Date: Feb 22, 2026

Alleyne/Apprendi Is Not a “Change in Law” Creating a §1B1.13(b)(6) Gross Disparity When Drug Quantity Was Charged and Admitted by Guilty Plea

1. Introduction

United States v. Orlandez-Gamboa (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 2026) is a non-precedential summary order affirming the denial of a federal prisoner’s motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The defendant, Alberto Orlandez-Gamboa (also known as “Caracol” and “Chiriqui”), was extradited from Colombia and pleaded guilty in 2003 to cocaine importation and conspiracy offenses (including a drug quantity of at least five kilograms) and to a money-laundering conspiracy. The district court calculated a Guidelines range of 324 to 405 months but imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 480 months.

In this appeal, Orlandez-Gamboa sought compassionate release by invoking the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (the “unusually long sentence/change in law” provision), arguing that Alleyne v. United States changed the law in a way that would materially affect his sentencing exposure. The core issues were (i) whether Alleyne (and its Apprendi lineage) constituted the kind of “change in the law” that would produce a “gross disparity” under § 1B1.13(b)(6) given his indictment and guilty plea admissions, and (ii) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying relief after weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed on two independent, dispositive grounds:

No material “change in law” affecting his sentence: Orlandez-Gamboa’s indictment charged, and his plea allocution admitted, the drug quantity (more than five kilograms of cocaine) necessary to trigger the statutory minimum. Therefore, there was no Alleyne/Apprendi problem to “fix,” and Alleyne did not create the sort of disparity § 1B1.13(b)(6) contemplates.
§ 3553(a) independently supports denial: The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that, notwithstanding “laudable” rehabilitation, the seriousness of the offense conduct warranted continued incarceration.

Because those points resolved the appeal, the panel expressly declined to reach broader questions about the “propriety” of § 1B1.13(b)(6) or whether § 1B1.13 is binding for defendant-filed compassionate release motions—issues implicated by the pending Supreme Court matter Rutherford v. United States.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Compassionate release framework and review

United States v. Havlon, 26 F.4th 566 (2d Cir. 2022), supplied the standard of review: denials of compassionate release are reviewed for abuse of discretion, while statutory interpretation issues are reviewed de novo. This matters because the panel treated the Alleyne-based argument as a legal mismatch (no qualifying “change in law” affecting the statutory range) and treated the § 3553(a) balancing as a discretionary judgment entitled to deference.

2) The Apprendi–Alleyne line and guilty-plea admissions

Orlandez-Gamboa’s “change in law” theory relied on:

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000): any fact that increases the statutory maximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013): extends the principle to facts that increase a statutory mandatory minimum.

The panel used two related cases to explain why a guilty plea can neutralize an Apprendi/Alleyne concern:

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004): for Apprendi purposes, the statutory maximum is what a judge may impose “solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Because plea admissions count, a defendant’s own admissions can supply the necessary elements.
United States v. Cordoba-Murgas, 422 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2005): a plea allocution “effectively waives” submitting drug quantity to a jury when the defendant admits the quantity.

The panel distinguished situations where the indictment includes quantity but the plea does not clearly admit it: United States v. Yu, 285 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2002), was cited as an example where remand may be appropriate when an enhanced statutory minimum rests on quantity included in the indictment but not specifically allocuted.

3) Judicial factfinding and the Guidelines vs. statutory ranges

The panel emphasized Alleyne’s limiting language: Alleyne v. United States itself states that not “any fact that influences judicial discretion” must be found by a jury. Consistent with that distinction, the panel cited United States v. Viola, 555 F. App’x 57 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order), which rejected the argument that Alleyne bars judicial factfinding that increases the advisory Guidelines range.

That precedent mattered here because the sentencing judge’s finding that Orlandez-Gamboa imported over 150 kilograms of cocaine affected the sentencing calculus, but (as the panel framed it) did not alter the statutory minimum or maximum once the charged-and-admitted five-kilogram threshold set the statutory floor.

4) The defendant’s litigation history and prior rulings

The panel situated the case against a backdrop of prior affirmances and denials: United States v. Orlandez-Gamboa, 185 F. App’x 86 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary order) affirmed the original sentence; United States v. Orlandez-Gamboa, No. 21-1594, 2022 WL 17491645 (2d Cir. 2022) (summary order) affirmed a prior § 3553(a) analysis; and United States v. Orlandez-Gamboa, No. 99-cr-654, 2017 WL 2876480 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2017) reflects earlier unsuccessful collateral efforts. The appealed order was United States v. Orlandez-Gamboa, No. 99-cr-654, 2025 WL 71976 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2025).

5) The contested status of § 1B1.13

The panel noted (without deciding) that the “legality” of the relevant policy statement is the subject of a pending Supreme Court case: Rutherford v. United States, S. Ct. No. 24-820. The panel’s decision to affirm without reaching that question illustrates a narrowing approach: courts may avoid the policy-statement validity/bindingness debate when the defendant fails on materiality and/or § 3553(a) grounds.

B. Legal Reasoning

§ 1B1.13(b)(6) requires a material change that would create a “gross disparity.”
The panel treated § 1B1.13(b)(6) as demanding (i) a “change in the law” and (ii) a showing that the change would produce a “gross disparity” between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time of the motion.
Orlandez-Gamboa’s Alleyne theory failed because the statutory triggering facts were charged and admitted.
The defendant’s indictment charged, and his plea allocution admitted, importing more than five kilograms of cocaine. Under Blakely v. Washington and United States v. Cordoba-Murgas, those admissions eliminate any claim that a jury must find the drug quantity to support the statutory minimum tied to that quantity. In other words, Alleyne did not change the legal consequences of his own admissions.
Judicial findings that affect only the advisory Guidelines do not trigger Alleyne.
The district judge’s finding (over 150 kilograms) did not change the statutory minimum or maximum as framed by the panel; it influenced the advisory sentencing discretion. Alleyne v. United States and United States v. Viola supported the conclusion that such judicial factfinding is not barred by Alleyne.
Independent discretionary denial under § 3553(a).
Even putting § 1B1.13(b)(6) to one side, the panel held the district court reasonably weighed rehabilitation against the seriousness of the offense and found continued incarceration warranted. That analysis was reinforced by the earlier affirmance in United States v. Orlandez-Gamboa, 2022 WL 17491645, at *2.
Issue avoidance on broader guideline-policy questions.
Having found no material “change in law” and no abuse of discretion under § 3553(a), the panel declined to address contested questions about the binding status or propriety of § 1B1.13(b)(6), despite acknowledging Rutherford v. United States.

C. Impact

Although non-precedential, the order signals several practical points likely to shape compassionate-release litigation in the Second Circuit:

“Change in law” arguments under § 1B1.13(b)(6) must be sentence-material. Defendants invoking Apprendi/Alleyne must show the relevant statutory minimum/maximum actually depended on judge-found facts rather than facts admitted in a guilty plea or found by a jury.
Plea admissions are decisive. Where the indictment charges the threshold quantity and the allocution admits it, courts will treat jury-right claims as waived or satisfied, making it difficult to characterize Apprendi/Alleyne as producing any “gross disparity” in the likely sentence today.
Guidelines-only factfinding remains an uphill “change in law” theory. The decision reaffirms the distinction between facts that set statutory boundaries and facts that guide judicial discretion within those boundaries.
§ 3553(a) remains a standalone barrier. Even when a defendant can articulate an “extraordinary and compelling” rationale, district courts can deny relief based on offense seriousness, public safety, deterrence, and similar considerations—subject only to deferential appellate review.
Rutherford-sensitive cases may be decided on narrower grounds. Pending Supreme Court review of § 1B1.13’s status may not matter in many cases if courts can resolve motions based on lack of materiality and/or § 3553(a).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Compassionate release (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)): A mechanism allowing a court to reduce a prison term after considering § 3553(a) factors if “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justify it and the reduction aligns with applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements.
§ 3553(a) factors: The sentencing considerations Congress requires courts to weigh, including the nature and seriousness of the offense, deterrence, protection of the public, and the defendant’s history and characteristics.
“Extraordinary and compelling reasons”: A legal threshold for compassionate release; it can include medical, family, or (as in § 1B1.13(b)(6)) certain unusually long-sentence scenarios tied to changes in law and resulting disparities.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (“unusually long sentence” / “change in law”): A policy-statement provision permitting courts to consider certain non-retroactive legal changes as part of “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” but only if the change would create a “gross disparity” between the sentence being served and what would likely be imposed now, considering individualized circumstances.
Apprendi / Alleyne rights: Constitutional rules requiring jury findings (or defendant admissions) for facts that increase statutory sentencing limits: Apprendi covers statutory maximums; Alleyne covers statutory minimums.
Plea allocution: The defendant’s sworn statement during a guilty plea admitting facts that establish the elements (and sometimes sentencing triggers) of the offense. Admissions here can satisfy the jury-finding requirement for Apprendi/Alleyne purposes.
Statutory range vs. advisory Guidelines range: Statutes set the legal minimum/maximum sentence permitted; the Sentencing Guidelines recommend a range within those boundaries. Post-Booker, the Guidelines are generally advisory; judges may find facts affecting the advisory range without violating Alleyne so long as statutory limits are unchanged.

5. Conclusion

The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of compassionate release because the “change in law” invoked—Alleyne v. United States—did not materially alter Orlandez-Gamboa’s statutory sentencing exposure: the indictment charged and he admitted the drug quantity necessary for the relevant statutory minimum. Judicial factfinding that affected only the advisory Guidelines did not implicate Alleyne. Separately, the district court acted within its discretion in concluding, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), that the gravity of the underlying conduct outweighed rehabilitative progress. The decision’s broader significance lies in its insistence on a concrete, sentence-changing legal development for § 1B1.13(b)(6) relief—especially in guilty-plea cases— and in its reaffirmation that § 3553(a) can independently foreclose compassionate release.