Date: Feb 20, 2026

Admissibility of OSHA ALJ Non-Violation Findings in Product-Defect Trials and No Waiver by Opening-Statement Reference (11th Cir.)

I. Introduction

Tyler Wallace v. TSI Inc (11th Cir. Feb. 18, 2026) arises from a severe workplace accident at a Louisiana-Pacific engineered-wood facility in Alabama. Tyler Wallace, a factory-floor worker, suffered catastrophic arm injuries when his hand was caught at an exposed conveyor-belt nip point and pulled into machinery.

After the incident, OSHA investigated and cited Louisiana-Pacific for alleged violations of the machine-guarding regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212(a) (1974). Louisiana-Pacific contested the citation before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, where an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a detailed opinion concluding there was no regulatory violation because Wallace’s entry near the nip point was not “reasonably predictable,” and no similar injury had occurred before.

Wallace separately pursued a state-law design-defect claim against the conveyor manufacturer, TSI, Inc., contending that the lack of a guard rendered the conveyor unreasonably dangerous. A central appellate issue became whether the district court properly admitted the OSHA ALJ opinion at Wallace’s jury trial, and whether certain safety testimony improperly crossed from lay to expert opinion.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defense verdict for TSI, holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in:

Rejecting Wallace’s claim that he waived his objections by mentioning the ALJ opinion in opening statement.
Admitting the OSHA ALJ opinion as relevant under Rule 402.
Concluding Rule 403 did not require exclusion for unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury.
Allowing Louisiana-Pacific’s safety manager, Michael Rhea, to give a lay opinion (Rule 701) about why workers had no reason to be near the conveyor while operating, despite his use of the phrase “guarded by location.”

The court also declined to entertain newly raised appellate arguments that the ALJ opinion was inadmissible as hearsay or improper opinion evidence, noting those objections were not preserved and did not satisfy the demanding plain error standard in civil cases.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is built primarily on evidentiary standards (preservation, relevance, balancing, and lay/expert boundaries) and draws from multiple lines of authority:

1. Standards of review and preservation

United States v. Graham, 981 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2020): Provided the baseline standard—preserved evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion; unpreserved claims for plain error. This framing mattered because Wallace preserved Rule 402/403 objections but not hearsay/opinion objections.
Burch v. P.J. Cheese, Inc., 861 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2017) and Fed. R. Evid. 103(e): Used to emphasize the limited ability to correct unpreserved evidentiary errors on appeal.
Ledford v. Peeples, 657 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2011): Reinforced that plain error “rarely applies in civil cases,” making appellate relief especially difficult absent proper objection.

2. Waiver principles and what counts as “evidence”

Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1985): The court cited the waiver concept that a party may waive an objection by later introducing similar evidence themselves. The panel distinguished Wallace’s situation because his lawyer’s mention in opening statement did not “introduce evidence.”
United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1990) and Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases), General Preliminary Instruction 1.1 (Sept. 2025): These authorities support the proposition that statements of counsel are not evidence. That doctrinal point prevented TSI from converting a tactical reference in opening into a waiver of preserved objections.

3. Relevance threshold

United States v. Macrina, 109 F.4th 1341 (11th Cir. 2024): Cited for the proposition that the relevance bar is low. The ALJ’s conclusion of regulatory compliance had “any tendency” to make it more likely the conveyor did not require guarding.
Porchia v. Design Equip. Co., 113 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 1997): Used to support the link between regulatory compliance evidence and product-defect issues; the ALJ’s no-violation finding could bear on whether a guard was necessary. While not binding, it provided persuasive authority for treating compliance-related determinations as probative in design-defect litigation.

4. Rule 403 balancing and “unfair prejudice” definition

United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999): Supplied a forceful articulation that Rule 403 is an “extraordinary remedy,” anchoring the presumption toward admissibility.
United States v. Saintil, 753 F.2d 984 (11th Cir. 1985): Defined “unfair prejudice” as the risk the jury will decide irrationally on an improper basis—critical to rejecting Wallace’s concern that the ALJ’s status would overawe the jury.
United States v. Grant, 256 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2001): Provided the quoted “strong presumption in favor of admissibility,” which the panel used to reject speculative confusion arguments.
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998): Invoked for the broader institutional premise that juries are presumed capable of weighing credibility and evidence without surrendering their factfinding role. This helped the court dismiss the notion that jurors would automatically “defer” to an ALJ.

5. Administrative findings in litigation; completeness versus selective use

U.S. Steel, LLC v. Tieco, Inc., 261 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2001): Distinguished in a footnote to emphasize that TSI introduced the ALJ opinion in full rather than cherry-picking “handpicked snippets” that could create a misleading, “self-serving and unreliable” narrative. The comparison supported admitting the ALJ opinion without treating it as inherently distortive.
Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 548 (11th Cir. 1995): Cited in the same footnote to note the complication of “conflicting findings of two administrative officials who reviewed the same facts.” The panel used this to undercut Wallace’s claim of confusion because Wallace himself relied on OSHA’s citation, inviting administrative findings into the case.

6. Lay vs expert testimony; cumulative error considerations

Fed. R. Evid. 701: Provided the governing rule for lay opinions “rationally based on the witness’s perception.” The court treated Rhea’s testimony as rooted in his firsthand knowledge of plant layout and work practices, notwithstanding his use of industrial terminology.
United States v. Hock, 995 F.2d 195 (11th Cir. 1993): Used to support the court’s harmlessness/cumulativeness point: even if Rhea’s phrasing drifted toward expertise, TSI’s actual expert testified similarly, making any error non-outcome-determinative.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. No waiver from opening statement references

The court’s first move is procedural: it rejects TSI’s argument that Wallace waived objections by mentioning the ALJ opinion in opening. The panel treats waiver as requiring the objecting party to introduce the evidence (or its equivalent) into the evidentiary record. Because openings are not evidence, and because the district court had already signaled the ALJ opinion would come in over objection, Wallace’s mention was characterized as a reasonable attempt to contextualize inevitable evidence rather than a relinquishment of rights.

2. Rule 402: “any tendency” relevance of an OSHA ALJ non-violation opinion

The panel ties relevance to the central design-defect issue: whether the conveyor was unreasonably dangerous due to lack of a guard. Even though OSHA compliance is not identical to Alabama tort standards, the ALJ’s conclusion that the employer complied with the guarding regulation made it marginally more probable that the conveyor did not require a guard in that location and operational context. The court emphasized that differences between agency adjudication and jury trials go to weight, not relevance.

3. Rule 403: credibility aura and “OSHA vs. tort law” confusion did not substantially outweigh probative value

Wallace advanced two Rule 403 theories: (i) jurors would defer to an “unbiased judge,” and (ii) jurors would conflate OSHA standards with Alabama design-defect law. The court treated both as speculative and insufficient to overcome Rule 403’s presumption of admissibility.

On deference, the panel leaned on the premise that juries can evaluate credibility, and that the mere possibility that jurors may find an ALJ credible is not “unfair prejudice” of the kind Rule 403 targets. On confusion, the panel found Wallace’s argument particularly weak because Wallace’s own expert had already made OSHA compliance a major theme by opining the conveyor violated OSHA. If OSHA-based testimony was permissible to support Wallace, the court reasoned, an OSHA adjudicator’s contrary view was not uniquely confusing.

4. Rule 701/702 boundary: “guarded by location” as shorthand for a permissible lay perception

The opinion acknowledges “guarded by location” is a term of art and that Rhea was not a Rule 702 expert. But it interprets his testimony functionally: Rhea described the plant’s physical layout and safety practices and concluded there was no reason for an employee to be near the conveyor during operation. His later explanation—remote area, not a main walkway, no employees near—anchored the conclusion in perception and familiarity rather than technical engineering analysis. The court thus characterized the phrase as shorthand rather than an attempt to provide specialized engineering opinion.

5. Unpreserved objections: hearsay and improper opinion challenges largely foreclosed

The panel’s final paragraph is practically important: it signals that even if the ALJ opinion “may have been inadmissible on other grounds,” Wallace did not timely raise them. The court’s reliance on plain-error limitations underscores a litigation lesson: parties must object on the correct evidentiary grounds at trial or risk losing them on appeal.

C. Impact

Expanded practical admissibility of OSHA adjudications in product cases (within discretion): Even in a state-law design-defect trial, an OSHA ALJ finding of no regulatory violation may be treated as probative on guarding necessity and defectiveness. Trial courts in the Eleventh Circuit can cite this decision to justify admitting administrative findings, especially where a party already injects OSHA theories through expert testimony.
Strategic symmetry principle: If a plaintiff relies on OSHA citations or standards to show danger/defect, a defendant may more easily argue that contrary OSHA adjudicative outcomes are fair rebuttal evidence, reducing the persuasive force of “confusion” objections under Rule 403.
Reinforcement that “opening statements are not evidence” has real appellate consequences: Counsel can reference anticipated adverse evidence in opening to frame it without automatically waiving objections—particularly when admission is already indicated by the court.
Lay witnesses may use technical phrases when grounded in firsthand operational knowledge: The ruling supports admitting operational-safety testimony from managers and supervisors as lay opinion when it reflects observations of layout, practices, and access, even if the witness borrows industry terminology—so long as the testimony is effectively explained in non-technical terms and not offered as specialized engineering judgment.
Preservation discipline: The panel’s refusal to reach hearsay/opinion-evidence objections highlights how appellate pathways narrow sharply when trial objections are limited to relevance and prejudice.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 401 / Rule 402 (Relevance): Evidence is relevant if it makes a consequential fact even slightly more or less likely. If relevant, it is generally admissible unless another rule excludes it.
Rule 403 (Unfair prejudice, confusion, misleading the jury): Even relevant evidence can be excluded, but only when the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion substantially outweighs its probative value. “Unfair prejudice” is not “damaging to your case”; it is the risk of an improper, irrational decision (e.g., deciding based on status or emotion rather than facts).
Waiver vs. forfeiture (in practice): “Waiver” generally implies intentionally giving up a known right (often treated as more final). “Forfeiture” is failing to timely assert a right (often reviewed under stricter standards). Here, mentioning an item in opening did not waive objections because opening statements are not evidence.
Rule 701 vs. Rule 702 (Lay vs. expert opinion): Lay opinion (Rule 701) must be based on what the witness personally perceived and help the jury understand facts. Expert opinion (Rule 702) is based on specialized knowledge, training, or methodology. A lay witness may use a technical phrase if the substance is grounded in firsthand experience (e.g., layout and access), not technical analysis.
“Guarded by location”: In industrial safety, it refers to a hazard being placed or designed so people ordinarily cannot reach it during normal operations (e.g., remote placement, barriers, restricted access). In this case, it functioned as shorthand for “employees had no reason to be in that area while the machine operated.”
Plain error (civil appeals): An exceptionally narrow doctrine allowing correction of unpreserved errors only in rare circumstances. The court emphasized it “rarely applies in civil cases,” making trial-level objections crucial.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms a trial court’s broad discretion to admit an OSHA ALJ non-violation opinion in a state-law design-defect trial where guarding necessity is disputed, particularly when OSHA compliance is already a live issue through expert testimony. The panel also clarifies that referencing anticipated evidence in opening statements does not, by itself, waive preserved objections, and it permits lay operational testimony about workplace access and layout even when couched in industry terminology—so long as the testimony remains perception-based.

The opinion’s most enduring lesson is practical: evidentiary battles are won or lost on preservation and framing. Parties who want to exclude agency findings must raise all applicable grounds at trial (not just Rules 402 and 403), and parties who rely on OSHA theories should expect reciprocal OSHA-based rebuttal.