Appellate Abandonment in Immigration Petitions: Conclusory Briefing Forfeits Review and May Trigger Grievance Referral

Introduction

Minagua-Yaucan v. Bondi (2d Cir. Jan. 21, 2026) is a nonprecedential summary order in which the Second Circuit denied a petition for review brought by Felix Ivan Minagua-Yaucan, Olga Maria Villa-Aulla, and their minor children—natives and citizens of Ecuador—seeking reversal of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) affirmance of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) relief.

Although the petition nominally challenged the agency’s merits findings—whether petitioners suffered “persecution,” whether harms were connected to a protected ground, whether the record showed a pattern-or-practice of persecution of indigenous people, and whether the risk of future harm/torture was sufficiently supported—the court resolved the appeal on a threshold appellate issue: petitioners’ counsel failed to meaningfully contest the agency’s dispositive grounds and filed a brief consisting largely of conclusory assertions and misstatements. The panel not only denied the petition on abandonment/waiver grounds, but also forwarded the order to the Grievance Panel based on the defects in counsel’s briefing.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit reviewed the IJ’s decision “as supplemented by the BIA,” and held that petitioners abandoned their claims by failing to challenge the dispositive findings supporting denial of asylum, withholding, and CAT relief. The court emphasized:

  • Petitioners did not meaningfully contest findings that alleged race-based discrimination/abuse did not rise to “persecution,” that the alleged gang abuse lacked nexus to a protected ground, that country conditions did not show a pattern-or-practice of persecution of indigenous people, and that there was no showing of continuing gang interest in targeting the lead petitioner.
  • The brief violated basic appellate requirements by offering conclusory statements without citations to authorities or record evidence, and it misstated facts and law (including an erroneous assertion that asylum was denied as time-barred).
  • Counsel advanced legal arguments the court had rejected before, including the incorrect contention that the nexus requirement for withholding is less stringent than for asylum, and an unsupported contention about CAT “acquiescence.”

The court denied the petition, denied all pending motions/applications, vacated stays, and referred counsel to the Grievance Panel.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The order is notable less for new substantive asylum/CAT doctrine than for how it deploys established Second Circuit case law to enforce appellate briefing standards and waiver rules in immigration petitions.

1) Scope and standards of review

  • Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005): Cited for the standard approach that the court reviews the IJ decision as supplemented by the BIA. This matters because omissions in the brief must address the operative agency reasoning across both decisions.
  • KC v. Garland, 108 F.4th 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2024): Reiterates the division between de novo review of legal questions/application of law to fact and substantial evidence review of factual findings.
  • 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B): The “conclusive unless compelled” standard for agency factfinding—raising the practical burden on petitioners and underscoring why record-based argumentation is essential.

2) Abandonment/waiver for inadequate briefing

  • Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023): The central authority for the dispositive holding. The court invoked Debique to treat claims as abandoned where an appellant does not adequately present them in the brief; failure to make legal or factual arguments constitutes abandonment.
  • Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8): Requires arguments with citations to authorities and the record. The panel used Rule 28 to characterize the brief’s defects as more than stylistic: they prevented meaningful appellate review.
  • Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005): Supports the point that a “single conclusory sentence” is insufficient to raise an argument. This case supplies a concrete benchmark for when an issue is effectively not briefed.

3) Substantive asylum/withholding framework (used mainly to show what petitioners failed to contest)

  • 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b), 1208.16(b): The statutory/regulatory baseline for asylum and withholding, including the protected-ground nexus requirement.
  • Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 109-14 (2d Cir. 2022): Crucial clarification that the “one central reason” nexus standard applies not only to asylum, but also to withholding of removal. The court relied on Quituizaca to label counsel’s contrary position as a misstatement of law.
  • Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011): “Persecution is an extreme concept,” excluding merely offensive treatment.
  • Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006): Harm must rise above “mere harassment.”
  • Huo Qiang Chen v. Holder, 773 F.3d 396, 406 (2d Cir. 2014): “Threats of persecution, no matter how credible,” generally do not establish past persecution.
  • Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004): Requires an “objectively reasonable” fear absent past persecution.
  • Diallo v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2000): Even a “slight, though discernible, chance” can support a well-founded fear.
  • Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. I.N.S., 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005): Without “solid support in the record,” fear is “speculative at best.”

4) CAT standard and the “acquiescence” requirement

  • 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1): Requires showing torture is “more likely than not” and inflicted “by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of” a public official (or other person acting in an official capacity).
  • The panel did not develop CAT doctrine on the merits; instead, it criticized counsel for repeating an “unsupported argument” about acquiescence that the court had already rejected in other matters.

5) The court’s reliance on counsel’s prior, rejected arguments (summary orders)

The panel cited several prior summary orders (nonprecedential) to demonstrate that counsel had notice his arguments were erroneous:

  • Acero-Guaman v. Garland, No. 21-6606, 2024 WL 1734054, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2024) (summary order)
  • Guerrero-Andachz v. Bondi, No. 23-7943, 2025 WL 2810831, at *1 n.2 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2025) (summary order)
  • Aucacama-Azogue v. Bondi, No. 23-7165, 2025 WL 2078445, at *3 (2d Cir. July 24, 2025) (summary order)
  • Ortega-Garcia v. Bondi, No. 23-7162, 2025 WL 2504616, at *2 (2d Cir. Sept. 2, 2025) (summary order)

While summary orders do not create binding precedent, their use here functioned as a record of repeated conduct and repeated legal error—supporting the court’s decision to refer the matter to the Grievance Panel.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in a tight sequence that effectively treats adequate briefing as a prerequisite to merits review:

  1. Identify the dispositive agency grounds. The agency denied relief based on multiple independent findings: insufficiency of harm for “persecution,” lack of protected-ground nexus (particularly regarding gang harm), inadequate pattern-or-practice country-conditions showing, and lack of evidence of continued targeting; plus CAT deficiencies.
  2. Apply abandonment doctrine. Under Debique v. Garland, a petitioner who does not meaningfully contest the dispositive grounds in the opening brief abandons those claims. Because those grounds independently supported denial, abandonment was outcome-determinative.
  3. Reinforce the abandonment finding with Rule 28 deficiencies. The court underscored that the brief lacked record citations and legal support (Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)), and that conclusory assertions do not preserve issues (Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales).
  4. Address credibility of advocacy (misstatements and recycled language). The panel highlighted factual misstatements (e.g., incorrect claim that asylum was time-barred; unsupported allegations of being “savagely beaten multiple times”) and “identical” language to other briefs, implying boilerplate advocacy untethered to the record.
  5. Correct misstatements of substantive law. The court explicitly called out counsel’s incorrect assertion that withholding has a less stringent nexus standard than asylum, pointing to Quituizaca v. Garland as controlling on that point.
  6. Escalate professional-conduct consequences. Given these combined defects, the panel forwarded the order to the Grievance Panel—signaling that repetitive, unsupported, and legally erroneous briefing may have disciplinary implications beyond the loss of a single case.

Impact

Even as a “SUMMARY ORDER” without precedential effect, the decision is significant in at least three practical ways:

  • Procedural enforcement in immigration petitions. The order reinforces that the Second Circuit will dispose of petitions where counsel fails to engage the agency’s dispositive reasoning. Immigration petitions often involve multiple independent agency grounds; failing to challenge any one can be fatal.
  • Clarification-by-repetition of key substantive rules. The panel restated foundational standards (e.g., “one central reason” for both asylum and withholding, high bar for “persecution,” objective reasonableness for future fear, and “more likely than not” plus official acquiescence for CAT). The order’s corrective function is aimed at advocacy quality: it flags recurring misstatements as unacceptable.
  • Professional responsibility signal. Referral to the Grievance Panel is a strong institutional message: defective, boilerplate, record-misstating briefs may create risks not only for clients (loss of relief) but also for counsel (disciplinary scrutiny).

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Abandonment” (waiver) on appeal: If you do not clearly argue why the agency’s key reasons were wrong—using legal authority and record citations—the court treats the issue as given up, even if the underlying claim might have had merit.
  • “Persecution” vs. discrimination/harassment: Not all mistreatment qualifies. The Second Circuit repeatedly describes persecution as “an extreme concept” (Mei Fun Wong v. Holder) and requires harm beyond “mere harassment” (Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep't of Just.).
  • “Nexus” and “one central reason”: It is not enough to show harm; the harm must be connected to a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or particular social group). Under Quituizaca v. Garland, the “one central reason” nexus standard applies to both asylum and withholding.
  • “Pattern or practice”: A way to prove future risk by showing systematic persecution of a group in the country of removal, not merely isolated incidents.
  • CAT “acquiescence”: CAT relief requires a showing that torture is likely and that government officials would be involved or would consent/turn a blind eye in the legally relevant way described in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).
  • Substantial evidence review: The court does not re-try the facts; it upholds agency factfinding unless the record would compel any reasonable adjudicator to reach the opposite conclusion (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).

Conclusion

Minagua-Yaucan v. Bondi illustrates a decisive appellate lesson in immigration litigation: the failure to directly and supportively challenge the agency’s dispositive findings results in abandonment and automatic loss. The order also underscores that counsel’s obligations include accurate record portrayal, correct statements of governing law (especially the “one central reason” nexus rule of Quituizaca v. Garland), and compliance with Fed. R. App. P. 28. By referring counsel to the Grievance Panel, the Second Circuit adds an institutional warning that persistent, boilerplate, or misleading briefing can carry consequences beyond the case at hand.