Arguable Probable Cause for Conspiracy-to-Fabricate-Evidence Arrest Can Rest on Apparent Involvement Despite Unchecked Exculpatory Leads; Malicious Prosecution Requires a Pleaded Seizure Pursuant to Legal Process

Case: Garrett M. Cook v. Micheal Brooks, et al. (11th Cir. Feb. 19, 2026) (per curiam) (Not for Publication)

1. Introduction

This appeal arises from the warrantless arrest of Garrett M. Cook, a former Polk County, Florida sheriff’s deputy, after cash seized during a traffic stop went missing and a supplemental report was created to account for the missing currency. Cook sued Detective Michael Brooks and other supervisory officers (Mark Dainty, Dina Russell, Britt Williams, Larry Williams, and Sergeant Taylor Plowden) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution, and also asserted Florida false-arrest claims. Sheriff Grady Judd was sued in his individual and official capacities.

The key issues were:

  • False arrest / qualified immunity: whether the officers had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Cook for conspiracy to tamper with or fabricate evidence under Florida law.
  • Malicious prosecution: whether Cook pleaded the required Fourth Amendment “seizure pursuant to legal process,” as distinct from a warrantless arrest.
  • Supplemental jurisdiction: whether the district court properly declined to keep the state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Accepting Cook’s allegations as true, the court held:

  • The defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal false-arrest claims because, under the totality of the circumstances alleged, they had arguable probable cause to arrest Cook for conspiracy to tamper with or fabricate evidence.
  • Cook failed to state a federal malicious-prosecution claim because he did not allege a seizure pursuant to legal process (and he alleged no other post-process seizure).
  • With all federal claims dismissed, the district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction over the Florida claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Standards at the motion-to-dismiss stage

  • Ounjian v. Globoforce, Inc., 89 F.4th 852: supplied the pleading posture—facts are accepted as true and viewed in the plaintiff’s favor. This framing mattered because Cook’s story (e.g., that he did not authorize use of his password) was assumed true, yet the court still found arguable probable cause.

Qualified immunity framework

  • Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228: emphasized qualified immunity’s “breathing room” for reasonable mistakes, reinforcing why arguable probable cause (not actual probable cause) is dispositive at this stage.
  • Roberts v. Spielman, 643 F.3d 899: provided the two-part qualified immunity inquiry (constitutional violation + clearly established law) once discretionary authority is shown.
  • Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765: supplied the “beyond debate” formulation for clearly established law, underscoring Cook’s burden to point to controlling law that would make the arrest clearly unlawful.
  • Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304: supported the procedural propriety of resolving qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss when the complaint itself fails to allege violation of a clearly established right.
  • Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268: provided de novo review standards for qualified immunity and Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals.

Probable cause, arguable probable cause, and officers’ investigative duties

  • Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130: anchored the Fourth Amendment seizure principle and the definitions of probable cause and arguable probable cause. Skop’s “reasonable belief” formulation is the backbone of the court’s arguable probable cause conclusion.
  • United States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346: was incorporated via Skop as the articulation of probable cause (“facts and circumstances” warranting a reasonable belief).
  • Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891: was pivotal on how officers may handle competing inferences. It supplied the propositions that officers need not rule out innocent explanations and need not resolve conflicting evidence in a suspect-favorable way.
  • District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48: influenced the court twice—first for the “not a high bar” description of probable cause; second, for the inferential latitude officers have under the totality of circumstances and their ability to infer dishonesty.
  • Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425: framed the general duty of reasonable investigation and the possibility of liability when readily obtainable information is ignored. The court used Rankin to acknowledge the investigative principle but ultimately found that the omitted steps would not eliminate arguable probable cause under the pleaded facts.
  • Tillman v. Coley, 886 F.2d 317: via Rankin, supported the limitation that officers need not take “every conceivable step” to eliminate innocence.
  • Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176: supplied the modern Eleventh Circuit taxonomy for when arguable probable cause can fail (precedent on similar facts, statutory text plainly precluding arrest, or obviously unconstitutional arrest). The court used Garcia to show Cook did not fit any failure mode.
  • Davis v. City of Apopka, 78 F.4th 1326: reinforced that Eleventh Circuit precedent does not require officers to believe or rule out an innocent explanation before arrest.

Elements of Florida conspiracy and the federal malicious-prosecution “legal process” requirement

  • Bradley v. State , 787 So. 2d 732: provided the Florida Supreme Court definition of conspiracy as an agreement (express or implied) that can be inferred from circumstances, directly supporting the court’s view that “agreement” can be reasonably inferred without direct proof.
  • Williams v. State, 314 So. 3d 775 and Slaughter v. State, 301 So. 2d 762: supported the Florida rule that conspiracy does not require proof of an overt act and that even a minor role can suffice—lowering what officers needed to reasonably suspect as to Cook’s participation.
  • Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147: was central to distinguishing false arrest (seizure without legal process) from malicious prosecution (seizure pursuant to legal process).
  • Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259: via Williams v. Aguirre, supported the “pursuant to legal process” element and examples (warrant-based arrest, post-arraignment/indictment/PC hearing arrests).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Why arguable probable cause existed despite Cook’s asserted alibi and the unreviewed IT evidence

The court treated the decision as a qualified-immunity/probable-cause problem, not a “who is telling the truth” merits trial. The pleaded facts included (i) Cook’s participation in the stop, (ii) his counting of the money, (iii) the later filing of a supplemental report that appeared to be notarized by Cook, and (iv) the cash never being logged into evidence. From those facts, a reasonable officer could suspect Cook agreed with other deputies to cover up missing evidence by using a false report.

Cook’s principal pushback was investigative: he claimed officers should have checked IT logs and contacted his supervisor, which he said would show he was out of county when the supplemental report was submitted and therefore did not notarize it. The court’s response was functional: even if those steps proved Cook did not personally submit the electronic notarization at that time, a reasonable officer could still infer Cook’s involvement—e.g., that he supplied or authorized use of his password, or participated in an agreement to fabricate a record even if he did not personally execute it.

This is where Washington v. Howard, District of Columbia v. Wesby, and Davis v. City of Apopka do the work: officers need not disprove innocent explanations or resolve conflicts for the suspect, and may draw reasonable inferences from suspicious circumstances. The court also noted that, by Cook’s own allegations, Raczynski had lied repeatedly, giving officers reason to discredit accounts and treat the situation as a coordinated cover-up—making an inference of agreement more plausible under the “totality of circumstances” lens.

(b) Why Florida conspiracy doctrine mattered

The court’s arguable probable cause analysis is notably driven by the breadth of Florida conspiracy principles as cited. Under Fla. Stat. § 777.04(3) and Bradley v. State , 787 So. 2d 732, the agreement element can be inferred circumstantially. Under Williams v. State, 314 So. 3d 775 and Slaughter v. State, 301 So. 2d 762, no overt act is required and a minor role can still constitute conspiracy. Those rules reduce the investigative “gap” Cook sought to emphasize: even if he did not personally notarize the report, and even if others were the main actors, an “agreement” inference could still yield arguable probable cause to arrest him for conspiracy to fabricate evidence.

(c) Why the malicious-prosecution claims failed at the pleading stage

Following Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147 and Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, malicious prosecution requires a seizure “pursuant to legal process.” Cook pleaded only a warrantless arrest and one day in jail, and pleaded no intervening legal-process event (e.g., arrest on a warrant, arraignment-based detention, indictment-based detention, or a probable-cause hearing leading to continued seizure). The court rejected the suggestion that “discovery would reveal” legal process because Rule 12(b)(6) requires the element to be pleaded, not hypothesized.

3.3. Impact

Practical effect on § 1983 false-arrest litigation (especially at Rule 12(b)(6))

The opinion reinforces that, at the pleading stage, plaintiffs face a steep climb when the complaint itself supplies a coherent narrative supporting an inference of criminal agreement, even if the plaintiff also pleads an innocent explanation. Where the charged offense is conspiracy—particularly under a jurisdiction’s broad conspiracy doctrine—arguable probable cause may be found based on circumstantial linkage (presence, access, apparent authentication/authorization, and a missing-evidence cover story) without officers first exhausting exculpatory leads.

Clarification of malicious prosecution’s distinct “legal process” element

The decision underscores a recurring Eleventh Circuit boundary: a warrantless arrest may support a false-arrest theory, but it does not, without more, satisfy the malicious-prosecution “pursuant to legal process” seizure. Plaintiffs must plead the specific legal-process mechanism that continued or re-initiated the seizure.

Supplemental jurisdiction and pleading discipline

The opinion also reflects the common federal-courts trajectory: once federal claims fall early, state claims are typically dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), pushing the dispute (if any) back to state court. It further signals that a conclusory request for a “final chance to amend” without a proper motion and proposed amendments is unlikely to preserve amendment opportunities.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualified immunity: a doctrine that shields officials from damages unless they violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. It protects reasonable mistakes.
  • Probable cause vs. arguable probable cause: probable cause is a reasonable belief a crime was committed; arguable probable cause is an even lower threshold—whether a reasonable officer could think probable cause existed, which is often enough to trigger qualified immunity.
  • Conspiracy (Florida): an agreement (even implied) by two or more people to commit an unlawful act; it can be inferred from circumstances, does not require proof of an overt act, and includes minor participants.
  • False arrest vs. malicious prosecution (Fourth Amendment): false arrest addresses a seizure without legal process (commonly a warrantless arrest). Malicious prosecution requires a seizure that occurs because of legal process (like a warrant, indictment, or hearing).
  • “Need not rule out innocent explanations”: officers may arrest if the facts reasonably point to crime even if a suspect offers an innocent story; officers are not required to conclusively disprove innocence before making an arrest.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal because Cook’s own allegations allowed a reasonable officer to infer an agreement to cover up missing evidence, satisfying arguable probable cause for a conspiracy arrest and triggering qualified immunity on the false-arrest claims. Separately, the court applied settled circuit law to hold that a malicious-prosecution claim fails absent a pleaded seizure “pursuant to legal process.” The opinion’s broader significance lies in its reinforcement of (i) how forgiving arguable probable cause can be—especially for conspiracy charges—and (ii) the strict pleading divide between warrantless arrests (false arrest) and process-based seizures (malicious prosecution).

Note: The opinion is labeled “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” which generally limits its precedential force, though its reasoning may still be cited as persuasive authority subject to applicable circuit rules.