Allocatur Denied for Inadequate Development of Pa.R.A.P. 1114(b) Criteria Despite Apparent Errors Below

Case: Wentz, M. v. Wentz, D. (Pa. Supreme Court, June 5, 2026) — Concurring Statement (Wecht, J.)
Posture: Petition for Allowance of Appeal (allocatur) denied; Justice Wecht concurs, explaining why the petition failed to warrant review.

1. Introduction

This custody dispute involves Melinda Wentz (“Mother”) and Dustin Wentz (“Father”), who share two children. In March 2024, after a multi-day hearing on custody and relocation, the trial court permitted Mother to relocate to New Jersey and awarded her primary physical custody, citing Father’s “persistent abuse of alcohol,” emotional abuse, drunk driving, and physical roughness with a child, while also crediting Mother’s caretaking role and the educational/family and employment benefits of the move.

Only seven months later, Father sought a custody modification. After hearings in June and July 2025, the trial court reversed course, awarding Father primary custody and ordering the children returned to Pennsylvania. Mother appealed; the Superior Court affirmed under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Mother then sought discretionary review in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Justice Wecht’s concurring statement identifies serious concerns with the trial court’s rapid reversal and apparent moralizing about Mother’s adult vacation, and it highlights unresolved legal questions about when relocation factors must be applied in custody modifications that result in a child’s move. Nonetheless, he concurs in denying allocatur because Mother’s petition did not adequately develop the criteria for allowance of appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1114(b).

2. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Wecht agrees that allocatur should be denied—not because the case is free of troubling features, but because the petition for allowance of appeal fails to present the issues in a manner that meaningfully invokes the Supreme Court’s discretionary review criteria. He emphasizes:

  • The record and the Superior Court’s memorandum reflect concerns that could have supported Supreme Court review (including potential issues of first impression regarding relocation analysis in “non-relocation” custody modifications).
  • Mother, however, focused primarily on the trial court’s delayed and purportedly shallow discussion of relocation factors, without developing the broader doctrinal conflicts or first-impression questions flagged by the Superior Court and Justice Wecht.
  • Mother also argued the Superior Court should have reversed given its criticisms of the trial court, but she did not grapple with the appellate court’s deferential standard of review or provide authority for more searching scrutiny.
  • Because the petition did not adequately satisfy Pa.R.A.P. 1114(b), Justice Wecht concurred in denial.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Wentz v. Wentz (Superior Court memorandum referenced as “Slip. Op.”)

Justice Wecht relies on the Superior Court’s account of the trial court’s reasoning and procedural handling of relocation factors. The Superior Court expressed discomfort with the trial court’s focus on Mother’s adult vacation and with the speed and magnitude of the custody reversal, yet affirmed due to the limited scope of appellate review.

Graves v. Graves, 265 A.3d 688, 701 (Pa. Super. 2021)

The Superior Court cited Graves v. Graves to illustrate uncertainty about what distance qualifies as “significant” for purposes of triggering relocation-factor consideration when neither parent is formally “relocating” but the modification would move the child. Justice Wecht underscores that the “significant distance” threshold remains unclear—an ambiguity that could warrant Supreme Court attention if properly presented.

Carrero v. Lopez, 300 A.3d 494, 501 (Pa. Super. 2023) and Taylor v. Smith, 302 A.3d 203, 207 (Pa. Super. 2023)

These cases are cited for the proposition that custody determinations are reviewed deferentially; appellate courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the trial court that observed witnesses and weighed credibility. Justice Wecht uses these citations to explain why Mother’s argument—that the Superior Court “should not have affirmed” despite misgivings—required a more sophisticated engagement with the controlling standard of review.

D.K. v. S.P.K., 102 A.3d 467, 474 (Pa. Super. 2014)

Justice Wecht highlights D.K. v. S.P.K. as the core doctrinal source for the “not per se triggered” approach: when neither parent is relocating, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337 is not automatically triggered, but relocation factors should be considered where a custody modification would move the child to a “significantly distant location.” The concurring statement points to the lingering uncertainty in how courts should operationalize that qualifier—especially in interstate scenarios.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

Central procedural principle: Even where the record suggests potential error or bias below, the Supreme Court will deny discretionary review if the petition fails to adequately develop and connect the claimed issues to Pa.R.A.P. 1114(b)’s allowance-of-appeal criteria.

Justice Wecht’s reasoning proceeds in two steps:

  1. Identification of potentially review-worthy questions: He flags (a) the unsettled relationship between custody modifications and statutory relocation analysis, and (b) the lack of clarity regarding what constitutes a “significant distance,” particularly when a move is interstate but relatively short in travel time. He suggests these may be issues of first impression for the Supreme Court.
  2. Why review is nonetheless unwarranted: He concludes Mother did not properly present those questions. Instead, she emphasized the timing and depth of the trial court’s relocation-factor discussion and argued that the Superior Court should have reversed despite its deferential standard. In Justice Wecht’s view, this did not “meaningfully” invoke Pa.R.A.P. 1114(b), nor did it offer authority for the proposition that the Superior Court should heighten scrutiny simply because the trial court reversed itself quickly.

The concurrence therefore functions as a practice-oriented admonition: allocatur is not a vehicle for generally re-litigating fact disputes or expressing dissatisfaction with deference; the petition must articulate a reviewable legal issue (e.g., conflict, first impression, or statewide importance) and explain why the case satisfies the rule-based criteria for allowance of appeal.

3.3. Impact

Although a concurring statement accompanying an allocatur denial does not itself create binding precedent, Justice Wecht’s analysis has likely practical influence in three ways:

  • Allocatur drafting discipline: The concurrence underscores that petitioners must squarely develop Pa.R.A.P. 1114(b) grounds, not merely argue that the lower courts were “wrong” or that their reasoning was troubling.
  • Relocation-factor litigation strategy: By identifying unresolved questions about when 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h) should be applied in modification cases, the concurrence signals to future litigants that the Supreme Court may be receptive—if properly asked—to clarifying the “significant distance” line and the treatment of interstate moves.
  • Trial-court reasoning transparency: The statement implicitly cautions trial courts against injecting moral judgments unrelated to child welfare (e.g., criticism of an adult vacation without evidence of adverse impact) and against abrupt reversals that appear insufficiently reconciled with prior findings—especially findings as grave as “persistent abuse of alcohol.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Allocatur (Petition for Allowance of Appeal): In Pennsylvania, most Supreme Court review is discretionary. The Court typically accepts cases that present important legal questions (conflicts in the law, issues of first impression, statewide significance), not simply to correct alleged errors in one case.
  • Pa.R.A.P. 1114(b): The rule listing the principal reasons the Supreme Court may grant allocatur. A petitioner must do more than cite the rule; the petition must explain, with developed argument, how the case satisfies one or more criteria.
  • Relocation factors (23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h)): Ten statutory considerations applied when a parent proposes relocating with a child, designed to assess impacts on the child’s welfare and relationships. A key contested issue is whether (and when) these factors apply if a custody modification will move the child but neither parent is “relocating” in the typical sense.
  • Deferential standard of review / abuse of discretion: Appellate courts generally defer to custody judges on credibility and weighing evidence. Even if appellate judges would decide differently, they often must affirm unless the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, based on legal error, or unsupported in a way that constitutes an abuse of discretion.
  • Issue of first impression: A legal question the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not yet answered. Such issues are often prime candidates for allocatur—if clearly presented.

5. Conclusion

Justice Wecht’s concurrence conveys a dual message. Substantively, it highlights serious concerns about a trial court’s swift custody reversal, apparent bias in focusing on a parent’s adult vacation absent evidence of child impact, and the under-theorized boundary between custody modifications and relocation analysis—especially given the unsettled “significant distance” concept discussed in cases such as D.K. v. S.P.K. and Graves v. Graves. Procedurally, it underscores a decisive gatekeeping principle: the Supreme Court will not reach even potentially important questions when the petition fails to develop and connect them to Pa.R.A.P. 1114(b)’s criteria. For practitioners, the case is a reminder that discretionary review is won or lost as much on issue-framing and rule-based justification as on the perceived equities of the underlying dispute.