APA Review of USCIS § 1154(c) Marriage-Fraud Bars: Contradictory Affidavits and “Same-Evidence” Refilings Do Not Make Denials Arbitrary

1. Introduction

Albana Avullija v. Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (11th Cir. Apr. 23, 2026) concerns the denial of Albana Avullija’s fifth I-130 “alien relative” petition filed for her husband, Leonard Avullija. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS, referred to in the opinion as “the Services”) denied the petition under § 1154(c), which prohibits approval of petitions where the beneficiary previously attempted or conspired to enter a marriage to evade immigration laws.

The dispute did not primarily turn on Albana and Leonard’s current marriage, but on Leonard’s earlier marriage to U.S. citizen Alice Spivey and the government’s longstanding conclusion that it was a sham. Albana sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing that USCIS’s denial was “arbitrary and capricious.” The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Key issues: (i) whether USCIS’s marriage-fraud determination was arbitrary and capricious in light of the administrative record, (ii) whether a new affidavit from the prior spouse (Spivey) undermined USCIS’s fraud finding, and (iii) whether the district court could dismiss without reviewing the “complete” administrative record given the pleadings and attachments.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held that Albana failed to state an APA claim because USCIS’s § 1154(c) denial was supported by record evidence consistent with a sham marriage between Leonard and Spivey. The court emphasized that APA review is narrow and does not allow courts to reweigh evidence.

The panel also held that USCIS did consider Spivey’s new sworn statement but reasonably discounted it because it contradicted other evidence, and because affidavits “of this nature” generally do not overcome fraud evidence without objective corroboration.

Finally, the court rejected Albana’s argument that the district court erred by dismissing without reviewing the complete administrative record, noting that Albana conceded the petition relied on similar or identical evidence to prior petitions and that the only new evidence (Spivey’s affidavit) was before the district court.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Standard of review on dismissal

  • United States v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 195 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
    Cited for the de novo standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6)-style dismissal: the Eleventh Circuit applies the same standard as the district court. This framing matters because the appeal is not about fact-finding but whether the complaint plausibly alleges an APA violation.

APA review framework

  • Bouarfa v. Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., 75 F.4th 1157, 1161 (11th Cir. 2023), aff'd sub nom. Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 604 U.S. 6 (2024)
    These authorities supply two foundational propositions used by the panel: (1) the APA provides for judicial review of final agency action; and (2) courts cannot review matters committed to agency discretion, but may review a non-discretionary statutory predicate to discretionary action. The panel places § 1154(c) into the reviewable “predicate” category—i.e., whether the marriage-fraud bar applies is not treated as an unreviewable discretionary call.
  • Mendoza v. Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., 851 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir. 2017)
    Mendoza is used for the familiar APA standards (“arbitrary, capricious” and “unsupported by substantial evidence”) and for the operative regulatory test: USCIS “will deny” an I-130 where there is “substantial and probative evidence” of an attempt or conspiracy to enter into a fraudulent marriage (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(ii)). Mendoza also anchors the fraud inquiry in intent at the time of marriage, and it approves reliance on evidence from prior proceedings.
  • Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir. 2007)
    Provides the canonical four-part articulation of when agency action is arbitrary and capricious (wrong factors, failure to consider important aspect, explanation contrary to evidence, or implausible explanation). The panel measures Albana’s allegations against this rubric and finds them wanting.

Marriage-fraud intent and evidence sources

  • Matter of Laureano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2-3 (BIA 1983)
    Quoted (via Mendoza) for the core test: whether the “bride and groom intended to establish a life together at the time they were married.” This focuses the inquiry on contemporaneous intent rather than later marital breakdown alone.
  • Matter of Tawfik, 20 I. & N. Dec. 166, 168 (BIA 1990)
    Supports USCIS’s ability to rely on “any relevant evidence,” including evidence derived from prior proceedings. This is particularly important here because Leonard’s marriage to Spivey had already been scrutinized in visa/consular contexts and prior I-130 cycles.
  • Matter of Pak, 28 I. & N. Dec. 113, 119 (BIA 2020)
    Used to diminish the probative force of late-breaking affidavits: such affidavits generally do not overcome existing fraud evidence without objective corroboration. The court applies Pak directly to Spivey’s new statement and emphasizes its contradictions with the record.

Judicial restraint in weighing evidence

  • Murugan v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 10 F.4th 1185, 1194 (11th Cir. 2021)
    Cited for the principle that reviewing courts do not “reweigh the evidence from scratch.” This is central to the panel’s rejection of Albana’s argument, which effectively asked the court to draw different inferences from circumstantial facts.

Prior litigation involving the same parties

  • Avullija v. Sec'y of State, 839 F. App'x 292, 299 (11th Cir. 2020)
    The earlier unpublished decision is used primarily as factual and procedural context: prior petitions and visa applications were denied, and a prior complaint was dismissed. It also highlights a different doctrinal barrier from the earlier visa litigation—consular nonreviewability—which the present case largely avoids by focusing on USCIS’s § 1154(c) petition denial rather than the consular officer’s visa refusal.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The court’s framing: narrow APA review + a non-discretionary predicate

The court begins by situating the claim within the APA’s limited review model. It treats the application of § 1154(c) as reviewable because it is a statutory predicate to agency action rather than a purely discretionary determination (drawing from Bouarfa v. Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec.). Once in the APA posture, the question becomes whether USCIS had a rational basis grounded in the administrative evidence and whether it applied the proper legal test.

(b) Application of § 1154(c): “substantial and probative evidence” of a prior sham marriage

The opinion recites the governing standard: USCIS “will deny” an I-130 if there is “substantial and probative evidence” of an attempt or conspiracy to enter a fraudulent marriage (from Mendoza v. Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec. and 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(ii)). It then evaluates whether the agency’s fraud determination was rationally supported by the record.

The panel highlights multiple circumstantial indicia supporting USCIS’s finding that Leonard and Spivey did not intend to establish a life together at the time of marriage:

  • Leonard and Spivey did not speak the same language.
  • Spivey was previously married to Leonard’s cousin.
  • Spivey left Albania one week after the marriage and did not return or see Leonard for years.
  • They never lived together.
  • The marriage occurred shortly after the birth of Leonard’s second child with Albana (while Albana was married to someone else).
  • Photos presented to document the relationship appeared staged and taken on a single day.

Importantly, the court does not declare any single fact dispositive. Rather, it accepts USCIS’s ability to draw a fraud inference from the cumulative record. Albana’s challenge—asking the court to prefer alternative inferences—fails because APA courts do not substitute their judgment for the agency’s on evidentiary weight (citing Murugan v. U.S. Att'y Gen.).

(c) Treatment of Spivey’s new affidavit

Albana’s key “new” evidence was a sworn statement from Spivey asserting the legitimacy of her marriage to Leonard. The panel’s analysis is twofold:

  1. Consideration: USCIS did consider the affidavit; this defeats any claim that the agency “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem” under Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne.
  2. Weight and contradictions: USCIS discounted it because it contradicted record evidence concerning: (i) when Spivey first spoke with Leonard, (ii) when she submitted the first I-130, (iii) the number of people at the wedding, and (iv) whether Leonard’s parents attended or knew about the wedding. The panel reinforces this approach with Matter of Pak, which warns that affidavits alone—without objective corroboration—generally do not overcome existing fraud evidence. Here, the affidavit was not merely uncorroborated; it was affirmatively inconsistent with other evidence.

(d) Dismissal without the “complete” administrative record

Albana argued that the district court should not have dismissed without reviewing the complete administrative record. The panel rejects that objection based on the way the case was pleaded and litigated:

  • Albana conceded the evidence for the fifth petition was “similar (if not the same)” as for earlier petitions.
  • The sole new item—Spivey’s affidavit—was attached to Albana’s response to the motion to dismiss and thus was available to the district court.

On those facts, the panel concludes the district court had “everything it needed” to determine the complaint failed to state an APA claim. Practically, the court treats the “complete record” argument as immaterial where the plaintiff identifies no missing record material that could plausibly change the arbitrary-and-capricious analysis, especially in a repetitive, same-evidence refiling.

3.3. Impact

Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” decisions are not binding precedent, the opinion is instructive in several recurring contexts:

  • Refiled I-130 petitions after repeated fraud findings: Petitioners who refile with largely unchanged evidentiary showings face a steep APA hurdle. Courts may view “new” evidence skeptically where it is conclusory, uncorroborated, or inconsistent with the existing record.
  • Affidavit strategy: The decision reinforces Matter of Pak in practice: a supportive affidavit from a prior spouse is not a silver bullet, especially if it conflicts with earlier statements, timelines, or objective indicators.
  • APA pleading posture and record disputes: The court’s tolerance for dismissal without full-record compilation—on the specific facts that the plaintiff conceded evidentiary sameness and placed the only new evidence before the court—may influence how litigants frame “record completeness” arguments at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
  • Agency deference on intent in marriage-fraud determinations: The panel’s reliance on the “no reweighing” principle underscores that, once USCIS points to multiple record-based indicia of non-bona-fide intent, challengers must show more than alternative interpretations.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

I-130 petition
A form an eligible U.S. citizen (or lawful permanent resident) files to establish a qualifying family relationship so the noncitizen relative may seek immigration benefits. Approval is a prerequisite step; it does not itself grant a visa.
§ 1154(c) marriage-fraud bar
A statutory rule prohibiting approval of a family-based petition if the beneficiary previously tried or conspired to enter a marriage to evade immigration laws. (The opinion cites “11 U.S.C. section 1154(c),” but the marriage-fraud bar is commonly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c).)
“Substantial and probative evidence”
A heightened evidentiary threshold used in this context: USCIS must have meaningful, persuasive evidence of prior marriage fraud—more than a hunch, but not necessarily proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Arbitrary and capricious (APA)
A deferential standard. A court asks whether the agency considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. Courts generally do not decide the issue anew or reweigh competing evidence.
Consular nonreviewability
A doctrine (prominent in the parties’ prior case) limiting judicial review of consular officers’ visa decisions. This case is different because it centers on USCIS’s petition denial under § 1154(c), which the panel treats as judicially reviewable under the APA as a statutory predicate.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal because USCIS’s denial of Albana Avullija’s fifth I-130 petition rested on a rational, record-supported application of the § 1154(c) marriage-fraud bar. The court’s analysis underscores three practical lessons: (1) APA review is narrow and does not permit reweighing of circumstantial fraud indicators; (2) a late affidavit from a prior spouse, especially one that contradicts existing evidence, typically cannot overcome a developed fraud record; and (3) where a petitioner concedes the refiling relies on substantially the same evidence and the only “new” material is before the court, dismissal may be appropriate without full administrative-record litigation.