“Any Other Person” Gambling-Loss Actions Under Tenn. Code § 29-19-105 Do Not Confer Federal Article III Standing (and Removed Cases Must Be Remanded)

1. Introduction

This Sixth Circuit opinion addresses a recurring modern litigation pattern: “social casino” game users (or third parties) invoking old gambling-loss recovery statutes to seek repayment of money spent on virtual casino-style games. In four consolidated cases arising from Tennessee, the plaintiffs sued various game companies under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-19-105, a statute that—after a 90-day window for the gambler to sue—authorizes “any other person” to sue to recover gambling losses “for the use of” the gambler’s spouse, children, or next of kin.

Defendants removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and traditional diversity jurisdiction. The district court remanded, concluding (i) the suits were not CAFA “class action[s]” and (ii) the alleged losses could not be aggregated to satisfy the diversity amount in controversy. On appeal under CAFA’s expedited provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c), the Sixth Circuit did not reach those statutory jurisdiction questions. Instead, it held that the plaintiffs—who did not allege they personally lost money gambling—lacked Article III standing, requiring remand to state court.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the remand orders because the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing in federal court:

• No personal injury alleged: Plaintiff Burt’s complaint alleged only Tennessee residency and sought recovery of “all sums paid by Tennessee residents” to Playtika; it did not allege Burt herself suffered a gambling loss.
• Statutory authorization is not enough: Even if a state statute authorizes a cause of action, a federal plaintiff must still show a concrete harm to satisfy Article III.
• Not qui tam: Burt argued § 29-19-105 is qui tam-like because it allows “any other person” to sue after 90 days. The court rejected this: § 29-19-105 does not redress an injury to the state, does not allocate any recovery to the government, and lacks procedural safeguards typical of qui tam regimes.
• Removal issues left undecided: Because Article III standing is “perhaps the most important” jurisdictional doctrine, the court refused to decide CAFA/class-action status or aggregation questions once it found no standing.
• Mandatory remand: Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), when subject matter jurisdiction is absent “at any time,” the removed case “shall be remanded.”

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Standing doctrine and “statutory rights”

• Murray v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 681 F.3d 744 (6th Cir. 2012): Cited for the proposition that Article III limits federal jurisdiction to “cases or controversies,” which do not exist absent standing. It anchors the panel’s threshold move: jurisdiction must be confirmed before reaching statutory removal disputes.
• Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011): Used to support the court’s independent obligation to raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte even when parties do not.
• Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016), and Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992): Supply the canonical three-part standing test (injury in fact, traceability, redressability) and the requirement that injury be concrete.
• TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021): The key modern limiter on “statutory standing” arguments. The panel quotes its central idea: a plaintiff does not satisfy injury-in-fact “whenever a statute grants” a right to sue; rather, the plaintiff must be “concretely harmed.” This directly defeats Burt’s reliance on § 29-19-105’s broad “any other person” language as sufficient for federal standing.

B. Qui tam standing and assignment theory

• Stalley v. Methodist Healthcare, 517 F.3d 911 (6th Cir. 2008): The Sixth Circuit’s template for identifying a qui tam statute. It explains qui tam as an action to redress government injury and notes typical statutory signals: suit brought on behalf of the government, government share of recovery, and procedural controls. The opinion uses Stalley repeatedly to show § 29-19-105 looks nothing like a qui tam regime.
• Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000): Provides the doctrinal foundation that qui tam standing is rooted in partial assignment of the government’s injury claim to the relator. The panel contrasts this with § 29-19-105, which targets private family benefits rather than governmental injury.
• Action Chiropractic Clinic, LLC v. Hyler, 467 S.W.3d 409 (Tenn. 2015): Cited for the principle that assignment requires consent; an assignor cannot be forced to assign rights. This undercuts any argument that § 29-19-105 “automatically” assigns family members’ claims to a stranger-plaintiff.
• Braden v. ARB Gaming, LLC, No. 24-CV-00762, 2024 WL 4648002 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 2024): Used as persuasive authority that a statutory “right of action” does not create a forced assignment, especially when potential beneficiaries might want to sue themselves.
• Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008): Addressed and distinguished. Sprint upheld assignee standing where there was an express assignment agreement. Here, the complaint alleges no agreement or manifested intent by family members to assign claims to Burt.
• Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 2015): Cited in the assignment discussion to emphasize the need for evidence of intent to assign.
• Duncan v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 854 F. App'x 652 (6th Cir. 2021): Reinforces the court’s reluctance to extend “qui-tam-like standing” to statutes that are not actually qui tam.

C. Removal, remand, and sequencing

• International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 500 U.S. 72 (1991): Defendants invoked it to argue the plaintiffs have standing to contest removal, so the court could decide CAFA/detour around standing. The panel reads International Primate narrowly: it shows a plaintiff may contest removal as a distinct adversity interest, but it does not authorize a federal court to decide removability once it itself concludes Article III standing is absent.
• Polo v. Innoventions Int'l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2016): Cited for the proposition that a removed case lacking Article III standing must be remanded under § 1447(c), including CAFA removals.
• Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 2001), quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990): Used to emphasize standing’s primacy among jurisdictional doctrines and to justify declining to reach other appellate issues once standing fails.

D. Background authorities on gambling-loss statutes

• Nichol v. Batton, 11 Tenn. 469 (Tenn. Err. & App. 1832): Establishes the common-law baseline: gambling losses were not recoverable absent statute.
• Applicability of Statute of Anne Provisions Regarding Gambling, Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 04-046, 2004 WL 789813 (Mar. 18, 2004): Provides legislative and historical context for Tennessee’s enactment and expansion of gambling-loss recovery.
• Berkebile v. Outen, 426 S.E.2d 760 (S.C. 1993); Vinson v. Casino Queen, Inc., 123 F.3d 655 (7th Cir.1997); Salomon v. Taft Broad. Co., 475 N.E.2d 1292 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984): Cited to explain policy rationales for expansive loss-recovery statutes—protecting families, deterring illegal gambling, and supplementing weak enforcement capacities in earlier eras. These citations help frame why Tennessee might empower “any other person” to sue, but they do not change the federal standing analysis.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The court’s sequencing: Article III first

The opinion’s most consequential move is methodological: it treats Article III standing as a threshold bar that prevents reaching CAFA and diversity questions. Relying on Henderson v. Shinseki and Sixth Circuit standing doctrine, the panel holds it must police jurisdiction even where the parties largely briefed only statutory removability.

This sequencing is not merely prudential; it is constitutional. Once the court concludes the plaintiff lacks injury-in-fact, the federal judiciary lacks power to opine on the remaining disputes. The court therefore characterizes deciding CAFA issues without standing as inconsistent with its “independent obligation” to examine jurisdiction.

B. Injury-in-fact: § 29-19-105’s breadth cannot create a federal injury

Burt alleged she is a Tennessee resident and sought to recoup money spent by unidentified Tennessee players. The court treats this as dispositive under TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez: statutory authorization to sue does not itself constitute a concrete injury.

In other words, even if Tennessee law permits a private attorney general-style suit in state court, federal court demands that the named plaintiff herself have suffered (or be validly asserting via recognized doctrine) a concrete injury. Because Burt alleged no personal gambling loss, she alleged no injury-in-fact.

C. Rejection of “qui tam” characterization

To save standing, Burt attempted to reframe § 29-19-105 as qui tam. The court rejects that framing through three converging features (all drawn from qui tam doctrine and Stalley v. Methodist Healthcare):

• No governmental injury / no “on behalf of the state” language: The statute directs recovery “for the use of” private relatives (spouse/children/next of kin). That is a private remedial structure, not a government-injury enforcement mechanism.
• No government share of recovery: The opinion contrasts § 29-19-105 with the False Claims Act’s explicit split (31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1), (2)), where the government receives the remainder after the relator’s share. Here, the text signals the opposite: the recovery is for private beneficiaries.
• No procedural safeguards indicating the state is the real party: Classic qui tam statutes contain filing-under-seal requirements, notice to government, government intervention and settlement controls, and consent-to-dismiss mechanisms. § 29-19-105 contains none, reinforcing that the state is not the real party in interest.

The court also addresses (and effectively forecloses) a substitute theory: that § 29-19-105 operates as an assignment of family members’ claims to “any other person.” Even if assignment could support Article III (as in Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc.), the complaint alleged no consent, agreement, or intent to assign; and Tennessee assignment law (via Action Chiropractic Clinic, LLC v. Hyler) requires consent.

D. Removal challenge standing does not rescue federal jurisdiction

Defendants suggested the court should decide CAFA/determine removal propriety and let standing be addressed later. They invoked International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund. The panel accepts the limited point that plaintiffs have a cognizable interest in the forum and can contest removal. But it distinguishes the posture: once the federal court itself determines Article III standing is lacking, § 1447(c) compels remand.

Thus, the opinion synthesizes International Primate with the remand statute and with decisions like Polo v. Innoventions Int'l, LLC: the remedy for a removed case lacking Article III standing is not dismissal and not merits-like adjudication of CAFA; it is remand to state court.

3.3 Impact

A. Immediate effect: a federal courthouse “gatekeeping” rule for § 29-19-105 plaintiffs

The decision functions as a strong gatekeeping precedent for federal litigation (including CAFA removal appeals) involving Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-19-105:

• Named plaintiffs must show their own concrete injury (e.g., personal gambling loss) or a recognized basis for asserting another’s injury (e.g., actual assignment with manifested intent).
• “Any other person” is not a shortcut into federal court. Tennessee may authorize broader enforcement in state court, but that authorization does not create Article III injury.
• Federal courts will remand without reaching CAFA fights if standing is absent—potentially mooting expensive class-action jurisdiction battles at the outset.

B. Litigation strategy implications for defendants and plaintiffs

• Defendants removing under CAFA may face an early remand when the plaintiff is an uninjured “stranger” litigant. Even if CAFA might otherwise apply, standing can prevent federal adjudication of that question.
• Plaintiffs seeking a federal forum will need different plaintiffs. If the goal is to remain in federal court, the safest route is a plaintiff who personally lost money (or a family beneficiary with a direct stake), rather than a generalized “any other person.”
• State courts become the primary venue for these “bounty-like” Tennessee gambling-loss actions brought by uninjured plaintiffs—unless Tennessee law or pleading practices evolve to include assignments or to place the state in an enforcement posture.

C. Broader doctrinal significance: TransUnion applied to state-created enforcement rights

Beyond Tennessee gambling statutes, the decision exemplifies a post-TransUnion trend: federal courts scrutinize state (and federal) statutes that create private rights of action for people who did not themselves suffer concrete harm. The opinion underscores a federalism-sensitive but firm constitutional boundary: states define causes of action; Article III defines who can invoke federal judicial power.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s consolidated decision establishes a clear federal-jurisdiction rule for Tennessee’s gambling-loss recovery statute: a plaintiff who has not personally suffered a gambling loss cannot rely on Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-19-105’s “any other person” authorization to satisfy Article III standing, and the statute is not properly characterized as qui tam. Once a federal court identifies that defect in a removed case, it must remand under § 1447(c) and should not proceed to decide CAFA or diversity removability questions.

In practical terms, the opinion channels many § 29-19-105 suits—especially those filed by uninjured, non-beneficiary plaintiffs—back into state court, while also signaling how litigants might restructure pleadings or parties if they seek to litigate such disputes in a federal forum.