Analysis
1. Governing standard and the right to present a defense
Preserved evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Under State v. Bustos, a ruling is an abuse of discretion if it rests on an erroneous view of the law or conflicts with logic and the record. State v. Blom and Dolo v. State emphasize appellate deference in close evidentiary cases.
At the same time, erroneous exclusion of defense evidence may violate the constitutional right to present a complete defense. Under State v. Carbo and State v. Westrom, such an error is harmless only when, even assuming the excluded evidence’s full damaging potential, a reasonable jury would have returned the same verdict.
2. L.Y.’s recorded “in his body” statement
Rule 807: Residual hearsay exception
State v. Hallmark establishes a two-step Rule 807 inquiry: the statement must possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and must satisfy each of the rule’s three additional requirements. The majority focused on Rule 807(B), which requires the statement to be more probative than other reasonably obtainable evidence.
The court concluded that the recording was not more probative than L.Y.’s trial testimony. L.Y. had testified that he performed CPR, helped T.B. with toileting, and told officers that he had touched T.B. “in his body.” Although both the testimony and recording were unclear, the majority treated them as materially similar. Because Rule 807 demands comparative superiority—not merely relevance—the district court acted within its discretion.
Rule 613: Prior inconsistent statements
Under State v. Vance, extrinsic impeachment evidence requires an actually inconsistent statement, and trial courts may resolve ambiguity in whether an inconsistency exists. State v. Fraga holds that extrinsic proof may be excluded when the witness admits making the prior statement.
L.Y. appeared at different points both to admit and deny making the statement. The majority accepted the district court’s view that L.Y. was disputing its meaning and context rather than unequivocally denying that he had uttered the words. Given that ambiguity, exclusion under Rule 613 was not a clear abuse of discretion.
3. Squad-car video
During the State’s case, the district court excluded the portion showing the conversation between Young and L.Y. because it exceeded the scope of the officer’s direct examination. State v. Parker supported that ruling: cross-examination is generally confined to the subjects raised on direct, especially when the defense may later call the witness itself. Young ultimately did so.
When Young again offered the video during his own case, the court excluded it as cumulative under Rule 403. State v. Buchanan and State v. Zumberge define cumulative evidence as evidence that merely duplicates what has already been presented. By contrast, State v. Schulz explains that evidence is not cumulative when it proves a material fact in a uniquely probative way.
The majority found that the video largely duplicated L.Y.’s testimony about leaving Mankato, returning to the apartment, performing CPR, and speaking with Young. Although State v. Penkaty recognizes that genuine corroborative evidence is not necessarily cumulative, the video was offered principally to undermine L.Y.’s credibility, not to restore confidence in his testimony as contemplated by State v. Clark. The court therefore upheld the exclusion. Consistent with State v. Ali, it declined to address the district court’s alternative hearsay ruling.
4. Internet searches as reverse-Spreigl evidence
State v. Heller and State v. Glover govern evidence of an alleged alternative perpetrator’s prior crimes, wrongs, or bad acts. Such “reverse-Spreigl” evidence is not admissible simply to show that the third party is the sort of person who might commit the crime. It must bear on a legitimate Rule 404(b) issue, such as motive, intent, opportunity, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Courts assess the relationship between the prior conduct and the charged crime in terms of time, place, and modus operandi. L.Y.’s searches for “anal teen” pornography occurred weeks earlier and did not necessarily involve minors because “teen” may refer to an 18- or 19-year-old. The majority therefore found insufficient similarity between the searches and the sexual assault of a two-year-old.
The ruling reinforces that an alternative-perpetrator theory does not relax Rule 404(b). A defendant must establish a concrete, non-propensity connection between the proposed act and the charged offense.
5. Prior methamphetamine-possession convictions
The same reverse-Spreigl framework governed L.Y.’s prior convictions. Although toxicology testing found a small quantity of methamphetamine in T.B., the drug did not cause his death. The convictions showed only that L.Y. had possessed methamphetamine in the past; they did not explain how or why T.B. ingested it.
Applying State v. Glover’s requirement of a high degree of similarity, the court held that past possession was not sufficiently related to administering or exposing a child to the drug. The convictions were therefore neither relevant nor material to the charged murder.
6. Learned treatise on confirmation bias
Rule 803(18) permits statements from an authoritative learned treatise to be read into evidence while generally prohibiting admission of the publication itself as an exhibit. Young sought to use an article on confirmation bias to challenge the BCA forensic scientist.
The Supreme Court did not decide whether the exclusion was erroneous or whether learned treatises must be disclosed before trial. Instead, it found any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Young was allowed to establish that the article was required BCA reading, that it was recognized as authoritative, what confirmation bias meant, and why it could impair forensic work. Under State v. Westrom, reading from the article itself would not reasonably have changed the verdict.
7. Undisclosed expert opinion
The State disclosed that Young’s shoes tested positive for blood and contained a DNA mixture including T.B.’s DNA, but it did not disclose the expert’s additional opinion that the blood was human. Because Young did not object at trial, Arredondo v. State required plain-error review in the postconviction proceeding.
Under Pulczinski v. State, plain-error relief requires an error that is plain, affects substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The State conceded plain error under the expert-disclosure requirements of Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.01.
The remaining question was prejudice. State v. Watkins and State v. Bustos place the burden on the appellant to show a reasonable likelihood that the error significantly affected the verdict. Drawing from State v. Bigbear, the court considered:
- how prominently the evidence was presented;
- its persuasive force;
- whether the prosecutor relied on it in closing argument;
- whether the defense effectively countered it; and
- the overall strength of the State’s case.
The opinion was scientifically persuasive, a point reinforced by State v. Caulfield. Nevertheless, it occupied only a few pages of a 1,076-page transcript and was not the focus of the expert’s testimony. Townsend v. State, State v. Trifiletti, and State v. Smith supported treating limited and nonprominent evidence as less likely to have affected the verdict.
The prosecutor’s closing argument relied primarily on the admissible evidence that both blood and human DNA were present on the shoes. Under State v. Fraga, State v. Bobo, State v. Barnes, and State v. Porter, prosecutors may argue reasonable inferences from admitted evidence.
Young also countered the opinion through cross-examination and closing argument, methods recognized in State v. Smith and State v. McDonald-Richards. The expert admitted that the opinion had not been disclosed and that he could not identify whose blood was present.
Finally, the court considered the other evidence strong: Young remained in the apartment, gave police false information, and had semen and DNA connected with items bearing T.B.’s blood. The majority distinguished State v. Beecroft, where State intimidation prevented a defense expert from testifying, and cited State v. Matthews to reject the idea that improperly admitted expert testimony necessarily requires rebuttal by another expert.
8. Cumulative error
Under State v. Fraga, multiple errors may collectively require reversal even when each is individually harmless, particularly in a close factual case. The majority considered the possible erroneous exclusion of the confirmation-bias article together with the undisclosed expert opinion.
It concluded that the errors did not combine to make the trial unfair. Young cross-examined the expert about confirmation bias, challenged the DNA analysis, and presented a substantial alternative-perpetrator defense. The court invoked State v. Vang’s presumption that juries follow instructions and consider the admitted evidence properly.
The Dissent
Chief Justice Hudson would have reversed and ordered a new trial. Justice Thissen joined the portion addressing exclusion of L.Y.’s recorded statement.
Exclusion of L.Y.’s statement
The dissent viewed L.Y.’s trial testimony as containing repeated, unequivocal denials that he had said he touched T.B. “in his body.” Relying on Briggs v. Chi. Great W. Ry. Co. and Price v. Grieger, it argued that only an unequivocal admission makes extrinsic impeachment unnecessary. Because no such admission occurred, Rule 613 permitted the recording.
The dissent also maintained that the district court’s Rule 807 ruling rested on an inaccurate recollection of the testimony. Citing State v. Bonnell, State v. Bustos, and Dolo v. State, it emphasized that appellate deference does not protect a ruling inconsistent with the record. Although State v. Diggins recognizes the trial court’s superior position to evaluate evidence, that deference is not absolute.
Applying State v. Post, Chapman v. California, and State v. Juarez, the dissent found the exclusion constitutionally harmful. The recording could have shown that L.Y. lied under oath and attempted to explain preemptively why his DNA or semen might be found in the victim.
Undisclosed expert opinion
Applying the plain-error framework of State v. Griller, State v. Bigbear, and Pulczinski v. State, the dissent concluded that the undisclosed opinion affected Young’s substantial rights. It regarded scientific evidence as uniquely persuasive and relied on State v. Beecroft for the concern that jurors may give forensic testimony an undeserved aura of infallibility.
In the dissent’s view, the disclosure violation deprived Young of the opportunity to prepare a competing expert opinion. It also regarded the case as close because substantial evidence implicated L.Y., including his conduct after the killing and his DNA in T.B.’s mouth. Relying on State v. Penkaty, the dissent concluded that the errors undermined the fairness and integrity of the trial.