Appellate Waivers Foreclose Guidelines-Enhancement Challenges; Alternative Upward-Variance Sentencing Renders Potential “Crime of Violence” Error Harmless (Third Circuit)

Introduction

In United States v. Terell Crump (3d Cir. Jan. 21, 2026) (not precedential), the Third Circuit affirmed a 120-month sentence imposed on Terell Crump after his guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The case arose from a widely visible incident in which social media posts depicted Crump and another man firing guns from a home’s window in a densely populated Philadelphia neighborhood; images also showed Crump handling a firearm alleged to have an obliterated serial number. Crump committed the conduct while on parole.

The appeal presented two core issues: (1) whether Crump’s plea-agreement appellate waiver barred challenges to two Sentencing Guidelines enhancements; and (2) whether, even assuming an error in classifying a prior conviction as a “crime of violence,” the ultimate sentence could still be affirmed as reasonable because the district court announced it would impose the same sentence via an upward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed. It held that Crump’s appellate waiver barred his challenges to Guidelines enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(b)(4) and (b)(6)(B) because the waiver was knowing and voluntary, no enumerated exception applied, and enforcement did not create a miscarriage of justice. As to Crump’s argument that the district court misclassified second-degree aggravated assault as a “crime of violence” (affecting the base offense level), the panel did not decide the merits. Instead, it held any potential error was harmless because the district court expressly stated it would impose the same 120-month sentence even under the lower alternative Guidelines range, by varying upward based on the § 3553(a) factors. The court then found the 120-month statutory-maximum sentence substantively reasonable.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529 (3d Cir. 2008)
    The court applied Goodson’s framework for enforcing appellate waivers: (1) whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary; (2) whether an exception permits the appeal; and (3) whether enforcement would work a miscarriage of justice. Crump is a straightforward application of this three-part test to Guidelines-enhancement claims.
  • United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292 (3d Cir. 2007) and United States v. Brown, 578 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2009)
    These cases supplied definitional guardrails that prevented Crump from re-labeling Guidelines “enhancements” as an “upward departure” or “variance” to fit within waiver exceptions. Shedrick distinguishes an “enhancement” (Guidelines-specified adjustment to offense level) from an “upward departure” (discretionary movement from the calculated range under the Guidelines framework). Brown distinguishes a “variance” as a non-Guidelines, § 3553(a)-based change to the range. The panel used these definitions to hold that waiver exceptions for departures/variances did not open the door to appealing enhancements.
  • United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2013)
    Castro supported the conclusion that an “arguably erroneous calculation of a guidelines range” is a “garden variety claim of error” contemplated and barred by a typical appellate waiver, and that enforcing a waiver in that circumstance is not a miscarriage of justice.
  • United States v. Crump, No. 22-3379, 2023 WL 7297334 (3d Cir. Nov. 6, 2023) and United States v. Jenkins, 68 F.4th 148 (3d Cir. 2023)
    The panel recounted the case’s prior appellate history: Crump’s sentence had been vacated under then-existing law because Jenkins held that second-degree aggravated assault in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(3) could be committed by omission and therefore was not a “violent felony.” That earlier landscape explains why the “crime of violence” question remained live on remand.
  • Delligatti v. United States, 604 U.S. 423 (2025)
    The opinion noted an intervening Supreme Court clarification: “The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the use of physical force against another person.” Although the Third Circuit ultimately affirmed on harmlessness grounds, this citation signals that omission-based conduct may still satisfy “use of force” formulations post-Delligatti, undercutting the earlier logic that omission categorically precludes “violent felony” or “crime of violence” status.
  • In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 582 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2009) and In re Krebs, 527 F.3d 82 (3d Cir. 2008)
    These cases were cited for the “law of the case” and intervening-authority principles, particularly that a panel may reevaluate a prior holding that conflicts with intervening Supreme Court precedent. The district court invoked this concept to explain why earlier omission-focused reasoning would not necessarily control after Delligatti.
  • United States v. Carter, 730 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2013)
    Carter provided the key harmless-error template: where the district court explains it would impose the same sentence even absent the challenged “crime of violence” finding, any error in that finding can be harmless, shifting the appellate focus to the reasonableness of the alternative sentence.
  • United States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 2018), United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc), and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)
    These authorities framed substantive-reasonableness review: appellate courts consider the totality of circumstances and affirm unless no reasonable sentencing court would impose the same sentence for the reasons given, with “due deference” to a district court’s decision to vary based on § 3553(a).
  • United States v. Seibert, 971 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 2020), opinion clarified, 991 F.3d 1313 (3d Cir. 2021)
    Seibert supported the proposition that a sentence is not substantively unreasonable merely because the district court did not assign mitigating factors the weight the defendant wanted; weight allocation is largely entrusted to the trial court.
  • United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610 (11th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Nelson, 793 F.3d 202 (1st Cir. 2015)
    These out-of-circuit citations reinforced deference to district courts’ weighting of § 3553(a) factors and affirmances of upward variances where the sentencing judge demonstrates deliberate consideration.

Legal Reasoning

1) Appellate waiver enforcement: enhancements are not departures or variances

Applying United States v. Goodson, the court enforced the waiver because:

  1. Knowing and voluntary waiver: the district court reviewed the waiver at the plea hearing and found Crump’s agreement knowing and voluntary.
  2. No applicable exception: the plea agreement listed five exceptions; Crump’s challenges to U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(b)(4) and (b)(6)(B) enhancements did not fit. The panel rejected Crump’s attempt to reframe enhancement errors as “upward departure” or “upward variance” issues by invoking the enhancement/departure/variance distinctions from United States v. Shedrick and United States v. Brown.
  3. No miscarriage of justice: under United States v. Castro, routine Guidelines-calculation disputes are exactly the type of claims typically surrendered by waiver; enforcing the waiver therefore did not rise to the extraordinary level required to find a miscarriage of justice.

The practical doctrinal takeaway is that defendants cannot evade a waiver by semantic relabeling: an alleged misapplication of a Guidelines enhancement remains an enhancement challenge, not a departure/variance challenge, and is barred unless the waiver expressly preserves it.

2) “Crime of violence” dispute avoided via harmlessness and alternative sentencing rationale

Crump contested the district court’s conclusion that his second-degree aggravated assault conviction qualified as a “crime of violence,” which affected his base offense level. The Third Circuit declined to reach the classification question because the district court made a clear alternative finding: even if the “crime of violence” determination were wrong (and even if the resulting advisory range dropped to 84–105 months), it would still impose 120 months by varying upward under § 3553(a).

Following United States v. Carter, the panel treated any Guidelines error as harmless where the sentencing judge states, with reasons, that the same sentence would be imposed under an alternative calculation. The appellate inquiry thus became whether that upward-variant, statutory-maximum sentence was substantively reasonable.

3) Substantive reasonableness: deference to § 3553(a) weighing

Under United States v. Douglas and United States v. Tomko, and with the “due deference” principle from Gall v. United States, the panel assessed whether the totality of circumstances supported the sentence. Crump argued the district court inadequately accounted for mental health issues, substance abuse, and inadequate treatment while incarcerated. The panel responded in two steps:

  • A complaint that the court did not “adequately consider” an argument is typically framed as procedural reasonableness; Crump did not advance a procedural challenge. In any event, the record reflected that the district court did consider the mitigating factors.
  • Under United States v. Seibert, a defendant’s disagreement with the weight given to mitigation does not establish substantive unreasonableness. The district court emphasized aggravating considerations, including the public-danger nature of the offense conduct and Crump’s “horrendous” record of prison infractions, including assaults.

Given those reasons, the panel could not say “no reasonable sentencing court” would impose the same sentence; thus the 120-month sentence was affirmed.

Impact

Although designated “not precedential,” the opinion reinforces several operational rules in Third Circuit sentencing practice:

  • Waivers meaningfully constrain Guidelines litigation on appeal. Challenges to enhancements—common flashpoints in firearms cases—are squarely within the class of claims typically barred by appellate waivers absent a specific reservation. Defendants should assume that an agreed waiver will be enforced even if the enhancement ruling is contestable.
  • Alternative sentencing statements can insulate judgments from Guidelines disputes. Where the district court clearly explains it would impose the same sentence as a variance even under a different Guidelines range, appellate courts may treat potential Guidelines errors as harmless and review only the reasonableness of the alternative sentence.
  • Post-Delligatti pressure on omission-based arguments. The opinion flags that intervening Supreme Court authority may weaken earlier analyses (such as those in omission-focused discussions) when “use of force” is tied to intentional causation of injury even by omission. Future “crime of violence” litigation in the Third Circuit may increasingly pivot on Delligatti’s framing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Appellate waiver: a plea-agreement term where a defendant gives up (waives) the right to appeal most issues. Courts usually enforce it if the defendant understood it and agreed voluntarily, unless a listed exception applies or enforcement would be fundamentally unfair.
  • Guidelines enhancement vs. upward departure vs. variance:
    • Enhancement: a specific, rule-based increase to the offense level built into the Guidelines (e.g., obliterated serial number).
    • Upward departure: a Guidelines-authorized move away from the calculated range based on specified departure provisions.
    • Variance: a non-Guidelines adjustment based on the judge’s holistic evaluation of the § 3553(a) factors.
    Calling an enhancement a “variance” does not change what it is.
  • “Crime of violence”: a label used in the Guidelines that can raise the base offense level. Whether a prior conviction qualifies can be complex and depends on statutory elements and controlling precedent.
  • Harmless error in sentencing: even if a court made a Guidelines mistake, an appellate court may affirm if the district court made clear it would impose the same sentence anyway, and that alternative sentence is reasonable.
  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness:
    • Procedural: did the court follow the right steps (calculate the range correctly, consider arguments, explain reasons)?
    • Substantive: is the final sentence too high/low given the totality of circumstances? Appellate courts defer heavily to the district court’s judgment.
  • Law of the case & intervening precedent: earlier rulings in the same case often guide later stages, but a new Supreme Court decision can override prior assumptions and permit reevaluation.

Conclusion

United States v. Terell Crump underscores two durable features of federal sentencing appeals: (1) appellate waivers will be enforced to bar routine Guidelines-enhancement challenges unless an explicit exception applies; and (2) when a district court announces and justifies an alternative upward-variance sentence under § 3553(a), potential disputes about predicate “crime of violence” classifications may become harmless if the resulting sentence remains substantively reasonable. The opinion also signals that Delligatti v. United States may reshape omission-based debates in future “use of force” and “crime of violence” litigation.