Appellate Record Failure Requires Affirmance of Settlement Enforcement Treated as a Bench Trial

I. Introduction

This further-review decision arises from a post-decree custody/physical-care modification proceeding between Johnathon (“John”) Sprague (appellant) and Lanora Sprague (appellee), divorced in 2017 and parents of three children. On the scheduled trial date (Aug. 30, 2023), the parties believed they reached a verbal settlement but did not reduce it to writing or place it on the record. Months later, Lanora moved to enforce what she claimed were the agreed terms, attaching her proposed written stipulation; John resisted, asserting that her draft omitted provisions he said were part of the courthouse agreement.

The district court held an unreported hearing on the motion to enforce and then entered a written order enforcing Lanora’s version of the settlement. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for an ancillary trial, treating the enforcement ruling as akin to summary judgment. On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision and affirmed the district court—principally because John failed to create an appellate record of the unreported hearing (or to use the statement-of-evidence substitute procedure), making meaningful review impossible.

The case’s central issues were (1) how to characterize an in-person hearing on a motion to enforce a settlement when the filings do not invoke summary judgment rules, and (2) what consequence follows when the appellant fails to provide a transcript or an authorized substitute record of that hearing.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that, given the way the matter proceeded, the district court’s hearing functioned “in form—and in function” as a bench trial on whether the parties settled and on the settlement’s terms, consistent with Recio v. Fridley, 30 N.W.3d 532 (Iowa 2025). Under that characterization, the district court’s findings would be reviewed for substantial evidence—yet the appellate court had no record of the unreported hearing to test whether substantial evidence supported the findings.

Applying Iowa appellate rules requiring the appellant to provide the necessary record (including transcripts or a statement of evidence when proceedings are unreported), the court affirmed the enforcement order because it could not verify or refute the parties’ competing accounts. It also awarded Lanora $2,678.00 in appellate attorney fees under Iowa Code § 598.36 (2024), emphasizing she had to defend an appeal that could not be decided on the merits due to John’s failure to comply with appellate record requirements.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

• Recio v. Fridley, 30 N.W.3d 532 (Iowa 2025)
  The majority relied on Recio to distinguish between summary judgment-like enforcement and a factfinding proceeding. Here, “by all appearances,” the district court conducted the hearing “as though it were a bench trial,” and the district judge—who was present at the prior settlement conference—resolved competing accounts and expressly found Lanora’s draft “an accurate recitation.” The quoted passage from Recio (that such a hearing is a bench trial and factual findings bind on appeal if supported by substantial evidence) provided the doctrinal bridge for treating the proceeding as non-summary and factfinding in nature.
• State v. Brown, 16 N.W.3d 484 (Iowa 2025)
  Used to emphasize Iowa R. App. P. 6.806’s “statement of the evidence” mechanism for unreported hearings. The majority’s point was practical and dispositive: when the hearing is unreported, the appellant has a rule-based method to create a reviewable record; failure to use it forecloses meaningful appellate review.
• In re F.W.S., 698 N.W.2d 134 (Iowa 2005)
  Cited for the fundamental maxim that the appellant must provide a record “affirmatively disclosing the alleged error,” and that appellate courts will not “speculate as to what took place.” The case anchors the court’s refusal to decide who is right about what happened in the hearing.
• In re T.V., 563 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1997)
  Supports two key propositions: (1) the appellee has no obligation to create the missing record, and (2) an appellant is not entitled to relief when they do not attempt to comply with the rule allowing a substitute statement when a transcript is unavailable.
• Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 696 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2005)
  Reinforces that appellate courts will not consider facts lacking record support. This underpins the majority’s insistence that competing brief assertions cannot substitute for a transcript or settled statement.
• In re Marriage of Ricklefs, 726 N.W.2d 359 (Iowa 2007)
  Cited to illustrate that the absence of a record of a district court’s statements can preclude appellate decision-making; the majority uses it to criticize the court of appeals’ ability to decide procedure/substance without a record.
• Smith v. Iowa Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 729 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 2007)
  Used for the proposition that even a written ruling is “not a substitute for the required appellate record.” In other words, appellate review cannot reconstruct the evidentiary basis for findings from the face of an order alone.
• Mumm v. Jennie Edmundson Mem'l Hosp., 924 N.W.2d 512 (Iowa 2019); Estes v. Progressive Classic Ins., 809 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 2012); Iowa Land Title Ass'n v. Iowa Fin. Auth., 771 N.W.2d 399 (Iowa 2009); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Schadendorf, 757 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 2008); State v. Scott, 136 N.W. 132 (Iowa 1912)
  This string cite supplies the remedial rule applied: when the appellant fails to provide a record adequate to review the claimed error, the default consequence is affirmance (so long as the ruling is not fundamentally erroneous on its face).
• In re Marriage of Michael, 839 N.W.2d 630 (Iowa 2013)
  Guides the appellate attorney-fee analysis: ability to pay is controlling, and courts also consider whether the prevailing party had to defend the district court’s decision on appeal.
• McNeal v. Wapello County, 985 N.W.2d 484 (Iowa 2023)
  Quoted (via Recio) for the policy that “The law favors settlements.” The dissent invoked this policy to argue for clearer procedures so settlement enforcement is predictable and fair.
• Wende v. Orv Rocker Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995)
  Central to the dissent’s critique. Justice Oxley characterized Wende (and what she viewed as the majority’s extension of it through Recio) as endorsing an “undefined motions/undefined hearings” practice that invites post hoc characterization and procedural uncertainty.

B. Legal Reasoning

The majority’s analysis proceeds in two steps.

1. Characterization of the proceeding (bench trial, not summary judgment). The court rejected John’s attempt to frame the enforcement dispute as a summary-judgment-like “material facts” argument, emphasizing that neither party cited Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981 or used the term “summary judgment” in district court. The court concluded the hearing “by all appearances” resembled a factfinding hearing where the judge decided which version of the settlement was accurate—i.e., a bench trial as described in Recio v. Fridley. Under that model, factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.
2. Record failure forecloses review; affirmance follows. Even if substantial-evidence review applied, the appellate court lacked the predicate to perform it: the May 15 hearing was unreported, and John provided neither a transcript (Iowa R. App. P. 6.803(1)) nor a statement of the evidence (Iowa R. App. P. 6.806) to reconstruct the proceeding. The court refused to decide the appeal based on unsupported factual assertions in briefs (Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.) or speculation (In re F.W.S.). In line with the court’s repeated rule that an inadequate record generally requires affirmance (e.g., Estes v. Progressive Classic Ins.), the district court’s enforcement order was affirmed.

C. Impact

• Heightened practical importance of record-making in settlement enforcement. The opinion is less about the “right” settlement terms and more about appellate architecture: litigants who intend to challenge settlement-enforcement factfinding must ensure the hearing is reported or must promptly use Iowa R. App. P. 6.806 to produce a settled statement. Failure can be outcome-determinative.
• Procedural characterization will be inferred from function and form. By leaning on Recio v. Fridley, the majority signals that courts may treat enforcement proceedings as bench trials even absent explicit labeling—especially when the district court resolves factual disagreements about what was agreed.
• Fee exposure for pursuing unreviewable appeals. The award under Iowa Code § 598.36 (2024) underscores that a party may be ordered to pay appellate fees when the other side must defend a judgment against an appeal rendered non-merits-reviewable by the appellant’s record failure.
• Continuing debate and uncertainty flagged by the dissent. Justice Oxley’s dissent invites future cases to confront the process question head-on: whether the moving party should be required to select a clear procedural path (summary judgment under rule 1.981 versus a “separate trial” under rule 1.914) and whether reliance on a judge’s recollection risks blurring witness/factfinder roles. That critique suggests further doctrinal development is likely.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Bench trial”: a trial decided by a judge (not a jury). The judge can resolve factual disputes and credibility, and makes findings that are reviewed on appeal for “substantial evidence.”
• “Summary judgment” (Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981): a pretrial procedure used when there is no genuine dispute of material fact; the court decides the legal outcome based on the written record (pleadings, affidavits, discovery materials). If key facts are disputed, summary judgment is improper.
• “Substantial evidence” review: an appellate standard asking whether a reasonable factfinder could reach the district court’s findings based on the evidence. It is not a reweighing of credibility.
• “Appellate record” (Iowa R. App. P. 6.803(1)): the materials an appellate court is allowed to rely on (including transcripts). If a crucial hearing is missing, the appellate court often cannot decide the claimed error.
• Statement of evidence for an unreported hearing (Iowa R. App. P. 6.806): if no transcript exists, the appellant can draft a statement “from the best available means,” the appellee can object or propose amendments, and the district court settles and approves a final version. It is the rule-based substitute for a transcript.
• Appellate attorney fees (Iowa Code § 598.36 (2024)): in modification actions, the appellate court may order the losing party to pay part of the winning party’s attorney fees, often based primarily on ability to pay and on fairness considerations (including whether the appellee had to defend the ruling).

V. Conclusion

In re the marriage of Johnathon Sprague and Lanora Sprague establishes a stark, practice-driving principle: when a settlement-enforcement hearing effectively operates as a bench trial and the appellant fails to supply a transcript or a rule-compliant substitute record, appellate courts will not arbitrate competing narratives and will generally affirm. The decision also reinforces that appellate attorney fees may be awarded when the appellee is compelled to defend a judgment against an appeal that cannot be reached on the merits due to the appellant’s record failure.

The dissent highlights an unresolved procedural tension—whether Iowa should require clearer labeling and rule-based pathways (summary judgment versus a separate trial) for settlement enforcement. Until that debate is resolved, the majority’s message is immediate and concrete: preserve the record, or lose the appeal.