Amendment 833 Is Substantive (Not Clarifying) and Non-Retroactive on Direct Appeal; MDLEA Jurisdiction Applies in Foreign EEZs Without a U.S. Nexus

Introduction

United States v. Angelo Martinez is a consolidated Eleventh Circuit appeal arising from Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) prosecutions of Angelo Martinez, Eric Manuel Suero Terrero, and Justo Matos Pena after the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted a go-fast vessel and recovered approximately 375 kilograms of cocaine. The interdiction occurred about 158 nautical miles southeast of Isla Beata (Dominican Republic), within the Dominican Republic’s Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”).

The defendants jointly challenged their indictment on constitutional grounds, arguing (i) Congress lacked power under the Constitution’s Felonies Clause to criminalize their conduct in another nation’s EEZ, (ii) the MDLEA’s “vessel without nationality” definition is unconstitutional because it departs from customary international law, and (iii) due process requires a nexus between the conduct and the United States. Separately, Suero Terrero challenged the denial of a minor-role reduction and argued that recent Sentencing Guidelines amendments (effective November 1, 2025) should apply retroactively on appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed all convictions and sentences. It held that binding precedent—particularly United States v. Alfonso and United States v. Canario-Vilomar—foreclosed the defendants’ constitutional attacks on the MDLEA and any claim that a U.S. nexus is required. It also held that Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 833 (concerning minor-role treatment in drug-trafficking cases) is substantive, not clarifying, and therefore not retroactively applicable on direct appeal under Eleventh Circuit law.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) MDLEA / Felonies Clause / EEZ = “High Seas”

  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025): The controlling precedent. The panel reiterated Alfonso’s two central holdings: (a) a foreign nation’s EEZ is “part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause,” and (b) “international law does not limit the Felonies Clause.” Martinez applies Alfonso to reject the as-applied challenge based on the Dominican Republic EEZ.
  • United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 269 (2025): Reinforced Alfonso’s framework and specifically upheld the MDLEA’s “vessel without nationality” provision against an international-law-based constitutional attack; also confirmed that “nexus” challenges are foreclosed.
  • In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789 (11th Cir. 2015): Supplied the prior-panel-precedent rule that compelled the panel to follow Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar absent en banc or Supreme Court abrogation.

2) Relationship to “customary international law” cases

  • United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012): Defendants relied on it to argue that customary international law limits Congress’s Article I powers. The panel distinguished Bellaizac-Hurtado as an Offences Clause case involving conduct in another country’s territorial waters (not an EEZ) and emphasized that Bellaizac-Hurtado itself recognized Congress’s “additional constitutional authority” on the high seas, including under the Felonies Clause.

3) Protective principle and high-seas drug trafficking jurisdiction

  • United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2003): These cases were cited (primarily by the district court) for the proposition that under the “protective principle” Congress may reach extraterritorial conduct that threatens U.S. security or governmental functions, and that the Eleventh Circuit has upheld MDLEA-type extraterritorial drug enforcement accordingly.
  • United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982): Used to frame the international-law baseline that flag states generally have jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas, while also supporting the “stateless vessels” exception—stateless vessels as “international pariahs”—that Congress may regulate.

4) Nexus / Due process

  • Walker v. Jones, 10 F.3d 1569 (11th Cir. 1994): Provided the procedural bar principle (issues not raised below generally not considered on appeal), though the panel also addressed the merits.
  • United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir 2020): Cited for the rule that the MDLEA is valid “without a ‘nexus’ to the United States.”
  • United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815: Cited to reaffirm that nexus arguments are foreclosed in this circuit.

5) Minor-role reduction and standard of review

  • United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert denied, 528 U.S. 976 (1999): The governing framework (“De Varon factors”) for § 3B1.2 minor-role determinations: (1) compare the defendant’s role to the relevant conduct attributed to him; (2) compare, where appropriate, to other identifiable participants in that relevant conduct.
  • United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016) and United States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2002): Emphasized the deference owed under clear-error review and the district court’s discretion in role assessments.
  • United States v. Alvarez-Coria, 447 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2006): Confirmed the defendant bears the burden of proving entitlement to a minor-role reduction by a preponderance of the evidence.
  • United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 2015): Clarified that comparisons to other participants are limited to identifiable participants involved in the relevant conduct attributed to the defendant, not a broader conspiracy.

6) Retroactivity of Guidelines amendments on direct appeal

  • United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2011): Supplied the controlling test for whether an amendment is “clarifying” (and thus may be applied on direct appeal) or “substantive” (not applied retroactively on appeal), using factors including text vs. commentary changes, Commission characterization, inclusion in § 1B1.10(c), and whether circuit precedent is overturned/abrogated.

Legal Reasoning

1) Felonies Clause authority reaches conduct in a foreign EEZ

The panel treated the defendants’ EEZ argument as directly controlled by United States v. Alfonso. Under Alfonso, an EEZ is part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes. Thus, the MDLEA can constitutionally apply to drug trafficking on a stateless vessel in the Dominican Republic’s EEZ. The court’s reasoning is primarily institutional: it did not re-derive the rule; it applied the prior-panel-precedent rule from In re Lambrix.

2) International law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause power or the MDLEA’s “vessel without nationality” definition

The defendants’ facial challenge asserted that the MDLEA’s definition of “vessel without nationality” (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)) is unconstitutional because it treats a vessel as stateless when the claimed flag state neither confirms nor denies registry. The panel rejected this argument as foreclosed by United States v. Canario-Vilomar, which held that “international law cannot limit Congress’s authority to define ‘stateless vessel’ for purposes of the MDLEA.”

Applying the statute, the panel reasoned that because Martinez claimed Colombian registry and Colombia could not confirm or deny, the vessel qualified as “without nationality” under the MDLEA—triggering U.S. jurisdiction and criminal liability for the charged drug offenses.

3) No due process “nexus” requirement for MDLEA prosecutions of stateless vessels on the high seas

The defendants raised the nexus/due process theory for the first time on appeal; the panel cited Walker v. Jones to note forfeiture principles. Even so, it rejected the argument on the merits as “repeatedly rejected” by circuit precedent, citing United States v. Cabezas-Montano, United States v. Alfonso, and United States v. Campbell. The panel also underscored Congress’s findings in 46 U.S.C. § 70501 that high-seas drug trafficking threatens U.S. security and societal well-being—offering an additional rationale that, even if a nexus were relevant, Congress has articulated one.

4) Minor-role reduction: deference, relevant conduct, and drug quantity

For Suero Terrero’s requested minor-role reduction, the panel applied the clear-error standard and the United States v. Rodriguez De Varon framework. It emphasized (i) Suero Terrero’s relevant conduct—transporting nearly “half a ton” of cocaine—and (ii) the limited pool of comparable participants (the other mariners on the vessel), concluding that being the least culpable among a small crew does not automatically make one “minor” under De Varon. The panel also noted the district court’s mitigating response in practice: it varied downward and imposed the lowest sentence among the three defendants.

5) Amendment 833 is substantive and not retroactive on direct appeal

Addressing the post-sentencing effective date of Amendment 833, the court applied United States v. Jerchower and held the amendment substantive because: (1) it changes the guideline text (not merely commentary); (2) the Commission described it as expanding when § 3B1.2 is warranted in § 2D1.1 cases; (3) it was not listed as retroactive in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c); and (4) it would abrogate circuit precedent insofar as it makes other-participant involvement irrelevant. Therefore, it could not be applied retroactively to Suero Terrero on direct appeal.

Impact

  • MDLEA litigation in the Eleventh Circuit: The decision further entrenches (by straightforward application) the post-Alfonso and post-Canario-Vilomar landscape: EEZ-based “high seas” arguments, international-law limits on the Felonies Clause, objections to § 70502(d)(1)(C), and “no nexus” due process challenges remain effectively unavailable in this circuit absent en banc or Supreme Court intervention.
  • Sentencing appeals and Amendment 833: The opinion supplies a clear holding that Amendment 833 is substantive under Jerchower and thus cannot be invoked retroactively on direct appeal for pre-amendment sentencings. For defendants sentenced after November 1, 2025, the amendment may materially affect how district courts evaluate couriers/low-level roles in § 2D1.1 cases; for defendants sentenced before that date, relief (if any) would not come via direct-appeal retroactivity under this decision.
  • Practical effect on “boat cases”: The ruling underscores that transporting very large quantities of narcotics on the high seas remains a powerful fact against a minor-role reduction under traditional De Varon analysis, even when the defendant claims a low-level mariner function.

Complex Concepts Simplified

MDLEA
A federal statute (46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508) that criminalizes certain drug trafficking conduct aboard “covered vessels,” including stateless vessels, on the high seas.
Felonies Clause
The constitutional provision giving Congress power “[t]o define and punish ... Felonies committed on the high Seas.” The Eleventh Circuit reads this power broadly in MDLEA cases.
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
A maritime zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal baseline where a coastal nation has certain resource-related rights. In this circuit, an EEZ counts as “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes (United States v. Alfonso).
“Vessel without nationality” (stateless vessel) under the MDLEA
A vessel can be treated as stateless if the master claims registry but the claimed nation does not “affirmatively and unequivocally assert” nationality (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)). Stateless vessels can be subject to broader enforcement jurisdiction.
Prior-panel-precedent rule
A later Eleventh Circuit panel must follow an earlier panel’s holding unless the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc overrules it (In re Lambrix).
Minor-role reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2)
A sentencing decrease for defendants substantially less culpable than the average participant. In the Eleventh Circuit, it is assessed using the fact-intensive United States v. Rodriguez De Varon framework and reviewed deferentially for clear error.
Clarifying vs. substantive Guidelines amendments
On direct appeal, the Eleventh Circuit applies new amendments only if they are “clarifying.” Under United States v. Jerchower, Amendment 833 was deemed “substantive,” so it does not apply retroactively on direct appeal.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms MDLEA convictions and sentences by faithfully applying binding precedent: (1) a foreign EEZ is “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes; (2) international law does not constrain Congress’s Felonies Clause authority or the MDLEA’s stateless-vessel definition; and (3) MDLEA prosecutions of stateless vessels do not require a U.S. nexus. Separately, the opinion establishes (for direct-appeal retroactivity analysis in this circuit) that Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 833 is a substantive change and therefore cannot be applied retroactively to pre-amendment sentencings on appeal.