1. Introduction
This case concerns the evidence necessary to obtain additional insurance payments after an insurer has acknowledged a covered event and paid its own damage assessment. Torry Hull maintained that Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana substantially underestimated the repairs required after an attic condenser-line leak. Safeco maintained that Hull lacked admissible evidence connecting the additional repairs he demanded to that leak.
The appeal presented two related questions: whether the district court properly excluded an expert affidavit disclosed only after discovery had closed, and whether Hull’s remaining evidence created a genuine factual dispute supporting breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims.
The Eleventh Circuit answered both questions in Safeco’s favor. Its central lesson is that a substantially higher repair estimate does not, by itself, establish an unpaid covered loss. The insured must supply evidence connecting the additional work to the covered event, and any expert needed to establish that connection must be disclosed in accordance with discovery requirements.
2. Background and Procedural History
Hull discovered the leak after returning from a two-week trip. His homeowners policy covered “accidental direct physical loss to” his home. Following an inspection, Safeco’s adjuster assessed damage at $17,187.02. After deductions, Safeco paid $13,843.95.
Hull obtained a competing estimate from Leading Public Adjuster, Inc. It valued the repairs at $112,401.23 on a replacement-cost basis and $104,167.45 on what the opinion describes as an “actual-cost” basis. Hull demanded $112,401.23 and warned that litigation would follow if the dispute remained unresolved. Safeco declined to increase its payment.
Hull then sued for breach of contract and bad faith. After discovery, Safeco sought summary judgment, arguing that Hull had no admissible evidence showing that the additional claimed repairs resulted from the covered leak.
In response, Hull identified Carlos Martorell, a public adjuster who had helped prepare the competing estimate, as an expert for the first time. Hull argued that the omission was harmless because Safeco already possessed the estimate and had communicated with Martorell’s employer. He also maintained that his own testimony independently supported the additional loss.
The district court excluded Martorell’s affidavit because the late disclosure was neither substantially justified nor harmless. It then found the estimate and Hull’s testimony insufficient to establish causation. The court also concluded that Safeco had a reasonable basis for declining further payment and entered summary judgment on both claims.
4. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
Cedant v. United States, 75 F.4th 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2023)
The court cited this decision for the abuse-of-discretion standard governing sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. That standard mattered because the appellate court was not deciding the disclosure issue afresh. It assessed whether excluding Martorell’s affidavit fell within the district court’s permissible discretion.
Akridge v. Alfa Ins. Cos., 93 F.4th 1181, 1191 (11th Cir. 2024)
This decision supplied the de novo standard for reviewing summary judgment. Unlike the discretionary discovery ruling, the determination that Hull’s admissible evidence could not support his claims received independent appellate review. The different standards explain the opinion’s two-stage approach: first evaluate the exclusion, then evaluate the remaining record.
Gratton v. Great Am. Commc'ns, 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999)
The court relied on this precedent’s explanation that Rule 37 sanctions protect litigants against unfair prejudice and preserve the integrity of discovery. It supported treating expert disclosure as more than a technical formality. Knowing that an estimate exists does not necessarily provide a fair opportunity to investigate the expert opinions that may later be offered to support it.
Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008)
This case provided the three considerations used to review the exclusion: the testimony’s importance, the explanation for nondisclosure, and prejudice to the opposing party. The first favored Hull because the affidavit was central to proving unpaid covered damage. The other two strongly favored Safeco, demonstrating that the importance of late evidence does not itself excuse noncompliance.
Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2008)
The court cited this decision by analogy because it affirmed exclusion where the proponent supplied no explanation for identifying an expert late. Hull attributed his omission to a “clerical placement error,” but the court found that inadequate to justify failing to satisfy discovery obligations throughout the litigation. The precedent reinforced the significance of an actual, persuasive explanation rather than an unexplained administrative lapse.
Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1255 (11th Cir. 2022)
This decision supported the court’s conclusion that the late disclosure deprived Safeco of a meaningful opportunity to depose Martorell. The prejudice concerned the inability to question the expert about his methods and opinions, not merely the insurer’s awareness of the estimate’s contents. Hull’s own deposition could not substitute for that examination.
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Neisler, 779 S.E.2d 55, 62 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)
This Georgia decision supplied the elements relevant to Hull’s bad-faith claim: coverage for the additional damages, a demand before suit, and a failure to pay motivated by bad faith. It made coverage a necessary foundation of the claim. A demand for payment could not compensate for the absence of evidence establishing an unpaid covered loss.
R&G Invs. & Holdings, LLC v. Am. Fam. Ins. Co., 787 S.E.2d 765, 774 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)
The court used this case to explain that bad faith involves an insurer having “no good cause for resisting and delaying payment.” That formulation distinguished an unsupported refusal from a reasonable disagreement over the cause or scope of damage. Safeco’s inspection-based position supplied good cause on the record before the court.
Shaffer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 540 S.E.2d 227, 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
This decision informed the inquiry into whether the adjuster’s conclusion was “unfounded” or unreasonable. Hull offered no evidence establishing either defect. Its application supported the alternative holding that Safeco’s refusal was reasonably grounded even apart from Hull’s failure to establish additional coverage.
B. Expert Disclosure: Familiarity with an Estimate Is Not Disclosure of an Expert
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(A) generally requires parties to disclose witnesses they intend to use as experts. Rule 37(c)(1) restricts reliance on undisclosed evidence unless the disclosure failure was substantially justified or harmless. Northern District of Georgia Local Rule 26.2(C) further requires expert designation early enough to allow a deposition within the discovery period.
Hull’s harmlessness argument confused access to a document with a fair opportunity to test expert testimony. Possessing the estimate did not tell Safeco that Hull would rely on Martorell as an expert, nor did it require Safeco to locate and depose him merely against that possibility.
Likewise, questioning Hull about the estimate could not expose Martorell’s methodology. Hull expressly disclaimed responsibility for preparing the estimate. The person relying on another’s assessment cannot necessarily explain the technical judgments behind it.
The court therefore found no abuse of discretion in exclusion. Importantly, this was a disclosure ruling, not a determination that Martorell’s opinions were substantively unreliable. Nor did the court decide whether his affidavit, if admitted, would necessarily have established Hull’s claims.
C. Causation: Repair Prices Do Not Alone Establish Policy Coverage
The breach-of-contract claim required evidence that Safeco had failed to pay for damage covered by its policy. Safeco’s acknowledgment that the leak caused some insured damage did not establish that every item in Hull’s larger estimate arose from that event.
The court identified a missing evidentiary connection: the estimate provided no causation analysis, methodology, or other basis for attributing the additional repairs to the leak. Its inclusion of approximately $3,000 for tree removal illustrated the problem. Nothing in the estimate explained how that work related to water escaping from a condenser line in the attic.
Hull’s deposition did not supply the missing connection. He admitted that he was “not the estimator,” did not “do the estimation,” and simply relied on others’ estimates. Those admissions left him without a personal basis to explain why the additional repairs were necessary because of the covered incident.
The holding should not be read as a categorical rule that homeowners can never testify about damage or that every insurance dispute requires expert testimony. The problem was the particular record: neither Hull nor the estimate provided an adequate basis for attributing the disputed work to the insured event.
Although the opinion ultimately described the additional repairs as not caused by a covered loss, its reasoning rests on Hull’s failure to produce sufficient admissible evidence of that connection. The decision did not depend on a universal determination that every disputed repair was physically unrelated to the leak.
D. Bad Faith: Coverage and Unreasonable Refusal Are Separate Requirements
The court gave two independent reasons for rejecting bad faith. First, Hull could not establish that the additional amount represented a covered obligation. Without an unpaid covered claim, there was no basis for bad-faith liability for refusing that payment.
Second, Safeco had a reasonable basis for its decision. Its adjuster inspected the property and concluded that the disputed additional repairs were not attributable to the leak. Hull supplied no evidence that this conclusion lacked a foundation or was unreasonable.
This alternative analysis is significant. A disagreement over an insurer’s payment does not itself establish bad faith, and a competing estimate does not automatically make the insurer’s position unreasonable. Equally, the opinion does not give insurers blanket immunity whenever an adjuster conducts an inspection. The adequacy and reasonableness of that investigation remain open to evidentiary challenge in another case.
E. Potential Impact
- For policyholders: Evidence should address not only the cost of proposed repairs but also why those repairs are attributable to the covered event.
- For litigation counsel: A public adjuster’s pre-suit involvement or communications with the insurer do not replace required expert disclosures.
- For insurers: A documented inspection and reasoned causation assessment can support a defense to bad faith, particularly where the insured supplies no competent contrary evidence.
- For courts: The decision illustrates how a justified discovery exclusion can leave a party unable to meet its substantive burden at summary judgment.
The opinion’s unpublished status limits its precedential force. Its practical importance lies principally in illustrating established rules, especially the interaction between federal discovery procedure and Georgia insurance law.
6. Conclusion
Torry Hull v. Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana underscores that an additional insurance demand must be supported by evidence connecting the disputed repairs to covered damage. A higher estimate establishes a competing price calculation, not necessarily a contractual entitlement.
The decision also demonstrates the consequences of untimely expert disclosure. Once Martorell’s affidavit was properly excluded, Hull lacked evidence sufficient to establish additional covered loss. His bad-faith claim additionally failed because Safeco’s inspection supplied a reasonable basis for declining further payment. The broader lesson is the interdependence of timely discovery, competent causation evidence, and substantive insurance recovery.