Aggravated Stalking with a Deadly Weapon Is Not a “Felony Involving an Act of Violence” for § 7553a Hold-Without-Bail

Introduction

In State v. Mark Sterling (Vt. July 10, 2026), the Vermont Supreme Court (single-justice de novo review) reversed a trial-court order holding Mark Sterling without bail pending trial under 13 V.S.A. § 7553a. The State sought a hold-without-bail (HWOB) order based on a charge of aggravated stalking while in possession of a deadly weapon under 13 V.S.A. § 1063(a)(5), arising from two entries onto the complaining witness’s property (his former spouse, “B.S.”) in alleged violation of a relief-from-abuse order, while a backpack containing a handgun and long-handled knife remained in a stolen dump truck.

The case presented three recurrent HWOB issues: (1) whether the charged felony is one “an element of which involves an act of violence against another person” (Vt. Const. ch. II, § 40(2); 13 V.S.A. § 7553a(a)); (2) whether the State proved “great” evidence of guilt; and (3) whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence a substantial threat of physical violence that cannot be reasonably prevented by conditions of release. The Court resolved the appeal on prongs (1) and (3), and therefore did not reach the vagueness challenge.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court reversed and remanded. It held that aggravated stalking—including under § 1063(a)(5) (possession of a deadly weapon while stalking)—is not a felony with an element involving an act of violence for HWOB purposes, because under the statutory elements the offense can be committed through nonviolent conduct such as interference with property coupled with a “knew or should have known” (negligence-like) mental state regarding substantial emotional distress. The Court further held that, even if the “act of violence” prong were satisfied, the State’s evidence did not meet the clear-and-convincing standard to show an unmanageable substantial threat of physical violence. The matter was remanded for the trial court to promptly impose conditions of release; the HWOB order would be vacated upon issuance of such conditions.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited

  • State v. Beldiman, No. 25-AP-211, 2025 WL 1993825 (Vt. July 16, 2025) (unpub. mem.)
    Role in Sterling: The controlling decision. Sterling treats Beldiman as dispositive on whether aggravated stalking is a felony involving an act of violence. Beldiman reasoned that aggravated stalking’s elements can be satisfied by (i) interference with property and (ii) a “knew or reasonably should have known” mens rea regarding emotional distress—features that, in the Court’s view, do not amount to constitutionally cognizable “violence” for Chapter II, § 40(2) and § 7553a.
  • State v. Perron, No. 24-AP-163, 2024 WL 3416096 (Vt. July 12, 2024) (unpub. mem.)
    Role in Sterling: Provides the operative definition of “violence” used in this constitutional-bail context, including the concept of violence as an “abusive or unjust use of power.” Sterling (through Beldiman) relies on Perron to emphasize that aggravated stalking’s negligence-like mens rea and non-person-directed property interference can fall outside that definition.
  • State v. Madison, 163 Vt. 360 (1995)
    Role in Sterling: Cited both procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, Madison addressed what “review de novo” meant for bail review under earlier law and informed V.R.A.P. 9(b). Substantively, Madison is grouped with Perron as a source for defining “violence” in the § 40(2)/§ 7553a inquiry.
  • State v. Shores, 2025 VT 62, __ Vt. __
    Role in Sterling: The State invoked Shores to argue for a broader “act of violence” interpretation. Sterling rejects that reading, noting Shores (i) approved the Perron/Madison framework, (ii) overruled State v. Madigan but did not undermine Beldiman, (iii) reaffirmed that legislative labels are “instructive and persuasive, but not determinative,” and (iv) highlighted that the linkage between conduct and mens rea can matter in the “violence” analysis—supporting (not weakening) Beldiman’s element-focused reasoning.
  • State v. Madigan, No. 2011-103, 2011 WL 4974812 (Vt. Mar. 25, 2011) (unpub. mem.)
    Role in Sterling: Not applied directly; discussed because Shores overruled it. Sterling acknowledges that Beldiman cited Madigan, but concludes Beldiman ultimately rested on Perron and Madison—the same authorities Shores endorsed.
  • Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023)
    Role in Sterling: Cited by analogy to underscore the constitutional significance of mens rea in stalking contexts—specifically, that negligence standards can be insufficient in certain constitutional settings. Sterling uses Counterman to reinforce why the “should have known” component is a meaningful limiting consideration when deciding whether “violence” is an element.
  • State v. Bulson, 2024 VT 15, 219 Vt. 631 (mem.) and State v. Filippo, 172 Vt. 551, 532 (2001) (mem.)
    Role in Sterling: These anchor the elements-based approach. Bulson supports focusing on the statute’s plain language to determine whether any element involves violence. Filippo is quoted for the rule that the inquiry is the statutory elements “and not the evidence that will be offered to prove the felony.”
  • State v. Downing, 2020 VT 97, 213 Vt. 643 (mem.)
    Role in Sterling: Used to treat single-justice decisions as binding in this context; Sterling states it is bound to follow Beldiman under Downing. Sterling further notes that Beldiman’s unpublished status does not diminish its force, pointing to Shores’ extensive treatment of an unpublished decision before overruling it.
  • State v. White, 2020 VT 62, 212 Vt. 658 (mem.)
    Role in Sterling: Addresses the final step in HWOB analysis—narrow discretion to release even if constitutional/statutory predicates are met, considering factors in 13 V.S.A. § 7554. Sterling cites White to frame the multi-step structure, though it does not reach that step.
  • State v. Auclair, 2020 VT 26, 211 Vt. 651
    Role in Sterling: Emphasizes Vermont’s “usual presumption in favor of pretrial release,” positioning HWOB as an exception requiring strict proof.
  • Lanfear v. Ruggerio, 2020 VT 84, 213 Vt. 322 and State v. Lontine, 2016 VT 26, 201 Vt. 637, overruled on other grounds by State v. Downing, 2020 VT 101 213 Vt. 468
    Role in Sterling: Define and contextualize the clear and convincing evidence standard, stressing it requires “highly probable” proof and acts as a “fundamental caution” against detention absent a “firm conviction” in the judge’s mind.
  • State v. Galanes, No. 2009-210, 2009 WL 2480128 (Vt. July 23, 2009) (unpub. mem.)
    Role in Sterling: Illustrates a circumstance supporting HWOB: in-custody assaultive conduct. Sterling contrasts that with the absence of in-custody misconduct evidence here.
  • State v. Hosten, No. 26-AP-008, 2026 WL 253322 (Vt. Jan. 30, 2026) (unpub. mem.) and State v. Steuerwald, 2012 VT 98, 193 Vt. 663
    Role in Sterling: Provide benchmarks for HWOB-level dangerousness and uncontrollability by conditions—e.g., repeated strangulation, serious bodily injury, demonstrated disregard for court orders/conditions, and violence requiring police force to stop.
  • State v. Van Aelstyn, 2007 VT 6, 181 Vt. 274
    Role in Sterling: Used in the legislative-history footnote to mark that the stalking mens rea (“knows or should know”) was added in 2005—supporting Sterling’s point that the modern statute’s breadth differs from the 1993 version often referenced in bail-history arguments.

2) Legal Reasoning

A. The “Act of Violence” Prong Is an Elements Inquiry, Not a Facts Inquiry

Sterling reiterates that HWOB eligibility turns first on whether the charged felony is one “an element of which involves an act of violence against another person.” Following State v. Bulson and State v. Filippo, the Court focuses on the outer reach of statutory elements, not on how alarming particular facts may be in a given case. That methodology is decisive: if the statute can be violated in nonviolent ways, the offense is not categorically a “violent act” for § 7553a/§ 40(2) purposes.

B. Why Aggravated Stalking (Including § 1063(a)(5)) Does Not Qualify

The Court holds the issue “largely resolved and controlled” by State v. Beldiman: aggravated stalking can be proven through property-focused interference plus a mental state that can be satisfied by what the defendant “should have known” about resulting distress. Under State v. Perron and State v. Madison, “violence” in this setting is not unlimited; Sterling accepts Beldiman’s conclusion that the statute’s combination of (i) non-person-directed conduct and (ii) a negligence-like mens rea does not necessarily entail the “abusive or unjust use of power” against another person required to make violence an element.

The State attempted to distinguish Beldiman because Sterling was charged under § 1063(a)(5), which adds the element that the defendant “had a deadly weapon” “in his or her possession while engaged in the act of stalking.” Sterling rejects the distinction: the features that prevented a finding of violence in Beldiman “remain elements of the crime charged in this case,” and the presence-of-weapon element does not cure the fact that the stalking component itself can be committed through nonviolent, property-related interference plus “should have known” culpability. In short, possession of a weapon while engaging in statutorily broad stalking does not transform the offense into one whose elements necessarily involve an act of violence against another person.

C. Shores Does Not Displace Beldiman

Sterling treats State v. Shores as consistent with Beldiman rather than contrary to it. Shores endorsed the same Perron/Madison definitional framework, held legislative designations are “instructive and persuasive, but not determinative,” and emphasized that conduct-plus-mens-rea linkage can matter. Sterling uses those points to confirm that the modern aggravated stalking statute’s breadth—especially the “should have known” standard—matters for whether violence is an element.

D. Clear and Convincing Dangerousness and No-Conditions Finding Was Not Met

Even assuming HWOB eligibility, Sterling holds the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence both (1) that release poses a substantial threat of physical violence and (2) that no conditions or combination of conditions will reasonably prevent that violence. Quoting Lanfear v. Ruggerio and State v. Lontine, the Court underscores this is an exacting standard requiring a “highly probable” factfinding and a “firm conviction” in the judge’s mind.

The Court candidly recognizes concerns: two alleged relief-from-abuse violations, failure to surrender firearms, recent erratic behavior and possible suicidality, homelessness, anger and swearing, and the absence (so far) of a proposed responsible custodian. But it finds key “HWOB-level” indicia missing: no threats, no physical contact, no display or use of weapons, weapons remained in the truck, no history of violence toward B.S. or the children, no criminal record or proven willful failures to appear, no evidence of in-custody assaultive behavior (contrast State v. Galanes), and factual patterns far less extreme than cases where HWOB was upheld (contrast State v. Hosten; State v. Steuerwald).

The result is not unconditional release; it is a determination that the State’s proof did not justify the exceptional remedy of pretrial detention without bail. Sterling remands for imposition of stringent conditions (no contact, stay-away zones, weapon and alcohol prohibitions, mental health evaluation and treatment compliance, curfew, possible responsible custodian, and immediate arrest for violations), and directs that the HWOB order be vacated upon issuance of conditions.

3) Impact

  • Clarifies categorical HWOB eligibility for aggravated stalking: The decision reinforces that aggravated stalking—including § 1063(a)(5)—does not satisfy the “act of violence” element requirement for HWOB under 13 V.S.A. § 7553a and Vt. Const. ch. II, § 40(2), because the statute’s elements sweep in nonviolent conduct with a “should have known” standard.
  • Limits weapon-possession arguments in bail litigation: Sterling signals that mere possession of a deadly weapon while committing an otherwise non-categorical “violent act” offense may be insufficient to satisfy the constitutional “violence element” requirement, where the underlying offense remains broad and can be committed nonviolently.
  • Raises the evidentiary bar on “no conditions can work”: The opinion continues a trend of requiring concrete, case-specific proof that conditions cannot reasonably prevent violence—often via past violence, threats, repeated violations of criminal court conditions, or in-custody misconduct—rather than generalized concern.
  • Practical effect on charging and motion practice: Prosecutors seeking HWOB may need to rely on charges whose elements categorically involve violence (or add qualifying violent felonies when supported), rather than attempting to bootstrap HWOB through stalking plus weapon-possession alone.
  • Conditions-first orientation where feasible: Sterling exemplifies an approach of addressing risk through intensive release conditions (no-contact, exclusion zones, treatment mandates, curfew, custodianship) when the record does not justify the exceptional step of HWOB.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Hold Without Bail (HWOB)
Pretrial detention without bail is permitted only in narrow circumstances under Vt. Const. ch. II, § 40(2) and 13 V.S.A. § 7553a. The State must satisfy multiple prerequisites; it is not enough that the allegations are serious.
“A felony, an element of which involves an act of violence”
This is a categorical, elements-based question: the court asks what the statute requires the State to prove in the worst-case breadth of its language, not how violent the defendant’s conduct appears in the specific incident.
“Clear and convincing evidence”
A level of proof higher than “more likely than not,” lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The judge must find it highly probable that release creates a substantial threat of physical violence and that no set of conditions can reasonably prevent it.
Mens rea: “knew or should have known”
“Should have known” resembles a negligence standard—liability can be based on what a reasonable person would foresee, not solely on what the defendant actually intended or knew. Sterling treats that as important when assessing whether “violence” is an element of stalking.
Course of conduct
Stalking typically requires repeated acts forming a pattern. Here, the State argued two visits to the residence constituted the course of conduct under 13 V.S.A. § 1061.
Conditions of release
Court-ordered rules governing a defendant’s conduct while awaiting trial (e.g., no contact, curfew, weapon bans, treatment requirements). HWOB is permissible only when conditions cannot reasonably manage the risk of physical violence.

Conclusion

State v. Mark Sterling solidifies two key points in Vermont’s constitutional bail jurisprudence: (1) aggravated stalking, even when charged under 13 V.S.A. § 1063(a)(5) for possession of a deadly weapon, is not categorically a “felony, an element of which involves an act of violence” for § 7553a purposes; and (2) HWOB demands clear and convincing proof not only of substantial threatened physical violence, but also that no conditions can reasonably prevent it. The decision channels courts toward stringent, tailored conditions of release—rather than preventive detention—unless the State can meet the Constitution’s exacting prerequisites.