Argueta Castillo v. Blanche: Deferential Review of “Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship” (and No Requirement to Address Every Hardship Factor) After Wilkinson

1. Introduction

Case: Argueta Castillo v. Blanche, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (May 27, 2026).
Parties: Norberto Leonardo Argueta Castillo (petitioner) v. Acting Attorney General Todd W. Blanche (respondent).
Procedural posture: Petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denial of non-LPR cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).

The central question was whether Argueta Castillo established that his removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his two qualifying relatives—his minor U.S.-citizen daughters—given: (1) the older child’s anxiety/somnambulism (sleepwalking) treated with therapy, and (2) the younger child’s vision conditions requiring corrective lenses. He testified the children would relocate with him to Guatemala.

The First Circuit framed the appeal through the lens of Wilkinson v. Garland, emphasizing that appellate review is limited and deferential where the agency has applied the hardship standard to a set of facts.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit denied the petition for review. It held that, under the “deferential review required by Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024),” it found no basis to disturb the agency’s determination that the petitioner failed to prove the required level of hardship.

Key conclusions:

  • The IJ and BIA considered the relevant evidence and evaluated the asserted hardships in the aggregate.
  • The petitioner did not show either child had a serious medical condition at the level required for cancellation hardship analysis, nor did he show adequate medical care would be unavailable in Guatemala—especially given his assets and the record evidence of available services.
  • The court rejected claims that the agency ignored evidence or failed to write a sufficiently reasoned decision; the agency was not required to discuss every item of evidence or every potentially relevant factor.
  • The First Circuit again declined to choose between “substantial evidence” and “clear error” as the precise articulation of deference, because the petition failed under either standard.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Scope and deference of judicial review

  • Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024): The cornerstone of the opinion. The court treated hardship as a mixed question whose review is “deferential,” while also stressing that courts are “precluded from reviewing” the underlying facts of cancellation determinations. The First Circuit used Wilkinson to confine review to whether the agency properly applied the hardship standard to the established record.
  • Maldonado-Ruiz v. Bondi, 169 F.4th 315 (1st Cir. 2026) (quoting Martinez v. Bondi, 132 F.4th 74 (1st Cir. 2025)): Reiterates that when the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision but adds reasoning, the court reviews both decisions “together.” This matters because the petitioner attacked both the IJ’s handling of evidence and the BIA’s affirmance.

B. Defining the hardship standard and required showing

  • Cano v. Bondi, 152 F.4th 237 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Tacuri-Tacuri v. Garland, 998 F.3d 466 (1st Cir. 2021)): Restates the governing formulation: hardship must be “substantially different from, or beyond,” what is normally expected from removal. Cano also supplies the instruction that factors should be considered, including how “lower standard of living” and “adverse country conditions” may affect qualifying relatives.
  • Samayoa v. Bondi, 146 F.4th 128 (1st Cir. 2025) (second quoting In re Monreal-Aguinaga (“Monreal”), 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001)): Emphasizes the “high burden intended to cover truly exceptional situations,” while clarifying that the test is not “unconscionable hardship.” The panel used Samayoa to situate the petitioner’s evidence against a demanding baseline.
  • In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 2002): Cited through Cano to illustrate that the agency must consider the qualifying relatives’ “age, health, and circumstances,” including the impact of lower living standards and country conditions.
  • Tacuri-Tacuri v. Garland, 998 F.3d 466 (1st Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Figueroa v. Garland, 119 F.4th 160 (1st Cir. 2024): Supplies a key medical-hardship rule: to rely on a child’s health, the applicant must show (1) a “serious medical condition” and (2) if relocating, that “adequate medical care” is not “reasonably available” in the destination country. The First Circuit used this framework to validate the agency’s treatment of the therapy and vision evidence.
  • In re J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 808 (BIA 2020): Invoked to reinforce that hardship analysis involving medical conditions turns on seriousness and reasonable availability of care in the country of return. The panel treated the IJ’s findings on these points as the sort of factual determinations insulated from reweighing on petition for review.

C. Agency obligation to consider evidence (and what “failure to consider” means)

  • Contreras v. Bondi, 134 F.4th 12 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Diaz-Valdez v. Garland, 122 F.4th 436 (1st Cir. 2024)): Provides the “turn a blind eye to salient facts” / “completely overlook critical evidence” standard for reversible legal error. The court used this to reject the petitioner’s claim that the IJ/BIA ignored hardship evidence.
  • Trejo v. Bondi, 152 F.4th 248 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Domingo-Mendez v. Garland, 47 F.4th 51 (1st Cir. 2022)): Supports the inference that the agency considered evidence when its decision is not inconsistent with it and gives no reason to believe it was unaware of it.
  • Leao v. Bondi, 144 F.4th 43 (1st Cir. 2025): Two uses: (1) Monreal lists factors permissively; the agency need not discuss every factor in every case; and (2) a petitioner must explain how omitted factors would materially strengthen the hardship claim.
  • Djokro v. Garland, 102 F.4th 39 (1st Cir.) (quoting Xin Qiang Liu v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2015)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 774 (2024): Confirms the agency is not required to “dissect in minute detail” every contention or discuss each piece of evidence.
  • Nolasco v. Bondi, 134 F.4th 677 (1st Cir. 2025): Cited via Leao to support rejecting “they didn’t mention X” arguments when the petitioner fails to show why X would change the hardship outcome.

D. Unresolved articulation of the deferential standard (post-Wilkinson circuit landscape)

The panel noted (without deciding) a split in how courts articulate “deferential” review of the hardship application:

  • “Substantial evidence” approach: Wilkinson v. Att'y Gen., 131 F.4th 134 (3d Cir. 2025); Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996 (9th Cir. 2025); Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 149 F.4th 1202 (11th Cir. 2025).
  • “Clear error” approach: Toalombo Yanez v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 35 (2d Cir. 2025).
  • Circuits declining to choose: Cuenca-Arroyo v. Garland, 123 F.4th 781 (5th Cir. 2024); Santos Mendoza v. Bondi, 151 F.4th 900 (7th Cir. 2025); Cortes v. Garland, 105 F.4th 124 (4th Cir. 2024); Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 2024); Gonzalez-Rivas v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1010 (8th Cir. 2024); Martinez v. Garland, 98 F.4th 1018 (10th Cir. 2024); and prior First Circuit decisions: Cano v. Bondi, Leao v. Bondi, Samayoa v. Bondi, Nolasco v. Bondi, Trejo v. Bondi.

The practical point: the First Circuit again avoided selecting a label because the petition failed under either articulation, reinforcing that many hardship petitions will rise or fall on the strength of the record, not the semantics of the deference standard.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The court’s core methodological move: confinement to “application,” not “factfinding”

The opinion operationalizes Wilkinson by drawing a strict boundary: the court will not revisit “facts underlying any determination” on cancellation hardship, and will only assess whether the agency’s application of the hardship standard to those facts is legally and procedurally sound—and, because the mixed question is “primarily factual,” it will do so deferentially.

B. Rejecting “failure to consider evidence” as a question of law

The petitioner attempted to convert disagreements over evidentiary weight into a reviewable “question of law,” arguing the BIA departed from its “settled course” by failing to correct the IJ’s supposed omissions. The court rejected that framing, relying on Contreras/Diaz-Valdez to require a showing that the agency actually ignored salient facts or critical evidence.

The court found the opposite: the IJ explicitly stated she considered all testimony and documentary evidence and assessed hardship “in the aggregate,” and both the IJ and BIA addressed the key categories of evidence (medical, educational, economic, and country conditions). Under Trejo/Domingo-Mendez, a reasoned decision that is consistent with the evidence supports an inference of consideration even absent exhaustive discussion.

C. Rejecting the “insufficiently reasoned” argument

The court used Djokro (quoting Xin Qiang Liu) and Leao to reiterate that administrative adjudicators need not provide line-by-line commentary on every item of evidence or each potentially relevant factor. Importantly, it treated Monreal as permissive: listing factors that “may” matter, not a mandatory checklist.

D. Applying medical-hardship doctrine to the record as the agency found it

The panel’s discussion tracked Tacuri-Tacuri and In re J-J-G-: even when a child has health issues, the applicant must show seriousness and the lack of reasonably available adequate care in the country of removal.

On this record, the agency concluded:

  • For K.A.: therapy notes repeatedly characterized symptoms as “stable,” not affecting functioning, and reported “great progress,” strong academic/social performance, and a safety system at home—supporting the agency’s view that the evidence did not establish a serious condition rising to the cancellation-hardship level.
  • For D.A.: vision was “stable” with glasses; risk of blindness was not substantiated by medical records; the IJ treated the “could become blind” testimony as unsupported and speculative.
  • As to Guatemala care: record evidence reflected limitations, but also availability in large cities and some low-cost services; petitioner’s assets undermined an inability-to-access argument.

E. Economic and country-conditions hardship as “ordinary consequences” absent exceptional amplification

The agency treated reduced income and relocation challenges as typical consequences of removal; the First Circuit cited Samayoa for the proposition that reduced income generally does not transform a case into “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” The petitioner’s savings and assets further weakened the claim that Guatemala’s economic conditions would produce extraordinary hardship to the children.

F. “Additional factors” (language, ties, lack of other relief) did not compel remand

The court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate how certain unaddressed factors (English fluency/lack of Spanish fluency, U.S. community ties, limited Guatemala ties, lack of alternative relief) would materially strengthen the hardship claim, invoking Leao and Nolasco. The court also noted that the petitioner’s reliance on an article about mental-health effects of deportation did not match his own testimony that the family would remain intact by relocating together.

3.3. Impact

A. Reinforcement of post-Wilkinson deference in the First Circuit

Although the First Circuit again declined to choose between “substantial evidence” and “clear error,” the opinion’s practical effect is to cement a highly deferential posture toward agency hardship determinations by emphasizing: (1) unreviewability of underlying factual findings, (2) permissibility of concise agency explanations, and (3) the petitioner’s burden to connect asserted factors to the statutory “substantially beyond ordinary” threshold.

B. Litigation consequences: “failure to consider” arguments must clear a high bar

The decision illustrates that a petitioner cannot obtain review by merely labeling an evidentiary dispute as “legal error.” The court treated “ignored evidence” as a narrow category—reserved for decisions that genuinely overlook critical facts—not for decisions that mention categories of evidence but assign them less weight.

C. Medical-hardship evidence: the record must be clinical, current, and tied to access in the destination country

The opinion underscores how medical-hardship claims often fail absent: (i) medical documentation of severity and prognosis, (ii) evidence of concrete treatment needs (frequency, cost, specialty), (iii) evidence those services are not reasonably available where the family would live, and (iv) evidence the applicant cannot relocate within the country to access care.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Cancellation of removal (non-LPR): A discretionary form of relief that, if granted, allows a removable noncitizen to remain in the United States. Even qualifying for it requires meeting strict statutory criteria, including a demanding hardship showing.
  • “Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”: Hardship to a U.S.-citizen (or other qualifying) relative that is substantially beyond what is normally expected from a family member’s removal. It is intentionally a high threshold.
  • “Qualifying relatives”: For this ground, the statute limits hardship consideration to the applicant’s U.S.-citizen (or LPR) spouse, parent, or child. Here, the qualifying relatives were the petitioner’s two U.S.-citizen daughters.
  • “Aggregate” hardship: The agency must consider all hardship factors together (health, education, finances, country conditions), not in isolation. But considering them together does not mean any set of difficulties automatically becomes “exceptional.”
  • Mixed question / deferential review: Applying a legal standard (hardship) to facts is a mixed question. After Wilkinson, courts defer heavily because the inquiry is “primarily factual,” and they cannot reweigh or redo the agency’s factual findings.
  • Reasonably available medical care: The question is not whether care is as good as in the United States; it is whether adequate care is reasonably accessible in the country of removal, considering location, feasibility, and resources.

5. Conclusion

Argueta Castillo v. Blanche is a post-Wilkinson decision that demonstrates how difficult it is to overturn a cancellation-of-removal hardship denial in the First Circuit. The court reaffirmed that it will not revisit underlying factual findings, will review the hardship application deferentially, and will not require the IJ or BIA to discuss every piece of evidence or every Monreal factor expressly.

The key takeaway for future cases is practical: successful hardship petitions require a record that substantiates severity, non-speculative risk, and lack of reasonably available mitigation (including medical access and internal relocation options). Absent that, appellate courts are likely to treat the agency’s hardship determination as well within the zone of deference mandated by Wilkinson v. Garland.