Arizona’s EPM Is Outside APA Rulemaking When § 16-452 Supplies an Alternative Process “Otherwise Provided by Law”

1. Introduction

Case: REPUBLICAN NATL COMMITTEE v. FONTES (Ariz. July 17, 2026).
Parties: Plaintiffs/Appellants Republican National Committee, Republican Party of Arizona, LLC, and Yavapai County Republican Party (collectively, “RNC”); Defendant/Appellee Adrian Fontes, Arizona Secretary of State (“Secretary”); Intervenor-Defendants/Appellees Voto Latino, Arizona Alliance for Retired Americans, Democratic National Committee, and Arizona Democratic Party.
Core issue: Whether the Secretary must follow the Arizona Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), A.R.S. §§ 41-1001 to -1093.08, when issuing the biennial Election Procedures Manual (“EPM”) mandated by A.R.S. § 16-452.

The dispute arose after the Secretary issued the 2023 EPM following a voluntary 15-day public comment period—shorter than the APA’s typical notice-and-comment framework. The RNC sought to invalidate the EPM for failure to comply with APA rulemaking procedures and, alternatively, challenged eight EPM provisions as conflicting with state or federal law. The superior court dismissed, holding the APA did not apply. The court of appeals reversed, holding the EPM was subject to the APA and the Secretary had not substantially complied. The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision and held the APA does not apply to the EPM; it then remanded for consideration of the alternative substantive challenges to specific EPM provisions.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that although the EPM fits the APA’s definitional concepts of “rules” and the Secretary is an “agency,” the EPM is not invalid for noncompliance with APA rulemaking because § 16-452 establishes a comprehensive, distinct, self-contained procedure for developing and issuing the EPM—i.e., a rulemaking process “otherwise provided by law” within the meaning of § 41-1030(A).

The Court rejected the Secretary’s alternative theory that asserted conflicts between the APA and § 16-452 create an “express” exemption under § 41-1002(A). But it ultimately agreed with the Secretary that § 16-452 operates as an alternative procedural scheme that § 41-1030(A) recognizes, thereby preventing invalidation solely because APA procedures were not followed.

Disposition: Court of appeals opinion vacated; trial court’s dismissal reinstated (in part); remanded for the court of appeals to address the RNC’s alternative claims challenging eight EPM provisions.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Ariz. Pub. Integrity All. v. Fontes, 250 Ariz. 58, 63 ¶ 16 (2020)
    Used to underscore the EPM’s legal force: once issued and approved, it “carries the force of law,” and violations can be prosecuted as a class 2 misdemeanor. This high-stakes effect frames why the procedural question (APA vs. § 16-452) is consequential.
  • State v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 253 Ariz. 6, 10 ¶ 8 (2022) and State ex rel. Brnovich v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 250 Ariz. 127, 130 ¶ 7 (2020)
    Provide standards of review for motions to dismiss: de novo review, assume well-pleaded facts true, draw reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. The Court relied on these to assess the plausibility of “conflict” arguments in the abstract.
  • Normandin v. Encanto Adventures, LLC, 246 Ariz. 458, 460 ¶ 9 (2019); In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, 18 ¶ 5 (2024) (quoting Columbus Life Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Tr., N.A., 255 Ariz. 382, 385 ¶ 11 (2023)); Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, 509 ¶ 7 (2017)
    Supply the Court’s interpretive method: plain meaning in statutory context, harmonization in pari materia, and giving effect to the entire scheme. These cases anchor the Court’s decision to read § 41-1002 and § 41-1030 alongside § 16-452 rather than in isolation.
  • Ariz. State Univ. ex rel. Ariz. Bd. of Regents v. Ariz. State Ret. Sys., 237 Ariz. 246, 252 ¶ 27 (App. 2015)
    Cited to reflect the baseline APA principle: agencies must comply with APA rulemaking “in the absence of an express exemption.” The Court accepted this baseline but ultimately distinguished the EPM context through § 41-1030(A)’s “otherwise provided by law” clause.
  • Carondelet Health Servs., Inc. v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin., 182 Ariz. 221 (App. 1994)
    Appears in two roles: (1) the court of appeals used it to emphasize the APA’s comment-period purpose; (2) the Supreme Court used it to distinguish a “statutory silence” situation (agency fills gaps with unpublished methods) from a statute like § 16-452 that affirmatively prescribes a detailed adoption procedure.
  • Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 589 U.S. 423, 425 (2020)
    Invoked for the “Purcell principle” caution against last-minute judicial changes to election rules. The Court used this as context for why “emergency rulemaking” might theoretically address late changes, while acknowledging courts’ institutional reluctance to alter election rules close to an election.
  • Sanchez v. Maricopa County, 260 Ariz. 136, 142 ¶ 13 (2025) (quoting Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568 ¶ 11 (2019))
    Supports the anti-surplusage canon: do not interpret statutes in a way that makes express exemption provisions superfluous. This buttressed the Court’s rejection of the Secretary’s attempt to treat “conflict” as an “express exemption.”
  • Garibay v. Johnson, 259 Ariz. 248 (2025) and Matthews v. Indus. Comm'n, 254 Ariz. 157 (2022)
    Used to justify dictionary consultation and to apply the “fixed meaning” approach: interpret “otherwise” as understood when enacted (1992). This supports the Court’s reading that “otherwise” means “differently/in another manner.”
  • State v. Marner, 261 Ariz. 275, 280 ¶ 19 (2026), as amended on reconsideration (Feb. 26, 2026)
    Cited for the proposition that statutory text is not merely evidence of intent; it is the law courts apply—reinforcing the Court’s emphasis on the words “unless otherwise provided by law.”
  • May v. Ellis, 208 Ariz. 229 (2004)
    The Court’s key analog for construing “otherwise provided by law” in another context. The Court drew from May the approach that when another statute speaks to the matter by providing a different method, the general provision yields.
  • Ariz. St. Bd. of Regents ex rel. Ariz. State Univ. v. Ariz. St. Pers. Bd., 195 Ariz. 173, 175 ¶ 12 (1999)
    Used to support the uncontroversial premise that “provided by law” refers to statutory enactments.
  • Samaritan Health Sys. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin., 198 Ariz. 533, 537 ¶ 19 (App. 2000)
    Referenced to explain how APA petition-and-review channels may delay or narrow judicial review—contrasting with the EPM’s distinct review posture in practice and highlighting how importing APA mechanisms could change litigation dynamics.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three moves:

  1. Reject “conflict creates express exemption.”
    The Secretary argued the APA and § 16-452 conflict so sharply that the EPM must be treated as “expressly exempted” under § 41-1002(A). The Court analyzed five alleged conflicts—timing, consultation iterations, publication format (manual vs. Administrative Code), dual approval (Governor + AG), and last-minute changes—and found none made compliance impossible on the pleadings record. Importantly, the Court warned that allowing inferred “express” exemptions from alleged conflict would render the APA’s explicit exemption architecture (e.g., § 41-1005) superfluous.
  2. Give operative meaning to “unless otherwise provided by law” in § 41-1030(A).
    The Court treated the interpretive question as textual: what does “otherwise” mean? Using contemporaneous dictionaries and fixed-meaning methodology, it concluded “otherwise” means “in another way/differently.” The Court then leveraged May v. Ellis to support the idea that when the Legislature prescribes a different method elsewhere, that different method is “otherwise provided by law.”
  3. Hold § 16-452 is that “other way.”
    The Court found § 16-452 is comprehensive and self-contained: consultation with county election officials, hard deadlines (Oct. 1 submission, Dec. 31 issuance), and dual executive approval (Governor and Attorney General), with legal enforceability and criminal penalties after issuance. This structure is tailored to the recurring, time-sensitive nature of elections, unlike general-purpose APA rulemaking meant for ongoing program administration. Therefore, the EPM is “not invalid for failing to comply with the APA’s procedures,” because it is adopted under an alternative process the Legislature itself provided.

The Court also addressed and rejected the argument that this reading makes § 41-1002(A) meaningless. It drew a functional distinction: § 41-1002(A) governs APA applicability and the rule that exemptions must be express; § 41-1030(A) governs the validity consequences of noncompliance and recognizes that the Legislature can create alternative comprehensive procedures that yield valid rules “otherwise provided by law.”

3.3. Impact

This decision is a major clarification in Arizona administrative law and election administration:

  • Election rules pathway clarified: The EPM’s biennial issuance under § 16-452 is confirmed as a distinct legislative design not subject to APA notice-and-comment as a validity prerequisite.
  • Broader administrative-law implication: The Court gives independent force to the “unless otherwise provided by law” clause in § 41-1030(A). Agencies (and litigants) will likely cite this decision when a separate statute provides a detailed, alternative procedural framework—even if it does not use the APA’s usual “exempt from Title 41, Chapter 6” wording.
  • Litigation strategy shift: Procedural APA-based challenges to the EPM are substantially narrowed. Future challenges may pivot toward (a) whether particular EPM provisions exceed statutory authority or conflict with state/federal law, and (b) the contours of the § 16-452 process itself (e.g., whether consultation and approval requirements were met).
  • Institutional design reinforced: The Court’s emphasis on election timing and administrability implicitly supports legislative tailoring for recurring election cycles, while still leaving room for political-accountability mechanisms (Governor/AG approval) embedded in § 16-452.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • APA “rulemaking”: A standardized process requiring public notice, publication, time to comment (often 30 days), and formal review steps before a rule becomes effective.
  • “Express exemption” (APA context): A clear legislative statement that the APA does not apply (often by saying rules are “exempt from title 41, chapters 6 and 6.1,” or listing the exemption in § 41-1005).
  • “Unless otherwise provided by law”: A savings clause. Here, it means: even if the APA would usually control, if another statute provides a different, comprehensive way to adopt the rule, the rule is not invalid merely because the APA steps were not followed.
  • In pari materia: A method of interpretation requiring related statutes to be read together so they form a coherent whole.
  • “Substantial compliance”: Under § 41-1030(A), some APA procedural defects may not invalidate a rule if the agency substantially complied. The court of appeals used this concept to critique the 15-day comment period—but the Supreme Court’s holding made that inquiry largely irrelevant for the EPM.
  • Purcell principle: A judicial caution against changing election rules close to an election due to risks of confusion and administrative disruption (cited via Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.).

5. Conclusion

REPUBLICAN NATL COMMITTEE v. FONTES establishes that Arizona’s EPM is not subject to APA rulemaking as a condition of validity when the Legislature has supplied, in § 16-452, a comprehensive alternative adoption framework—an approach the Court holds is “otherwise provided by law” under § 41-1030(A). The decision rejects attempts to manufacture “express exemptions” from claimed statutory conflicts, but simultaneously affirms that legislative design can displace APA procedural invalidation where a tailored, self-contained process exists. Going forward, disputes over the EPM will center less on APA procedure and more on whether particular EPM provisions exceed statutory authority or conflict with superior law.