Ambiguous Restitution Basis in Title 26 Cases Is Not Plain Error Absent Clear Reliance on MVRA/VWPA

Case: United States v. Ali Akhenaten (11th Cir. Feb. 4, 2026) (unpublished, Non-Argument Calendar)
Charges: Five counts of filing false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)
Issues on appeal: (1) sufficiency of evidence as to willfulness (mens rea); (2) authority to order restitution for Title 26 offenses

1. Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision addresses two recurring themes in federal tax prosecutions: how the government may prove willfulness under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) using circumstantial evidence (including a defendant’s own disbelieved testimony), and when a district court may order restitution for Title 26 offenses despite the inapplicability of the principal federal restitution statutes (MVRA/VWPA).

The defendant, Ali Akhenaten (formerly Darryl Tyrone Oliver), was convicted after trial of filing false returns for himself and his business. On appeal, he argued the evidence did not establish he acted willfully, and he further contended the restitution order was unlawful because the restitution statutes the district court purportedly relied upon do not cover Title 26 tax crimes.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Convictions affirmed: The court held a rational jury could find willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt based on circumstantial indicators (including suspicious “round number” reporting), the defendant’s tax education and experience, and the inference permitted when a jury disbelieves the defendant’s testimony on intent.
  • Restitution affirmed under plain-error review: While acknowledging the MVRA and VWPA do not authorize restitution for Title 26 offenses, the court held the defendant failed to show it was “clear or obvious” that the district court relied on an impermissible statute rather than imposing restitution as a supervised-release condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (via 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(2)), which is not limited by MVRA/VWPA.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Mens rea / sufficiency framework

  • United States v. Margarita Garcia, 906 F.3d 1255, 1279 (11th Cir. 2018)
    Provided the elements of a § 7206(1) offense, including the requirement that the defendant acted “willful[ly]” (not negligently). The Akhenaten panel used this as the governing legal test for the challenged mens rea element.
  • United States v. Henderson, 893 F.3d 1338, 1348 (11th Cir. 2018)
    Supplied the standard of review: de novo review of the denial of a judgment of acquittal, applying the familiar “rational trier of fact” sufficiency standard. This framed the court’s deference to the jury’s credibility and inference choices.
  • United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2016)
    Played a central role on willfulness proof. Croteau emphasizes (i) intent is often proven circumstantially, especially in fraud-type crimes, and (ii) when a defendant testifies and the jury disbelieves him, it may infer the opposite—an inference with “special force” for subjective elements like knowledge or intent. Akhenaten relies on this to treat disbelieved testimony (combined with corroborating evidence) as substantive evidence of willfulness.

Restitution authority and plain-error review

  • United States v. Dickerson, 370 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2004)
    Established the foundational point that restitution requires statutory authorization; district courts have no inherent restitution power. This principle sets up the MVRA/VWPA analysis.
  • United States v. Utsick, 45 F.4th 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2022)
    Controlled the standard of review: unpreserved restitution challenges are reviewed for plain error. This heightened standard was outcome-determinative because the record was “ambiguous” as to the restitution’s statutory basis.
  • Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 202–03 (2025)
    Provided the modern Supreme Court gloss on plain error in sentencing: reversal requires that it be “clear” or “obvious” the district court actually relied on an impermissible statute or rationale. The Eleventh Circuit applied Esteras to conclude that ambiguity about the restitution basis defeats plain-error relief.
  • United States v. Humphrey, 164 F.3d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1999)
    Reinforced that “plain” means obvious and clear under current law—supporting the panel’s conclusion that the defendant could not meet the “clear or obvious” prong given the ambiguous record and the availability of a lawful route (§ 3583(d) / § 3563(b)(2)).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Willfulness under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1): circumstantial proof plus credibility inferences

The panel’s willfulness analysis proceeds in three moves consistent with Eleventh Circuit practice in tax and fraud cases:

  • Circumstantial markers of falsity can imply intent. The government highlighted “suspicious round numbers” and improbably neat reporting (e.g., exactly $0 income in certain years, exactly $100 in another). While round numbers alone may be consistent with sloppiness, the court treated them as one piece of circumstantial evidence supporting a deliberate pattern.
  • Specialized training/experience can support inference of knowledge. The defendant’s accounting education (MBA/accounting) and professional/teaching experience in federal income tax—specifically including C- and S-corporation taxation— gave the jury a rational basis to infer he understood the reporting obligations and was less likely to be making innocent mistakes.
  • Disbelieved testimony can be affirmative evidence of intent when corroborated. The opinion applies United States v. Croteau to the defendant’s direct testimony that he did not knowingly file false returns. Once the jury rejected that testimony, it could infer the opposite (that he did know), and—critically—treat that inference as substantive evidence when coupled with other corroborative facts.

The reasoning is less about any single “smoking gun” and more about aggregate inference: numbers suggesting fabrication + sophisticated tax background + adverse credibility finding equals enough for a rational jury to find willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. Restitution for Title 26 offenses: not MVRA/VWPA, but potentially a supervised-release condition; ambiguity defeats plain error

The restitution portion establishes (and the parties agreed) two doctrinal points and then resolves the case on the standard of review:

  • MVRA and VWPA generally do not authorize restitution for Title 26 offenses. The court emphasizes that the enumerated offense categories in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (MVRA) and 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (VWPA) do not include Title 26 offenses. Standing alone, those statutes cannot support restitution for a § 7206(1) conviction.
  • Restitution may be imposed as a condition of supervised release under § 3583(d) via § 3563(b)(2). Section 3583(d) permits conditions of supervised release including any discretionary probation condition in § 3563(b). Section 3563(b)(2) authorizes “restitution to a victim of the offense,” and the opinion underscores that this form of restitution is “not subject to the limitation of” the VWPA and MVRA. In other words, even when MVRA/VWPA do not apply, supervised-release-based restitution may still be lawful.
  • Plain error turns on clarity of reliance. Because the defendant did not object at sentencing, he had to show a clear or obvious error. The court found the record “ambiguous” on whether restitution was imposed under an inapplicable restitution statute or as a supervised-release condition. Under Esteras v. United States, that ambiguity prevents a finding that it is “clear” or “obvious” the district court relied on an impermissible statute, so the defendant could not satisfy the plain-error standard.

3.3. Impact

A. Practical implications for § 7206(1) trials

  • Willfulness can be built from “pattern + expertise.” The decision illustrates how prosecutors can leverage (i) suspicious reporting patterns and (ii) the defendant’s tax literacy to support willfulness.
  • Testifying carries strategic risk on intent. By foregrounding the Croteau rule, the opinion signals that when intent is contested, a defendant’s categorical denial—if disbelieved—may strengthen the government’s proof. This may influence defense strategy on whether and how to present defendant testimony.

B. Restitution in tax cases: the “lawful pathway” and the importance of a clean record

  • Sentencing courts: The opinion implicitly encourages district courts to specify the statutory basis for restitution in Title 26 cases—particularly whether restitution is imposed as a supervised-release condition under § 3583(d)—to avoid appellate uncertainty.
  • Defense counsel: The decision is a cautionary tale about forfeiture. Failure to object can be fatal where a lawful alternative basis exists and the record is not explicit. Even if MVRA/VWPA are wrong vehicles, an appellate court may affirm if the record does not clearly show the court relied on them.
  • Appellate posture: The case operationalizes Esteras in the restitution context: ambiguity about sentencing authority tends to defeat plain-error relief when an alternative, lawful authority could support the result.

Note on precedential weight: The opinion is labeled “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” so it is not binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Its reasoning may still be cited as persuasive authority to the extent permitted by circuit rules.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Willfulness” (tax crimes): In this context, it means the defendant intentionally violated a known legal duty (not merely making a mistake or being careless). Because intent is internal, it is usually proven indirectly through surrounding facts.
  • Circumstantial evidence: Proof that implies a fact rather than directly proving it (e.g., reporting exact $0 or $100 repeatedly may imply fabrication when paired with other facts).
  • Disbelieved-testimony inference: If a defendant testifies “I didn’t know / I didn’t intend,” and the jury finds him not credible, it may infer the opposite—especially on mental-state issues. The court treated that inference as usable “substantive” evidence when supported by other evidence.
  • MVRA vs. VWPA: Federal statutes authorizing (and in MVRA categories, requiring) restitution for certain crimes. Title 26 offenses generally are not within their enumerated coverage.
  • Restitution as a supervised-release condition: Even where MVRA/VWPA do not apply, the court may require restitution as part of supervised release under § 3583(d) and § 3563(b)(2).
  • Plain-error review: A demanding appellate standard applied when the defendant did not object in the trial court. The error must be clear/obvious, and ambiguity usually defeats relief.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Ali Akhenaten reaffirms two practical rules in federal tax litigation: (1) willfulness under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) can be proven through circumstantial indicators, including a defendant’s tax sophistication and the adverse inference that can flow from disbelieved testimony; and (2) while MVRA/VWPA do not authorize restitution for Title 26 offenses, restitution may still be lawful as a supervised-release condition—and on plain-error review, an ambiguous sentencing record will not support reversal absent a clear showing the district court relied on an impermissible statute.