Ancillary Jurisdiction to Enforce Criminal Restitution After Probation Ends

1. Introduction

In United States v. Mikel Mims (11th Cir. Mar. 2, 2026), the Eleventh Circuit addressed a question of first impression: whether a federal district court retains jurisdiction within the original criminal case to order a defendant to comply with an outstanding restitution obligation after completion of a probationary sentence.

Parties: The United States (Plaintiff-Appellee) and Mikel Mims (Defendant-Appellant).
Background: Mims pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, received three years’ probation, and was ordered to pay $255,620 in restitution at 10% of monthly gross earnings until altered by the court. After probation ended in 2017, she ceased payments. In 2022, the district court entered an order in the criminal docket directing renewed compliance, “make up” missed payments, and submit a financial statement. Mims appealed, arguing: (1) no jurisdiction post-probation; and (2) denial of due process.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s compliance order. The court held that the district court had ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the restitution component of its criminal judgment even after probation ended. It further held that Mims was afforded sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard, so there was no plain due process error.

Notably, the panel granted rehearing, vacated its prior opinion, and substituted the present one; it also considered ancillary-jurisdiction and inherent-authority theories after supplemental briefing despite forfeiture concerns, citing the general-impact nature of the issue.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994): The cornerstone for the court’s ancillary-jurisdiction analysis. The opinion quotes Kokkonen’s formulation that ancillary jurisdiction covers matters “incidental” to those properly before the court and is necessary to “manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” The panel analogizes Kokkonen’s dicta—ancillary jurisdiction exists to enforce obligations incorporated into an order—to restitution as part of a criminal judgment.
  • Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 (1996): Supports the proposition that judicial power would be “incomplete” without jurisdiction to enforce federal judgments, reinforcing enforcement as a core judicial function.
  • Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297 (11th Cir. 1991): Cited for the Eleventh Circuit’s recognition of “inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt,” grounding the enforcement authority conceptually.
  • United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2015): Used to distinguish impermissible sentence modification from permissible enforcement. The court stresses the 2022 order did not “alter[] the amount of restitution” but compelled compliance with the existing judgment.
  • United States v. Batmasian, 66 F.4th 1278 (11th Cir. 2023): Reinforces the circuit’s understanding of ancillary jurisdiction in criminal-adjacent contexts.
  • United States v. Potes Ramirez, 260 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2001) and United States v. Martinez, 241 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2001): Deployed by analogy to show district courts may adjudicate post-judgment matters within the existing criminal docket (there, Rule 41(e) property-return motions), even years after final judgment, without opening a new civil case.
  • Fla. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Bush, 246 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2001): Establishes that administratively “closing” a case is a docket-management act without jurisdictional consequence; a closed case may be reactivated.
  • Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine, 998 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2021): Mentioned to distinguish Rule 41 voluntary dismissals without conditions (not applicable because restitution was incorporated into the criminal sentence).
  • United States v. Benjamin, 958 F.3d 1124 (11th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Rivera, 613 F.3d 1046 (11th Cir. 2010): Provide general jurisdictional standards (de novo review; federal courts’ limited jurisdiction).
  • United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022), Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004), United States v. Holland, 117 F.4th 1352 (11th Cir. 2024), and Ramirez v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 686 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2012): Together frame the forfeiture issue and the court’s discretion to consider correct legal constructions and/or entertain new theories in extraordinary circumstances. The panel treated enforcement jurisdiction as a question of general impact warranting consideration after supplemental briefing.
  • Ellingburg v. United States, No. 24-482, --- S. Ct. ---, 2026 WL 135982 (Jan. 20, 2026): Not necessary to the holding, but noted for the characterization of MVRA restitution as criminal punishment for Ex Post Facto purposes—supporting the “sentence” framing.
  • United States v. Moore, 22 F.4th 1258 (11th Cir. 2022) and United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010): Supply the plain-error framework for reviewing the unpreserved due process claim.
  • United States v. Smith, 30 F.4th 1334 (11th Cir. 2022) and Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006): Used for the principle that courts must provide fair notice and an opportunity to present positions before acting on their own initiative.
  • United States v. Pacheco-Romero, 995 F.3d 948 (11th Cir. 2021): Supports rejecting due process challenges when the defendant had sufficient notice and multiple opportunities to be heard.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. The jurisdictional problem framed as enforcement of a decree, not re-sentencing. The court begins with first principles: federal courts possess limited jurisdiction (Kokkonen; Rivera), but district courts have original jurisdiction over federal offenses (18 U.S.C. § 3231) and authority to impose mandatory restitution for covered offenses (18 U.S.C. § 3663A). The dispositive move is characterizing the 2022 order as enforcement of an existing criminal judgment, not an impermissible post-judgment modification of sentence (distinguishing Puentes).
  2. Ancillary jurisdiction as the doctrinal bridge beyond supervision. The panel holds that ancillary jurisdiction exists to “effectuate” the court’s decrees (Kokkonen) and that enforcement jurisdiction is essential to judicial power (Peacock v. Thomas). Because restitution was incorporated into the criminal judgment, nonpayment is a violation of the sentence’s terms; the court therefore may act within the criminal case to compel compliance.
  3. Rule-based reinforcement for enforcement tools. The court points to Fed. R. Crim. P. 38(e)(2) as expressly authorizing post-disposition orders reasonably necessary to ensure compliance with restitution (e.g., restraining orders, injunctions, deposits into the registry, bonds). This supports the view that enforcement can proceed without reopening a separate civil action.
  4. Administrative closure does not terminate jurisdiction. Relying on Fla. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Bush, the court rejects the argument that the criminal case’s closure stripped power to act. “Closed” is a docket label, not a jurisdictional event.
  5. Due process: multiple opportunities to be heard; plain-error review defeats the claim. Because Mims did not object on due process grounds below, review was for plain error (Moore; McNair). The panel concludes there was no plain error because Mims had: (i) repeated requests to provide financial information; (ii) a status conference attended by counsel; and (iii) briefing opportunities after the court directed a written motion and response. The court also references 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k) to emphasize the mechanism for reporting material changes in economic circumstances and adjusting payment schedules. Her strategic focus on jurisdiction, rather than inability-to-pay, did not convert available process into a due process violation.
  6. Statutory MVRA/FDCPA routes left undecided. Although the district court cited MVRA/FDCPA provisions, the panel expressly declines to decide whether those statutes independently supplied jurisdiction, because ancillary jurisdiction sufficed. It also does not reach FDCPA procedural-compliance arguments for the same reason.

C. Impact

1) Clarifies post-supervision enforcement power within the criminal docket.
The decision establishes in the Eleventh Circuit that a district court may use ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a criminal restitution judgment even after probation ends, without requiring the government to initiate a new civil action solely to obtain a compliance directive.

2) Reinforces the conceptual treatment of restitution as part of the sentence.
By framing nonpayment as violation of the criminal sentence and noting Ellingburg v. United States (MVRA restitution as punishment for Ex Post Facto purposes), the opinion strengthens arguments that restitution obligations retain criminal-judgment character even when supervised release/probation has expired.

3) Guides procedure and litigation strategy.
Defendants resisting post-supervision enforcement should expect courts to ask not only “jurisdiction?” but also “what is the defendant’s financial condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k)?” The case also signals that “futility” arguments may fail where the court provides channels for factual submissions and briefing.

4) Limits on the holding.
The panel repeatedly distinguishes enforcement from modification: orders compelling compliance with existing terms are permissible, while increasing restitution or altering the sentence would implicate the constraints recognized in United States v. Puentes. Future disputes may focus on whether a particular enforcement order crosses that line.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Restitution (MVRA)
A court-ordered obligation to compensate victims as part of the criminal judgment. Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, restitution is mandatory for certain offenses.
Ancillary jurisdiction
A court’s power to decide matters that are not independently within federal jurisdiction but are necessary to manage a case and enforce its judgments. Here, it means the criminal court can take steps to enforce its restitution judgment even after the supervision term ends.
Inherent authority
The judiciary’s traditional power to enforce compliance with lawful orders (often through contempt). The opinion treats enforcement authority as deeply rooted, while using ancillary jurisdiction as the jurisdictional doctrine that permits post-judgment action within the closed criminal docket.
Sentence “modification” vs. “enforcement”
Modification changes the sentence (generally barred unless a statute/rule permits). Enforcement compels compliance with existing terms without changing the sentence’s substance. The court held the compliance order was enforcement, not modification.
Plain-error review
A demanding appellate standard applied when a party failed to raise an objection in the district court. The appellant must show an obvious error that affected substantial rights, and even then the court corrects it only if it seriously harms the fairness or integrity of proceedings.
FDCPA
A statutory set of civil procedures to collect federal debts. Although referenced below, the panel did not decide whether FDCPA procedures were required because it affirmed on ancillary-jurisdiction grounds.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Mikel Mims establishes that, in the Eleventh Circuit, a district court retains ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the restitution component of its criminal judgment after a defendant completes probation, and may do so within the original criminal case. The court also underscores that due process is satisfied where the defendant receives fair notice and meaningful opportunities to submit information and arguments—especially regarding financial circumstances and payment scheduling—even if the defendant elects to litigate only jurisdiction.

The broader significance is practical and institutional: restitution orders do not become judicially inert when supervision ends; federal courts maintain tools to “effectuate” their decrees, while remaining constrained against substantively modifying sentences without statutory authorization.