Article 78 Review Preserved Despite “Force and Effect of a Judgment” Language in RPTL 421-a(16)(c)(x)

1. Introduction

Matter of Bldg 44 Devs. LLC v State of New York (2026 NY Slip Op 02898, Third Department) addresses whether the enforcement structure for New York’s Affordable Housing Program wage provisions—specifically, the clause in RPTL 421-a (16) (c) (x) providing that the Comptroller’s filed order “shall have the full force and effect of a judgment duly docketed”—unconstitutionally forecloses judicial review.

The petitioner, Bldg 44 Developers LLC, is a New York City developer seeking enhanced 421-a benefits conditioned on payment of a statutorily defined hourly wage. After an audit found a wage deficiency and the matter was referred for an OATH hearing, petitioner brought a combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of the “judgment provision” on separation-of-powers and due-process grounds.

Supreme Court declared the judgment provision unconstitutional and, going further, struck the OATH hearing requirement as “futile.” The State of New York and the New York City Comptroller appealed.

Key Issues

  • Whether RPTL 421-a (16) (c) (x) violates separation of powers by effectively eliminating judicial review of the Comptroller’s final determination.
  • Whether due process is violated because the order obtains “judgment” effect without a statutory mechanism to challenge or stay it beforehand.
  • Whether CPLR 5015 prevents courts from granting meaningful relief once the administrative order is “docketed” as a judgment.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department reversed, dismissed the petition, and declared that RPTL 421-a (16) (c) (x) has not been shown to be unconstitutional. The court held:

  • The absence of an express statutory judicial-review clause does not mean judicial review is precluded.
  • The Comptroller’s post-OATH final determination remains reviewable through a timely CPLR article 78 proceeding (certiorari to review).
  • CPLR 5015 does not bar article 78 relief; it addresses vacatur of a court’s own orders/judgments, not the court’s remedial power under CPLR article 78.
  • Article 78 supplies meaningful remedies: courts may stay enforcement (CPLR 7805), and may annul/modify determinations and direct specified action (CPLR 7806).
  • Because judicial review is available, the separation-of-powers and due-process challenges (premised on “wholesale denial of judicial review”) fail.

The court also noted (in a footnote) that even if “prejudgment review” were constitutionally required, the statute does not compel immediate filing/docketing: the Comptroller could delay filing to allow time for an article 78 challenge.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) The 421-a statutory backdrop

The court situates the dispute within the Affordable Housing Program (RPTL 421-a et seq) and references Burrows v 75-25 153rd St., LLC, 44 NY3d 74, 81 (2025) as general context for the program’s structure and purpose. While not central to the constitutional holding, the citation underscores that the wage-and-benefit regime is part of a broader legislatively designed incentive framework.

2) Presumption of constitutionality and the heavy burden of facial challenges

The court relies on White v Cuomo, 38 NY3d 209 (2022) for two critical propositions: (i) statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality; and (ii) a facial challenger must show invalidity “beyond a reasonable doubt” and that the law is unconstitutional in “every conceivable application.” The court reinforces this framework with Cuomo v New York State Commn. on Ethics & Lobbying in Govt., 44 NY3d 141, 149 (2025), Stefanik v Hochul, 43 NY3d 49, 57 (2024), and Matter of Walt Disney Co. & Consol. Subsidiaries v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 42 NY3d 538, 550 (2024), cert denied ___ US ___, 145 S Ct 1125 (2025).

This doctrinal setup matters: Supreme Court had treated the statutory structure as categorically foreclosing review. The Third Department instead asks whether any constitutional application exists—and finds that article 78 review provides one, defeating the facial attack.

3) Separation of powers: when administrative finality becomes unconstitutional

The court frames separation of powers using Matter of Maron v Silver, 14 NY3d 230, 258 (2010), Matter of New York State Inspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Empls., Dist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 233, 239 (1984), and Delgado v State of New York, 39 NY3d 242, 255 (2022). The operative limit is that no branch may arrogate powers that reside entirely in another branch.

For the specific risk—administrative action insulated from courts—the court points to Long Is. Coll. Hosp. v Catherwood, 23 NY2d 20, 36 n 3 (1968), appeal dismissed 394 US 716 (1969), recognizing that statutes precluding all judicial review of final administrative determinations raise separation-of-powers concerns. The Third Department distinguishes the 421-a scheme because it does not preclude review: article 78 remains available.

4) Judicial review exists even when a statute is silent—or tries to prohibit review

A central move is the court’s use of Matter of Board of Educ. of City of Rochester v Nyquist, 48 NY2d 97, 103 (1979), and Roosevelt Islanders for Responsible Southtown Dev. v Roosevelt Is. Operating Corp., 291 AD2d 40, 54 (1st Dept 2001), lv denied 97 NY2d 613 (2002), for the principle that statutory silence does not eliminate the default availability of CPLR article 78 review.

The court contrasts Matter of New York City Dept. of Envtl. Protection v New York City Civ. Serv. Commn., 78 NY2d 318, 321-322 (1991), which it cites as a “compare” authority—signaling that there are contexts where review contours differ, but not supporting the proposition that silence equals no review here.

The court further cites Matter of De Guzman v State of N.Y. Civ. Serv. Commn., 129 AD3d 1189, 1190 (3d Dept 2015), lv denied 26 NY3d 913 (2015), to reinforce that even attempts to prohibit judicial review do not necessarily extinguish article 78 review.

5) Article 78 as the correct vehicle after a hearing: certiorari to review

The court treats the Comptroller’s post-OATH decision like other final determinations after a statutorily required hearing, reviewable in a CPLR article 78 proceeding in the nature of certiorari to review, citing Matter of Action Elec. Contrs. Co. v Goldin, 64 NY2d 213, 220 (1984).

6) CPLR 5015 does not negate article 78 remedies; distinguishing “administrative judgment” cases

Supreme Court had accepted petitioner’s view that once the Comptroller’s order is filed with “judgment” effect, CPLR 5015 would prevent vacatur because courts can only vacate their own judgments. The Third Department rejects that framing by relying on Commissioner of Labor of State of N.Y. v Hinman, 103 AD2d 886, 887 (3d Dept 1984), appeal dismissed 64 NY2d 756 (1984), for the point that courts can provide complete relief from administrative determinations in article 78 notwithstanding CPLR 5015’s limits.

The court addresses petitioner’s reliance on Workers' Compensation Bd. of the State of N.Y. v Williams Auto Parts Inc., 187 AD3d 1252 (3d Dept 2020), explaining it was not an article 78 case and involved an improper attempt to use CPLR 5015 to “undermine” the statutory review process under the Workers’ Compensation Law.

The court also discusses Commissioner of Labor of State of N.Y. v. Eagle Comtronics, 104 AD2d 716 (4th Dept 1984), emphasizing it does not show a lack of jurisdiction to grant article 78 relief and, if anything, illustrates that article 78 is an appropriate challenge mechanism in similar schemes.

7) The remedial toolkit in article 78: stays, annulment, and directed action

The opinion highlights:

  • CPLR 7805 stays, citing Matter of Sysco Metro NY, LLC v City of New York, 168 AD3d 459, 460 (1st Dept 2019).
  • CPLR 7806 authority to annul/confirm/modify and direct specified action, supported by treatise authority (David D. Siegel & Patrick M. Connors, New York Practice § 570 [6th ed]) and case law including Health Care Plan v Bahou, 61 NY2d 814, 816-817 (1984), Matter of Tamsen v Licata, 94 AD3d 1566, 1569 (4th Dept 2012), and Matter of Carlisi v New York State Liq. Auth., 52 AD2d 1083, 1084 (4th Dept 1976).

These citations do the heavy lifting in rebutting Supreme Court’s “no relief possible” conclusion: even if a clerk’s docket reflects “judgment” status, article 78 relief can annul the underlying determination and direct agency action to secure the ordered relief.

8) Additional authorities reinforcing reviewability of agency “orders” (Footnote 3)

To show the implausibility of petitioner’s CPLR 5015 theory, the court notes that agencies commonly issue “orders,” yet they remain reviewable under article 78, citing Matter of National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp. v Public Serv. Commn. of the State of N.Y., 16 NY3d 360, 368 (2011), Alarcon v Henry, 235 AD3d 706, 706 (2d Dept 2025), Matter of New York Apple Tours v Hoffman, 278 AD2d 70, 72 (1st Dept 2000), appeal dismissed & lv denied 96 NY2d 729 (2001), Cahill v Harter, 277 AD2d 655, 656 (3d Dept 2000), and Matter of Steck v Jorling, 227 AD2d 849, 850 (3d Dept 1996).

9) Disposition template for declaratory challenges

Finally, the court cites Matter of County of Delaware v Zucker, 146 AD3d 1178, 1179 (3d Dept 2017), for the standard appellate remedy: dismissal and a declaration that the statute has not been shown unconstitutional.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Framing the case as a facial constitutional challenge with a demanding standard

The court’s reasoning begins with method: a facial challenge requires proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” and invalidity in “every conceivable application.” This immediately undermines Supreme Court’s approach, because the Third Department needs only to identify a constitutionally valid path for judicial review within the statutory scheme to defeat petitioner’s facial claim.

2) The core separation-of-powers inquiry: is judicial review truly eliminated?

The Third Department accepts the general proposition that total foreclosure of judicial review of administrative finality could present a separation-of-powers problem. But it finds no foreclosure here, because:

  • Article 78 review is the default mechanism for challenging final administrative action after a required hearing.
  • Statutory silence on review does not imply nonreviewability.
  • Even statutory attempts to bar review do not necessarily eliminate article 78 review.

3) Addressing the “judgment provision” concern: judgment effect does not equal immunity from review

The opinion distinguishes between (a) the administrative order’s enforceability mechanics and (b) the judiciary’s power to review and remedy illegality. Even if the filing “has the full force and effect of a judgment duly docketed,” that does not transform the determination into something beyond article 78.

4) The CPLR 5015 misconception: wrong tool, wrong conclusion

Supreme Court treated CPLR 5015 as the controlling lens (vacatur of judgments), and then concluded the court would be powerless because the judgment was not “its own.” The Third Department responds that this conflates distinct procedural pathways:

  • CPLR 5015: a mechanism for vacating a court’s own judgments/orders in specified circumstances.
  • CPLR article 78: a mechanism for judicial review of administrative determinations, with its own stay powers (CPLR 7805) and remedial powers (CPLR 7806).

Under article 78, a court can stay enforcement, annul the determination, and direct agency action to secure the relief ordered—making judicial review meaningful notwithstanding the statute’s enforcement language.

5) Due process analysis becomes “academic” once review is confirmed

Petitioner’s procedural and substantive due process arguments depended on characterizing the statute as a “wholesale denial of judicial review.” Once the court holds that article 78 provides a real avenue for review and relief, the due process claims collapse as a practical matter.

6) A secondary rationale defeating facial invalidity: administrative implementation can preserve pre-filing review

In Footnote 2, the court adds an alternative reason the facial challenge fails: the statute requires the Comptroller to “make” and “file” an order—two separate acts. Nothing requires immediate filing, and the State submitted evidence that the Comptroller “would wait” until after the article 78 limitations period passes before docketing. That possibility alone defeats the claim of invalidity in “every conceivable application.”

C. Impact

1) Stabilizing enforcement mechanisms that convert administrative determinations into judgment-like instruments

The decision supports the continued use of “full force and effect of a judgment” mechanisms in regulatory and benefits-linked wage enforcement, without treating such mechanisms as constitutionally suspect merely because the statute does not spell out judicial review procedures.

2) Clarifying that “judgment effect” does not displace article 78—and emphasizing the availability of stays

Practically, the ruling signals that regulated parties should move quickly with an article 78 challenge and seek a CPLR 7805 stay where necessary. For agencies, it reduces litigation risk that judgment-effect statutes will be struck down on separation-of-powers grounds.

3) Limiting attempts to weaponize CPLR 5015 against administrative enforcement

The opinion draws a clear line: CPLR 5015’s limits on vacating non-court judgments do not negate the judiciary’s article 78 remedial authority. This framing may constrain future arguments that administrative “judgments” become practically unreviewable.

4) Program-specific significance for NYC 421-a wage enforcement

For RPTL 421-a (16) wage compliance in New York City, the Comptroller’s “sole authority” to determine and enforce underpayment liability remains intact, with judicial oversight preserved through article 78 rather than embedded in the statute’s text.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • RPTL 421-a (Affordable Housing Program): A tax benefit program encouraging new residential construction with affordability requirements; “enhanced” benefits may require paying workers a statutorily defined wage.
  • OATH hearing / ALJ report: An administrative trial-like hearing before an Administrative Law Judge who issues a report and recommendation; the Comptroller issues the final agency order.
  • “Full force and effect of a judgment duly docketed”: The agency’s filed order is treated like a court judgment for enforcement/collection purposes. It does not, by itself, erase the right to judicial review.
  • Separation of powers: The Legislature cannot eliminate the judiciary’s essential role; a statute that truly blocks all judicial review of administrative finality can raise constitutional concerns.
  • Due process (procedural/substantive): Government action must be implemented through fair procedures and must not be arbitrary in a way that violates fundamental fairness. Here, the asserted due process problem depended on the claim that courts could not review or remedy the Comptroller’s decision.
  • Facial constitutional challenge: An argument that a statute is invalid in all (or essentially all) applications—an especially hard claim to win due to the presumption of constitutionality.
  • CPLR article 78: The primary New York procedure for challenging final administrative determinations; courts can stay enforcement (CPLR 7805), annul/modify the determination and direct agency action (CPLR 7806).
  • CPLR 5015: A rule about vacating a court’s own orders/judgments; it does not define (or limit) article 78 review of agency determinations.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Bldg 44 Devs. LLC v State of New York establishes a clear rule for New York administrative enforcement schemes that use judgment-effect language: an administrative order that “has the full force and effect of a judgment duly docketed” remains subject to meaningful judicial review under CPLR article 78, and CPLR 5015 does not strip courts of the ability to grant effective relief.

By reversing Supreme Court and sustaining RPTL 421-a (16) (c) (x), the Third Department reinforces (i) the high bar for facial constitutional challenges, (ii) the judiciary’s continuing supervisory role through article 78 even when statutes are silent on review, and (iii) the breadth of article 78 remedies, including stays and directions to agencies necessary to secure effective relief.