Date: Oct 10, 2025

ALJ Discretion to Limit VE Cross-Examination and Acceptance of SkillTRAN Job Browser Pro, with SSRs as an Independent Step-Five Backstop

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Date: October 7, 2025

Case: Carolyn Matthiscyk v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, No. 24-2488

Disposition: Affirmed (Nonprecedential)

Introduction

This nonprecedential Seventh Circuit decision addresses a recurring cluster of issues in Social Security disability adjudication: the scope of an ALJ’s discretion to limit cross-examination of a vocational expert (VE), the sufficiency of a VE’s job-number methodology (including reliance on SkillTRAN Job Browser Pro), the handling of post-hearing challenges to VE evidence, the role of Social Security Rulings (SSRs) as independent support for a step-five denial, and the weight accorded to a medical expert’s absenteeism opinion grounded largely in a claimant’s subjective reports and emergency room utilization.

Plaintiff-appellant Carolyn Matthiscyk alleged disability since 2015 due to degenerative disc disease, asthma, and other conditions. After a remand from district court, an ALJ issued a partially favorable decision: disabled as of May 16, 2019 (her 55th birthday) based on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the “grids”) for “advanced age,” but not earlier. On judicial review, the magistrate judge affirmed. The Seventh Circuit now affirms as well, holding that the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and that any arguable procedural misstep regarding VE cross-examination was harmless.

Summary of the Opinion

The court applies the substantial-evidence standard to the ALJ’s findings and declines to reweigh the record.
Limitation of VE cross-examination was within the ALJ’s discretion given time constraints and the VE’s prior explanation of methodology; in any event, any error was harmless.
The ALJ adequately addressed and reasonably rejected post-hearing objections to the VE’s job-number evidence, noting unclear provenance and geographic limits in the claimant’s counter-data.
Reliance on the VE’s use of SkillTRAN Job Browser Pro and the “total distribution method” was supported by circuit precedent recognizing these sources and methods as reliable when reasonably explained.
Even if VE evidence were deemed insufficient, SSRs independently supported the step-five finding that significant numbers of jobs exist for a person limited to light work with occasional stooping/crawling and no concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants.
The ALJ permissibly discounted the medical expert’s absenteeism opinion because it rested primarily on the claimant’s reported ER visit frequency rather than medical necessity tethered to objective evidence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97 (2019) – Establishes a pragmatic substantial-evidence framework for VE testimony: reliability is case-by-case; the bar is not high, and the inquiry is flexible, focusing on whether a reasonable mind would accept the VE’s explanation as adequate. The court invokes Biestek’s standard to uphold the VE’s methodology and the ALJ’s reliance on it.
Ruenger v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 760 (7th Cir. 2022) – Clarifies that a methodology is reliable when it draws upon broadly accepted sources and is cogently explained. The panel uses Ruenger to affirm the ALJ’s acceptance of the VE’s SkillTRAN-based job numbers and the VE’s explanation of her approach.
Chavez v. O’Malley, 96 F.4th 1016 (7th Cir. 2024) – Recognizes SkillTRAN Job Browser Pro as a reliable and widely used vocational data source in this circuit. This endorsement directly supports the ALJ’s use of the VE’s SkillTRAN-derived job estimates.
Fetting v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th 332 (7th Cir. 2023) – Holds that VEs need not provide every calculation detail to meet substantial evidence; reasonable explanation suffices. The panel cites Fetting to reject the argument that the VE’s failure to delve into algorithmic minutiae undermined reliability.
Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir. 1999) – Confirms that ALJs have discretion to manage cross-examination, including whether and how long it proceeds; there is no right to unlimited cross-examination. This anchors the court’s approval of the ALJ’s time-based limitation here.
McKinsey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2011) – Supports the principle that SSRs and the Medical-Vocational Guidelines can independently sustain step-five determinations under certain RFC/vocational profiles, thus serving as a harmless-error backstop even if VE testimony is questioned.
Prill v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 738 (7th Cir. 2024) – Authorizes ALJs to discount medical opinions based largely on subjective complaints rather than objective findings. This validates the ALJ’s rejection of the medical expert’s absenteeism estimate.
Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2021) – Reiterates that appellate review does not permit reweighing evidence or substituting judicial judgment for that of the ALJ when substantial evidence exists. The panel applies this deferential approach.
Schmitz v. Colvin, 124 F.4th 1029 (7th Cir. 2024) – Restates that the court reviews the district court’s affirmance de novo but defers to the ALJ on substantial evidence. This frames the appellate posture.
Social Security Rulings 83-14 and 85-15 – Provide agency policy guidance on the erosion of the occupational base due to non-exertional limitations. The ALJ relied on these rulings to conclude that occasional stooping and limits on crawling, crouching, kneeling, and dust exposure do not significantly erode the light work base, independently supporting the step-five finding.

Legal Reasoning

The Seventh Circuit grounds its affirmance in the substantial-evidence standard. The ALJ’s decision survives if a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate—even if the record might also support the opposite conclusion. Against that backdrop, the opinion resolves four main issues:

1) Limitation of Cross-Examination of the Vocational Expert

The claimant argued that cutting off cross-examination violated her right to a full and fair hearing under 20 C.F.R. § 498.203(a)(6) and improperly “shifted the burden” by preventing probing of VE methods and sources. The panel disagreed:

There is no right to unlimited cross-examination; ALJs may restrict questioning for reasons including time management. See Butera and HALLEX I-2-6-74C(E).
Here, the claimant’s counsel did conduct cross-examination on methodology and data sources before the ALJ, facing time constraints, closed the record. The court even suggests a best practice—ALJs should foreshadow time limits—but finds no abuse of discretion.
Any arguable error was harmless because the VE had already provided a sufficient explanation, and the claimant’s post-hearing objections did not discredit that testimony.

2) Handling of Post-Hearing Objections to the VE’s Job-Number Evidence

The claimant contended that the ALJ ignored her written objections. The panel notes the opposite: the ALJ opened the decision by addressing them. The ALJ reasonably rejected the claimant’s alternative job-number data because its provenance was unclear and it appeared limited to specific counties, undermining its probative force at the national-economy inquiry central to step five.

3) Reliability of the VE’s Methodology (SkillTRAN Job Browser Pro)

The claimant criticized the VE’s explanation as vague and insufficient, particularly regarding SkillTRAN’s algorithm. The court upheld the ALJ’s reliance:

SkillTRAN Job Browser Pro is a “well-accepted” source within the circuit. See Chavez.
Under Biestek, a VE need not produce every input or formula; the test is practical reasonableness. Fetting reiterates that a full mathematical breakdown isn’t required.
The VE explained she used SkillTRAN’s Job Browser Pro, the total distribution method, full-time job numbers, and ensured consistency with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). She also pointed counsel to SkillTRAN’s website for methodological details.
Ruenger confirms that when a VE uses accepted sources and explains methods cogently, substantial evidence is satisfied. The court found that threshold met here.

Critically, the court emphasizes a fallback: even if VE testimony had been deemed insufficient, the ALJ independently supported the step-five finding through SSRs 83-14 and 85-15, which signal that occasional stooping and limits on crawling/crouching, coupled with avoiding concentrated pulmonary irritants, do not significantly erode the light occupational base. Under McKinsey, this makes any VE-related deficiency harmless.

4) Discounting the Medical Expert’s Absenteeism Opinion

Dr. Shapiro opined that the claimant would miss at least four days of work per month based on her reported ER visits. The ALJ gave little weight to that testimony because it was grounded not in medical necessity tied to diagnosed impairments, but in the frequency of ER attendance and subjective pain reports. The ALJ noted that the ER presentations did not line up with the claimant’s established impairments and referenced treating providers’ observations of possible narcotic dependence signs—without finding or suggesting substance abuse as a determinative factor. Prill authorizes discounting medical opinions overly reliant on subjective complaints. The panel holds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s weighing.

Standard of Review Anchors the Outcome

Throughout, the court invokes the limited scope of review: it will not reweigh evidence (Gedatus) and will uphold the ALJ if the record contains such evidence as a reasonable mind would accept (Biestek). The ALJ’s partial award as of age 55—based on the grids—only underscores that the decision flexibly applied the regulatory framework rather than reflexively denying benefits.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although designated nonprecedential, this disposition is instructive in several respects for Social Security practice within the Seventh Circuit:

Cross-Examination Management: ALJs may limit cross-examination, particularly when a VE has already explained methodology and the record is otherwise developed. Counsel should plan direct, prioritized questions early in VE testimony and ask the ALJ at the outset about time limits.
VE Methodology Challenges: General attacks on SkillTRAN or demands for algorithmic transparency are unlikely to succeed without more. Counsel should come prepared with reliable, clearly sourced counter-evidence tied to national job numbers and be ready to articulate why the VE’s particular application of SkillTRAN is flawed—not merely that SkillTRAN is opaque.
SSRs as a Safety Net at Step Five: The court’s harmless-error analysis reinforces that SSRs 83-14 and 85-15 can independently carry the Commissioner’s burden when non-exertional limitations (like occasional stooping and respiratory irritant avoidance) do not significantly erode the light occupational base. Practitioners should address SSRs head-on in briefing—either to leverage them (for the agency) or to distinguish them (for claimants) by demonstrating greater erosion than the SSRs contemplate.
Medical Expert Opinions on Absenteeism: Absenteeism estimates rooted in the frequency of ER visits—without medical necessity tied to objective findings—are vulnerable. Claimants seeking to rely on such opinions should develop evidence linking specific impairments to medically necessary treatment patterns that would reliably result in work absences.
Use of the Grids at Age 55+: The ALJ’s partially favorable award based on the grids illustrates the significant role of age categories. Claimants approaching 55 should ensure the record captures exertional limits that align with grid rules, as those rules can be outcome-determinative.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantial Evidence: A low but meaningful threshold. The question is not whether the court would decide the case the same way, but whether the ALJ’s decision is reasonable based on the evidence.
Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): What a claimant can still do despite impairments. Here, the ALJ found capacity for light work with additional limits (restricted climbing; only occasional stooping/crawling; avoid concentrated respiratory irritants).
Light Work: Jobs typically requiring standing/walking for much of the day and lifting up to 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently.
The Grids (Medical-Vocational Guidelines): Tables that, considering age, education, past work, and exertional capacity, direct disability or non-disability outcomes. At age 55+ (“advanced age”), limitations to light work may direct a finding of disabled depending on the vocational profile.
Vocational Expert (VE): An expert who testifies about job availability given a claimant’s RFC and vocational factors, including job numbers in the national economy.
SkillTRAN Job Browser Pro: A tool widely used by VEs to estimate job numbers by linking DOT occupations to SOC categories and distributing employment data (often via the “total distribution method”) across DOT codes.
SSR 83-14 and SSR 85-15: Agency rulings that guide how non-exertional limitations (like postural restrictions or environmental exposures) affect the size of the job base. They can support step-five outcomes even apart from VE testimony in appropriate cases.
Harmless Error: Even if the ALJ made a mistake (e.g., curtailing cross-examination or relying on an arguably thin VE explanation), affirmance is proper if other, independent grounds (like SSR-based analysis) sustain the outcome.

What the Court Did Not Decide

The court did not adopt a categorical rule that SkillTRAN is always sufficient; rather, it reaffirmed that SkillTRAN-based testimony, reasonably explained and cross-checked with DOT/SOC, can meet the Biestek standard.
The court did not hold that ALJs can always cut off cross-examination; it approved the exercise of discretion on the facts here and signaled that advance notice of time limits is a best practice.
The court did not find that ER visit frequency can never inform absenteeism; it held that, in this record, the lack of medically necessary linkage and objective corroboration justified discounting the opinion.

Conclusion

This decision reinforces several practical and doctrinal points in disability adjudication. First, the substantial-evidence threshold—grounded in Biestek—continues to sustain ALJ reliance on VE testimony that uses well-accepted sources like SkillTRAN, so long as the VE’s explanation is reasonable even if not granular. Second, ALJs retain discretion to limit VE cross-examination, with harmless-error doctrine cushioning potentially premature cutoffs where the record otherwise supports the step-five determination. Third, SSRs 83-14 and 85-15 remain potent tools for showing that non-exertional limitations such as occasional stooping, limited crawling, and avoiding pulmonary irritants typically do not significantly erode the light job base, thereby independently supporting step-five outcomes. Finally, absenteeism opinions unmoored from objective medical necessity face headwinds post-Prill.

Although nonprecedential, the opinion offers a clear roadmap for litigants and ALJs: develop VE challenges with concrete, reliable counter-evidence; anticipate and navigate time management at hearings; address SSRs directly; and ground medical opinions in objective evidence. For claimants, it also highlights the material shift at age 55 under the grids—a pivot that, as here, can be dispositive.