Date: Mar 29, 2026

Appeal Waivers Bar Challenges to Criminal-Contempt Judgments Despite Jurisdictional Attacks on the Underlying Civil Case

1. Introduction

In In re: Contempt Proceedings Against Daniel E. Carpenter, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether a defendant who pleaded guilty to criminal contempt could pursue consolidated appeals challenging (i) his contempt conviction and sentence and (ii) the district court’s dismissal of his post-sentencing motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), notwithstanding an appellate-waiver clause in his plea agreement.

The contempt charge arose from an alleged violation of a district-court order in a related civil-litigation matter that prohibited interference with certain assets. Carpenter pleaded guilty to criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), received a sentence of zero months’ imprisonment, five years’ supervised release, and a $100,000 fine. He later sought relief under Rule 35(a), which the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The government moved to enforce the appeal waiver.

The central issues on appeal were whether the waiver should be enforced under the Tenth Circuit’s framework for appellate waivers, and whether Carpenter’s arguments (alleged breach, jurisdictional defects, lack of knowledge/voluntariness, and miscarriage of justice) avoided the waiver.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court granted the government’s motion to enforce the waiver and dismissed both consolidated appeals. Applying United States v. Hahn, the panel concluded:

Carpenter did not dispute that his appeals fell within the waiver’s scope.
The waiver was knowing and voluntary, as confirmed by the plea agreement’s text and a detailed Rule 11 colloquy.
Enforcement would not result in a miscarriage of justice under Hahn’s four narrow exceptions.

In doing so, the court clarified that (a) the district court cannot “breach” a plea agreement because it is not a party to it, and (b) jurisdictional attacks on the underlying civil case do not undermine the court’s authority to adjudicate a criminal contempt charge, which is treated as separate.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004)

Hahn supplies the controlling three-part test for enforcing appellate waivers: (1) scope, (2) knowing and voluntary, and (3) miscarriage of justice. This opinion is a straightforward application of Hahn, with the key work occurring in the knowing/voluntary and miscarriage-of-justice prongs because Carpenter effectively conceded scope.

United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2005)

Cited for the proposition that when a defendant does not dispute the scope prong, the court need not address it. The panel used Porter to streamline the analysis and focus on Carpenter’s remaining objections.

United States v. Luna-Acosta, 715 F.3d 860 (10th Cir. 2013)

Luna-Acosta stands for the important limitation that an appellate waiver does not bar an appeal from a judgment entered without jurisdiction. The panel accepted that principle but held it did not help Carpenter because his “jurisdictional” claims targeted the underlying civil case rather than the court’s authority to enter a criminal-contempt judgment.

United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003 (11th Cir. 2007)

The panel relied on Straub to support the conceptual separation between (i) jurisdiction over the underlying controversy and (ii) the power to punish criminal contempt. The quote used emphasizes that adjudicating criminal contempt does not require resolving the legal merits of the underlying dispute—reinforcing why Carpenter’s civil-case jurisdiction arguments did not defeat the contempt judgment or the waiver.

United States v. Tanner, 721 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2013)

Tanner assigns the burden to the defendant to show that a waiver was not knowing and voluntary. The court invoked this burden allocation to reject Carpenter’s claim that he did not agree to the fine or supervised release.

United States v. Sandoval, 477 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2007)

Sandoval plays two roles here. First, it rejects the idea that a waiver is invalid unless the defendant knows the precise outcome later imposed; it is enough that the defendant understands the nature of the rights being surrendered and how they apply generally. Second, it clarifies the miscarriage-of-justice inquiry: the focus is on whether the waiver itself is unlawful, not whether the sentence (or some other aspect of the proceeding) might be unlawful.

United States v. Green, 405 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2005)

Green defines “statutory maximum” for Hahn purposes as the upper limit Congress has specified for the offense. This definition mattered because Carpenter argued his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.

United States v. Bowers, 847 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2017)

Bowers provides the key substantive premise that 18 U.S.C. § 401 “carries no statutorily authorized maximum punishment.” Using Bowers (and Green’s definition), the panel concluded Carpenter could not show that his sentence exceeded a statutory maximum in the sense required by Hahn.

United States v. Smith, 500 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2007)

Smith is used to correct a common misapprehension: the “otherwise unlawful” miscarriage-of-justice exception addresses unlawfulness in the waiver itself, not alleged errors in the conviction or sentence. The panel applied Smith to reject Carpenter’s attempt to repackage merits challenges as a waiver-unlawfulness argument.

B. Legal Reasoning

No breach by the government (and the court cannot “breach”). Carpenter framed his complaint as “breach of the plea agreement,” but his cited conduct was the district court’s imposition of supervised release and a $100,000 fine. The panel disposed of this quickly: the district court is not a party to the plea agreement and therefore cannot breach it; and Carpenter identified no government action constituting breach.
Jurisdictional arguments must target the contempt judgment itself. While acknowledging that waivers do not bar appeals from jurisdictionally void judgments, the panel found Carpenter’s jurisdictional attacks were misdirected. They challenged jurisdiction over the underlying civil litigation, not the court’s authority to punish criminal contempt under § 401(3). The court treated the contempt proceeding as legally separate for this purpose, relying on Straub.
Knowing and voluntary waiver shown by the text and Rule 11 colloquy. The waiver’s language expressly covered: (i) conviction, (ii) any fine where the sentence included 0 months’ incarceration, and (iii) the length and conditions of supervised release. During the plea colloquy, Carpenter affirmed he understood that there was no statutory limit on a fine for this offense and that supervised release could be imposed up to five years; and he specifically acknowledged each relevant waiver provision. Under Sandoval, the waiver was not invalid merely because he later disliked the particular fine/supervision imposed.
No miscarriage of justice under Hahn’s four exceptions. The panel found none of the enumerated situations:
- No impermissible factor (e.g., race) was alleged or shown.
- No ineffective assistance in negotiating the waiver was established.
- No “statutory maximum” exceedance: § 401 has no maximum punishment (Bowers), and the five-year supervised release term fell within 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1)’s cap for a Class A felony.
- “Otherwise unlawful” did not apply because Carpenter’s arguments challenged the conviction/sentence, not the waiver’s validity (Smith; Sandoval).

C. Impact

Although designated as a nonprecedential “Order and Judgment,” the opinion is a useful consolidation of several practical points that are likely to influence plea-waiver litigation in the Tenth Circuit as persuasive authority:

Contempt + waiver enforcement. The decision underscores that criminal-contempt convictions obtained by plea are treated like other criminal judgments for appellate-waiver purposes; a well-drafted waiver can bar direct appeals from the conviction, fine, and supervised release.
Jurisdictional “escape hatch” is narrow. Defendants often attempt to avoid waivers by labeling arguments “jurisdictional.” This decision emphasizes the need for a tight fit: the alleged jurisdictional defect must relate to the criminal judgment being appealed, not a separate underlying proceeding.
§ 401 sentencing arguments face a high hurdle under Hahn. Because § 401 lacks a statutory maximum (as recognized in Bowers), defendants will have difficulty using the “sentence exceeds the statutory maximum” miscarriage-of-justice category to bypass appellate waivers in contempt cases—though other statutory provisions (like supervised-release caps) still matter.
Rule 11 colloquy remains decisive. The transcript-based reaffirmation of waiver terms illustrates how a careful colloquy can foreclose later claims of misunderstanding, particularly concerning fines and supervised release.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Criminal contempt (18 U.S.C. § 401(3)): A court’s power to punish willful disobedience of its lawful orders. It is “criminal” because it imposes punishment (fine, imprisonment, or both) to vindicate the court’s authority, rather than merely coercing future compliance.
Appeal waiver: A plea-agreement clause where the defendant agrees not to appeal certain issues (often conviction and/or sentence) in exchange for negotiated benefits. Courts generally enforce these waivers if they are within scope, knowing and voluntary, and do not produce a miscarriage of justice.
Rule 11 colloquy: The in-court questioning required before accepting a guilty plea. Its purpose is to ensure the defendant understands the charge, potential penalties, and rights being surrendered—critical for proving a waiver was knowing and voluntary.
“Statutory maximum” (in the waiver context): Not the guideline range, and not what a defendant expected, but the maximum punishment Congress authorized for the offense. Under § 401, there is no explicit maximum term/fine set in the statute (though other statutes can impose related limits, such as supervised release caps).
Miscarriage-of-justice exceptions (under Hahn): Four narrow categories that can prevent enforcement of a waiver: reliance on an impermissible factor, ineffective assistance in negotiating the waiver, sentence exceeding the statutory maximum, or a waiver that is otherwise unlawful (i.e., defective as a waiver).
Jurisdiction vs. merits: “Jurisdiction” concerns a court’s power to adjudicate a matter; “merits” concerns whether the defendant actually violated the law/order. This opinion stresses that attacking jurisdiction over an underlying civil case is not the same as attacking the court’s power to punish criminal contempt.

5. Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit enforced Carpenter’s appellate waiver and dismissed his consolidated appeals, reiterating that (1) courts do not “breach” plea agreements because they are not parties to them; (2) the jurisdictional exception to waiver enforcement is limited to defects in the judgment being appealed; (3) a thorough plea agreement and Rule 11 colloquy can establish a knowing and voluntary waiver even when the defendant later objects to the specific fine or supervised-release term; and (4) the miscarriage-of-justice exceptions cannot be used to relitigate the merits of the conviction or sentence when the waiver itself remains valid.