Date: Jul 31, 2026

Adoption-Act Terminations Must Include the “Strictly Necessary” Best-Interest Finding

Ross v. Kracht, 2026 UT 22 (Utah Supreme Court, July 30, 2026)

I. Introduction

Parties. Julie Ross and Gerald Ross (“Grandparents”) petitioned to adopt their grandchildren, R.K. and J.K. Denielle Kracht (“Mother”) and Steven Kracht (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) opposed termination of their parental rights.

Context and procedural posture. In a district-court adoption proceeding, Grandparents sought to terminate Parents’ rights under the Utah Adoption Act’s contested-termination pathway, Utah Code § 81-13-205(5)(e). The district court terminated Parents’ rights and found termination in the children’s best interests, but it did not make a “strictly necessary” finding or address feasible alternatives to termination. On appeal, the court of appeals certified the statutory question to the Utah Supreme Court.

Core legal issue. Whether termination under Utah Code § 81-13-205(5)(e) requires the same “strictly necessary to promote the child’s best interest” analysis that applies under the Termination and Restoration of Parental Rights Act (the “Termination Act”), Utah Code § 80-4-301(1) (and relatedly § 80-4-104).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that terminations of parental rights under Utah Code § 81-13-205(5)(e) (Adoption Act) require a “strictly necessary” analysis, because that provision incorporates the Termination Act’s “grounds described in” framework, which is expressly conditioned on a finding that termination is “strictly necessary to promote the child’s best interest.” However, the court affirmed because the district court’s failure to expressly conduct that analysis was harmless error given the court’s unchallenged factual findings that Parents were dangerous and that further contact offered “no benefit and only potential danger.”

Associate Chief Justice Pohlman concurred in the harmless-error affirmance but would not have reached the statutory-interpretation holding, reasoning the issue was unnecessary to resolve the appeal and noting recent legislative amendments that might affect the analysis.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

In re Adoption of M.A. — Cited for the standard of review (“questions of statutory interpretation” reviewed “for correctness”) and for reading statutory language “as a whole” and “in harmony” with related chapters. The court used this interpretive approach to read the Adoption Act alongside the Termination Act.
Castro v. Lemus — Reinforced the court’s method: legislative intent is best reflected in “plain language,” read in statutory context.
2 Ton Plumbing, L.L.C. v. Thorgaard — Supported the presumption that the legislature selects words deliberately and according to ordinary meaning; this buttressed the majority’s reading of “described in” as broad enough to include the qualifying “strictly necessary” condition.
In re Adoption of B.H. — A pivotal adoption/termination interface case. The court relied on its statement that the Adoption Act’s cross-reference does not convert an adoption case into a Termination Act proceeding, but it does mean “the same considerations apply whenever a termination is sought.” Ross treats “strictly necessary” as one of those “same considerations.”
In re B.T.B. — Supplied the substantive content of the “strictly necessary” requirement: the court must “explore whether other feasible options exist” and termination is improper if a child “can be equally protected and benefited” by an alternative; and the finding must be made “on the record.” Ross uses B.T.B. as the benchmark the district court failed to meet.
Meinhard v. State (and, by analogy, Pugin v. Garland) — Addressed the anti-superfluity canon as a presumption that can yield when redundancy is used “as a point of emphasis.” This answered Grandparents’ argument that incorporating “strictly necessary” would make § 81-13-205(5)(e)’s best-interest language redundant.
Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City — Cited for the principle that canons of construction are “tools,” not formulaic rules; also used in the majority’s reasoning that Grandparents’ reading would do “violence to the text and structure” by creating divergent standards for similarly situated parents.
In re J.P. — Quoted for the classic framing of the child’s best interests as the “polar star,” underscoring why the Adoption Act might reiterate best interests even if the Termination Act already embeds them.
In re J.A.L. and In re J.J.W. — Cited to confirm that failure to conduct the strictly necessary analysis (and to make required findings) is legal error.
H.U.F. v. W.P.W. and State ex rel. W.A. — Provided the harmless-error standard (“no reasonable likelihood” the error affected the outcome) and confirmed harmless-error review applies in termination cases.
In re L.B. — Referenced alongside harmless-error authorities to support appellate affirmance despite trial-level error.
State v. Richins, Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, and State v. Reece — Used to justify deciding an issue even where the resulting error is harmless, particularly where the issue is preserved, briefed, and squarely presented.
In re L.L.B. and In re Adoption of J.E. — Cited to show the “open question” had been identified but “evaded resolution,” supporting the majority’s decision to reach the statutory question.
Ross v. Kracht, 2025 UT 22, 589 P.3d 687 — Noted as the court’s earlier determination that the termination order was immediately appealable.
Thompson v. State — Cited in the separate writing to emphasize contextual statutory interpretation; the concurrence invoked it when noting 2026 amendments might inform future interpretation of § 81-13-205(5)(e).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Incorporation by reference: “grounds described in” includes the qualifying conditions

The majority’s interpretive move is textual: § 81-13-205(5)(e) authorizes termination when rights are terminated “on grounds described in” the Termination Act and when termination is in the child’s best interests. The court reasoned that the Termination Act’s “grounds” are not merely the list in § 80-4-301(1)(a)-(j); rather, the statute begins with a condition: termination may occur only if, “based on the totality of the circumstances,” it is “strictly necessary to promote the child’s best interest.” Because that condition precedes and qualifies the grounds, the court read “described in” to incorporate the grounds as the Termination Act actually “describes” them—i.e., as conditioned by “strictly necessary.”

2. Harmony between the Adoption Act and Termination Act

The court emphasized that the Adoption Act and Termination Act are “related chapters,” and § 81-13-205(5)(e) is the Adoption Act’s specific mechanism for terminating the rights of a parent with perfected rights who contests the adoption. In that posture, the parent’s liberty interest is the same as in a termination-only case, and (per the majority) it would be anomalous for the legislature to demand “strictly necessary” in juvenile-court termination proceedings but allow a lesser standard in district-court contested-adoption terminations.

3. Answering the superfluity objection

Grandparents argued that if “strictly necessary” is incorporated, § 81-13-205(5)(e)’s separate “best interests” clause becomes superfluous. The court treated the repetition as permissible emphasis—best interests is the “polar star”—and refused to adopt a narrower reading of “described in” that would, in the majority’s view, distort the integrated statutory scheme.

4. Application and harmless error

Under In re B.T.B., “strictly necessary” requires consideration of feasible alternatives short of termination (e.g., guardianship), and a finding on the record that no alternative can achieve equivalent protection and benefit. The district court did not do this, so the court found error. But it affirmed on harmless error: the district court’s unchallenged findings—Parents’ severe substance abuse, repeated dangerous conduct, prolonged absence, failures at parent-time, and the court’s express finding that further contact offered “no benefit and only potential danger”—left no reasonable likelihood that a guardianship or similar alternative would have produced a different result.

C. Impact

Doctrinal clarification in adoption-linked terminations. Ross squarely resolves that contested terminations under § 81-13-205(5)(e) must include the Termination Act’s “strictly necessary” analysis. Practically, district courts presiding over adoption cases must now build the same “alternatives” record that juvenile courts must build in termination cases.
Trial-court practice: required findings and “alternatives” litigation. Litigants should expect expanded evidentiary development on: (i) guardianship/permanent custody feasibility; (ii) safety planning; (iii) enforceability of parent-time limitations; and (iv) the child-specific benefits of adoption versus non-termination permanency options. Orders that merely find “best interest” without addressing alternatives risk reversal unless the error is demonstrably harmless.
Appellate framing: harmless error remains a significant backstop. Ross underscores that even where strict-necessity findings are missing, affirmance may occur if the district court’s unchallenged factual findings foreclose any realistic alternative. This incentivizes appellants to directly challenge (where viable) factual findings bearing on danger, benefit of contact, and feasibility of non-termination options.
Legislative cross-currents. The concurrence highlights that 2026 amendments (referenced as Child Welfare Changes, H.B. 372) may influence future interpretation of the Adoption Act’s best-interest determinations. Even so, the majority’s holding sets the baseline rule unless and until the legislature revises the contested-termination provision more explicitly.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Strictly necessary”: A heightened best-interest requirement: termination is allowed only if no other feasible option (like guardianship or custody orders) can protect the child and serve the child’s welfare equally well. It is not enough that termination is beneficial; it must be the least drastic adequate option.
“Best interests of the child”: A holistic welfare standard focusing on the child’s safety, stability, permanency, emotional and physical needs, and overall well-being—viewed “from the child’s point of view.” Ross treats this as central in both adoption and termination statutes.
Incorporation by reference (“grounds described in”): When one statute points to another, the question is what gets imported. Ross holds that “described in” imports not just a list of grounds, but also the qualifying conditions that define when those grounds authorize termination.
Harmless error: Even if the trial court made a legal mistake, an appellate court will affirm if there is no reasonable likelihood the mistake changed the outcome. Here, the factual findings (danger/no benefit of contact) made it implausible that an “alternatives” analysis would have avoided termination.

V. Conclusion

Ross v. Kracht establishes a clear rule: contested terminations of parental rights in adoption proceedings under Utah Code § 81-13-205(5)(e) require the Termination Act’s “strictly necessary” best-interest analysis, including consideration of feasible alternatives on the record. Although the district court failed to perform that analysis explicitly, the Supreme Court affirmed on harmless error because the unchallenged findings showed Parents posed danger and offered no benefit through continued contact, effectively foreclosing non-termination options. The decision tightens procedural and analytical rigor in district-court adoption terminations and aligns them with Utah’s termination jurisprudence centered on necessity, not mere desirability, of severing parental rights.