Amendment 826 Does Not Retroactively Bar Acquitted-Conduct Sentencing; Undisputed PSI Facts Sustain Enhancements

Introduction

In United States v. Yandrey Negrin Rojas (11th Cir. Apr. 10, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 97-month sentence imposed on a defendant who pleaded guilty to alien-smuggling transportation offenses but was acquitted by a jury of related hostage-taking counts. The central issue on appeal was whether the district court impermissibly relied on acquitted conduct to apply sentencing enhancements, allegedly violating the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right.

The case arises from a migrant-smuggling scheme in which Cuban migrants were transported by boat, held in houses in the Florida Keys and Miami-Dade area, and ransomed for payment. Although the jury acquitted on hostage-taking charges, the district court imposed several Guidelines enhancements and selected the top of the advisory range.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It reiterated that, under binding Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent, acquitted conduct may be considered at sentencing if proved by a preponderance of the evidence, so long as the sentence does not exceed that authorized by the jury verdict. The court also concluded that this appeal did not require any reassessment of that doctrine in light of U.S.S.G. Amendment 826 because (1) Amendment 826 was not shown to apply retroactively, and (2) the record supported that the district court relied on admitted, undisputed presentence report facts rather than acquitted conduct— and the district court expressly stated it did not consider acquitted conduct.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997): The keystone authority. The panel treated Watts as controlling for the proposition that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct, if proved by a preponderance, when selecting a sentence within the statutory limits.
  • United States v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2006): The Eleventh Circuit’s principal articulation of the acquitted-conduct rule post-Watts, quoted for the “long-standing precedent” that acquitted conduct may be considered as “relevant conduct” if proved by a preponderance.
  • United States v. Touray, 151 F.4th 1317 (11th Cir. 2025): Reinforced the constitutional framing in this Circuit: considering acquitted conduct does not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments if the sentence is within that authorized by the verdict and supported by a preponderance.
  • United States v. Rolle, 65 F.4th 1273 (11th Cir. 2023): Cited for the institutional point that only the Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents—foreclosing the defendant’s request to treat Watts as wrongly decided.
  • United States v. Romeu, No. 25-10788, 2026 WL 36113 (11th Cir. Jan. 6, 2026) (unpublished), and United States v. Simpson, 138 F.4th 438 (6th Cir. 2025): Used to support the panel’s conclusion that Amendment 826 is not retroactive (and not a “clarifying” amendment that would apply to earlier sentencings).
  • United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2011): Provided the doctrinal hook for retroactivity arguments—“clarifying amendments” can apply retroactively—but the panel noted the defendant did not meaningfully develop this argument as to Amendment 826.
  • United States v. Turner, 626 F.3d 566 (11th Cir. 2010), and United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006): Critical to the court’s alternative (and practical) basis for affirmance: a defendant who fails to object to factual statements in the PSI is deemed to admit those facts for sentencing.
  • United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008): Cited for the standard of review (constitutional sentencing issues reviewed de novo).
  • United States v. Cruz, 713 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Barner, 572 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2009): Cited for reviewing Guidelines issues (legal conclusions de novo; factual findings for clear error).
  • United States v. Angeles-Mendoza, 407 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2005): Not controlling but notable. The district court referenced it to explain that even if certain enhancements did not “technically” apply, it would have varied upward to reach the same outcome—underscoring a discretionary, § 3553(a)-driven backstop.
  • United States v. Files, 63 F.4th 920 (11th Cir. 2023), and United States v. Horn, 129 F.4th 1275 (11th Cir. 2025): Cited in a footnote for judicial restraint (declining to decide harmless error because no error was found).

Legal Reasoning

  1. Amendment 826 did not change the governing law for this defendant’s sentencing. The court noted that Amendment 826 (effective Nov. 2024) added U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c), limiting “acquitted conduct” as “relevant conduct” unless it also establishes, in whole or in part, the instant offense of conviction. But because the sentencing occurred before Amendment 826, and because the defendant did not meaningfully argue the amendment is “clarifying” (and thus retroactively applicable under United States v. Jerchower), the panel applied the law “at the time of sentencing.”
  2. Binding precedent foreclosed the Sixth Amendment claim. Even if the record had shown reliance on acquitted conduct, the panel explained it was bound by United States v. Watts and United States v. Faust. It rejected the defendant’s invitation to treat Watts as erroneous, citing United States v. Rolle.
  3. The record supported that the district court relied on admitted conduct, not acquitted conduct. The panel emphasized two points: (a) the district court expressly stated it did not consider acquitted conduct; and (b) by failing to object to most factual assertions in the PSI, the defendant “admit[ted] those facts for sentencing purposes” under United States v. Turner and United States v. Wade. On that basis, the court found no error in applying the challenged enhancements.
  4. Top-of-range sentence upheld within an advisory range supported by the record. With an offense level of 28 and criminal history category I, the advisory range was 78 to 97 months, and the district court selected 97 months—still within the range and not exceeding any verdict-authorized maximum.

Impact

  • Amendment 826’s practical reach is temporally limited. This decision reinforces—at least for pre-November 2024 sentencings—that Amendment 826 will not help on direct appeal absent a well-developed “clarifying amendment” retroactivity argument, and it signals alignment with the view expressed in United States v. Romeu and United States v. Simpson that Amendment 826 is not retroactive.
  • PSI objections remain pivotal. The opinion underscores a recurring sentencing lesson: failure to object to PSI factual assertions can effectively concede the factual predicates needed for Guidelines enhancements—even where related acquitted charges exist.
  • Acquitted-conduct disputes may turn on record characterization. The panel avoided any deeper confrontation between acquitted-conduct doctrine and Amendment 826 by concluding the enhancements were supported by admitted conduct and the judge’s stated approach—suggesting future litigants must build a clear record of what facts the sentencing court relied upon and why.
  • Sentencing-court “variance backstops” can blunt guideline disputes. The district court’s remarks (referencing United States v. Angeles-Mendoza) illustrate how a court may indicate it would impose the same sentence via an upward variance even if an enhancement were unavailable—affecting both appellate strategy and harmless-error analysis.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Acquitted conduct”: Facts connected to charges the jury found the defendant “not guilty” of. Under United States v. Watts and Eleventh Circuit precedent, those facts historically could still be considered at sentencing if proved by a “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not), so long as the sentence stays within lawful limits.
  • “Relevant conduct” (Guidelines concept): Conduct related to the offense of conviction that can affect the Guidelines range even if not charged or not resulting in conviction. Amendment 826 narrows whether acquitted conduct counts as “relevant conduct.”
  • “Preponderance of the evidence”: A lower proof standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It asks whether a fact is more likely true than not.
  • “Retroactive” vs. “clarifying” amendments: Most Guidelines amendments apply only going forward unless the Sentencing Commission makes them retroactive. A “clarifying” amendment may apply to older cases on appeal because it explains existing meaning rather than changing the law, but the defendant must properly argue it.
  • PSI admissions by silence: In the Eleventh Circuit, unobjected-to factual statements in the presentence investigation report are treated as admitted for sentencing.

Conclusion

United States v. Yandrey Negrin Rojas reaffirms that, for pre-Amendment-826 sentencings, the Eleventh Circuit remains bound by United States v. Watts and United States v. Faust on acquitted-conduct consideration, and it highlights a decisive practical point: undisputed PSI facts can independently sustain enhancements and defeat claims that sentencing necessarily rested on acquitted charges. The opinion’s broader significance lies in its treatment of Amendment 826 as nonretroactive on this record and its emphasis on preserving sentencing disputes through timely, specific factual objections.