Date: Sep 4, 2026

Adverse Possession in New Hampshire: Title Ripens for Long-Standing Encroaching Structures Before Later Acknowledgment; Intermittent Parking After Removal Is Not “Notorious”

1. Introduction

In Patrice Thomas v. Paul R. Gosselin & a. (N.H. Sept. 3, 2026), the New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed a bench-trial judgment awarding Patrice Thomas title by adverse possession to portions of a shared driveway located on the Gosselins’ record title land. Although Thomas’s property enjoyed an easement to “pass and repass” over the driveway, the dispute concerned whether Thomas also acquired fee title to two areas of the driveway based on long-term physical occupation and use tied to two carports:

Carport 1, attached to Thomas’s house and encroaching on the driveway since at least 1969; and
Carport 2, a second structure that existed historically, reappeared in 1993, collapsed in 2002, and was not rebuilt; thereafter Thomas’s guests parked in the former Carport 2 area through at least 2019.

A key factual and legal flashpoint was a recorded 2002 “Boundary & Sewer Easement Plan” (the “2002 Plan”) commissioned by Thomas. The plan depicted the driveway areas as belonging to the Gosselins’ lot, while noting for Carport 1: “Encroachment Carport Over Lot Line.”

The Supreme Court affirmed adverse possession as to the area occupied by Carport 1, but reversed as to the former Carport 2 area, holding the latter use was not sufficiently “notorious” over the statutory period—particularly in light of the 2002 Plan and the post-collapse shift to intermittent guest parking.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Applying New Hampshire’s adverse possession framework, the Court held:

Carport 1: Thomas established adverse possession. The encroaching structure was a “blatant” non-permissive use, and the statutory 20-year period had already run (1969–2002) before the 2002 Plan was recorded. Thus, even if the plan could be read as recognizing Gosselin title, it came too late to defeat a title that had already “ripened.”
Carport 2 area: The trial court erred in finding “notorious” possession for the requisite period. Carport 2’s relevant iteration existed only from 1993–2002; after it collapsed, Thomas did not rebuild it and relied on less-than-daily guest parking in a different orientation. Combined with the 2002 Plan depicting the area as Gosselin property (without an encroachment note), Thomas’s post-2002 use did not adequately “alert the true owner of the cause of action.”

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Court’s reasoning is anchored in a line of New Hampshire adverse possession cases, supplemented by persuasive out-of-state authority on “acknowledgment” of the record owner’s title.

Maddock v. Higgins, 176 N.H. 182 (2023)

Maddock supplied the Court’s appellate posture and a relevant adverse-possession analogy. First, the Court reiterated deferential review of factual findings and credibility determinations, while reviewing the application of law to facts de novo. Second, in the Carport 2 discussion, the Court invoked Maddock to illustrate that even potentially “notorious” structures or uses may fail if they do not satisfy the full twenty-year requirement—particularly where the relevant physical occupation is not maintained continuously.

Mastroianni v. Wercinski, 158 N.H. 380 (2009)

Mastroianni provided core definitions: adverse possession requires “twenty years of adverse, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted use” sufficient to give notice to the owner. It also reinforced that when a claimant is “actually in possession” of disputed property, open-and-notorious proof is “normally” satisfied—an important pillar for affirming Carport 1, where a fixed, visible structure occupied the land.

O'Malley v. Little, 170 N.H. 272 (2017)

O’Malley supplied both the burden-shifting framework and the Court’s approach to “permission.” The claimant must first show acts creating an inference of non-permissive use; then the defendant must produce evidence of permission (explicit or implied), with the ultimate burden of persuasion remaining on the claimant. The Court used O’Malley to characterize Carport 1’s construction/encroachment as the kind of act that inherently supports an inference of non-permissive use.

Blagbrough Family Realty Trust v. A & T Forest Prods., 155 N.H. 29 (2007)

Blagbrough contributed two constraints: (1) evidence of adverse possession is construed strictly, and (2) sporadic or limited acts can be insufficiently notorious/exclusive, sometimes resembling “occasional trespass” rather than possession. The Court used this lens to reject Carport 2-area possession based on irregular guest parking after the structure’s removal.

Riverwood Commercial Prop's v. Cole, 138 N.H. 333 (1994)

Riverwood supplied the key “ripening” principle: once adverse possession runs for twenty years, the record owner is time-barred from recovery and “title passes to the adverse possessor.” This concept was dispositive for Carport 1: by 2002, the period had already matured, so later conduct (the 2002 Plan) could not “unripen” title.

Hewes v. Bruno, 121 N.H. 32 (1981)

Hewes reinforced the notice rationale: using land “as if it were their own for over twenty years” puts record owners on notice, and failure to act within the period bars recovery. The Court relied on Hewes to frame Carport 1 as a long-term, visible, owner-like occupation that should have prompted timely action by the record owner.

Inhabitants of Town of Island Falls v. A.K.R. Inc., 170 A.2d 395 (Me. 1961) (persuasive)

This Maine case illustrates a general principle: one cannot claim by adverse possession while simultaneously recognizing another’s title. The Court cited it as a potential analogy for how the 2002 Plan might undermine notoriety/adversity—yet ultimately deemed it non-dispositive for Carport 1 because title had already ripened before the plan’s recording.

Pirri v. Chow, 333 A.3d 833 (Conn. App. Ct. 2025) (persuasive)

Pirri was used twice to explain “acknowledgment” as potentially breaking adverse possession: admissions by declaration or conduct may negate adversity, and acting to acknowledge the owner’s superior title may interrupt continuity. The Court treated the 2002 Plan as something the Gosselins could reasonably interpret as acknowledgment of their ownership—especially for Carport 2, where the statutory period had not run.

Compart v. Wolfstellar, 906 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018) (persuasive)

Compart supported the distinction between acknowledgment before the statute runs (which can break continuity) and acknowledgment after the statute runs (which cannot undo ripened title). The Court used this logic to (1) discount the 2002 Plan’s effect on Carport 1 (too late), and (2) underscore its effect on Carport 2 (timing mattered because the period had not matured).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The Court’s element-by-element framing

The Court reaffirmed the standard New Hampshire elements—adverse, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted for twenty years—and emphasized the practical objective: whether the claimant’s conduct gave the record owner sufficient notice “to take preventive action with reasonable promptness.”

B. Carport 1: a permanent encroachment plus ripening before the recorded plan

Two propositions drive the Carport 1 affirmance:

Structural encroachment is inherently notice-giving. The Court characterized construction and long-term existence of a structure on a neighbor’s land as a “blatant” act supporting an inference of non-permissive use (drawing on O'Malley v. Little and Mastroianni v. Wercinski).
Later “acknowledgment” cannot defeat already-ripened title. Even if the 2002 Plan could be read as recognizing Gosselin ownership (as cases like Inhabitants of Town of Island Falls v. A.K.R. Inc. and Pirri v. Chow suggest), the Court held that title had already vested by the time of recording (Riverwood Commercial Prop's v. Cole; Hewes v. Bruno). Therefore, the plan did not constitute waiver/abandonment of an already-complete adverse possession claim.

On permission, the Court rejected the Gosselins’ implied-permission argument grounded in friendly relations. The trial court could reasonably find no implied license—particularly because Carport 1 predated the Gosselins’ purchase, making later cordiality “of little bearing on a pre-existing structure,” and because the parties did formalize other permissions (temporary construction and septic easements) without addressing the carport.

C. Carport 2 area: discontinuity, changed use, and the signaling effect of the recorded plan

The reversal on Carport 2 rests less on abstract doctrine than on the Court’s practical assessment of what would actually put a record owner “on guard”:

No 20-year continuous structural occupation prior to 2002. The Court focused on the “relevant iteration” of Carport 2 (1993–2002), which fell short of the statutory period.
Post-2002 conduct looked like intermittent use, not possession. After Carport 2 collapsed, Thomas chose not to rebuild; instead, visitors parked less-than-daily and in a different orientation. The Court treated this as too insubstantial and irregular to be “notorious” possession, analogizing to Blagbrough Family Realty Trust v. A & T Forest Prods. and invoking Maddock v. Higgins to stress that even visible occupation must persist for twenty years in the requisite manner.
The 2002 Plan plausibly communicated the opposite of an adverse claim. Unlike Carport 1, the plan did not call out any encroachment for Carport 2. The Court found it reasonable that the Gosselins would interpret the recording as an acknowledgment of their ownership, undermining the idea that Thomas’s later parking practices clearly signaled an adverse claim (cf. Pirri v. Chow; Compart v. Wolfstellar).

Notably, the Court framed its conclusion as an error “with its application of the law to the facts,” permitting reversal notwithstanding deference to the trial court on pure factfinding.

3.3 Impact

This order clarifies several practical rules likely to shape New Hampshire adverse possession disputes involving driveways, encroachments, and recorded plans:

“Ripening” is a one-way ratchet. Once the twenty-year period has run in a manner that satisfies the elements, subsequent acts that might otherwise be viewed as acknowledging the record owner’s title (including recorded plans) generally do not undo vested title (reinforcing Riverwood Commercial Prop's v. Cole).
Recorded plans can be powerful evidence—especially before ripening. Where the statutory period has not matured, a claimant’s recording of a plan depicting the land as belonging to the neighbor may weigh heavily against the “notorious” and “adverse” character of later use, particularly if the plan fails to identify an encroachment.
Permanent structures are qualitatively different from intermittent parking. A fixed encroachment (Carport 1) readily supplies notoriety; irregular, less-than-daily parking by guests (Carport 2 area) may be treated as too equivocal to provide the notice adverse possession is designed to ensure.
Friendly neighbor relations do not equal implied permission, especially for pre-existing encroachments. The decision signals that courts may demand concrete evidence of permission, rather than inferring it from amicability alone—particularly where parties have shown they know how to document permissions when they intend them.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Adverse possession: A method of acquiring ownership of land by possessing it like an owner for a long time (in New Hampshire, 20 years), in a way that is not based on the true owner’s permission and is visible enough that the owner could reasonably object.
Open and notorious / “notorious”: Possession must be visible and obvious enough to put the record owner on notice. A building encroachment usually satisfies this; sporadic parking often does not.
Continuous and uninterrupted: The claimant’s possession must persist in the required manner for the whole statutory period. If a key feature of possession disappears (e.g., a structure collapses and is not rebuilt), later weaker or different uses may not “carry” continuity.
Adverse vs. permissive use: “Adverse” means without permission (a “claim of right where no right exists”). Permission can be explicit (spoken/written) or implied from circumstances, but it must be supported by evidence.
Ripening of title: Once the 20 years are met with the required elements, the record owner is barred from recovering the land and ownership is treated as having passed to the possessor.
Acknowledgment of title: Conduct suggesting the claimant recognizes the neighbor as the true owner (e.g., recording a plan depicting the area as the neighbor’s) can undermine or interrupt an adverse possession claim—especially if it occurs before the statutory period has run.
Easement vs. ownership: An easement is a right to use someone else’s land for a specific purpose (here, passing and repassing). Adverse possession, by contrast, seeks ownership (title) to the land itself.

5. Conclusion

The New Hampshire Supreme Court drew a sharp line between (1) a long-standing, obvious structural encroachment that satisfied the twenty-year period before any potentially inconsistent recorded document, and (2) a shorter-lived structure followed by intermittent, altered parking patterns coupled with a recorded plan depicting the area as the neighbor’s property. The decision reinforces that adverse possession turns on clear, owner-like signals over the full statutory period—and that recorded plans may either be irrelevant (if title has already ripened) or highly consequential (if they occur before the claim matures).