Anders Withdrawal Granted Where Rule 11 Plea Colloquy and Within-Guidelines Sentence Reveal No Nonfrivolous Appellate Issues

1. Introduction

In United States v. Luis Gomez (3d Cir. July 6, 2026) (nonprecedential), the Third Circuit reviewed an appeal from drug and firearm convictions and a 228-month sentence imposed by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. After a jury was empaneled but before openings, Luis Gomez chose to plead guilty to all counts without a plea agreement. On appeal, appointed counsel moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, asserting there were no nonfrivolous issues to raise.

The central issues were procedural rather than merits-based: (1) whether counsel’s Anders submission satisfied Third Circuit requirements; and (2) whether the record nonetheless contained any nonfrivolous appellate issues regarding jurisdiction, the validity of the guilty plea under Rule 11 and the Constitution, or the reasonableness of the sentence.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed. It held that counsel’s brief complied with Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(a) and Anders, and that an independent review of the record revealed no nonfrivolous issues. Specifically:

  • Jurisdiction: The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 because the indictment charged federal offenses.
  • Guilty plea validity: The plea colloquy satisfied Boykin and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11; any challenge would fail under plain-error review.
  • Sentence reasonableness: The sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable; it fell at the bottom of the properly calculated Guidelines range (228–270 months), included a mandatory consecutive term for the § 924(c) count, and reflected meaningful consideration of § 3553(a).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)

Anders supplies the constitutional framework for appointed counsel who concludes an appeal is frivolous: counsel must submit a brief identifying anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal and request leave to withdraw; the appellate court must then independently review the record. Here, the Third Circuit treated Anders as the governing standard and evaluated counsel’s submission accordingly.

United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2001)

Youla provides the Third Circuit’s two-step inquiry: (1) whether counsel satisfied the requirements of an Anders brief; and (2) whether the court’s own review reveals any nonfrivolous issues. It also states that if the Anders brief is adequate, the court may “confine” scrutiny to the record portions counsel identified. The panel applied this structure, found the brief sufficient, and proceeded to assess the flagged issues (jurisdiction, plea validity, sentencing).

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988)

Penson is cited for the appellate court’s obligation to review the record to determine whether any nonfrivolous issues exist. The panel invoked Penson to frame its plenary responsibility in the Anders context.

McCoy v. Ct. of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429 (1988)

McCoy is used for the definition of “frivolous” as an issue that “lacks any basis in law or fact.” The Third Circuit employed that definition to explain why the potential issues identified by counsel did not rise above frivolity on this record.

United States v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564 (3d Cir. 2022) and United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 2000)

These cases articulate what an adequate Anders brief must contain in the Third Circuit: a thorough review of the record, identification of issues that could arguably support the appeal, and explanations of why those issues are frivolous. The panel relied on these standards to conclude counsel had met the obligation.

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)

Boykin requires that a guilty plea be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, with an adequate record showing the defendant understood the rights being waived. The panel used Boykin as the constitutional baseline for reviewing the plea colloquy.

United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2007)

Lessner supplies the standard of review—plain error—where the defendant did not challenge the plea’s validity in the district court. This mattered because the panel evaluated the Rule 11 record through the more defendant-unfriendly lens of plain-error review.

United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2006)

Schweitzer is cited for the content requirements of Rule 11 advisements (rights waived, nature of charges, penalties, Guidelines, and any waiver terms) and the court’s duty to ensure comprehension and voluntariness. The panel used Schweitzer to measure the adequacy of the district court’s plea colloquy.

United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc)

Flores-Mejia is cited for applying plain-error review to unpreserved procedural sentencing objections. Because Gomez did not object to procedural reasonableness, this precedent set the standard governing any procedural challenge.

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)

Gall provides the overarching framework for appellate review of sentencing: procedural reasonableness first, then substantive reasonableness, with abuse-of-discretion review for the latter. The panel invoked Gall when explaining how it evaluated the sentence.

United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)

Tomko supplies a frequently quoted substantive reasonableness formulation: whether “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence” for the reasons given. The panel used Tomko to justify affirmance on substantive reasonableness.

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)

Rita recognizes that a within-Guidelines sentence may be treated as presumptively reasonable on appeal. The panel relied on this presumption to reinforce why Gomez’s bottom-of-the-range sentence did not present a nonfrivolous issue.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The Anders/L.A.R. 109.2(a) screening function

The opinion’s core work is procedural gatekeeping. The court first ensured counsel complied with Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(a) by (i) identifying potential issues and (ii) explaining why they were frivolous. Having found the submission adequate, the court proceeded under Youla to focus review on the areas counsel highlighted—while still independently confirming there were no overlooked nonfrivolous issues.

(b) Jurisdiction

The panel’s jurisdiction analysis is straightforward: 18 U.S.C. § 3231 grants district courts jurisdiction over “all offenses against the laws of the United States.” Because Gomez was indicted under federal drug and firearm statutes (including 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 856 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(c)), the jurisdictional issue had no arguable merit.

(c) Guilty plea validity (Rule 11 / Boykin) and the significance of the district court’s hesitation

The opinion emphasizes that Gomez initially suggested he was pleading guilty because he believed he would lose at trial. The district court responded with an important safeguard: it would not accept a plea if Gomez was simultaneously asserting he did not commit the crimes. Only after Gomez “unequivocally admitted guilt multiple times” did the court proceed.

Under Rule 11 and Boykin, the panel looked for a record showing:

  • competence,
  • understanding of charges and trial rights (including confrontation and the presumption of innocence),
  • knowledge of maximum and mandatory minimum penalties,
  • understanding of the Guidelines’ role and the court’s discretion,
  • a factual basis for the plea, and
  • voluntariness.

Because the record contained these elements—and because review was for plain error under Lessner—the panel concluded there was no nonfrivolous basis to attack the plea.

(d) Sentencing: procedural and substantive reasonableness

The court applied the standard sentencing review sequence reflected in Gall. Procedurally, the panel noted:

  • no objections to the Guidelines calculation (total offense level 32, criminal history category IV),
  • a correctly identified Guidelines range of 228–270 months (incorporating a statutory minimum consecutive sentence on the § 924(c) count),
  • the district court’s discretionary rejection of a downward departure for allegedly overrepresented criminal history, and
  • meaningful consideration of § 3553(a), including seriousness, lack of remorse, deterrence, and disparity avoidance.

Substantively, the panel leaned on Rita’s within-Guidelines presumption and Tomko’s deferential benchmark. Given the nature of the conduct (large quantity of methamphetamine and firearms-related evidence recovered from the home) and the sentence at the low end of the range, the panel found no plausible argument that the sentence was unreasonable.

3.3 Impact

Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL” and thus not binding under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7, the opinion has practical instructional value in three recurring areas:

  • Anders practice: It reinforces what a compliant Anders/L.A.R. 109.2(a) submission looks like—issue identification plus a record-based explanation of frivolousness—and illustrates how an adequate brief narrows the appellate court’s focus under Youla.
  • Plea-taking safeguards: It highlights a best practice when a defendant appears to be pleading guilty for strategic reasons: the court should clarify that the plea is an admission of guilt and refuse the plea absent an unequivocal acknowledgment and factual basis.
  • Sentencing appeals: It reflects how difficult it is to mount a nonfrivolous challenge to a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence where the district court articulates § 3553(a) reasons and the defendant failed to preserve procedural objections.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Anders brief: A filing by appointed counsel stating that, after reviewing the entire record, counsel believes the appeal has no arguable merit—paired with a roadmap to any potentially appealable issues so the court can independently verify.
  • Plain error review: A strict appellate standard applied when an issue wasn’t raised below; the appellant must show a clear error that affected substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness or integrity of proceedings.
  • Rule 11 colloquy: The judge’s in-court questioning to ensure a guilty plea is knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis, and that the defendant understands the rights being waived and the sentencing exposure.
  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: “Procedural” asks whether the court followed the right steps (correct Guidelines, considered § 3553(a), explained sentence). “Substantive” asks whether the final sentence is reasonably justified by those reasons.
  • Within-Guidelines presumption (appellate): A sentence inside the advisory Guidelines range is generally harder to overturn because it is presumed reasonable on appeal (though that presumption can be rebutted).
  • Mandatory consecutive sentence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)): Certain firearm-in-furtherance convictions require prison time that must run consecutively to other counts, constraining the sentencing court’s overall discretion.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Luis Gomez is a textbook application of the Third Circuit’s Anders and L.A.R. 109.2(a) framework: where the plea colloquy satisfies Rule 11/Boykin, the appellant failed to preserve objections (triggering plain-error review), and the district court imposes a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence after meaningful § 3553(a) consideration, the court will deem potential appellate claims frivolous, permit counsel to withdraw, and affirm.