All Minnesota Cartways Must Be Two Rods Wide, and Towns May Condition Their Opening on Safe Construction at the Petitioner’s Expense

Introduction

In Bryce Holstad, et al. v. Town of May, the Minnesota Supreme Court defined the breadth of a town’s authority when establishing a cartway under Minnesota Statutes section 164.08. A cartway is a public road created primarily to give a landlocked parcel access to a public road, even though the petitioning owner ordinarily bears the associated costs.

Bryce and Jody Holstad owned an approximately 2.5-acre landlocked parcel along the St. Croix River. After they failed to obtain a private easement across neighboring property, they petitioned the Town of May to establish a cartway over an existing unimproved driveway. The Town instead selected a route proposed by its engineer, required substantial improvements before the route could be opened, directed the Holstads to obtain federal, state, and county approvals, declined to use public funds, and charged the Holstads for damages and professional expenses.

The case presented four principal questions: whether all cartways must be at least two rods wide; whether the Town lawfully selected an alternative route; whether it could condition opening on construction and regulatory approvals at the petitioners’ expense; and whether the petitioners could be charged the Town’s attorney fees incurred during appellate proceedings.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals and established the following rules:

1. The two-rod minimum width in Minnesota Statutes section 164.08, subdivision 2(a), applies to every cartway established under that provision, including cartways serving parcels between two and five acres.
2. A town may reject the petitioner’s route and select an alternative that it reasonably finds less disruptive and damaging to affected landowners and in the public’s best interest.
3. A town may condition the opening and use of a cartway on compliance with reasonable construction standards needed to make it safe for public use.
4. Requiring federal, state, and county approvals does not exceed the town’s authority because those approvals arise from independently applicable law.
5. Minnesota Statutes sections 164.08, subdivision 2(d), and 164.10 give a town discretion not to spend public money on a cartway. In that event, construction and maintenance are the petitioner’s responsibility.
6. The petitioner’s statutory damages may include the town’s attorney fees incurred in proceedings challenging the cartway determination, including appellate fees.

The Court also limited the concept of “meaningful access.” A cartway must reach a usable portion of the petitioner’s property, but it need not be affordable to construct. Affordability may be considered by a town, but it is not a mandatory statutory factor.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Holstad property had never possessed roadway access. It bordered National Park Service land, the St. Croix River, and a privately owned neighboring parcel. The nearest public road was State Highway 95.

The Holstads proposed using an existing gravel-and-sand path across the neighboring property without improving it. The Town found that the path was less than 11 feet wide at its narrowest point, passed through steep ravines and forested terrain, could not accommodate emergency vehicles, and was nearly impassable in winter.

The Town’s engineer proposed a shorter route that turned north before reaching the most severe slopes and ravines. Although both routes were estimated to require approximately $1.4 million to $1.9 million in improvements, the Town found the engineer’s route safer, farther from the neighbors’ cabin, and comparatively less intrusive.

The Town required a two-rod right-of-way, a 16-foot paved surface, two-foot gravel shoulders, regulatory approvals, and certification before opening. It awarded the neighboring owners $200,000 for the taking and estimated its professional and administrative expenses at approximately $95,500.

The district court upheld the resolution, and the court of appeals affirmed in Holstad v. Town of May. The Supreme Court likewise affirmed.

Analysis

1. The Two-Rod Requirement Applies to All Cartways

Section 164.08, subdivision 2(a), first requires a cartway “at least two rods wide” for qualifying parcels of at least five acres. Its next sentence extends the mandatory cartway remedy to certain parcels between two and five acres without repeating the width language.

The Holstads argued that the omission meant smaller parcels were exempt from the minimum width. The Court rejected that reading because the subdivision must be interpreted as a whole. The second sentence does not independently specify either a width or a connection to a public road; those characteristics derive from the first sentence. Consequently, both requirements apply to all cartways covered by the subdivision.

The Court did not decide that the entire traveled surface must be 33 feet wide. A rod equals 16.5 feet, so two rods equal 33 feet, but the Town itself required only a 16-foot paved surface with shoulders inside the wider right-of-way. The decision therefore distinguishes the legal width of the cartway from the width of its improved driving surface.

2. Selection of the Engineer’s Route Was Not Arbitrary or Capricious

A town acts legislatively when deciding a cartway petition. Judicial review is therefore deferential: a cartway decision will be set aside only when the evidence is practically conclusive against it, the town applied an erroneous legal theory, or it acted arbitrarily and capriciously.

The Town conducted inspections, received photographs and video, heard testimony, obtained an engineering opinion, and held multiple public hearings. It expressly found that the engineer’s route avoided the most dangerous terrain, reduced interference with the neighboring cabin, and better served public safety. Those articulated findings showed judgment rather than whim.

The Court also rejected the argument that Kennedy v. Pepin Twp. of Wabasha Cnty. required the Town to evaluate routes in a particular sequence. The statute requires a substantive comparison—not a prescribed order of deliberation—and the record demonstrated that the Town compared the competing routes.

3. “Meaningful Access” Does Not Guarantee Affordable Access

Under Kennedy v. Pepin Twp. of Wabasha Cnty., a cartway must provide meaningful access to a usable portion of the petitioner’s land. The Holstads urged the Court to extend that principle so that a route would not be meaningful if construction costs made it practically unaffordable.

The majority declined. Nothing in the statutory text requires a town to tailor the route to the petitioner’s budget. Adding affordability as a mandatory factor could force a town to choose between statutory width, public safety, and the petitioner’s financial capacity. Because the engineer’s route connected a public road to a usable portion of the property, it provided meaningful access in the legal sense.

The Court emphasized that towns remain free to consider affordability. They simply are not legally required to select an affordable route when other statutory and safety considerations point elsewhere.

4. Towns May Require Construction Before a Cartway Is Opened

The majority treated establishment, construction, and opening as distinct stages. Establishment creates the legal right-of-way; construction may make it usable; opening permits public use. Because a cartway is a public way, the Town’s delegated eminent-domain authority includes reasonable power to ensure that it is suitable and safe for the public.

The Court rejected the contention that payment of damages is the only permissible condition preceding opening. Section 164.08, subdivision 2(c), makes payment a condition precedent, but it does not state that payment is the exclusive condition.

The authority is not unlimited. Construction conditions must be reasonable and related to legitimate concerns such as safety and public use. On this record, extensive improvements were justified by the narrow, steep, and environmentally sensitive terrain rather than imposed to defeat the petition.

5. Regulatory Approvals May Be Required

Establishment of a cartway does not exempt the petitioner from federal, state, or county law. Eminent-domain authority does not authorize disregard of environmental, zoning, or permitting requirements. The Town’s resolution merely recognized obligations that would apply regardless of who constructed the road.

The Town therefore did not unlawfully delegate its cartway authority or make its mandatory duty contingent on another agency’s discretion. It acknowledged that lawful construction required compliance with independently applicable regulations.

6. The Petitioner May Be Required to Fund Construction

Section 164.08, subdivision 2(d), provides that town road and bridge funds “shall not” be used unless the town determines by resolution that an expenditure is in the public interest. If it adopts no such resolution, grading, construction, and maintenance are the petitioner’s responsibility.

Section 164.10 permits a town to spend public funds when its board finds that the public interest requires it. It also permits ten taxpayers to initiate a vote at the annual town meeting after the board refuses funding. Reading the provisions together, the Court found a default rule against public funding coupled with discretionary and democratic exceptions.

The public nature of the cartway does not itself require public financing. A cartway may principally benefit one landowner while remaining legally open to the public.

7. Recoverable Damages Include Attorney Fees on Appeal

Section 164.08, subdivision 2(c), defines damages broadly to include professional services and other expenses incurred “in connection with the proceedings for the establishment of the cartway.” An appeal challenging the establishing resolution remains connected to those proceedings.

This express authorization satisfies the American Rule, under which attorney fees are unavailable without statutory or contractual authority. The Court also found no conflict with section 164.07, subdivision 8, which awards ordinary costs and disbursements to the prevailing party. Ordinary costs do not generally include attorney fees, while section 164.08 specifically addresses the professional expenses associated with a cartway.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Cartway and Access Precedents

• Roemer v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elysian Twp., LeSueur Cnty. explained that the cartway statute expanded common-law ways of necessity and effectively allows a landlocked owner to require condemnation of access upon compensating the burdened owner. It supplied the historical and eminent-domain foundation for the decision.
• Carlson v. Elmo Twp. established that a cartway is a public way even when created primarily for one person. The majority relied on its public character to justify safety-related construction requirements.
• Powell v. Town Bd. of Sinnott Twp., Marshall Cnty. and Trout Brook Realty Co. v. Town of Featherstone confirmed that private property may not be condemned for a purely private use. These cases reinforced the need for the cartway to remain genuinely usable by the public.
• Kennedy v. Pepin Twp. of Wabasha Cnty. was the principal modern precedent. It established deferential review, required meaningful access to a usable portion of the property, and allowed an alternative route only when it is less disruptive and damaging and serves the public interest. The majority refused to extend its meaningful-access rule to affordability.
• State ex rel. Rose v. Town of Greenwood distinguished the mandatory duty to establish a qualifying cartway from discretionary matters such as route selection and public expenditure. The majority rejected the argument that Rose limited all town discretion to route selection.
• Cich v. Bay Lake Twp. illustrated that an unimproved path may be selected as a cartway, but it did not establish that every cartway must remain unimproved.
• Holstad v. Town of May was the court of appeals decision under review. Its conclusions concerning route selection, implied construction authority, regulatory approvals, and attorney fees were affirmed.

Eminent Domain and Public-Use Precedents

• City of Duluth v. State recognized that condemnation may incidentally benefit private parties so long as its predominant purpose is public.
• Knapp v. State described eminent-domain authority as broad, subject principally to public use and just compensation. The majority relied on it to support authority to make the condemned cartway suitable for public use.
• State ex rel. Comm'r of Transp. v. Kettleson supported governmental discretion in choosing how to carry out a taking once a valid public purpose has been established.
• Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes and Fletcher v. Chi., St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co. applied strict construction to eminent-domain statutes for the protection of owners whose property was being taken. The majority found that rationale less applicable to petitioners who requested and principally benefited from the taking.
• Minn. Power & Light Co. v. State and Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester demonstrated that possessing eminent-domain authority does not automatically create immunity from other governmental regulations.

Statutory Interpretation and Administrative Review

• State v. Sanschagrin supplied the plain-meaning framework: determine ambiguity, read the statute in context, and apply unambiguous language as written.
• State v. Riggs required the Court to construe the statute as a whole and give effect to all provisions. It was central to extending the two-rod requirement to smaller parcels and harmonizing sections 164.08 and 164.10.
• Reiter v. Kiffmeyer and Energy Pol'y Advocs. v. Ellison cautioned against adding omitted language. The majority used them to reject an affordability requirement and the assertion that damages were the exclusive condition for opening.
• In re Year 2019 Salary of Freeborn Cnty. Sheriff defined an arbitrary decision as one reflecting will rather than judgment or lacking articulated reasons.
• Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev. v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs identified circumstances in which agency action is arbitrary and capricious, including reliance on improper factors, failure to consider an important issue, or explanations contrary to the evidence.
• No Power Line, Inc. v. Minn. Env't Quality Council supported a presumption of administrative regularity and the Court’s refusal to presume that towns would inflate expenses in bad faith.

Fees and Remedies

• Dworsky v. Vermes Credit Jewelry, Inc. stated the American Rule requiring express authority for attorney-fee awards. The Court found that section 164.08 supplied that authority.
• Star Tribune Co. v. Univ. of Minn. Bd. of Regents explained that Attorney General opinions deserve consideration but are not binding. This allowed the Court to reject older opinions based on a materially different statutory scheme.
• Expose v. Thad Wilderson & Assocs., P.A. reinforced that courts apply statutes as written rather than revise them based on policy objections.

Authorities Emphasized by the Partial Dissent

• Welsh v. City of Orono supported the proposition that local governmental power must derive from legislative authorization.
• State v. Caldwell supplied the expressio unius principle—the inclusion of one express condition may imply the intentional omission of others.
• Genin v. 1996 Mercury Marquis and In re Hubbard were invoked against implying regulatory powers absent from the statutory text.

The Partial Dissent

Justice Moore, joined by Justices McKeig and Thissen, agreed with the two-rod rule, the deferential standard for route selection, and the recovery of appellate attorney fees. The dissent disagreed that section 164.08 authorized the Town to condition opening on town-created construction standards and regulatory approvals.

In the dissent’s view, the statute separately addresses establishment, opening, construction, and maintenance but expressly conditions opening only on payment of damages. The absence of comparable language concerning construction standards showed that the Legislature had not granted towns a licensing power over cartway use.

The dissent also proposed a broader understanding of meaningful access. It would consider physical barriers, legal restrictions, regulatory uncertainty, and costs that make construction practically unattainable. Because the selected route required up to $1.9 million in construction and multiple discretionary approvals, the dissent regarded the access as formal rather than meaningful and would have remanded for reconsideration.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Cartway

A public road created by a town to connect qualifying landlocked property to an existing public road.

Two rods

Thirty-three feet. This describes the required legal width of the cartway, not necessarily the paved driving surface.

Eminent domain

The government’s power to take private property for public use after paying just compensation.

Condition precedent

An event that must occur before another legal right may be exercised. Payment of cartway damages is one such condition before opening.

Arbitrary and capricious

A decision based on whim or unsupported will rather than reasoned judgment and evidence.

Meaningful access

Under the majority’s rule, legal access from a public road to a usable portion of the property. It does not guarantee affordability.

American Rule

The general rule that each party pays its own attorney fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.

Impact

The decision substantially strengthens town authority in Minnesota cartway proceedings. Towns may insist that a cartway function as a safe public road rather than merely create a paper easement. They may also decline public funding and transfer construction, maintenance, permitting, and litigation costs to the petitioning owner.

Future petitioners must assess far more than the compensation payable to affected neighbors. Engineering work, environmental approvals, construction expenses, maintenance, and the town’s appellate attorney fees may all become part of the financial burden.

Town boards, meanwhile, should build a detailed administrative record. Inspections, engineering evidence, public hearings, route comparisons, safety findings, and explanations of public-interest considerations were decisive in sustaining the Town’s action.

Important limits remain. Construction conditions must be reasonable; damage awards remain judicially reviewable; towns may consider affordability even though they are not required to do so; and the Court did not hold that the entire traveled surface must be two rods wide.

Conclusion

Bryce Holstad, et al. v. Town of May establishes that every cartway under section 164.08, subdivision 2(a), must occupy a right-of-way at least two rods wide. It also confirms that towns possess broad discretion to select routes, require reasonable safety improvements and regulatory compliance, decline public financing, and recover attorney fees connected to appeals.

The ruling treats cartways as genuine public roads rather than private access easements. Its practical consequence is that the statutory right to obtain access does not guarantee inexpensive, immediate, or publicly financed access—particularly where geography, safety, and environmental regulation make construction difficult.