Date: May 19, 2026

Arizona’s Post-2021 Administrative Review Rule: Superior Courts Find Facts Independently, Yet Still Apply Substantial-Evidence Review; Appellate Courts Defer to Superior-Court Factfinding

1. Introduction

Simms v. Arizona Racing Commission (Ariz. May 14, 2026) addresses how Arizona courts must conduct judicial review of administrative decisions after the Legislature’s 2021 amendments to A.R.S. § 12-910(F). The dispute arose from competing claims over a horse-racing license at a Phoenix racetrack. Ronald A. Simms (“Ron”) sought a license; the agency process resulted in an ALJ recommendation favoring him, but the Arizona Racing Commission ultimately denied the license. Ron—treated as a “regulated party”—sought judicial review.

Although the underlying licensing fight is factually complex and long-running (as described in Simms v. Simms, 259 Ariz. 415 (App. 2025)), the Arizona Supreme Court took the case to resolve recurring statewide questions about the scope and standards of judicial review under § 12-910(F) as amended in 2021:

Did the 2021 amendments eliminate substantial-evidence review?
In a “proceeding brought by or against the regulated party,” what is the superior court’s standard for reviewing agency factfinding?
Must appellate courts also re-find facts de novo when reviewing the superior court’s ruling?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held:

The 2021 amendments to § 12-910(F) did not eliminate the statute’s requirement that courts affirm unless agency action “is not supported by substantial evidence.”
In a Regulated-Party Proceeding, the superior court must decide all questions of fact without deference to the agency’s prior factual determinations; then, using the facts the court independently determines, it asks whether the agency’s action is supported by substantial evidence (and whether it is contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion).
Appellate courts do not repeat the superior court’s independent factfinding. They review the superior court’s factual findings under ordinary appellate standards (defer if reasonably supported by the record), while independently reviewing the legal question whether the agency action meets § 12-910(F)’s standard.

Procedurally, the Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and judgment for Ron, reversed the superior court’s affirmance of the Commission, and remanded for the superior court to apply the correct framework in the first instance.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The Court’s reasoning is built on (a) familiar interpretive canons, (b) Arizona administrative-review precedent, and (c) appellate-standards-of-review cases. Key cited authorities and how they shaped the decision include:

A. Statutory interpretation framework

Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137 (2024) — cited for de novo review of statutory interpretation. It supports the Court’s threshold posture: the questions are legal and resolved by statute’s text and structure.
Franklin v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co., 255 Ariz. 409 (2023) — “begin with the text.”
Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566 (2019) — read statutory language in context and avoid constructions that render provisions superfluous. The Court uses this repeatedly to reject readings that would nullify the 2021 “no deference” sentence or make other subsections pointless.
Premier Physicians Grp., PLLC v. Navarro, 240 Ariz. 193 (2016) (quoting Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 212 Ariz. 255 (2003)) — legislative intent is best reflected by the statute’s plain language absent absurdity or unconstitutionality.
Burns v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 254 Ariz. 24 (2022) — different statutory language implies different meaning. The Court uses Burns to distinguish “evidentiary hearing” review under § 12-910(F) from “trial de novo” under § 12-910(C) and (D).
Mussi v. Hobbs, 255 Ariz. 395 (2023) (quoting City of Phoenix v. Yates, 69 Ariz. 68 (1949)) — every clause should be given effect; this underpins the Court’s central move: harmonizing substantial-evidence review with non-deferential factfinding.

B. Administrative review structure and “trial de novo” distinctions

Duncan v. Mack, 59 Ariz. 36 (1942) and Horne v. Superior Court, 89 Ariz. 289 (1961) — explain that a true “trial de novo” proceeds as an original action creating a new record. The Court uses these to show why § 12-910(F) (record review plus possible supplemental evidentiary hearing) is not de novo and why limiting the “no deference” sentence to de novo trials would be nonsensical.

C. Pre-2021 practice: deference to agency factfinding absent a statutory directive

Gaveck v. Ariz. State Bd. of Podiatry Exam'rs, 222 Ariz. 433 (App. 2009) and Webster v. State Bd. of Regents, 123 Ariz. 363 (App. 1979) — stand for the pre-amendment approach: courts deferred to agency factual findings and affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. The Court uses these decisions as the “before” picture and explains the 2021 amendment as a legislative repudiation of that default deference in regulated-party cases.

D. The meaning of “agency action” and what is being reviewed

Sw. Paint & Varnish Co. v. Ariz. Dep't of Env't Quality, 194 Ariz. 22 (1999) — supports the established understanding that “agency action” refers to the final administrative decision. The Court preserves this baseline and clarifies that courts evaluate whether the final agency action is supportable; the written decision explains reasoning but is not a separate object of review.

E. Mixed questions and independent legal judgment

Sanders v. Novick, 151 Ariz. 606 (App. 1986) — recognizes judicial independence on “the legal effect” of agency-found facts (mixed questions). The Court aligns § 12-910(F)’s “no deference” to law and fact with this tradition.
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020) — cited for the proposition that “questions of law” can include application of a legal standard to established facts. It bolsters the Court’s view that § 12-910(F)’s “questions of law” clause supports independent judicial resolution of mixed questions.

F. Agency discretion vs. judicial substitution of policy judgment

DeGroot v. Ariz. Racing Comm'n, 141 Ariz. 331 (App. 1984) — historically used to warn courts not to substitute their judgment for agencies in discretionary spheres. The Supreme Court narrows DeGroot: any suggestion of deference based on “expertise” cannot survive the 2021 text requiring no deference on fact or law, but courts still cannot replace an agency’s policy choice when the Legislature has committed that choice to agency discretion.
Lewis v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 186 Ariz. 610 (App. 1996) — cited to frame the court’s role as independently deciding whether the agency stayed within the legal bounds of its discretion.

G. Appellate standards: who finds facts after 2021

State v. Adair, 241 Ariz. 58 (2016) — provides the classic division: appellate courts defer to trial-court factfinding if reasonably supported, but review legal conclusions independently. The Court uses Adair to reject the notion that appellate courts should do their own factfinding in § 12-910(F) cases.
State v. Alvarez-Soto, 579 P.3d 1227 (Ariz. 2025) — reinforces that de novo appellate fact review collapses the trial/appellate distinction. The Court applies that logic directly to administrative judicial review: the superior court is the factfinding court; the appellate court is not.
Batty v. Arizona Med. Bd., 253 Ariz. 151 (App. 2022) — treated as a key interpretive foil. The Court clarifies Batty’s context (no genuine fact dispute) and disapproves any reading suggesting that (i) the “no deference” sentence is irrelevant because substantial-evidence is a “question of law,” or (ii) appellate courts “engage in the same process” as the superior court in a way that would require de novo factual redetermination.

H. ALJs, credibility, and the “cold record” problem

In re Pima Cnty. Juv. Action No. J-63212-2, 129 Ariz. 371 (1981) — invoked for the common-sense reason factfinders who hear live testimony are better positioned to assess credibility.
Ritland v. Ariz. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 213 Ariz. 187 (App. 2006) — supports the idea that ALJ credibility findings can matter, but are not binding on the ultimate decisionmaker. The Court uses it to explain that superior courts may find ALJ findings persuasive as a matter of weight, not deference mandated by § 12-910(F).

I. Waiver and reaching otherwise unpreserved issues

Kamma v. Gaun, 584 P.3d 534 (Ariz. App. 2025) and City of Tempe v. Fleming, 168 Ariz. 454 (App. 1991) — cited for the principle that waiver is procedural and courts may address a waived argument to avoid confusion. This supports the Court’s decision to clarify that “regulated party” is not limited to agencies listed in § 12-910(D).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Harmonizing “no deference” with “substantial evidence”

The Court’s interpretive centerpiece is structural: § 12-910(F) contains multiple sentences that do different work, and the Court refuses to let any of them become “void, inert, redundant, or trivial” (via Mussi v. Hobbs).

Sentence 2 sets the affirmance/relief standard: the superior court “shall affirm” unless the action is contrary to law, not supported by substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
Sentence 4 (added in 2021) sets the factfinding method for regulated-party proceedings: the court “shall decide all questions of fact without deference” to the agency.

The Court’s synthesis is sequential: (1) the superior court independently determines disputed facts (no deference to the agency), then (2) evaluates whether the agency action is supportable under the substantial-evidence (and other) grounds—using the facts the court found. On this view, the 2021 amendment changes the “inputs” (who determines the facts), not the “test” (substantial evidence remains).

B. Rejecting both parties’ extremes

The Court rejects:

The Commission/TP Racing position that substantial-evidence review necessarily entails deference to agency factfinding—because that would nullify the new “no deference” fact sentence.
Ron’s position that the “no deference” fact sentence must have eliminated substantial-evidence review—because that would effectively read the substantial-evidence clause out of the statute.

C. “Regulated party” is broad; § 12-910(F) is the default

The Commission argued “regulated party” should be limited to agencies listed in § 12-910(D) (the professional-licensing de novo provision), partly because both were added in 2021. The Court rejects this by relying on text and structure:

§ 12-910(F)’s fifth sentence makes it broadly applicable “in any action for judicial review of any agency action.”
Treating sentence 4 as only applying in de novo trials would make it superfluous because de novo trials inherently involve no prior agency factfinding to defer to.

D. Subsection (G) confirms the Legislature meant a real change

The Court treats § 12-910(G) as a contextual cross-check: in some healthcare-related cases, the Legislature preserved the older deferential framework. If the old framework also applied generally after 2021, subsection (G)’s special preservation would have little function—contrary to Nicaise v. Sundaram.

E. Contested issues only: the regulated party must identify disputed findings

The Court stresses procedure: the superior court’s independent factfinding is triggered by what the regulated party actually contests, consistent with A.R.S. § 12-909(A). The reviewing court does not automatically re-try all facts; it resolves the “questions of fact” actually placed in dispute.

F. Expertise is not an exception; discretion remains a boundary

The Court draws a sharp line:

No deference to agency views on facts or law, even where agencies have expertise (no expertise carve-out appears in the text).
But courts still may not substitute their policy preference for an agency’s where the Legislature committed the choice to agency discretion (a narrow survival of DeGroot v. Ariz. Racing Comm'n).

G. Appellate review: § 12-910(F) changes superior-court review, not appellate factfinding

The Court reads § 12-910(F) as addressing “the court” that conducts record review, potential evidentiary hearing, and factfinding—i.e., the superior court. Appellate review remains governed by ordinary principles: under State v. Adair and State v. Alvarez-Soto, appellate courts do not redo factfinding; they defer if the superior court’s findings are reasonably supported, and they review legal questions independently.

H. ALJ findings: not “agency” findings, but may be persuasive

A subtle but important clarification is institutional: the “no deference” bar in § 12-910(F) runs against “the agency,” and ALJs (Office of Administrative Hearings) are distinct from agencies under Arizona law. Therefore:

The superior court is not required to defer to ALJ factfinding.
The superior court may give ALJ credibility findings persuasive weight (because the ALJ saw live testimony), as recognized in In re Pima Cnty. Juv. Action No. J-63212-2 and consistent with Ritland v. Ariz. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs.

3.3. Impact

The decision meaningfully reshapes Arizona administrative litigation in regulated-party cases—less by changing the formal “substantial evidence” label, and more by changing who decides the facts that feed the standard.

A. Practical effects in superior court

Regulated parties gain a genuine judicial fact-check. Agencies can no longer rely on the traditional “if a reasonable person could agree” deference to agency factfinding described in Gaveck v. Ariz. State Bd. of Podiatry Exam'rs.
Litigation will pivot to identifying disputed findings. Because independent fact review is not automatic for uncontested facts, briefing under A.R.S. § 12-909(A) becomes strategically central: parties must precisely frame which facts are disputed and why.
Evidentiary hearings may matter more. Section 12-910(F) contemplates supplementing the record via evidentiary hearing, and the superior court’s independent factfinding may increase demand for such supplementation—especially where credibility is central.

B. Effects on agencies

Better explanation of departures from ALJ findings. Although courts do not defer to the agency’s factfinding, agencies remain accountable for the rationality and evidentiary support of their final action. Clear written justifications under A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(B) become more important as persuasive material in the superior court’s independent evaluation.
Expertise will not immunize fact and law determinations. Post-Simms, agencies cannot argue for “expertise deference” on disputed facts or statutory interpretation; their protection lies instead in demonstrating substantial evidentiary support and staying within delegated discretionary bounds.

C. Effects on appellate courts

Appellate courts remain appellate. The Court’s reaffirmation of Adair/Alvarez-Soto prevents an expansion of appellate factfinding. Appeals will focus on whether the superior court’s findings are reasonably supported and whether the agency action, judged against those findings, meets § 12-910(F).
Batty is narrowed. Litigants can no longer cite Batty v. Arizona Med. Bd. to argue that appellate courts must “engage in the same process” in a way that reopens facts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantial evidence: Evidence that is sufficient to support a conclusion. After Simms, in regulated-party cases the superior court asks whether the agency action is supported by substantial evidence given the facts the superior court independently finds, not given the facts as the agency found them.
De novo: “From the beginning.” A true “trial de novo” (under § 12-910(C) or (D)) is a new trial with a new record. Section 12-910(F) is different: it generally reviews the administrative record (with possible supplementation) but requires independent judicial decisionmaking on disputed facts in regulated-party cases.
Arbitrary and capricious: A decision lacking a rational connection to the facts and law—often meaning it is unreasonable, unexplained, or inconsistent without justification.
Abuse of discretion: A decision that exceeds the bounds of reason or the legal limits of the discretion granted. Courts independently decide whether the agency stayed within legal bounds, but they cannot replace an agency’s policy choice merely because they would have chosen differently.
Mixed questions of fact and law: Questions that apply a legal standard to facts (e.g., whether established conduct meets a statutory criterion). The Court confirms these are reviewed independently.
Regulated party: The party subject to the agency’s regulatory authority in the proceeding under review. The Court rejects narrowing this term to agencies listed in § 12-910(D).
ALJ (Administrative Law Judge): A neutral adjudicator (here, from the Office of Administrative Hearings) who often hears testimony and makes recommended findings. Under Simms, the superior court may find ALJ credibility assessments persuasive, but the statute’s “no deference” command targets the agency—not the ALJ.

5. Conclusion

Simms v. Arizona Racing Commission establishes a definitive post-2021 framework for judicial review under A.R.S. § 12-910(F): substantial-evidence review remains the statutory gatekeeper for affirming or setting aside agency action, but in regulated-party proceedings the superior court must independently decide disputed facts without deferring to the agency. Appellate courts, in turn, do not redo that factfinding; they defer to superior-court findings if reasonably supported and independently assess the legal sufficiency of the agency action under § 12-910(F).

The decision is significant not because it abolishes traditional administrative standards, but because it reallocates factfinding authority in regulated-party cases from agencies to courts—while preserving agency discretion as a boundary against judicial policy substitution.