Answer-Deadline Extensions Do Not Waive § 1446’s 30-Day Removal Clock; Untimely Removal Supports § 1447(c) Fee Awards

1. Introduction

In Groff Tractor Mid Atlantic, L.L.C. v. Rubble Master Americas Corporation (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2026) (per curiam) (not designated for publication), the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s award of attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) after remanding a case that was removed late. The dispute arose when Groff Tractor Mid Atlantic, L.L.C. (“Groff”) sued Rubble Master Americas Corporation (“Rubble Master”) in Texas state court. Groff perfected service on December 13, 2024. Shortly thereafter, Rubble Master’s counsel sought, and Groff’s counsel agreed to, “a 20 day extension to file an Answer” in the state-court case.

More than 30 days after service, on January 27, 2025, Rubble Master removed the action to federal court. Groff moved to remand on the ground that removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Groff also sought the fees it incurred to secure remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The key issues on appeal were:

  • Whether it was “objectively reasonable” for Rubble Master to believe that an agreed extension of time to answer in state court also extended (or waived) the federal 30-day removal deadline.
  • Whether the district court properly calculated a fee award using the lodestar method based on counsel’s affidavit (without separate “billing documentation”).
  • Whether the district court’s reliance on extra-record information (firm website) about counsel’s experience mattered, given the ultimate fee reduction.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that Rubble Master lacked an objectively reasonable basis to remove when it did, because the removal was plainly beyond the 30-day window in § 1446(b)(1) and the state-court answer extension did not constitute a waiver of the removal deadline. It also rejected Rubble Master’s attempt—raised on appeal—to demand “billing documentation” beyond the information provided by affidavit. Finally, even assuming the district court erred by consulting counsel’s firm website to confirm years of practice, any error was harmless because the only identified consequence was a reduction in the fee award.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Removal timing and waiver

  • City of Clarksdale v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 428 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2005)
    Cited for the baseline rule that “a defendant’s thirty-day removal period commences on formal service of process,” anchoring the analysis to a clear, service-based trigger. This matters here because service was perfected on December 13, 2024, making the January 27, 2025 removal facially late absent a recognized basis to toll or waive the deadline.
  • Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1986)
    Quoted for the principle that, “In the absence of waiver of the time limit by the plaintiff, or some equitable reason why that limit should not be applied,” an untimely removing defendant loses the right to remove. The Fifth Circuit used Brown to frame Rubble Master’s theory as a “waiver” argument—and to reject it on the facts: an extension “to file an Answer” is not a waiver of the separate federal removal deadline.

Fee entitlement under § 1447(c): “objectively reasonable” removal

  • Hornbuckle v. State Farm Lloyds, 385 F.3d 538, 541 (5th Cir. 2004)
    Cited for the standard of review: abuse of discretion governs the decision to award fees under § 1447(c). This deference is significant because Rubble Master needed to show the district court made a discretionary error, not merely that a different decision could have been made.
  • Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005)
    Supplies the governing test: fees are proper when no “objectively reasonable” basis for removal existed at the time of removal. The panel applied this standard straightforwardly: removing after the statutory deadline—based on an answer-extension theory not supported by removal doctrine—was not objectively reasonable.

Fee calculation: lodestar method and reductions

  • Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989)
    Identifies factors that can inform adjustments to the lodestar. Although modern fee practice often centers on the lodestar as the starting point, Johnson remains a key Fifth Circuit reference for evaluating reasonableness and potential adjustments (subject to later Supreme Court guidance). The opinion cites Johnson to situate the court’s discretion to adjust the lodestar in light of case circumstances.
  • Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 98 F.3d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1996)
    Reinforces Fifth Circuit practice regarding lodestar calculation and adjustment. It supports the structured approach: determine reasonable hours and rates first, then consider adjustment.
  • Wegner v. Standard Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 814, 822 (5th Cir. 1997)
    Used twice in effect: (1) for the standard of review—lodestar for clear error, adjustments for abuse of discretion; and (2) to illustrate that affidavits with some omissions do not necessarily defeat a fee request, particularly where the district court is familiar with the litigation and the fee opponent fails to offer detailed rebuttal. This undercut Rubble Master’s appellate insistence on “contemporaneous billing records or invoices.”
  • Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., Inc., 448 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
    Supports the district court’s authority to reduce the lodestar where the applicant fails to show “billing judgment” (i.e., that it excluded unproductive, excessive, or redundant time). The district court’s 25% reduction echoed the principle that the fee applicant bears the burden of demonstrating reasonableness, including evidence of billing judgment.

Forfeiture and appellate posture

  • Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021)
    Cited for forfeiture principles: arguments not properly raised below or inadequately briefed can be forfeited. This citation bolstered the court’s unwillingness to entertain Rubble Master’s new demand for additional billing materials when it did not meaningfully challenge the affidavit’s sufficiency in the district court.

Diversity citizenship clarification (raised but deemed immaterial to the fee issue)

  • Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 2008)
    Cited to correct a common jurisdictional mistake: LLC citizenship is determined by the citizenship of all members, not by principal place of business. The panel noted Rubble Master’s argument “betrays a misunderstanding” when it tried to analogize LLC citizenship to corporate citizenship.

Harmless error

  • 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fed. R. Civ. P. 61
    These harmless-error provisions supported the court’s conclusion that even if consulting the firm website was error, Rubble Master identified no prejudicial consequence—especially because the consultation led to a reduction, not an increase, of fees.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Objective reasonableness turns on the removal’s legal posture at the time of removal.
Applying Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., the panel focused on what Rubble Master reasonably could have believed when it removed on January 27, 2025. Service occurred on December 13, 2024; § 1446(b)(1) required removal within 30 days after service. Rubble Master’s only justification for lateness was that an agreed extension “to file an Answer” in state court also waived or extended the federal removal deadline.

(b) A state-court answer extension is not a waiver of the federal removal deadline.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the waiver theory. Read in context, the email agreement referenced the state-court case and requested more time “to file an Answer.” The panel treated removal timing as a separate statutory clock; an agreement about when a state-court responsive pleading is due does not, without more, waive § 1446(b)(1)’s deadline. In other words: the parties can stipulate about state-court procedure, but that does not rewrite the federal removal statute.

(c) Fee proof: affidavit can suffice absent a preserved, specific challenge.
Groff supported its fee motion with an attorney affidavit listing: hourly rate ($750), time entries by date and task description (23.6 hours), and the total amount requested. Rubble Master did not meaningfully contest the affidavit’s sufficiency in the district court. On appeal, Rubble Master demanded separate “billing documentation,” but the panel found no authority requiring invoices where an affidavit provides the same information, and found no clear error in the lodestar calculation.

(d) Lodestar adjustment and harmless error.
The district court reduced the lodestar by 25%, citing (i) the straightforward nature of the work relative to the attorney’s seniority (confirmed via a firm website), and (ii) lack of evidence of billing judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that even if consulting the website was error, Rubble Master showed no prejudice; the only identified effect was a smaller award. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2111 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 61, any such error was harmless.

(e) The panel’s jurisdictional aside underscores disciplined issue-framing in fee appeals.
Rubble Master argued it was objectively reasonable to believe diversity existed based on Groff’s prior “principal place of business” representations in bankruptcy filings. The Fifth Circuit dismissed this as immaterial to the dispositive question—objective reasonableness of the timeliness theory (answer-extension as waiver). It also used the moment to correct a doctrinal confusion: LLC citizenship follows members (Harvey), unlike corporate citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).

3.3 Impact

  • Practical rule for removal practice: Counsel should not assume that courtesy extensions in state court affect § 1446(b)(1)’s removal window. If removal is contemplated, the 30-day clock should be treated as independent unless an unmistakable, legally cognizable waiver is obtained (and even then, waiver arguments are perilous).
  • Fee exposure for late removal is real: This decision reinforces that removing late on a thin waiver theory can trigger § 1447(c) fees because the inquiry is objective reasonableness, not subjective good faith.
  • Fee applications in the Fifth Circuit: A detailed affidavit with rate, hours, and task descriptions may be sufficient where the opponent fails to lodge specific, timely objections. Parties who want to contest fees should do so in the district court with particularity and, ideally, counter-evidence.
  • LLC citizenship confusion remains a trap: The panel’s aside signals that arguments treating LLCs like corporations can undermine credibility in removal litigation, particularly where jurisdictional diligence is scrutinized.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Removal (28 U.S.C. § 1446): A defendant’s statutory right to move a case from state to federal court. For most cases, the notice of removal must be filed within 30 days after the defendant is formally served with the complaint.
  • Remand (28 U.S.C. § 1447): If removal is defective (e.g., late), the federal court sends the case back to state court. The court may also require the removing party to pay the other side’s costs and attorneys’ fees incurred “as a result of the removal.”
  • “Objectively reasonable” (fee standard): The question is whether a reasonable lawyer, viewing the law and facts at the time of removal, could think removal was proper. If not, fee shifting is appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for the needless removal fight.
  • Lodestar: The baseline fee calculation: reasonable hours × reasonable hourly rate. Courts may then adjust up or down in light of factors such as overstaffing, inefficiency, or lack of billing judgment.
  • Billing judgment: Evidence that the lawyer exercised restraint (e.g., wrote off duplicative or unnecessary time) rather than billing every minute. Absence of such evidence can justify a percentage reduction.
  • Harmless error: Even if a court makes a mistake, the appellate court will not reverse unless the mistake likely affected the outcome in a meaningful, prejudicial way.

5. Conclusion

Groff Tractor Mid Atlantic, L.L.C. v. Rubble Master Americas Corporation reinforces a clean procedural lesson in removal practice: an agreed extension to answer in state court does not, without more, waive or extend § 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day deadline to remove. Because Rubble Master removed well outside the statutory window and relied on an unsupported waiver theory, the Fifth Circuit held the district court acted within its discretion to award fees under § 1447(c). The decision also underscores that detailed fee affidavits can support a lodestar calculation when objections are not preserved, and that purported errors that only reduce an award will often be deemed harmless on appeal.