1501(4) to cancel/discharge a mortgage once the foreclosure statute of limitations has expired. The court also relied on it for FAPA retroactivity reasoning (discussed below).
  • Collins v Bank of N.Y. Mellon (227 AD3d 948): Reinforces the RPAPL 1501(4) pathway and, importantly here, supports the proposition that savings-statute relief is unavailable where the prior foreclosure dismissal was tied to CPLR 3215-type neglect.

ii. Acceleration and when the six-year clock starts

  • Citibank, N.A. v Horan (230 AD3d 1216): Cited for the rule that once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire balance accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run on the full amount.
  • Milone v US Bank N.A. (164 AD3d 145): Cited for the mechanism of acceleration—commencement of a foreclosure action seeking the full balance due may constitute acceleration.

iii. CPLR 3211(a)(7) pleading standards and use of evidence

  • Martinez v NYC Health & Hosps. Corp. (223 AD3d 731) and Weill v East Sunset Park Realty, LLC (101 AD3d 859): Cited for the liberal construction of pleadings on a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion and the “any cognizable legal theory” test.
  • Nyari v Onefater (171 AD3d 936) and Truesource, LLC v Niemeyer (223 AD3d 694): Cited for the rule that when evidentiary materials are considered on a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion without conversion to summary judgment, dismissal is inappropriate unless the opposing party’s material facts are shown “not a fact at all” with no significant dispute.
  • Guggenheimer v Ginzburg (43 NY2d 268): Cited generally for the boundary between pleading sufficiency and evidentiary negation on a motion to dismiss.

iv. Termination timing and appellate-finality

  • U.S. Bank N.A. v Coleman (215 AD3d 780): Used to support the proposition that the 2009 action “terminated” for savings/limitations purposes when the appellate court affirmed the dismissal (here, September 12, 2018).

v. FAPA, CPLR 205-a, retroactivity, and constitutionality

  • Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Brandt (230 AD3d 623): Cited for the key statutory point that FAPA replaced the CPLR 205(a) savings provision with CPLR 205-a for actions on instruments described in CPLR 213(4) (i.e., mortgage foreclosure-type instruments).
  • Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Vista Holding, LLC (239 AD3d 830) and 97 Lyman Ave., LLC v MTGLQ Invs., L.P.: Cited for rejecting arguments that FAPA/CPLR 205-a do not apply retroactively.
  • Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Feurtado (241 AD3d 499) and Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Dagrin (233 AD3d 1065): Cited for rejecting due process challenges to FAPA’s retroactive application and for applying CPLR 205-a’s “neglect dismissal” exclusion in foreclosure contexts.
  • U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Giangrande (229 AD3d 834): Quoted for the operative text and structure of CPLR 205-a(a), especially the exclusion for terminations due to neglect, including neglect specified in CPLR 3215.
  • Johnson v Cascade Funding Mtge. Trust 2017-1 (220 AD3d 929): Cited for applying CPLR 205-a’s limitation that an assignee/successor may not commence the new action unless it pleads and proves it is acting on behalf of the original plaintiff.
  • LaSalle Bank N.A. v Benjamin (164 AD3d 1223): This prior appeal in the same litigation history supplied the foundation for the finding that the claim against Chittra in the 2009 action was dismissed as abandoned under CPLR 3215 and that her absence required dismissal of the foreclosure.
  • Collins v Bank of N.Y. Mellon (227 AD3d 948): Reinforces that CPLR 205-a’s neglect carve-out blocks savings relief in circumstances like CPLR 3215 abandonment.

vi. Default judgment standards

  • Pemberton v Montoya (216 AD3d 988), Roy v 81E98th KH Gym, LLC (142 AD3d 985), and Fried v Jacob Holding, Inc. (110 AD3d 56): Cited for what must be shown under CPLR 3215—service, proof of the claim’s facts, and proof of default—and for the rule that a verified complaint can serve as proof if based on personal knowledge and evidentiary facts.
  • Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp. (100 NY2d 62): Quoted (via Fried) for the requirement of sufficient proof to demonstrate a viable cause of action on a default motion.
  • Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v RJNJ Servs., Inc. (89 AD3d 649): Cited for the defendant’s burden to defeat a default motion—show no default or show a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious defense.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Acceleration occurred in 2009, starting the six-year limitations period

The court treated the 2009 foreclosure complaint—where LaSalle elected to “declare the balance of the principal indebtedness immediately due and payable”—as an acceleration of the mortgage debt. Under the cited acceleration cases, that meant the statute of limitations began to run on the full balance in 2009.

2) By 2018, more than six years had elapsed—so RPAPL 1501(4) relief was viable unless a savings statute preserved foreclosure rights

Because the RPAPL 1501(4) action was commenced on October 3, 2018—more than six years after the January 8, 2009 acceleration—the pleading fit squarely within a cognizable “time-barred mortgage” theory. That placed pressure on U.S. Bank’s argument that it could still foreclose because it filed a new foreclosure within six months after termination of the old one.

3) FAPA displaced CPLR 205(a) with CPLR 205-a for mortgage instruments, and CPLR 205-a applies retroactively

The court rejected U.S. Bank’s attempt to use CPLR 205(a). Under FAPA, the relevant savings rule for CPLR 213(4) instruments is CPLR 205-a, and the Second Department reaffirmed that CPLR 205-a applies retroactively to pending disputes. The court also reaffirmed that this retroactivity does not violate due process, relying on decisions that have upheld the legislature’s authority to alter foreclosure-related limitations rules in this domain.

4) CPLR 205-a’s two independent barriers defeated U.S. Bank’s savings argument

First, CPLR 205-a excludes savings relief when the prior action was terminated by “neglect,” including dismissals under CPLR 3215. The 2009 action’s dismissal history included a CPLR 3215 abandonment dismissal as to Chittra, which was central to the overall dismissal because she was a necessary party. Under CPLR 205-a, that kind of neglect-based termination blocks use of the six-month savings period.

Second, CPLR 205-a(a)(1) imposes an additional restriction: a “successor in interest or an assignee” may not commence the new action unless it pleads and proves it is acting on behalf of the original plaintiff. U.S. Bank (an assignee) did not satisfy that pleading-and-proof requirement. On that basis alone, it failed to show entitlement to savings relief as against either mortgagor.

5) Procedural consequence: dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) was improper; the RPAPL 1501(4) claims were viable

Applying the liberal CPLR 3211(a)(7) standards (and the rule against factual issue resolution without conversion), the court concluded the pleadings supported an actionable RPAPL 1501(4) claim against U.S. Bank (including as to Chittra, where Supreme Court had dismissed), because U.S. Bank could not establish a legally valid basis—via CPLR 205-a—to avoid the time bar.

6) LaSalle remained a proper party; the record contradicted its “nonexistence” argument

LaSalle argued it was not a proper defendant because it allegedly no longer existed after 2007. The court rejected that contention as contradicted by the record, including LaSalle’s own conduct in prosecuting the 2009 foreclosure and its filing of an answer in the present RPAPL 1501(4) action. That contradiction made dismissal inappropriate at the pleading stage.

7) Default judgment against LaSalle should have been granted

The court applied the standard CPLR 3215 framework: proof of service, proof of the facts constituting the claim, and proof of default. The Benjamins met that burden (including through a verified complaint that contained evidentiary facts from a person with personal knowledge). LaSalle did not defeat the motion because it failed to show no default or a reasonable excuse plus a potentially meritorious defense.

C. Impact

  • Stronger homeowner/estate quiet-title posture after old foreclosure dismissals: Where acceleration occurred years earlier, this decision reinforces that RPAPL 1501(4) plaintiffs can survive dismissal motions if the foreclosing party cannot fit within CPLR 205-a’s narrowed pathway.
  • Assignees face a heightened pleading/proof burden under CPLR 205-a(a)(1): Mortgage transfers are common; this case underscores that a new holder cannot casually claim savings relief—its complaint and proof must satisfy the “acting on behalf of the original plaintiff” condition.
  • CPLR 3215 dismissals are especially toxic to “savings” arguments: If a prior foreclosure was dismissed as abandoned/neglected (including CPLR 3215), CPLR 205-a may be unavailable—cutting off the strategy of refiling shortly after an adverse termination.
  • Retroactivity and due process challenges continue to fail: The Second Department continues to treat FAPA’s retroactive application as settled, reducing the viability of constitutional defenses in similar cases.
  • Default practice reminder: Even in complex mortgage litigation, standard CPLR 3215 principles apply: plaintiffs who properly support a default motion can obtain default relief, and defendants must come forward with excuse and merit.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • RPAPL 1501(4): A “quiet title” tool allowing a property owner (or other interest holder) to ask the court to cancel a mortgage lien when a foreclosure is time-barred.
  • Acceleration: The lender’s act of making the entire loan balance immediately due (often done by filing a foreclosure complaint that demands the full balance). Acceleration typically starts the six-year limitations period on the whole debt.
  • CPLR 213(4): The six-year statute of limitations governing mortgage foreclosure actions in New York.
  • FAPA and CPLR 205-a vs CPLR 205(a): FAPA changed the rules for refiling mortgage foreclosure-type actions. CPLR 205-a is narrower than CPLR 205(a) and contains foreclosure-specific limits (including restrictions tied to neglect and assignees).
  • CPLR 3215 dismissal (neglect/abandonment): A procedural dismissal based on failure to timely pursue a default (or other neglect). Under CPLR 205-a, such a termination can bar the plaintiff from using the six-month savings period.
  • CPLR 3211(a)(7): A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Courts assume pleaded facts are true and ask whether they fit a recognized legal theory; they generally do not resolve factual disputes at this stage.

5. Conclusion

Benjamin v LaSalle Bank, N.A. solidifies, in a practical mortgage-litigation setting, two core FAPA/CPLR 205-a propositions: (1) the six-month savings period is unavailable after neglect-type terminations such as CPLR 3215 dismissals, and (2) an assignee/successor cannot invoke savings relief unless it pleads and proves it is acting on behalf of the original foreclosure plaintiff. Coupled with the court’s continued acceptance of FAPA’s retroactive application and rejection of due process challenges, the decision strengthens RPAPL 1501(4) as a path to clear stale mortgage encumbrances where prior foreclosures were mishandled or abandoned.