Anders Dismissal with Limited Review and Enforced Waiver of Sentencing/Release-Condition Objections in a Multi-Count Violent-Crime Sentence

1. Introduction

In United States v. Dwight Hasberry, the Seventh Circuit considered an appeal following guilty pleas to carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119), Hobbs Act armed robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)), and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). The district court imposed a total sentence of 180 months, below the calculated advisory guideline range that included a mandatory consecutive term for the § 924(c) count.

Appointed appellate counsel moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), asserting that any appellate issues would be frivolous. Because Hasberry did not respond to counsel’s motion, the court addressed only the issues counsel identified—primarily guideline calculations, waiver, supervised-release conditions, sentence reasonableness, and the then-unresolved restitution order.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit granted counsel’s Anders motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal. It concluded that potential challenges to (i) non-grouping of counts, (ii) the multiple-count adjustment, (iii) various guideline enhancements, (iv) substantive reasonableness of a below-guidelines sentence, and (v) supervised-release conditions were frivolous—often because the record foreclosed error or because Hasberry had waived the arguments in the district court.

The court also noted that a restitution challenge was not ripe at the time of briefing because no final restitution judgment had been entered; after an amended judgment ordered $2,150 in restitution, Hasberry filed a separate appeal (No. 26-1389).

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)
    Role in the decision: Provides the procedure for counsel to withdraw when an appeal would be frivolous. The court evaluated counsel’s submission for thoroughness and then independently assessed whether any nonfrivolous issues existed within the scope of that submission.
  • United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014)
    Role in the decision: Supplies the operational rule applied here: when counsel’s Anders brief is thorough and the defendant does not respond, the Seventh Circuit limits review to the issues counsel raises.
  • United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012) and United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002)
    Role in the decision: These cases support counsel’s choice not to contest plea voluntariness when the client does not wish to challenge the guilty plea; the court treated that omission as proper rather than deficient lawyering.
  • United States v. Pugh, 147 F.4th 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2025)
    Role in the decision: Anchors the court’s waiver analysis: where a defendant affirmatively requests or endorses a guideline position in the district court (here, urging the four-level serious-bodily-injury enhancement), he waives appellate review of that issue.
  • United States v. White, 80 F.4th 811, 813 (7th Cir. 2023)
    Role in the decision: Controls the interpretation of “physical restraint” for U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B); forcing a victim into a back room at gunpoint qualifies, foreclosing a plausible challenge.
  • United States v. Oregon, 58 F.4th 298, 302 (7th Cir. 2023)
    Role in the decision: Provides the presumption of reasonableness the court applied to Hasberry’s below-guidelines sentence, reinforcing the conclusion that a substantive-reasonableness appeal would be frivolous.
  • United States v. Gibbs, 130 F.4th 619, 622 (7th Cir. 2025)
    Role in the decision: Supports finding waiver of challenges to supervised-release conditions when a defendant expressly states he has no objection at sentencing.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Scope of appellate review under Anders
    Applying Anders and United States v. Bey, the court treated counsel’s brief as the roadmap for review because it was thorough and Hasberry filed no response. This procedural posture matters: the court did not conduct a free-ranging error hunt but instead tested whether the issues counsel identified had any nonfrivolous traction.
  2. Guidelines grouping and multiple-count adjustment
    The court agreed that the carjacking and store robbery counts were properly not grouped under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 because they involved different victims and because the guideline structure for robbery (§ 2B3.1) is excluded from grouping under § 3D1.2(d). With two separate units, the PSR’s two-level increase under § 3D1.4 followed mechanically, leaving no viable basis for appeal.
  3. Enhancements and “double counting” with § 924(c)
    The court accepted counsel’s point that U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 comment n.4(A) bars applying a firearm-brandishing enhancement to the underlying offense for a § 924(c) conviction. Critically, however, the court emphasized a charge-specific application: the § 924(c) count was tied to the armed-robbery charge, not the carjacking charge. Therefore, applying a firearm enhancement to the carjacking count did not violate the guideline’s anti-double-counting instruction on these facts.
  4. Waiver of the serious-bodily-injury enhancement
    Hasberry objected to a five-level injury enhancement and explicitly sought the four-level “serious bodily injury” enhancement instead. Under United States v. Pugh, that affirmative position constituted waiver, not mere forfeiture, making appellate review unavailable.
  5. Physical restraint enhancement
    Relying on United States v. White, the court concluded that forcing the cashier into a back room at gunpoint qualifies as physical restraint under § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). Given binding circuit authority, a challenge would be frivolous.
  6. Substantive reasonableness of the sentence
    The court treated the below-guidelines 180-month sentence as presumptively reasonable under United States v. Oregon and found the district court’s § 3553(a) explanation adequate: seriousness and deterrence were emphasized, and mitigation (comparatively lesser role than the codefendant who pistol-whipped the cashier, and a violent upbringing) was considered. On that record, an abuse-of-discretion argument lacked a plausible foundation.
  7. Supervised-release conditions waiver
    Under United States v. Gibbs, the defendant’s affirmative statement that he did not object to proposed conditions waived appellate challenge.
  8. Restitution finality and appellate timing
    At briefing, restitution was deferred, meaning there was not yet a final, appealable restitution determination in the judgment. Once the district court entered an amended judgment imposing $2,150 restitution, the proper vehicle became a new, separate appeal (which Hasberry filed). The order thus distinguishes between the merits of restitution and the procedural requirement of a final restitution order for review.

C. Impact

Although designated NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION, the order reinforces several practical rules that will shape litigants’ expectations in the Seventh Circuit:

  • Anders practice: When counsel’s Anders brief is thorough and the defendant does not respond, the court will generally confine its review to counsel-identified issues (United States v. Bey), raising the premium on careful issue-spotting by counsel and timely pro se responses by defendants.
  • Waiver consequences at sentencing: Strategic concessions—such as affirmatively requesting a particular enhancement or stating “no objection” to conditions—can extinguish appellate arguments entirely (Pugh; Gibbs).
  • Charge-specific firearm enhancement analysis: The decision illustrates that § 2K2.4’s limitation on firearm enhancements turns on identifying the correct “underlying offense” for the § 924(c) count, not a defendant’s overall course of conduct.
  • Restitution appeals: Deferring restitution can require a separate notice of appeal once restitution becomes final, and Anders briefing may be premature on that issue until an amended judgment enters.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Anders brief
A filing by appointed counsel stating that, after a conscientious review, no nonfrivolous appellate issues exist; counsel seeks permission to withdraw, and the court independently checks for arguable issues.
Grouping (U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2) and units (U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4)
Grouping combines certain counts to avoid double-counting closely related harms. If counts do not group, the guidelines use a “unit” system that increases the offense level to reflect multiple distinct harms or victims.
Specific offense characteristics
Guideline add-ons tied to particular aggravating facts (e.g., firearm use, injury severity, restraint), applied on top of a base offense level.
§ 924(c) and “double counting”
Section 924(c) imposes a mandatory consecutive sentence for using/brandishing a firearm during certain crimes. The guidelines generally prevent adding a second firearm enhancement to the same underlying offense because the § 924(c) sentence already accounts for it.
Waiver vs. forfeiture
Forfeiture is failing to object (sometimes reviewed for plain error). Waiver is an intentional relinquishment—such as affirmatively endorsing the disputed ruling—which typically blocks appellate review altogether.
Substantive reasonableness
Appellate review of the length of a sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard, focusing on whether the district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors was reasonable.
Deferred restitution
When a court postpones deciding restitution, the restitution component is not final for appellate review until the court later enters an order (often via an amended judgment).

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s disposition in United States v. Dwight Hasberry underscores a consistent set of appellate and sentencing principles: (1) in an Anders posture with a thorough brief and no defendant response, review narrows to counsel-presented issues; (2) guideline outcomes driven by clear victim distinctions, exclusions from grouping, and binding interpretations (such as “physical restraint”) are unlikely to yield viable appeals; (3) defendants can waive sentencing and supervised-release challenges by affirmative positions in the district court; and (4) restitution frequently requires separate appellate sequencing when ordered after sentencing.