Aggravated Stalking Is Not a “Violent Felony” for No-Bail Purposes:
A Commentary on State v. Nicolae Beldiman (Vt. 2025)
Introduction
On 16 July 2025 a specially-assigned Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court delivered an
Entry Order in State v. Nicolae Beldiman.
The decision squarely addressed whether the felony of aggravated stalking,
13 V.S.A. § 1063(a)(1), qualifies as “a felony, an element of which involves an act of
violence against another person” under Vermont Constitution ch. II, § 40(2) and its
statutory analogue, 13 V.S.A. § 7553a.
The classification is critical because only those felonies may support a pre-trial
hold-without-bail order.
This case reached the Supreme Court after the trial court continued a no-bail hold;
Mr. Beldiman pursued the constitutionally guaranteed de novo review before a single
Justice. The Court ultimately reversed, holding that aggravated stalking
does not contain an element that constitutes an act of violence. In so doing, the
Court refused to treat the Legislature’s characterization in § 1063(c) (“shall be
considered a violent act for the purposes of determining bail”) as dispositive,
re-affirming judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation.
Summary of the Judgment
- Issue: Whether aggravated stalking is a qualifying “violent felony” such that a
defendant may be held without bail under § 7553a.
- Holding: No. The elements of aggravated stalking do not require proof of an
act of violence, therefore the offense does not satisfy the first prong of the
constitutional and statutory no-bail framework.
- Result: The no-bail order was vacated, and the case remanded with instructions
to impose standard conditions under § 7554.
- Key Rationale:
(1) Only statutory elements, not factual allegations, determine whether an
offense “involves an act of violence.”
(2) The Legislature may not redefine constitutional terminology by fiat; § 1063(c)
is a nullity for purposes of § 7553a.
(3) Aggravated stalking can be proved without any threat or use of physical force,
and therefore lacks the requisite element of violence.
Detailed Analysis
A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
- State v. Filippo, 172 Vt. 551 (2001) (mem.)
Established that “element” refers strictly to the statutory building blocks of an
offense, not the evidence or surrounding facts.
Influence: Anchored the Court’s refusal to examine the factual
allegations in the information.
- State v. Madison, 163 Vt. 390 (1995)
Adopted an “expansive” dictionary sense of violence, yet still tied it to
conduct that creates fear of imminent serious bodily injury.
Influence: Demonstrated that even broad definitions require a nexus to
bodily harm or force, which aggravated stalking lacks.
- State v. Perron, No. 24-AP-163, 2024 WL 3416096 (Vt. Jul. 12, 2024)
(unpub.)
Found aggravated assault with a deadly weapon to be violent because it pairs an
intent to threaten with the means (weapon).
Influence: Provided a contrast: aggravated stalking does not require
matching intent and capacity.
- State v. Combs, No. 23-AP-185, 2023 WL 4348874 (Vt. Jul. 3, 2023)
(unpub.)
Focused inquiry on whether an element “relates closely to an injurious or
destructive act toward another.”
Influence: Helped frame the Court’s conclusion that stalking can be
completed without such an injurious act.
- State v. Madigan, No. 2011-103, 2011 WL 4974812 (Vt. Mar. 25, 2011)
(unpub.)
Highlighted legislative silence as a factor but ultimately centered analysis on
statutory elements.
Influence: Reinforced that a mere label added by the Legislature is not
controlling.
B. Legal Reasoning of the Court
- Three-Pronged Test under § 7553a / § 40(2).
The Court revisited the constitutional/statutory structure:
(1) violent-felony element; (2) weight of the evidence; (3) danger analysis &
adequacy of conditions. Because the first prong failed, the remaining prongs were
moot.
- Element-Focused Inquiry.
Following Filippo, the Justice parsed the text of § 1063:
none of its five statutory elements require either force or threats of
bodily harm. Fear or emotional distress can suffice.
- Separation of Powers and Legislative “Labeling.”
Although § 1063(c) calls stalking a “violent act,” the Court declared that
language a nullity for § 7553a purposes because the Vermont Constitution gives
the judiciary—not the Legislature—the final word on constitutional terms that
curtail liberty.
- Comparison with True “Violent” Elements.
By contrasting aggravated assault (§ 1024) and other recognized violent crimes,
the Court found aggravated stalking materially different:
it can be committed merely by property interference, surveillance, or conduct
causing emotional distress.
- Constitutional Avoidance of Over-Breadth.
Echoing the presumption that “most prisoners are bailable,” the decision avoids
an interpretation that would dramatically expand no-bail exceptions.
C. Potential Impact
- Immediate Bail Practice: Trial courts can no longer use aggravated
stalking alone to justify no-bail holds; prosecutors must charge an
additional qualifying violent felony, or proceed under § 7554 with stringent
conditions.
- Legislative Drafting: The decision signals that merely
inserting “is a violent act” into a statute does not overcome constitutional
limitations. Future bills will need to embed actual violence elements if the
Legislature wishes to expand § 7553a coverage.
- Separation of Powers Doctrine: Re-affirms the judiciary’s role
as gatekeeper when statutory language intersects with constitutional rights.
May influence future challenges where statutory classifications impinge on bail,
firearms dispossession, or habitual-offender enhancements.
- Domestic and Victim-Safety Concerns: Although stalking victims
may face genuine risk, the ruling underscores that risk must be handled through
conditions of release—electronic monitoring, no-contact orders, etc.—rather
than categorical denial of bail.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Element of an Offense
- The specific factual proposition the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
(e.g., “the defendant threatened another with a deadly weapon”). If it is not
listed in the statute’s wording, it is not an element.
- Act of Violence
- For § 7553a, conduct that by its nature involves physical force or threats
sufficient to create fear of serious bodily injury. Emotional distress
alone is insufficient.
- Hold Without Bail
- A pre-trial detention order denying any possibility of release.
Vermont allows it only in narrow circumstances set out in the Constitution.
- De Novo Review
- Latin for “from the beginning.” The reviewing Justice makes an entirely
independent decision, owing no deference to the trial court’s findings.
- Legislative “Labeling” vs. Constitutional Interpretation
- While the Legislature may describe conduct as “violent,” that label cannot expand
constitutional categories that limit liberty. The judiciary has the final say
on what counts as “violent” within § 40(2).
Conclusion
State v. Nicolae Beldiman represents a significant clarification of Vermont
bail jurisprudence. By holding that aggravated stalking is not inherently violent,
the Supreme Court reinforced two enduring principles: (1) only the statutory elements,
not factual allegations or legislative labels, determine whether a crime is “violent”
for no-bail purposes, and (2) constitutional safeguards against pre-trial detention
cannot be eroded by legislative re-definition. Practitioners must now assess stalking
charges through the ordinary bail-conditions framework, while lawmakers are reminded
that genuine violence must be built into the elements of an offense, not merely
pronounced in ancillary subsections. The decision strengthens the presumption of
bail, re-asserts judicial independence, and provides a robust template for analyzing
future challenges under § 7553a and ch. II, § 40(2).