Article 78 Adequacy and Personal Involvement as Threshold Bars to § 1983 Search/Seizure and Due Process Claims (and Monell’s Policy-or-Custom Requirement)

1. Introduction

Campbell v. City of Binghamton, NY (2d Cir. Apr. 9, 2026) is a nonprecedential summary order affirming the Northern District of New York’s sua sponte dismissal, at the in forma pauperis screening stage, of a pro se plaintiff’s amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff-Appellant David John Campbell alleged that municipal actors and officials—principally the City of Binghamton, its Mayor (Jared M. Kraham), the Binghamton Police Department Chief (Joseph Zikuski), and a BPD Detective (Bryan Sostowski)—were responsible for an illegal search of his home and seizure of his property, invoking the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The appeal presented three recurring § 1983 gatekeeping issues:

  • Individual liability: whether Campbell plausibly alleged personal involvement by each individual defendant in the alleged search/seizure.
  • Procedural due process: whether a Fourteenth Amendment claim can proceed when New York provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy via an Article 78 proceeding.
  • Municipal liability: whether the City can be liable absent plausible allegations that a policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation (Monell).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal without leave to amend. It held:

  1. Campbell failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim against Mayor Kraham, Chief Zikuski, and Detective Sostowski because the amended complaint did not plausibly allege their personal involvement in the search of Campbell’s home or seizure of his property.
  2. Campbell failed to state a procedural due process claim against Detective Sostowski because, even assuming a “random and unauthorized” deprivation, New York’s Article 78 process provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy; the complaint did not allege Article 78 was unavailable or pursued.
  3. Campbell failed to state a § 1983 claim against the City of Binghamton because he did not plausibly allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violations.

In a footnote, the Court also noted that dismissal of claims against state-court-related defendants on immunity grounds was appropriate under Bliven v. Hunt and Gollomp v. Spitzer.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Screening dismissals and pro se construction

  • Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 2015): The Court used Milan for the standard of review—dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are reviewed de novo. This framing matters because it confirms appellate scrutiny is not deferential even though dismissal occurs early and sua sponte.
  • McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2017): The Court reiterated that pleadings and briefs from pro se litigants are to be liberally construed. Yet the order demonstrates the limiting principle: liberal construction does not substitute for plausibility or supply missing elements such as personal involvement or a municipal policy.

B. Individual § 1983 liability requires personal involvement

  • Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004): Cited for the foundational rule that personal involvement is a prerequisite to damages under § 1983. The Court applied this directly to dismiss claims against the Mayor and Police Chief where the complaint alleged no specific conduct tied to the alleged search/seizure.
  • Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609 (2d Cir. 2020): Tangreti reinforces that supervisory status alone does not establish § 1983 liability; the plaintiff must plead the supervisor’s own unconstitutional actions (or actions meeting the relevant constitutional standard). The citation supports the Court’s rejection of claims that appeared to rely on rank/role rather than pleaded conduct.

C. Procedural due process and the “random and unauthorized” doctrine; Article 78 adequacy

  • Proctor v. LeClaire, 846 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 2017): Used for the basic elements of a procedural due process claim: a deprivation of a cognizable interest without constitutionally sufficient process.
  • Hellenic Am. Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New York, 101 F.3d 877 (2d Cir. 1996): This is the order’s central due-process authority. Hellenic distinguishes deprivations caused by established state procedures from those caused by random, unauthorized acts, and it holds there is no constitutional violation when the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Crucially, it recognizes Article 78 as providing both a hearing and means of redress for constitutional claims—even if it does not provide identical relief to § 1983.
  • DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 2003): Cited for the proposition that when pre-deprivation process is impracticable (because the deprivation is random/unauthorized), due process is satisfied by a meaningful post-deprivation proceeding.

D. Municipal liability (Monell) and the need for a policy/custom causal link

  • Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978): The Court reaffirmed that a municipality is not vicariously liable for employees’ conduct under § 1983; liability requires that an official policy or custom caused the constitutional injury.
  • Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2006): Invoked to underscore the pleading requirement: allegations of employee misconduct, standing alone, do not establish a municipal policy/custom or causation.

E. Immunity doctrines (noted in the footnote)

  • Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2009): Supports judicial immunity principles barring claims against judges (and related officials where applicable) for acts within judicial capacity.
  • Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 2009): Cited for Eleventh Amendment immunity principles as applied to state entities and arms of the state (including certain court-related entities).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Why the Fourth Amendment claims failed: personal involvement was not plausibly pleaded

The Court treated personal involvement as a threshold requirement. Even liberally construed, the amended complaint did not connect Mayor Kraham or Chief Zikuski to the alleged search and seizure through concrete factual allegations (orders given, participation, direction, approval, or other actionable conduct).

As to Detective Sostowski, the Court credited that Campbell pleaded “plausible facts” regarding the detective’s involvement in obtaining “extreme risk protection orders (“ERPOs”).” But the constitutional wrong pleaded was a search/seizure; the complaint did not plausibly allege that Sostowski had any role in conducting the search or seizing property. The reasoning reflects a common pleading pitfall: alleging involvement in a related legal process (here, ERPOs) is not the same as alleging involvement in the specific constitutional deprivation (the search/seizure) unless the complaint bridges that gap with facts.

B. Why the procedural due process claim failed: Article 78 was an adequate post-deprivation remedy

The Court framed Campbell’s due process theory as a claim that his property was taken without adequate process. Applying Hellenic and DiBlasio, it categorized the pleaded conduct as “random and unauthorized acts” rather than an “established state procedure.” In that category, due process is satisfied if the state offers a meaningful post-deprivation remedy.

The Court then applied Hellenic’s specific holding that an Article 78 proceeding is an adequate remedy, even if it does not provide the exact relief available under § 1983. The order emphasized the complaint’s silence on a critical point: Campbell did not allege that he attempted an Article 78 proceeding or that it was unavailable. In effect, the Court treated Article 78’s availability as defeating the procedural due process claim at the pleading stage.

Notably, the Court’s analysis is doctrinally narrow: it does not decide whether the seizure was lawful under the Fourth Amendment; it holds that, as pleaded, the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim is barred by the adequacy of state remedies for random/unauthorized deprivations.

C. Why municipal liability failed: no policy/custom causation was pleaded

Campbell alleged misconduct by city employees, but did not plead facts supporting the existence of a municipal policy, widespread custom, failure-to-train theory with deliberate indifference, or a decision by a final policymaker that caused the alleged constitutional violation. Under Monell and Segal, that omission is fatal.

3.3. Impact

Although labeled a “SUMMARY ORDER” with “no precedential effect,” the decision reinforces several practical, frequently dispositive rules in Second Circuit § 1983 litigation:

  • Pleading discipline for individual defendants: Plaintiffs must connect each defendant to the specific constitutional deprivation with factual allegations; status-based or process-adjacent allegations (e.g., involvement in ERPOs) will not necessarily support a search/seizure claim.
  • Article 78 as a due-process off-ramp: For property deprivations characterized as random/unauthorized, federal procedural due process claims often fail if Article 78 is available and not plausibly alleged to be inadequate or unavailable.
  • Monell remains a high bar: Allegations of wrongdoing by municipal employees do not, without more, create municipal liability; plaintiffs must plead a policy/custom and causation.
  • Early termination at § 1915 screening: The order illustrates how these doctrines can dispose of claims before service, discovery, or any appearance by defendants.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Sua sponte dismissal”: The court dismissed the case on its own initiative (here, during statutory screening), without a motion from defendants.
  • 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) screening: When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the court must dismiss claims that fail to state a claim (among other grounds) even at the outset.
  • “Personal involvement” under § 1983: A defendant is liable only for their own actions (or omissions meeting the relevant standard), not merely because they supervise others or hold office.
  • ERPOs (extreme risk protection orders): Court orders that can restrict firearm access under state law in circumstances of alleged risk. Mentioning ERPO involvement did not, by itself, plead participation in a home search or property seizure.
  • Procedural due process vs. Fourth Amendment: Procedural due process focuses on whether adequate procedures exist around a deprivation; the Fourth Amendment focuses on the reasonableness/lawfulness of searches and seizures.
  • “Random and unauthorized” deprivation: A deprivation caused by an official’s unpredictable misconduct rather than by an established government policy. In such cases, pre-deprivation hearings may be impracticable, so post-deprivation remedies can satisfy due process.
  • Article 78 proceeding: A New York state-court mechanism to challenge governmental action and obtain relief (often including review of legality and certain forms of redress). The Second Circuit repeatedly treats it as an adequate post-deprivation remedy in many procedural due process settings.
  • Monell “policy or custom”: A city is liable under § 1983 only when the constitutional injury was caused by an official policy, a widespread custom/practice, or certain policymaker decisions—not simply because it employs the alleged wrongdoer.

5. Conclusion

Campbell v. City of Binghamton, NY affirms dismissal of a pro se § 1983 action by applying three doctrinal gatekeepers: (1) individual liability requires plausibly pleaded personal involvement (Back; Tangreti); (2) procedural due process claims fail where New York’s Article 78 provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for random/unauthorized deprivations (Hellenic; DiBlasio); and (3) municipal liability requires a plausibly alleged policy/custom causing the injury (Monell; Segal). The order’s significance lies less in any novel constitutional holding and more in its clear demonstration that, even under liberal pro se construction, § 1983 claims routinely rise or fall on these foundational pleading and remedial-structure requirements.