Adjunct Faculty Unemployment: The “Regular but Not Successive Terms” Exclusion Applies When Spring–Fall Work Is Agreed and Fall Work Is Reasonably Assured

1. Introduction

In Vermont State Colleges v. Department of Labor (Louis Colasanti) (2026 VT 37), the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed an Employment Security Board decision awarding unemployment benefits to an adjunct professor for the summer trimester at the Community College of Vermont (CCV). The claimant taught in spring 2024 and had a contract (and reasonable assurance) to teach in fall 2024, but was not offered summer 2024 teaching. The central issue was statutory: whether 21 V.S.A. § 1343(c)(1) bars benefits not only “between two successive academic years or terms,” but also “when an agreement provides instead for a similar period between two regular but not successive terms.”

The parties were (1) Vermont State Colleges (employer/appellant) and (2) the Department of Labor/Employment Security Board (appellee) in a dispute over claimant Louis Colasanti’s eligibility for summer benefits.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court reversed the Board. It held that § 1343(c)(1)’s second exclusion—covering a “similar period between two regular but not successive terms” when an “agreement” provides for that schedule—applied to claimant’s spring-to-fall teaching arrangement, rendering him ineligible for unemployment benefits during the intervening summer term. The Board erred by focusing on “successive terms” and by failing to analyze the statute’s distinct “regular but not successive terms” language.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Deference and the standard of review in unemployment appeals

  • Cook v. Dep't of Emp. & Training, 143 Vt. 497 (1983): cited for the general proposition that Board decisions are entitled to great weight on appeal. The Court used it as a starting point, then narrowed deference where only statutory construction is at issue.
  • Windham Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't v. Dep't of Lab., 2013 VT 88: crucial to the Court’s approach; it supports de novo review when the dispute is statutory construction rather than factfinding or employment-specific expertise.
  • Chittenden Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't v. Dep't of Lab., 2020 VT 4: reaffirmed the de novo standard for pure statutory interpretation questions.
  • Great N. Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Lab., 2016 VT 126: emphasized that deference does not bind the Court to an erroneous legal interpretation.
  • Fleece on Earth v. Dep't of Emp. & Training, 2007 VT 29: invoked both for the remedial nature of unemployment law (liberal construction) and for the principle that the Board’s judgment is upheld absent a clear showing of mistake—again, tempered here because the case turned on statutory meaning.
  • Beasley v. Dep't of Lab., 2018 VT 104: used for the general review framework (legal conclusions must be reasonably supported by findings; findings reviewed for clear error), and also for a key federal-conformity point about the U.S. Department of Labor’s guidance (discussed below).

How Vermont interprets remedial statutes without rewriting them

  • Kelley v. Dep't of Lab., 2014 VT 74: supplied the Court’s caution that claimants should not be deprived of benefits unless the law clearly intends the exclusion, framing the Court’s insistence on fidelity to the statute’s actual exclusions.
  • Elkins v. Microsoft Corp., 174 Vt. 328 (2002): reinforced that liberal construction cannot stretch statutory language beyond legislative intent.
  • Sirloin Saloon of Shelburne, Rutland, & Manchester, Inc. v Dep't of Emp. & Training, 151 Vt. 123 (1989), and Riddel v. Dep't of Emp. Sec., 140 Vt. 82 (1981): anchored the plain-meaning method; if statutory meaning is plain, it must be enforced as written.
  • In re Villeneuve, 167 Vt. 450 (1998): supported reliance on ordinary meaning of legislative word choice, used here to interpret “agreement” and “successive.”
  • State v. Hale, 2021 VT 18: used to reject the Department’s attempt to add an “explicit agreement” requirement not found in the statute.

Federal guidance and “reasonable assurance”

  • Beasley v. Dep't of Lab., 2018 VT 104: the Court cited it for the proposition that the U.S. Department of Labor’s Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 5-17 is binding on the Vermont Department of Labor absent express statutory contrary language, due to federal conformity requirements (the Court nonetheless found the Board misapplied the Letter’s hypothetical to these facts).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The Court separated two distinct statutory exclusions

Section 1343(c)(1) creates (among others) two relevant “between-terms” exclusions for instructional employees:

  1. The “successive terms” exclusion: weeks of unemployment “between two successive academic years or terms” when the individual worked in the first term and has a contract or reasonable assurance for the second term.
  2. The “regular but not successive terms” exclusion: when an agreement provides for a similar period “between two regular but not successive terms,” benefits are likewise not payable during that period if the educator worked in the first term and has a contract or reasonable assurance for the second.

The Board analyzed only (1) and treated the “second successive academic term” as summer 2024. The Supreme Court held that even if that framing were arguable, the Board committed reversible error by failing to analyze (2), which directly fit a spring–fall schedule with a summer gap.

(b) “Agreement” means mutual assent; no “explicit” agreement requirement

The Department argued the second exclusion requires an “explicit agreement” to deny benefits. The Court rejected that as impermissible statutory rewriting, relying on State v. Hale. The statute says “agreement,” not “explicit agreement,” and the Court applied ordinary meaning (including Black’s Law Dictionary’s “manifestation of mutual assent”).

On these facts, the Court found sufficient mutual assent: claimant had spring and fall contracts, knew before spring began he would not teach in summer, and had a history of working spring and fall without always working summer. That established an “agreement” for two regular, nonconsecutive terms with a “similar period” (the summer term) between them.

(c) “Reasonable assurance” existed for fall 2024, triggering the exclusion

The parties agreed claimant had a contract and reasonable assurance for fall 2024. Once the Court concluded the spring–fall arrangement met the “regular but not successive terms” clause, reasonable assurance for the second term (fall) barred benefits for the intervening summer.

(d) The Program Letter was binding guidance, but its hypothetical did not control

The Board relied on a Program Letter hypothetical involving an adjunct who taught year-round for five years and then, unexpectedly at the end of spring, was not offered summer work—resulting in summer eligibility absent a “specific agreement” for nonsuccessive terms. The Court distinguished claimant’s circumstances: he did not consistently teach summers, he knew before spring started he would not teach summer, and he had assurance for the fall term immediately following the summer interval. The Board thus erred in analogizing claimant to the hypothetical.

(e) Purpose alignment: the statute targets predictable, agreed academic breaks

While reaffirming the Unemployment Compensation Act’s remedial purpose (e.g., Kelley v. Dep't of Lab.; Riddel v. Dep't of Emp. Sec.), the Court concluded that denying benefits here aligns with the legislative choice to exclude benefits during predictable academic breaks when continued employment is reasonably assured and the schedule is agreed. The Court emphasized claimant could plan for the summer recess and seek summer work—making the unemployment less “involuntary” in the way the statute addresses.

3.3. Impact

  • Clarifies and strengthens the “regular but not successive terms” exclusion: Adjuncts and other instructional staff who work spring and fall (or similar nonconsecutive “regular” terms) with a known, agreed intervening term off, and who have a contract/reasonable assurance for the later term, are generally ineligible for benefits during the gap.
  • Limits agency reliance on generalized federal hypotheticals: Even where Program Letters are binding guidance, agencies must carefully match the facts and must still apply the full text of § 1343(c)(1), including both “successive” and “regular but not successive” pathways.
  • Reduces need for “express waiver” paperwork: Employers may not need a special written “benefits denial” agreement; contracts and established scheduling practices can evidence the “agreement” element—though prudent documentation remains advisable to reduce disputes.
  • Likely increase in litigation over what counts as a qualifying “agreement”: Future cases may test the boundaries when schedules are less consistent, when notice is late, when assignments are contingent, or when “regular” terms are disputed in nontraditional academic calendars.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Reasonable assurance”: A reliable expectation—short of an ironclad guarantee—that the educator will return to perform services in the next covered term (here, fall 2024). If it exists, between-terms benefits are often barred.
  • “Successive” vs. “regular but not successive” terms:
    • Successive terms follow one after another (e.g., spring then summer).
    • Regular but not successive terms are standard terms in the institution’s calendar that are not consecutive for that worker (e.g., spring then fall, skipping summer) with a similar break between them.
  • “Agreement”: Not necessarily a special written clause about unemployment; it can be shown by mutual assent reflected in contracts, advance assignment notices, and consistent practice establishing the accepted schedule.
  • De novo review: The Supreme Court gives no special deference to the Board on pure statutory interpretation; it independently decides what the statute means.

5. Conclusion

2026 VT 37 establishes that § 1343(c)(1)’s “regular but not successive terms” exclusion is a distinct, enforceable bar to benefits during an intervening academic period when (1) the educator worked in the first regular term, (2) has a contract or reasonable assurance for the later regular term, and (3) the parties’ conduct and contracts show an agreement to that nonsuccessive schedule. The Court’s insistence on applying the statute’s full text constrains agency decisionmaking that focuses only on “successive terms” and clarifies that an “agreement” need not be “explicit” beyond ordinary proof of mutual assent.