Admissions at Reentry Can Trigger “Seeking Admission” Status for Returning LPRs Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) Without a Final Conviction

Introduction

In Peralta Taveras v. Blanche (2d Cir. Apr. 8, 2026) (summary order), the Second Circuit reviewed a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision upholding an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) refusal to terminate removal proceedings against Julio Antonio Peralta Taveras, a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) and native of the Dominican Republic.

The central dispute was whether, upon Peralta’s January 2016 return to the United States, the Government properly treated him as an LPR “seeking admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) based on a state narcotics case in which he had pleaded guilty but had not yet been sentenced—and which was later dismissed. The case also implicates the Government’s burden (clear and convincing evidence) to justify treating a returning LPR as an applicant for admission, and the limited scope of judicial review in criminal-related removal orders.

Important procedural note: the decision is a summary order and “do[es] not have precedential effect,” though it provides a clear application of existing Second Circuit and Supreme Court doctrine to admissions made at the border.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit denied the petition for review in part and dismissed it in part. It held that the BIA did not err in concluding that Peralta was properly classified as “seeking admission” under § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) because (i) the statute does not require a final conviction, and (ii) the Government may rely on an “admission of guilt,” including Peralta’s sworn statements to Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) officers admitting cocaine possession and an intent to sell and use it.

The court rejected Peralta’s argument that the absence of a final judgment at reentry (and the later dismissal) prevented the Government from treating him as seeking admission. It further noted that Peralta did not preserve, in his opening brief, an argument premised on United States v. Minter about whether the state offense matched a federally controlled substance; that argument was therefore deemed abandoned.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Chen v. Bd. of Immigr. Appeals, 435 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2006)
    The court used Chen to define the object of review when the BIA both affirms and supplements an IJ decision: review proceeds against the IJ decision “as modified or supplemented by the BIA.” This framing matters because the operative rationale depended on both the IJ’s findings about Peralta’s border admissions and the BIA’s legal conclusion that those admissions satisfy § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v).
  • Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106 (2d Cir. 2021)
    Cited for the standard of review: legal determinations are reviewed de novo; factual findings for substantial evidence. This division underpins the opinion’s approach—accepting the agency’s factual finding that Peralta made the admissions while independently assessing whether those facts meet the statutory standard.
  • Francis v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2006)
    The court emphasized that where the Government bears a “clear and convincing evidence” burden, the reviewing court still applies substantial evidence review, granting relief only if a rational factfinder would be compelled to conclude the Government failed to meet that burden.
  • Lau v. Bondi, 130 F.4th 42 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. granted sub nom. Bondi v. Lau, No. 25-429, 2026 WL 73094 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2026)
    Lau supplied two key propositions: (1) the Government bears the burden—by clear and convincing evidence—to prove an LPR should be treated as seeking admission; and (2) “in practice” the Government often relies on a conviction, but may also rely on an “admission of guilt.” The panel also invoked Lau to limit review to issues that formed the basis of the agency’s decision.

    The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Lau on the timing and proof required to classify an LPR as inadmissible under § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v). But it deemed the eventual Supreme Court resolution immaterial here because the IJ found Peralta himself admitted the essential elements of a federal narcotics offense at the time of reentry, which alone supported inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(2).
  • Centurion v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2017)
    This was the opinion’s principal answer to Peralta’s “no final conviction” theory. Centurion states that, for § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), the immigration consequences of “commission” attach at the time of commission, not upon entry of judgment of conviction. The panel used Centurion to reinforce that the statutory trigger is not limited to final convictions.
  • Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012)
    The court cited Vartelas (in particular, its footnote) for the proposition that § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) “advert[s]” to LPRs either “convicted” of an offense listed in § 1182(a)(2) or who “admit[] to one.” This supports the legality of using Peralta’s border admissions (even absent a final conviction) to treat him as seeking admission.
  • Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540 (2d Cir. 2005)
    Zhang appears twice for two distinct procedural doctrines: (1) removability based on the Government having “reason to believe” drug trafficking under § 1182(a)(2)(C), and (2) appellate waiver/abandonment when an argument is not raised in an opening brief. The court relied on this principle to deem Peralta’s belated Minter-based “federal controlled substance” argument abandoned.
  • United States v. Minter, 80 F.4th 406 (2d Cir. 2023)
    Although not substantively applied, Minter was flagged as a potentially relevant controlled-substance categorical-matching argument (i.e., whether the New York cocaine offense necessarily relates to a substance that is federally controlled). The panel declined to reach it because Peralta failed to raise it in his opening brief, illustrating how merits-relevant categorical arguments can be forfeited by appellate briefing choices.

Legal Reasoning

  1. The statutory trigger is “committed,” not “convicted.”
    Section 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) provides that an LPR is not treated as seeking admission unless he “has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2).” The court treated this wording as dispositive against Peralta’s argument that a final conviction is required. Invoking Centurion v. Sessions, it held that “commission” is the operative moment for consequences under this provision.
  2. An “admission of guilt” at the port of entry can satisfy the Government’s burden.
    The court held it was permissible for the agency to rely on Peralta’s sworn CBP statements describing essential elements of a drug offense (cocaine possession and intent to sell/use) to show he “committed” a § 1182(a)(2) controlled-substance offense. It also held that the agency could consider his guilty plea status as corroborative, even though the case was later dismissed.
  3. Later developments in the state case did not undermine the “seeking admission” determination.
    Peralta’s focus on the later dismissal did not prevail because the agency’s “seeking admission” inquiry turned on what the Government proved about commission/admission, not on the final disposition of the state prosecution. The panel thus treated the later dismissal as legally insufficient to negate the earlier admission-based inadmissibility theory accepted by the agency.
  4. The Government could amend charges during proceedings.
    The court rejected any objection to the Government’s decision to charge inadmissibility based on “admission” in addition to “conviction,” noting both that the initial Notice to Appear already reflected both bases and that regulations permit additional allegations during proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(e).
  5. Jurisdictional and issue-preservation constraints narrowed the appellate inquiry.
    The panel emphasized statutory limits on review of criminal-related removal orders (8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D)) and declined to consider arguments either not reached by the BIA or not preserved in Peralta’s opening brief, applying Lau v. Bondi, Zhang v. Gonzales, and Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).

Impact

  • Admissions to CBP are high-stakes evidence.
    The decision underscores that sworn statements at the border admitting the essential elements of a controlled substance offense can independently support “seeking admission” classification for an LPR, even without a final conviction.
  • Post-entry dismissal or non-finality of a state case may not cure inadmissibility when commission/admission is proven.
    Practically, a later dismissal (or lack of a final judgment at the time of reentry) may not defeat a § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) theory if the Government can prove “commission” through admissions.
  • Procedural rigor in briefing is outcome-determinative.
    The court’s abandonment ruling regarding United States v. Minter illustrates that controlled-substance “mismatch” arguments must be raised promptly and clearly—particularly where jurisdiction is otherwise limited.
  • Future uncertainty remains, but may not matter in admission-based cases.
    Although the Supreme Court’s pending review in Bondi v. Lau may refine the Government’s burden and timing requirements for § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), this case signals that an on-the-spot admission at reentry is likely to satisfy even a more demanding standard focused on what was proven “at the time of reentry.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Lawful permanent resident (LPR)”
A noncitizen who has “green card” status and ordinarily has the right to live in the United States permanently.
“Seeking admission”
A legal status at the border that subjects the person to inadmissibility rules. Returning LPRs are usually not treated as seeking admission, but § 1101(a)(13)(C) lists exceptions—one of which is having “committed” a § 1182(a)(2) offense.
“Inadmissible” (8 U.S.C. § 1182)
A category of grounds that can bar entry (or trigger removal treatment for those deemed applicants for admission).
“Controlled substance” offense
An offense “relating to” a drug that is controlled under federal law (21 U.S.C. § 802). Litigation often centers on whether a state drug statute matches the federal schedules.
“Admission of guilt”
A noncitizen’s statements conceding facts that amount to the essential elements of an offense. Here, the court treated sworn border statements about cocaine possession and intent to sell/use as qualifying admissions.
“Clear and convincing evidence”
A heightened burden of proof on the Government in certain removal contexts—more than “preponderance,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
“Substantial evidence” review
An appellate standard under which factual findings stand unless any rational factfinder would be compelled to disagree. It is deferential to the agency factfinding.
“Reason to believe” drug trafficking (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C))
A ground of inadmissibility requiring the Government to show sufficient reason to believe the person was involved in trafficking, even without a trafficking conviction.
“Issue abandonment/waiver”
Arguments not raised in the opening appellate brief are typically treated as abandoned, even if mentioned later in a reply brief.

Conclusion

Peralta Taveras v. Blanche applies existing doctrine to confirm that, for § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), the Government need not show a final conviction to treat a returning LPR as “seeking admission.” Proof that the LPR “committed” a controlled-substance offense may be established through an “admission of guilt” at the port of entry, and the agency may rely on such admissions even if the underlying state case was not final at reentry and was later dismissed. The order also highlights two recurring drivers in immigration appeals: narrow jurisdiction in criminal-related removal cases and the decisive importance of preserving arguments in the opening brief.