ADA Title III Standing Requires Plausible Intent to Return Despite Trespass; Conclusory Municipal “Policy or Custom” Allegations and Miranda-Only Theories Fail Under § 1983

I. Introduction

In Preston Lewis v. Aldi Inc. (11th Cir. Feb. 20, 2026) (unpublished, per curiam), pro se plaintiff Preston Jermaine Lewis appealed the Northern District of Florida’s sua sponte dismissal of his in forma pauperis amended complaint and the denial of his motion to recuse the district judge.

Lewis alleged that an ALDI employee twice denied him service in 2024 due to race and disability, culminating in a confrontation with another customer and a law-enforcement response involving Sheriff Sherri Leann Stovall and “Officer Ramirez Badge 2132.” After reviewing video, officers issued Lewis a trespass notice barring him from the store and, according to Lewis, restricted his ability to drive away.

The appeal focused on: (1) whether Lewis plausibly stated a Title III ADA claim against ALDI (especially standing for injunctive relief); (2) whether he stated § 1983 claims against municipal entities (the Santa Rosa County Sheriff’s Office and the Santa Rosa County Board of Commissioners) based on Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations; (3) whether the district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction over Florida negligence and premises liability claims; and (4) whether denial of recusal was an abuse of discretion.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that:

  • Lewis failed to state an ADA Title III claim against ALDI because he did not plausibly allege a “real and immediate” threat of future discrimination—particularly, he did not allege an attempt or intent to return to ALDI, even assuming a lifetime trespass.
  • Lewis failed to state Fourth and Fifth Amendment municipal-liability claims under § 1983 because he alleged no plausible county policy/custom (or final policymaker ratification), offering only conclusory assertions.
  • The district court acted within its discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law negligence and premises liability claims after dismissing all federal claims early.
  • Denial of recusal was proper because Lewis relied only on a prior adverse ruling, which is not evidence of extrajudicial bias.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Pleading and IFP screening standards

  • Mitchell v. Farcass: The court reiterated that dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is reviewed de novo under the same framework as Rule 12(b)(6), treating pleaded facts as true.
  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly: The decision applied the plausibility standard—factual content must permit a reasonable inference of liability; “labels,” “conclusions,” and formulaic recitations do not suffice.
  • Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.: While pro se pleadings are construed liberally, courts cannot rewrite deficient pleadings or act as counsel.
  • Timson v. Sampson: The panel treated issues not raised on appeal as abandoned, narrowing what it reviewed (including recusal arguments as to the magistrate judge and certain claims against officers).

2. ADA Title III standing and remedies

  • Kennedy v. Floridian Hotel, Inc.: Supplied the basic elements of a Title III claim (disability, public accommodation, discrimination within the ADA).
  • Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc.: The central standing authority. The court quoted Houston for the rule that injunctive relief is the only form of relief available under Title III and that standing requires a “real and immediate” likelihood of future harm.
  • Shotz v. Cates: Provided the critical application rule: absent allegations of an attempt or intention to return, future discrimination is conjectural and standing fails.

3. Municipal liability under § 1983

  • Vega v. Tekoh: Used both for the general § 1983 cause-of-action description and—more importantly—for the Fifth Amendment/Miranda distinction (discussed below).
  • McDowell v. Brown: Set out the three-part framework for municipal liability: underlying constitutional violation, deliberate-indifference policy/custom, and causation.
  • Grech v. Clayton Cnty.: Defined “policy or custom” as either an officially promulgated policy or an unofficial practice shown through repeated acts of a final policymaker.
  • Hoefling v. City of Miami: Recognized municipal liability where an unconstitutional decision by a subordinate is adopted by a final policymaker (ratification/adoption theory).

4. Fourth Amendment seizure standards

  • United States v. Virden: Distinguished reasonable suspicion (for investigatory detention) from probable cause (for arrest).
  • United States v. Lindsey: Defined reasonable suspicion as a “particularized and objective basis” under the totality of circumstances.
  • Washington v. Howard: Articulated probable cause as a “probability or substantial chance” of criminal activity from a reasonable officer’s perspective.

5. Fifth Amendment and Miranda

  • Miranda v. Arizona: Identified as the source of the familiar warnings regime.
  • Vega v. Tekoh: The controlling principle that a Miranda violation is not itself a Fifth Amendment violation; Miranda rules are prophylactic safeguards.

6. Supplemental jurisdiction after federal-claim dismissal

  • Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc. and Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP: Provided the abuse-of-discretion framework.
  • Baggett v. First Nat'l Bank of Gainesville: Confirmed discretion to dismiss state claims after federal claims are gone and identified factors (economy, convenience, fairness, comity).
  • Silas v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty.: Emphasized federalism/comity concerns favor dismissal of state claims once federal claims are dismissed.
  • Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill: Noted that dismissal is especially appropriate when federal claims are dismissed early.

7. Recusal

  • Draper v. Reynolds: Set abuse-of-discretion review.
  • Christo v. Padgett: Supplied the objective observer standard under § 455 and the “reasonable person” standard under § 144.
  • Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents of State of Fla.: Reiterated that disqualifying bias must stem from extrajudicial sources.
  • Liteky v. United States: “Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis” for recusal.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. ADA Title III: “Intent to return” remains essential even in a trespass scenario

The court treated Lewis’s ADA theory as a Title III public-accommodation claim, for which the only available relief is prospective (injunction). Because Title III injunctive standing turns on future injury, the panel required allegations showing a “real and immediate” likelihood that Lewis would again be subjected to the challenged conduct.

Lewis attempted to reframe the problem on appeal by arguing that a “lifetime ban” denies equal access. The court rejected that reframing on two pleading grounds: (1) the complaint did not allege the trespass was for life; and (2) even if it were, Lewis still did not allege he attempted to return or intended to return. Under Shotz v. Cates, that omission is fatal because it makes future discrimination speculative rather than imminent.

The key doctrinal move is that the presence of a past denial of access (and even the existence of a trespass notice) did not substitute for pleaded facts showing future exposure to the allegedly unlawful conditions—i.e., concrete plans or a plausible intent to return.

2. Municipal liability: conclusory “policy/custom” allegations do not satisfy Twombly/Iqbal

For the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against the Board and the Sheriff’s Office, the opinion focused on the structural limits of § 1983 municipal liability: municipalities are not liable simply because they employ alleged wrongdoers; the plaintiff must connect the injury to an official policy, a widespread custom, or a final policymaker’s adoption of the unconstitutional act (McDowell v. Brown; Grech v. Clayton Cnty.; Hoefling v. City of Miami).

Lewis’s amended complaint asserted that the county had “[p]olicy customs” of unlawful detentions and unconstitutional behavior, but offered no supporting factual content (no pattern, no prior incidents, no identification of final policymakers, and no ratification facts). Applying Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, the court held those assertions were conclusory and therefore not plausible.

3. Fifth Amendment: Miranda-procedure allegations do not equal a constitutional violation

The Fifth Amendment analysis had an additional independent defect beyond municipal-liability pleading: Lewis’s theory “focuses solely on violations of Miranda procedure.” Citing Vega v. Tekoh, the court stressed that Miranda rules are prophylactic; a Miranda violation, standing alone, is not itself a Fifth Amendment violation.

As pleaded, Lewis did not allege a compelled, incriminating statement was introduced against him in a criminal case, nor did he plead facts fitting the Fifth Amendment’s core trial-use/compulsion framework described in Vega v. Tekoh. Thus, even if a policy/custom had been plausibly alleged (it was not), the underlying constitutional violation was not plausibly stated on the Miranda-only theory presented.

4. State claims: early dismissal of federal claims supports declining supplemental jurisdiction

After all federal claims were dismissed at the pleading/IFP-screening stage—before any defendant response—the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over negligence and premises liability. The Eleventh Circuit found no abuse of discretion, citing § 1367(c)(3) and the comity/federalism preference recognized in Baggett v. First Nat'l Bank of Gainesville, Silas v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., and Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill.

5. Recusal: prior adverse rulings are not evidence of extrajudicial bias

Lewis’s recusal request relied on the district judge’s handling of a prior case. The panel affirmed denial because, under Liteky v. United States, judicial rulings “almost never” show disqualifying bias; and under Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., bias must come from an extrajudicial source. The objective-observer standard in Christo v. Padgett was not met.

C. Impact

Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and therefore nonprecedential, the opinion is a clear roadmap for recurring pleading and standing failures:

  • ADA Title III plaintiffs must plead concrete facts showing future harm—typically an intent to return—rather than relying solely on past incidents or the existence of a trespass notice.
  • Municipal-liability claims must include factual allegations showing an actual policy/custom or final-policymaker ratification; labels like “policy customs” will be screened out under Twombly/Iqbal, especially in § 1915(e) review.
  • Miranda-based civil rights claims remain constrained by Vega v. Tekoh; allegations of flawed warnings/interrogation procedure, without more, will not plausibly plead a Fifth Amendment violation.
  • State-law claims appended to weak federal pleadings may be routinely dismissed without prejudice when federal claims fall early, sending plaintiffs to state court.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • In forma pauperis screening (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)): When a plaintiff files without paying fees, the court must dismiss claims that don’t plausibly state a legal claim. This can happen before the defendant is served or responds.
  • Plausibility (Twombly/Iqbal): Courts require enough concrete facts to make liability a reasonable inference—not just suspicions or conclusions.
  • Standing for an injunction: To get an order stopping future misconduct, you must plausibly show it is likely to happen to you again; past harm alone is not enough.
  • “Intent to return” in ADA Title III cases: A common way to show likely future harm is alleging you plan to go back to the business and face the barrier again.
  • Municipal liability (“policy or custom”): A county is not automatically liable for officers’ actions. You must tie the harm to an official policy, a widespread practice, or a decision adopted by an official with final authority.
  • Miranda vs. the Fifth Amendment: Miranda warnings are a protective rule. Not following Miranda may lead to suppression in a criminal case, but it does not automatically create a stand-alone Fifth Amendment damages claim.
  • Supplemental jurisdiction: Federal courts may hear related state claims, but often decline to do so once the federal claims are dismissed, especially early.
  • Recusal: A judge must step aside if a reasonable observer would doubt impartiality, but losing a prior case before that judge is not, by itself, proof of bias.

V. Conclusion

Preston Lewis v. Aldi Inc. reinforces three practical rules that often decide civil-rights cases at the pleading stage: (1) Title III ADA injunctive standing requires plausible allegations of likely future exposure—typically an intent to return—even where a trespass is alleged; (2) municipal liability under § 1983 demands nonconclusory facts showing a policy/custom or final policymaker adoption; and (3) Miranda-procedure allegations, without more, do not state a Fifth Amendment claim under Vega v. Tekoh. The decision also reflects the routine preference for dismissing state-law claims once federal claims are eliminated early and underscores that prior adverse rulings do not establish recusal-worthy bias.